



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2022 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation

FRANCISCAN STUDIES

Vol. 24

Annual II, 1964



62441

Published by
THE FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE
ST. BONAVENTURE UNIVERSITY
ST. BONAVENTURE, N. Y.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Editor

James P. Reilly, Jr.
Franciscan Institute

Associate Editors

BX
3601
F7
ser. 2
Gedeon Gál, O. F. M.
Franciscan Institute

Stephen Brown, O. F. M.
Franciscan Institute

Advisory Editors

v. 24
1964
Ignatius Brady, O. F. M.
Quaracchi

Ernest A. Moody
Univ. of Calif. at Los Angeles

Stephen Hartdegan, O. F. M.
Holy Name College

J. Reginald O'Donnell, C. S. B.
Pont. Inst. of Mediaeval Studies

Anneliese Maier
Vatican Library

Damian Van den Eynde, O. F. M.
Antonianum

FRANCISCAN STUDIES is published annually. Annual subscription, \$ 5.00. Entered as second-class matter March 10, 1941, at the Post Office, St. Bonaventure, N.Y., under the Act of March 3, 1879.

All communications whether of a business or a literary nature should be addressed to *Franciscan Studies*, St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.

Cum permissu superiorum.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Duns Scotus at Oxford, 1288—1301	<i>C. K. Brampton</i> 5
Concerning the Autonomy of a Philosophy of Mind	<i>Douglas Browning</i> 21
Ockham: Tractatus Minor.	<i>Eligius M. Buytaert, O.F.M.</i> 34
Petrus Sutton (?), <i>O.F.M.</i> , Quaestiones Disputatae	<i>Ferdinand Etzkorn, O.F.M.</i> 101
Traces of God in Nature According to Robert Grosseteste With the Text of the Dictum: "Omnia creatura speculum est."	<i>Servus Gieben, O.F.M., Cap.</i> 144
Eustratius of Nicaea's Defense of the Doctrine of Ideas	<i>Kimon Giocarinis</i> 159
A Sermon of Thomas of York on the Passion . . .	<i>J. P. Reilly, Jr.</i> 205
The Redemptive Role of the Knowledge of Nature	<i>Kenneth L. Schmitz</i> 223
Husserl's Interpretation of the History of Philosophy	<i>Robert Sokolowski</i> 261

DUNS SCOTUS AT OXFORD, 1288—1301

It is well known that Duns Scotus read the Sentences at least twice, first at Oxford and later at Paris,¹ though the circumstances in which he did so still remain shrouded in obscurity. His two collections of lectures, the *Opus Oxoniense* and the *Reportata Parisiensia*, as edited by Luke Wadding in 1639, have been subjected to the most minute analysis² by Fr. C. Balić, as a first step towards a new and critical edition, now happily in course of production.³ In view of the fact that over one hundred manuscripts of these commentaries have been evaluated, it is natural to enquire what light they shed upon their author's academic career.

The central fact in the life of Scotus is established by MS⁴ Worcester Cath. 69, which indicates that he began his lectures on the Sentences at Paris in the autumn of 1302. Yet this date is far from establishing a division between the Oxford period and his career at Paris, for he is believed to have studied at Paris before 1302 and to have returned from Paris to Oxford after 1302, to complete tasks which the events of 1302 had obliged him to leave unfinished. It will be the purpose of this essay to discuss this situation, and to clarify, as far as it is possible, the career of Duns Scotus at Oxford.

The residence of Scotus in the Franciscan convent at Oxford is clearly established by Fr E. Longpré, who⁵ discovered that a certain Johannes Duns was ordained priest by Oliver Sutton,⁶ bishop of Lincoln, on 17 March 1291, for Oxford was in the diocese of Lincoln at this time.

¹ Bartholomew of Pisa, *De Conformitate*, etc., in *Analecta Franciscana*, t. 4, Quaracchi 1906, p. 337: "Frater Ioannes Scotus, qui doctor subtilis nominatur. Hic primo in Anglia Oxoniae Sententias legit, deinde in studio Parisiensi."

² *Les Commentaires de Jean Duns Scot sur les quatre livres des Sentences*, Louvain 1927, edited for C. Balić by the editors of the Library of the *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* (later reference to Balić).

³ *Doctoris Subtilis et Mariani Joannis Duns Scoti O. F. M. opera omnia*, ed. the Scotist Commission; t. 1, Rome 1950, the Prologus of the *Ordinatio*-t. XVI, Rome 1960, the *Lectura in librum Sententiarum*.

⁴ Fol 158^v: see contents of MS given on p. 13 *infra*.

⁵ E. Longpré, *L'ordination sacerdotale du bx. Jean Duns Scot*, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* t. XXII (1929) pp. 54—62

⁶ Sutton Ep. Linc. Reg. fol. 371^v.

Moreover, A. G. Little⁷ shows that this John Duns was present at Dorchester-on-Thames on 26 July 1300, when with 21 other members of the Oxford convent he was presented to Bishop Dalderby, with a view to receiving from him a licence to hear confessions. Thus the earlier and later parts of his career at Oxford are sufficiently authenticated.

The argument that Scotus must have studied at Paris between 1291 and 1300 was first advanced by Fr A. Callebaut.⁸ Citing a passage from the *Chartularium*,⁹ Callebaut claimed that the period of theological study at Paris necessary for admission to read the Sentences lasted 9 years, on the principle that one year of study at Paris should be regarded as the equivalent of two years at any other recognised school of theology. Thus, if Scotus read the Sentences at Paris in 1302 without having studied previously at Paris, he would have been obliged to begin his theological studies at Oxford 18 years earlier, in 1284. As this date appeared to Callebaut to be too early in the life of Scotus, he conjectured that Scotus studied at Paris before 1302. According to the statutes of the Order,¹⁰ students sent to Paris for theological study were obliged to reside for at least 4 years, and the convenient date for this period in the case of Scotus was fixed by Callebaut "vers 1293—6." In his comment on this sojourn at Paris before 1302, Little¹¹ states: "This fact, of which no direct evidence has yet been discovered, rests on safe inferences." Referring to Callebaut, Fr J-F Bonnefoy¹² remarks: "Les conclusions de cet article ont été unanimement acceptées."

While in the process of explaining this passage on page 699 in the *Chartularium* in support of Callebaut, Little very nearly stumbled upon a proof of its irrelevancy. His translation of the passage continues¹³ with the words: "... By this however it is not intended to derogate in any way from the privileges of the mendicant friars or other privileged religious:" and, further on, he adds: "the privileges of the friars in this regard are not, so far as I know, anywhere stated." Unfortunately, they are so stated, and they are mentioned in the *Chartularium* on page 692,

⁷ A. G. Little, *Franciscan Papers Lists and Documents*, Manchester 1943, p. 235: Dalderby Ep. Linc. Lib. Mem. fol. 13^r.

⁸ A. Callebaut, *Le bx. Jean Duns Scot étudiant à Paris*, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* t. XVII (1924) pp. 3—12.

⁹ H. Denifle and A. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, t. II sectio prior (Paris 1891) p. 699 n. 30 (later reference to *Chart.*).

¹⁰ M. Bihl, *Statuta generalia ordinis*, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* t. XXXIV (1941) p. 72 § 13: "... studeant quattuor annis ad minus."

¹¹ A. G. Little, *Chronological Notes on the Life of Duns Scotus*, in *English Historical Review* t. XLVII (1932) p. 571 (later reference to *Chron. Notes.*).

¹² J-F. Bonnefoy, *Le Ven. Jean Duns Scot*, Rome 1960, p. 448 n. 918.

¹³ Little, *Chron. Notes*, p. 571.

to which Little directs the attention of his readers in another connexion.¹⁴ Whereas the seculars were obliged to study for 9 years, the mendicants were required to study¹⁵ for only 7. Thus Callebaut's 18 years — the appropriate number in the case of seculars — dwindles to the much more reasonable number 14, thirteen of which could have been passed in Oxford, and only one more year in England was needed to qualify Scotus for admission to read the Sentences at Paris in 1302.

The second reason for imagining Scotus at Paris between 1293 and 1297 derives from the necessity to explain the "experientia longa" upon which Gonsalvo de Valboa in his letter¹⁶ of 18 November 1304 based his recommendation of Scotus for the doctorate. As illustrating the reasonableness of this claim, Little¹⁷ expresses his opinion that Gonsalvo was in Paris in 1303, that he had recently incepted as doctor of theology, and that he was probably reading the Sentences about 1297.

But these conderations, taken by themselves, are hardly strong enough to prove the presence of Scotus in Paris at this time, and even if this meeting had occurred, its value may be doubted. There are, in fact, two problems and two sources of evidence. On the one hand, there are the notebooks of a student which reflected merely the opinions of those who taught him, and on the other hand the opening lectures of the *Opus Oxoniense*. The problem in 1304 was not whether Scotus should be accorded the doctorate, but how soon. The problem in 1301 was to choose the best possible "baccalaureus Sententiarum" for the Franciscan convent at Paris. The "fama quae ubique divulgata est" did not start with students days at Paris, but with the famous *Opus Oxoniense*. If Raymond Galfredi,¹⁸ minister general of the Order, could visit Oxford in 1291, so also could his successor John Minio de Murrovalle at some time between 1298 and 1301. If Scotus could go to Paris and there meet Gonsalvo, it was equally possible for Gonsalvo, John Minio's successor, to visit Oxford and there meet Scotus displaying his brilliance as a teacher. The evidence leading to the appointment of Scotus as a bachelor at Paris

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 575 n. 1.

¹⁵ *Chart.*, p. 692, n. 10: "item, nota, quod studentes in theologia, si sint saeculares, habent ibi audire per septem annos antequam admittantur ad lecturam bibliae, sed regulares admittuntur in sexto anno."

¹⁶ A. G. Little, *The Grey Friars in Oxford*, Oxford 1892, p. 220: "... Joannem Scotum, de cuius vita laudabili, scientia excellenti, ingenioque subtilissimo . . . partim experientia longa, partim fama quae ubique divulgata est, informatum sum ad plenum, dilectioni vestrae assigno."

¹⁷ *Chron. Notes*, p. 572.

¹⁸ A. G. Little and F. Pelster, *Oxford Theology and Theologians*, Oxford 1934, p. 189.

needed a surer foundation than the recollection of Gonsalvo that some years previously he had happened to meet Scotus as a student at Paris.

Moreover, the story casts a strange light on the Franciscan authorities at Oxford and Paris. When the English provincial and his "discreti" sent John Duns to study theology at Oxford, it was equally their right to send two such students to Paris.¹⁹ Why was Duns not one of them? Alternatively, why did he not accompany them? If there was any advantage in studying at Paris, the Franciscan authorities lost their opportunity by sending him to Oxford. Conversely, if there was no advantage, it may be asked why they should interrupt his course at Oxford, just when he had nearly completed his six years of theological training. But Duns must go to Paris. Here in Paris he started once more at the bottom of the ladder, and just when he was reaching the top, the authorities at Paris sent him back to Oxford. Then, in 1302, they saw their mistake. Scotus must read the Sentences at Paris, and the invitation was urged with such pressure, that Scotus must leave Oxford before he had begun to lecture on Book IV. In this story two Universities are observed to be in search of talent, while behaving as if they themselves were in need of it.

Thus the story of Scotus as a student at Paris before 1302, admitted by Little to be unsupported by direct evidence but alleged by him to rest on safe inferences, has all the appearance of failing to perform the function for which it was invented. Callebaut was clearly justified in relying on the *Chartularium*, but unfortunately he cited the wrong passage and made an error of four years. In these circumstances there now seems no adequate reason for believing that Scotus was sent from Oxford to Paris at any time between 1291 and 1300.

The next question concerns the date when Scotus began his lectures on the Sentences at Oxford, and an answer, so it seems, is provided by the words "anno Christi 1300" in the *pars secunda* of the *Prologue* to Book I of the *Opus Oxoniense* as edited by Wadding.²⁰ The passage runs as follows: "Si obicitur de permanentia sectae Mahometi, respondeo — illa incepit plus quam sescentis annis post legem Christi et in brevi Deo volente finietur, quae multum debilitata est anno Christi 1300 et eius cultores multi mortui et plurimi sunt fugati, et prophetia dicitur esse apud eos quod cito finienda est secta illa."

¹⁹ Bihl, *Statuta*, p. 72 § 19.

²⁰ Lyons ed. 1639, t. v pars prima, p. 51. The word order from "dicitur" to "illa" differs from that of MS Paris Bibl. Nat. 15854: see Balić, p. 38—9.

This passage refers to the defeat of the Egyptians at the hands of the Turks in alliance with the Christians of Armenia and Georgia at the battle of Medjamâa el-Morûdj on 23 December 1299. The news reached Canterbury²¹ (or Cambridge) on 6 June 1300, and no doubt reached Oxford about the same time.

Commenting on this reference to the battle, Wadding²² states: "Incepisse hoc opus post annum 1300 constat ex secunda quaestione prologi, ubi . . ." and his opinion has been widely followed. The question now is concerned with the time when Scotus wrote this *secunda quaestio*.

The answer is provided by three manuscripts discovered²³ by Balić; MS Padua St Anthony 178, MS Vienna Bibl. Nat. 1449 and MS Rome Palat. Lat. 993, which together constitute the *Lectura* of Book I, and the contents of these manuscripts, hitherto unpublished, are being produced in a critical edition in the sixteenth and succeeding volumes of the series. By *Lectura* is meant the text corresponding to the lectures actually given by Scotus at Oxford, in contrast to the *Ordinatio*, or text as re-edited by Scotus himself sometime later. In the preface²⁴ to volume XVI this comment is made: ". . . Conclusio est hoc in opere inveniri primigenia elementa praelectionum Oxoniensium in librum I *Sententiarum*, illudque fuisse fundamentum praecipuum commentarii quod *Opus Oxoniense* dicebatur, id est, ipsius *Ordinationis*;" and proof is given that this *Lectura* is not a later abbreviation of the *Opus Oxoniense*.

Now, the *Ordinatio* as edited by Wadding is a mélange of several texts, but Balić has discovered in MS Paris Bibl. Nat. 15854 and its family a true *ordinatio*. In this text the *Prologue* to Book I contains five *partes*, but the *Lectura* contains only four. The *pars prima* of the *Lectura* corresponds with the *pars prima* of the *Ordinatio*, and the *pars secunda* of the *Lectura* corresponds with the *pars tertia* of the *Ordinatio*, and so on. Therefore the whole of the *pars secunda*, as it appears in the *Ordinatio* with its reference to the battle of Medjamâa, is absent in the *Lectura*. There is therefore no need to connect the battle of Medjamâa with the lecture text, which was earlier still, and consequently the date when Scotus began his lectures at Oxford is not affected by the year date 1300.

The second problem connected with the *Ordinatio* concerns two references to Benedict XI in Book IV: (a) at Dist. 25 q. 1: "Unde Benedictus XI cum quodam tali sine dispensatione ordinato et in ordinibus ministrante postea faciliter dispensavit, sicut ipse vidi bullam dispensationis:" and (b) at Dist. 17 q. un.: "Patet in nova constitutione

²¹ Little, *Chron. Notes*, p. 573.

²³ Balić. pp. 56 sqq.

²² Lyons ed. t. I, p. 7.

²⁴ Introd., p. ix: see note 3 *supra*.

Inter cunctas." The dispensation is dated by Little²⁵ 31 January 1304, and the *Inter cunctas* was issued on 17 February 1304. Wadding²⁶ offers two explanations: (1) that Scotus did not read Book IV at Oxford, and alternatively (2) that these two references to Benedict XI could have been added later. Upon the second explanation Callebaut agrees with Wadding, whereas Balić expresses his disagreement with Callebaut.²⁷ The problem could be solved in a moment by a perusal of the *Lectura* of Book IV, but no such *Lectura* has survived.

The position is put clearly by Balić in the following manner.²⁸ At Oxford Scotus lectured on Book I and on parts of Book II and Book III, and he adds: "le IV^e ne fut commenté alors." After stating that Scotus was at Paris in 1302—3, he continues: "il y exposa le I^{er} et le IV^e livre des Sentences. On s'explique assez bien pourquoi il passa du I^{er} au IV^e livre: il n'avait pas commenté ce dernier à Oxford." A few lines below this statement, Balić uses the phrase "dans l'exposé du IV^e livre à Oxford, en 1306."

These points may be summarised as follows:

- (a) Scotus did not lecture on Book IV at Oxford before 1302;
- (b) In his lectures at Paris during 1302—3 Scotus proceeded from Book I to Book IV because he had not read Book IV at Oxford.
- (c) Scotus returned to Oxford sometime after 1303 to read Book IV.

The story is now becoming very difficult. It is not the purpose of this essay to solve the problems of the Subtle Doctor's career at Paris after 1302, but it is quite clearly impossible to dissociate the two parts of his career, when it is claimed that they were interwoven. It would therefore appear to be the best course to set Scotus on one side for the moment, encircled as he is by so many conjectures, and to envisage the method by which friars were appointed to read the Sentences at Paris, and what duties they were expected to perform at the University.

The Franciscan *Acta* recording appointments to read the Sentences at Paris have been lost, but the Dominicans have been more fortunate. For example, at Whitsun 1318 Michael of Furno²⁹ was appointed to read

²⁵ *Chron. Notes*, p. 577.

²⁶ *Annales Minorum*, new ed. Florence (1931) t. VI, p. 54, old § XXIX: "Quare post hac tempora hos scripsit Commentarios, nisi fortassis prius opus absolverit, et postea id suis locis inseruit." If by "hos Commentarios" Wadding meant the entire commentary, Book IV would be included.

²⁷ Balić, p. 207: A. Callebaut, *Le bienheureux Jean Duns Scot bachelier des Sentences à Paris en 1302—1303*, in *La France Franciscaine* t. IX (1926) p. 313 n. 1.

²⁸ Balić, pp. 242—3.

²⁹ *Chart.*, pp. 218, 230 and 238. It is of interest to note that Benedict was immediately assigned to the Paris convent for the purpose of preparing

them that year, and Benedict of Cumae received notice that he was to read them the year following: at Whitsun 1319 Benedict of Cumae was appointed and Hugh de Vaucemain warned: at Whitsun 1320 Hugh de Vaucemain was appointed. Among the Carmelites³⁰ the candidates for admission to read the Sentences were standing sometimes six deep. As the mendicants were treated equally, there can be little doubt that the Franciscans showed the same consideration towards their future bachelors at Paris, so that a friar who was teaching in a recognised school of theology would be given two summer vacations for preparing his lecture text, together with such time as he could spare during the intervening academic year of teaching. The actual appointment was made by the minister general himself.

Upon the procedure³¹ of their "baccalaurei Sententiarum" the authorities of the University of Paris were sufficiently explicit. Bachelors were to begin their lectures on the four books of the Sentences at the customary times and to continue them until the vacation, and they were not to prolong their lectures on the Prologue and Book I to such an extent that they could not properly handle the material of Books II, III and IV. Moreover, the Carmelite³² bachelor was to introduce his lectures on Book II with his second *principium* on the first 'legible' day in January, and the other bachelors in succession. This means that in regard to the four Mendicant Orders the *principium* of Book II was to be read by the Austin bachelor on the second 'legible' day in January, by the Franciscan bachelor on the third 'legible' day, and by the Dominican bachelor on the fourth 'legible' day. The rule proceeds to show that the Franciscan bachelor was to produce his third *principium* on the third 'legible' day in March and his fourth *principium* on the third 'legible' day in May. All four books were to be completed by 29 June, if the *principium* of Book I was read on or about 10 October.³³ More than this, the bachelor at his appointment stated on oath — "sub poena statuti" — that he would respond at quodlibetal disputations before his fourth *principium*.³⁴

his lectures ("pro hoc ex nunc", i. e. for the academic year 1318—19) and that he began lectures in October 1319.

³⁰ G. Wessels, *Acta Capitulorum Generalium ordinis ff. B. V. M de Monte Carmelo*, t. I (Rome 1912) years 1324 and 1327, pp. 25 and 28

³¹ *Chart.*, p. 700 n. 32 and n. 37; also p. 706 n. 22.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 700 n. 38; this is explained on p. 704 n. 37: "Secundum principium baccalaureus nonnisi primo libro completo facere potuit et sic de aliis duobus principiis."

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 692 n. 12.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 701 n. 43: "omni dispensatione seclusa: alioquin ipsis interdicatur quartum principium et ulterior lectura sententiarum;" see also p. 706 n. 28.

Thus any bachelor beginning Book IV in January would be restricting his own period for responsions from seven months to three. In view of the strictness with which the University time-table was followed, the performance of reading Book IV in January is difficult to imagine.

One conclusion must be clear. Lectures on all four books of the Sentences had to be completed within the academic year,³⁵ and they were read in the order I, II, III and IV. It also seems sufficiently certain that the four books were read a second time, as was the case with Peter Auriol³⁶ in 1316—18 and Francis of Meyronnes³⁷ 1320—2, in accordance with the reference³⁸ of John XXII to the "lecturam duorum cursum Bibliæ . . . nec non libri Sententiarum."

Against the background of the customs of the University, the notion may now be placed, that at Paris Scotus "after Book I proceeded to Book IV, because he had not read it at Oxford." This notion contains two implications: first, that Scotus made a choice of some sort; and secondly, that there is evidence sufficient to justify the view that at Paris he did in fact read Book IV immediately after Book I.

The choice before Scotus was to break the rule or apply for permission, but as Scotus was the most obedient of friars, it must be supposed that he asked for an "excusatio". If so, his case was not strong. The authorities of the University were conscious of the difference between the absence of a bachelor for his own purposes, and absence "pro factis³⁹ Universitatis aut facultatis." They would not be interested in a task

³⁵ This was also the case at Oxford: S. Gibson, *Statuta Antiqua Universitatis Oxoniensis*, Oxford 1931, p. 195 line 2: "lecturus librum Sententiarum . . . per tres anni terminos suam lecturam continuat." This is confirmed in the statutes of Philip of Somerville dated 1340: H. E. Salter, *The Oxford deeds of Balliol College*, Oxford 1913, p. 290. See also F. Ehrle, *I più antichi statuti della facoltà teologica dell' università di Bologna*, Bologna 1932, p. 19: "Lectura vero Sententiarum novem mensibus duret."

³⁶ A. Maier, *Zu einigen Sentenzenkommentaren des 14. Jahrhunderts*, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* t. LI (1958) pp. 369—393; in particular pp. 392—3: C. K. Brampton, *A note on Auriol, Ockham and MS Borghese 329*, in *Gregorianum* t. XLI (1960) pp. 713—6. The story in brief is that Auriol imagined that he would read the same text in his second series (1317—8) as he had used in his first (1316—7).

³⁷ A. Pelzer, *Bibliothecae Apostolicae Vaticanae 'codices vaticani latini*, t. II pars prior (Rome 1931): a *reportatio* of Book I is dated in MS 895 with the words "reportata sub eo parisiis Anno domini M^oCCC^o (corr. ex CCCC^o) XX^o"; and another in MS 894 with the words "haec lectura fuit sub eo reportata parisiis Anno domini M^oCCC^oXXJ".

³⁸ *Chart.*, p. 271; letter dated 23 May 1323. The reason for the "duo cursus" (a) of lectures on the Bible during the sixth and seventh years and (b) of lectures on the Sentences during the eighth and ninth years was doubtless owing to the large number of students at Paris, approximately three times the number at Oxford.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 702 n. 61.

which had been neglected in another University, except in so far as it was of importance to prevent another performance of this kind at Paris. As in any case Scotus was under an obligation to read Book IV in May, what good purpose would be served by his reading it in January?

The evidence relating to the reading of Book IV immediately after Book I at Paris receives a comment from Little.⁴⁰ He describes MS Worcester Cath. 69 as an “uncorrected *reportatio*, so far as Books I and IV are concerned,” and it is “near to the actual lectures given in the classroom.” In regard to the period 1302—3 at Paris, Little adds: “Here he lectured on Book I and then proceeded at once to Book IV. Frequent references to subsequent treatment in Books II and III leave no doubt about this:” and he gives examples of verbs in the future tense pointing from Book IV to Books II and III.

The contents of this *reportatio* — or copy of a *reportatio* — give the following picture.

fol. 7—63 Book I

fol. 66—132 Book II

fol. 133—157 Book III

fol. 158—160 (a) contents of Book I with the note “Expliciunt quaestiones super primum Sententiarum datae a fratre (. . .) ordinis fratrum minorum parisiis anno domini M^o trecentesimo secundo intrante tertio (ends on fol. 158^{va}).

(b) contents of Book II (ends on fol. 159^{ra})

(c) contents of Book III (ends on fol. 159^{rb})
folio 159 verso blank.

(d) contents of Book IV with the note “Expliciunt quaestiones Sententiarum datae a fratre J (. . .) antedicto in studio Parisius anno domini M^oCCC^oIII (fol. 160^{va}: the next entry begins on fol 160^{vb})

fol. 160—173 *Notabilia cancellarii* addita super 3^m

fol. 174—259 Book IV

fol. 259—264 remaining portion of the *Notabilia*.

To consider the features of this manuscript without reading into it the proof of what we want to find in it, is no easy task. Taken by itself, MS Worcester Cath. 69 presents the appearance of something wrong. Book II follows Book I, and Book III follows Book II, and then comes a table of contents, which not only refers to the material of Book IV, but also

⁴⁰ Little. *Chron. Notes*, p. 579.

includes its explicit. It is natural to expect to find a Book IV following Book III, and originally there must have been a Book IV between the end of Book III and the beginning of the contents, otherwise these contents would not have included the explicit of Book IV. More than this, the Book IV as given in this MS not only succeeds its own explicit, but also the *Notabilia cancellarii*, which in turn can hardly claim to have been part of any oral teaching; and in addition, Book IV is given in this MS between two parts of the *Notabilia*. In this way it would appear that this Book IV does not belong to the same tradition as Book I, as given on fol. 7.

It is tempting to suggest the following reconstruction. The scribe of this MS 69 (or his predecessor) had in front of him three documents: A, B and C. Document A contained all four books of the Sentences and concluded with the contents as given on fol. 158—160. Document B contained the *Notabilia*, and document C a text of Book IV. The scribe then copied out Books I, II and III. As he preferred the text of Book IV in document C to the text of Book IV in document A, he omitted this Book IV of document A and proceeded to copy out the table of contents as given in document A. This entailed copying out the explicit of Book IV, but as he intended to include a Book IV, the contents of Book IV as given in document A would be good enough, even if the text was not. Then, after the contents, he added the *Notabilia* from document B, as having a direct bearing on Book III, and after that he added Book IV from document C. It was then clear that the whole of the *Notabilia* had not been copied, so the final portion was added at the end of Book IV, and on fol. 173 verso the sign ⁰⁺⁺⁺ was added,⁴¹ so that the reader could find the rest of the *Notabilia* on fol. 259 verso sqq.

It is now safe to admit disappointment at not finding Book IV in MS Worcester Cath. 69 inscribed between fol. 66 and fol. 132, and therefore, if our story is true, it must be assumed that at some stage in the manuscript tradition one of the scribes switched the books, in order to make them stand as they now stand in the MS. There is no positive evidence that this ever happened, and the only difficulty is in explaining the future verbs in Book IV. But this Book IV has the appearance of not belonging to the tradition of Books I, II and III. It may well be that this Book IV belongs to the second series of lectures.

Here a very brief digression is necessary. On 25 June 1303 some 82 friars, who had supported Boniface VIII in his resistance to Philip IV

⁴¹ Balić, p. 161.

were banished from France, and Scotus was one of them. Boniface VIII replied on 15 August 1303 by withdrawing the right of the University to grant the degree of doctor of theology. By 2 April 1304 this ban had been withdrawn, and by 18 April the friars began to return.⁴² It will thus be clear that the period of exile, which Scotus probably spent in England, came between his first and his second reading of the Sentences at Paris. If Scotus returned to France at the end of April 1304, he would be ready to begin his second series on the third 'legible' day in May, and to keep in step with the rest of the University, he would begin this second series with Book IV. Book I would follow in October 1304, Book II in January, and Book III in March. If this was the case, he would complete his second series by 30 April 1305; the future verbs in his Book IV would point to subsequent treatment in Books II and III; and at no point would he have contravened the customs of the University. One may therefore conclude that this MS, though still presenting many unsolved difficulties, does not appear to substantiate the claim that Scotus after reading Book I proceeded immediately to read Book IV.

That Scotus read the Sentences at Paris for the third time is equally improbable. After completing his reading of the Sentences a friar was obliged to spend four years⁴³ as a "baccalaureus formatus" in pursuing the "facta facultatis . . . scilicet praedicando, argumentando et respondendo," but this period could be very considerably reduced, if sufficient external pressure were brought to bear on the authorities. This certainly occurred in the case of Scotus, but Gonsalvo in his letter of 18 November 1304 went even further: he asked the authorities at the Franciscan convent to persuade the chancellor to grant two licences, provided that one of them was accorded to Scotus. Thus even Scotus' doctorate was accelerated. It is in the highest degree improbable that his authorities would add to their own embarrassment by encouraging Scotus to leave Paris and in this way abandon his duties, merely to enable him to return to England to read Book IV at Oxford. It is easier to believe that between May 1305 and his inception, they never let him out of their sight. Similarly, there is little reason to imagine that at any time after May 1305 Scotus read the Sentences for a third time at Paris, or even one of the four books, and in any case such a proceeding would have usurped the functions of a bachelor previously appointed to perform them. No less

⁴² *Chart.*, p. 113; on 2 April Benedict XI had already asked the chancellor to promote two friars to the doctorate of theology: *ibid.* p. 112.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 692 n. 13. H. Felder, *Geschichte der Wissenschaftlichen Studien im Franziskanerorden bis um die Mitte des 13. Jahrhunderts*, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1904, p. 539.

strange would it be to find a doctor of theology⁴⁴ usurping the functions of a "baccalaureus Sententiarum" by reading the Sentences for a third time. Even regent masters had their own appropriate task to perform, witness their book or books of Quodlibeta: but what they could do, and what they so often did, was to alter and emend the lectures which they had already given.

In general, therefore, it is very difficult to trace any activity on the part of Scotus at Paris, which has a bearing on the neglected reading of Book IV at Oxford, and if he returned to Oxford during his period of exile, he would do so as an unexpected visitor. From October 1303 the task of reading the Sentences at Oxford had been assigned to a bachelor, who had spent the year 1302—3 in preparation, and Scotus could have read Book IV only by relieving this bachelor of his lecture room and his pupils.

Confidence in this story of a neglected Book IV dwindles as the background of academic life among the mendicants at Oxford is examined in greater detail. Of the thirteen years of training the first six were devoted to the study of theology: after this, the student learned to oppose for two years and to respond for one year.⁴⁵ Each year one student was required to remain at Oxford for four year longer, as a "baccalaureus theologiae." Thus, in his tenth year the student prepared his course of lectures on the Sentences and spent the eleventh year in delivering them.⁴⁶ After this, he lectured on the Bible during his twelfth year,⁴⁷ and disputed under various masters during his last and thirteenth year. The statutes further required that before he could incept as a regent master the candidate must have completed all his tasks in a praiseworthy manner⁴⁸ — "laudabiliter complesse" — and if he had been absent for a term or less, he was to complete his tasks *alias* for as long a time as he had been absent, before he could count that year as a full year.⁴⁹

⁴⁴ Little, *Chron. Notes*, p. 580: "There is no known instance of a master lecturing on the *Sentences* as such at Paris or Oxford."

⁴⁵ Gibson, *Statuta*, introd. p. cx, and p. 48 line 18.

⁴⁶ The ninth year being devoted to responsions, the tenth and eleventh were assigned to the Sentences: see note 35 *supra*. As the thirteen years of study at Oxford at this time were continuous, a year for the preparation of the lectures seems none too long.

⁴⁷ Gibson, *Statuta*, p. 50 line 17: "Post lecturam insuper libri Sententiarum, ad minus per biennium vel fere studio incepturus insistat, antequam scandat cathedram magistralem;" p. 51 line 10: "bachilario in eadem facultate minime valeant responsiones factae magistris ante completum annum post lecturam sententiarum;" and p. 52 line 12: "non liceat alicui praeterquam bachilario theologiae legere Bibliam publice." Lectures on the Bible, therefore, were assigned to the twelfth year.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 50 line 14.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 51 line 18.

The tasks which awaited a candidate who had successfully completed his thirteen years of training at Oxford have never been fully examined. Inception could legally take place immediately, as was the case at Paris, but the University of Oxford had decreed that upon receiving his licence the master should perform his tasks for the rest of the year in which he incepted and continue them for the whole of the year⁵⁰ following: “quod si contravenerit tanquam reus statuti et periurus, ubicunque in Anglia moram traxerit, denuntietur.” What the authorities at Oxford were likely to say about a “baccalaureus theologiae” who abandoned his lectures on Book IV in order to give Paris the benefit of their training, must be left to conjecture. The effect of this rule was that the Franciscan convent produced ten bachelors in a decade, but only eight masters.⁵¹ It is worth noting that William of Shireburn, ordained priest on the same day as Scotus, was obliged to wait about ten years for his doctorate.⁵²

Thus, in June 1301, there was little hope that Scotus would be promoted at Oxford for another ten years, and he was still short of one year to qualify for admission to read the Sentences at Paris. He must therefore have taught in an unknown convent in England as a lector. There is ample evidence in Bishop Martival’s register⁵³ that lectors were giving courses of lectures lasting one year or two years in the convents at Bristol, Dorchester, Reading and Salisbury. Among these were three friars of particular interest, in that they had completed their theological training in the University, but had not been called upon to act as regent masters: William of Chitterne, 53rd regent master at Cambridge, was lector at Winchester⁵⁴ in 1325 and at Salisbury in 1326; Stephen Sorel, 60th regent master at Oxford, was lector at Salisbury in 1327, and Ralph Pigaz, 49th regent master at Cambridge, was lector at Salisbury in 1329. During this year 1301—2 Scotus probably lectured on the Porphyry, the Predicaments, the Perihermenias and the Elenchi, just as Ockham did in similar circumstances.

The foregoing rules may now be of help in reconstructing the life of Scotus before he left England in 1302. At the meeting at Dorchester-on-Thames, already cited, the out-going master was Adam of Howden, and the in-coming master was Philip of Bridlington.⁵⁵ The date of this

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 54 line 11.

⁵¹ C. K. Brampton, *Sobre la licenciatura de los lectores franciscanos en Oxford entre los años 1286 y 1330*, in *Estudios eclesiasticos*, t. XXXVIII (1963) pp. 249—54.

⁵² Little, *Grey Friars*, p. 165.

⁵³ Martival Ep. Sar. Reg. II, fol. 186^v and 187^r.

⁵⁴ Stratford Ep. Wint. Reg. fol. 15^r.

⁵⁵ See note 7 *supra*.

meeting, 26 July 1300, shows that Bridlington's full year of regency was 1300—1. At some time during this year John Duns took part in a disputation under Bridlington, and the evidence, discovered⁵⁶ by Fr Longpré, is contained⁵⁷ in quaternus VI q. 20 of MS Worcester Cath. 99. Scotus is now seen to be taking part in a disputation in his last and thirteenth year, and from this fact it follows that he began his lectures on the Sentences at Oxford in October 1298 and his lectures on the Bible in October 1299. His course of training, therefore, began in October 1288 and ended in June 1301.

The evidence that Scotus spent some time at Cambridge cannot be ignored, for it is of Franciscan provenance and is preserved in MS Oxford, Merton College 66, in a work devoted to Scotus. The words run: "... qui floruit Cant' Oxon' et Parisius et obiit in Colonia." As Cambridge is mentioned before Oxford, there may be some doubt whether Scotus was at Cambridge in 1301—2. A more likely period is 1284—8, except that "floruit" usually implies teaching. Some such period is very probable. Before entering their theological schools at Oxford, the mendicants were obliged to have studied philosophy for eight years⁵⁸ "solis philosophicis intendendo," and by this is meant the B. A. and M. A. courses, each lasting four years. Most of the friars at this time entered the Order⁵⁹ at 18 years of age, and for one year lived in a house for novices, in which secular studies were forbidden.⁶⁰ As a rule, therefore, a friar would enter a house for novices at 18, and at 19, if he were considered worthy of training at Oxford, he would enter a convent which could provide full-time study of philosophy. Thus, if Scotus was residing at Cambridge from 1284 to 1288, he was studying the M. A. course for four years, and not acting as a teacher. The conjecture of Bonnefoy,⁶¹ that Scotus read the Sentences at Cambridge during the period 1298 to 1300, overlooks his prior commitments in the University of Oxford.

The main trouble all along has derived from the two citations of Benedict XI in the *Ordinatio* of Book IV, but as the *Ordinatio* of Book I, with its inclusion of the *pars secunda* of the *Prologue*, is some distance

⁵⁶ E. Longpré, *Philippe de Bridlington O. F. M. et le bx. Duns Scot*, in *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* t. XXII (1929) pp. 587—8.

⁵⁷ Little and Pelster, *Oxford Theology*, p. 310. Writing two years before Longpré, F. Pelster, in his article *Duns Scotus nach englischen Handschriften* (in *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* t. LI, 1927, p. 80) cites MS 99, but in error claims that the name of Scotus is mentioned "kein einziges Mal." A. Wolter, *Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings*, Nelson 1962, introd., p. xiv states that Duns took part in the vespers of Bridlington, but these are preserved in q. 18, not q. 20.

⁵⁸ Gibson, *Statuta*, p. 49 line 5.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40 § 9 and note 1.

⁵⁹ Bihl, *Statuta*, p. 39 § 2.

⁶¹ Bonnefoy, *op. cit.*, p. 123, and 448.

in time from the *Lectura* of Book I and an even greater distance from the actual reading at Oxford, it is natural to believe that the *Ordinatio* of Book IV was relatively the same distance from the actual lectures as the *Ordinatio* of Book I. The inclusion of these two citations of Benedict XI shortly after February 1304 need not be taken as proof that Scotus did not lecture on Book IV at Oxford in May and June 1299.

The only valid reason for excluding Book IV from his lectures at Oxford would be that he was not in Oxford in May and June 1299, when he ought to have been reading it; and with this situation one may associate a phrase from Wadding:⁶² "Quare evocato ex academia Oxoniensi ad Parisiensem . . ." This, one may be forgiven for thinking, must be a reference to Scotus, for Scotus is the subject of the sentence — the students, we are told, were flocking round him, and we know that he did not read Book IV at Oxford, because he was "evocatus ad academiam Parisiensem." None the less, the word "evocato" agrees with his master "Guillelmo Varrone". Thus Little in his courageous endeavour to harmonise his conflicting sources, may have been subconsciously influenced by the echo of these words. "It would seem," he says,⁶³ "that the call of Duns to Paris interrupted his course at Oxford." If this was the case, it took Scotus three years and five months to travel from Oxford to Paris. This startling situation is made more credible by the reflexion that "Duns⁶⁴ would have taken part in the dispute (sc. under Bridlington) as a bachelor and was probably at this time giving his great course on the *Sentences*, which is represented by the *Opus Oxoniense*." In this way, out of deference to the French, Scotus performed the extravaganza of telescoping his eleventh into his thirteenth year of study, and, fortified by the good news from Medjamâa el-Morûdj, succeeded in standing outside time, while enjoying the additional privilege of being in two places at once. We are now worse off than ever, and the only thing to do with the lectures on Book IV is to restore them to the place and time where they belong — the Franciscan convent at Oxford circa May and June 1299.

To conclude, the career of Scotus at Oxford, which began in October 1288 and ended in June 1301, followed the normal course and differed in no respect from the life of any other student of equal rank in the University, except for the fact that in October 1288 he first showed an

⁶² *Annales Minorum*, new ed. Florence 1931, t. VI, p. 54, old § XXVIII "Quare evocato ex academia Oxoniensi ad Parisiensem, Guillelmo Varrone, eius ut diximus praeceptore, ad cathedram theologalem regendam, Scotus suffectus est praeceptori."

⁶³ Little, *Chron. Notes*, p. 574.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 573.

intellectual power unequalled by any other Franciscan. That Gonsalvo was personally acquainted with him goes without saying, but the years 1298—1301 at Oxford would have provided a much more fruitful opportunity for praise than the period 1292—7 at Paris: and moreover, someone had to know enough about Scotus for him to be recommended at Whitsun 1301 and afterwards chosen at Whitsun 1302, to read the Sentences at Paris. It would have been no recommendation to have left Oxford with one obligation so gratuitously neglected, and it is a poor compliment to the authorities at Oxford to imagine that they allowed so negligent a bachelor to conclude his course. No explanation of the career of this saintly scholar can ring quite true, which casts a shadow of one sort or another on the important *dramatis personae* of his life: and the simplest explanation is that in all essentials there is so little to explain.

C. K. BRAMPTON

Walsall
Staffordshire

CONCERNING THE AUTONOMY OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

The philosophy of mind has as its business a set of problems which have been propounded since at least the time of Democritus, e. g., the problems of the nature of perceiving, the relation of consciousness and body, the justification of memory, the structure of practical reasoning, the possibility of an inner and private life, and the nature of dreams, feelings, actions, motives, and so on. That greatest of philosophers of mind, Henri Bergson, dealt with each of these and more. Nonetheless, the phenomenon of the development of this area since mid-century brings something new to its understanding. I think it is this. For the first time the problems of the philosophy of mind have been treated as constituting a distinctive and somewhat autonomous field of investigation. Whereas previously it was common for these problems to arise out of and in conjunction with problems which were primarily epistemological (the problems of memory and perception), metaphysical (the mind-body problem), or ethical (the problems of practical reasoning, motivation, and agency), it is on the contrary fashionable today to consider these problems of mind as interconnected among themselves yet separate from other areas of interest. Indeed, it is thought that one can make headway in solving these problems without special attention to any other fields of investigation, philosophical or otherwise, and this includes a recognition of the particular philosophical impotence of empirical psychology. It is this nationalistic, go-it-alone spirit of contemporary philosophy of mind which is the setting for the remarks which follow.

I would like to suggest that the dissociation of contemporary philosophy of mind from empirical psychology rests upon a precious insight into the logical nature of the subject-matter, but that the estrangement from ethics serves to obscure the self-same insight. Though this insight is implicit in the kind of investigation which is largely being carried on today in the philosophy of mind, it has only been hinted at in the literature and therefore we shall have to dig it out. I shall begin the job of

uncovering it where it lies nearest the surface, i. e., in the area of human action.

I shall not here discuss the relation of the philosophy of mind to such other areas as epistemology and metaphysics, though I cannot refrain from stating baldly that I believe the philosophy of mind to be a branch of a branch of metaphysics, namely, of that branch which I like to call anthropology.

I

The emphasis of recent philosophy of mind has been upon human action and upon what might be called the practical life of man. One of the fruits of this intensive study has been the doctrine, variously stated and understood, that human action cannot be identified with any happening, whether inner or outer, felt or physiological, molecular or molar. This distinction is thought to be a logical one, i. e., though some of the philosophers I have in mind have held that the same event can in fact be both an action and an occurrence, all of these philosophers agree that to say of something that it is an action and to say of it that it is a happening of some sort is not to say the same thing. The arguments for this position are various and I shall briefly mention only three of the major ones here.

It has been argued, first, that there is a linguistic inadequacy of occurrence-talk for the discussion of human action. One simply cannot say what he wants to say and does commonly and easily say about human action by adopting the language used for describing and understanding physiological or psychical processes. There is, to use a common example, a vast difference in the logic of the phrases 'my arm rises' and 'I raise my arm', not the least of which is the fact that whereas the latter statement cannot be intelligibly discussed apart from some reference to an agent, the former certainly can. The unravelling of the diverse ground-rules of these families of expressions has been the occasion of several recent incredibly tedious books.¹ I should have thought that all this was fairly obvious. But surely this linguistic duality is irremediable and unreformable just because it rests upon a radical difference in the nature of the objects.

A second approach to the distinction of acts and happenings may be put like this. We can, with seldom any difficulty, distinguish our own full-bodied conduct from mere bodily movement by attending to the

¹ E. g., G. E. M. Anscombe's *Intention* (Basil Blackwell, 1957), Stuart Hampshire's *Thought and Action* (Chatto and Windus, 1960), A. I. Melden's *Free Action* (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961), and K. W. Rankin's *Choice and Chance* (Basil Blackwell, 1961).

distinctively intimate way in which we claim or "own up to" the former. This difference might be expressed by saying that we can and often do take a theoretical or contemplative point of view toward the processes and movements of our person, but we cannot consistently take such a point of view toward our actions. The only stance we seem to be able to take up toward actions is the point of view of the agent. There is a logical as well as a phenomenological point here. Not only are the two orientations experientially distinct and their objects viewed in different lights, but the practical disinterest of the one and the practical interest of the other logically exclude their conjoint assumption. I should think, furthermore, that these distinctions, though reflected in behavior and speech, are concrete and pre-vocal; any behavioral or linguistic understanding of them would appear to presuppose taking them up. But the settlement of this matter is irrelevant here.

There is also the argument, which I have elaborated elsewhere, to the effect that human conduct differs from any bodily movement or conscious process as such by virtue of the fact that it is characterized by a *non-datal* component, i. e., a component which would *not* show up in a full description of the movement or process as a datum.² There is an *active* side of conduct which in itself cannot be sensed or introspected, even in principle, but which can only be *done*. In other words, not only is human action distinguishable from happenings by virtue of the facts, first, that we cannot adequately talk of them in the same language and, second, that we do not view them in the same fashion, but they are distinguishable, third, in their intrinsic natures. A dim recognition of this fact, I suspect, lies at the base of the common contention that acts are at least events but not just events. This point is related to the previous one, for it is because of this non-descriptive nature of acts that a theoretical or contemplative point of view cannot be wholeheartedly taken upon them.

I believe that all of these arguments are sound. The linguistic autonomy, orientational demands, and non-descriptiveness of human action are sufficient to set its study apart from the purely empirical and scientific investigations of human behavior. In the attempt to determine the nature of action the findings of empirical psychology may be in some unforeseen way relevant, but they cannot be sufficient.

The conclusion that action and happening are logically distinct and yet that one may be justified, in a sense, in speaking of certain movements and processes associated with the person as human acts (what I should

² *Act and Agent*. The University of Miami Press, 1964.

prefer to call *conduct*) reminds one of an ethical doctrine found in G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica*. Moore maintained that the meaning of the term 'good' is not the same as that of any non-moral term, such as 'pleasant', even though as a matter of fact this or that pleasant thing may be good as well. Analogously, we might say that the term 'action' is not the same in meaning as any term descriptive of what happens or occurs, such as the term 'physiological behavior', though it may conceivably be the case that a certain piece of physiological behavior is at the same time an action.

There is some analogy too between the arguments which can be brought for Moore's position and the three arguments which have been mentioned for the distinction of act and happening. It might be said, first, that the language adequate to the job of talking about non-moral matters is not adequate to the job of talking about goodness and other such moral matters. We are faced, it might be said, with two different linguistic orders, each of which may be explored in its own right though perhaps connected or overlapping at certain points with the other. It might also be said, secondly, that even were there objects which could be handled in both of these languages, though in a different way, this is possible only because these objects can be looked upon from different ultimate points of view, which we may call the moral or evaluative point of view and the descriptive point of view. It may even be maintained, thirdly, that goodness and other such moral characteristics are not descriptive of the objects of which they are predicated. We might attribute this non-descriptive nature of moral predicates to the fact that they refer to a normative and hence non-datal aspect of reality, however such an aspect is to be explained.

Indeed the analogy between the distinction of moral and non-moral and the distinction of action and happening is surprisingly exact. There is a formal identity in the two cases though there appears to be a material diversity. Consider the manner Moore suggests for exhibiting the indefinability of 'good' in non-moral terms. 'Good' cannot mean the same as 'pleasant', say, for it always makes sense to ask whether this or that pleasant thing is good, whereas if the terms were synonymous such a question would be worse than silly. And now the same holds true of any attempt to define 'action' in terms descriptive of any happening. We may always significantly ask: Is such and such a happening an act of mine (or his)?³

³ A. I. Melden has made this same point. Cf. p. 56, *Free Action*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.

It should also be pointed out that on Moore's view it is fallacious to argue from non-moral premises alone to moral conclusions. From premises which merely describe a state of affairs we cannot deduce the conclusion that anything is good or that any action ought to be performed. Not only are there terms in the conclusion which do not appear in the premises, but there even seems to be a different order of language involved. The same remarks may be made of any attempt to argue from premises which describe happenings to a conclusion which states the character of human action. There is a kind of "naturalistic fallacy" which is committed in the attempt to specify the actions of a person merely by describing his behavior. No results of empirical psychology or any other science could ever be sufficient to determine what the actions of a person were nor indeed whether he had acted at all, and this is impossible not because of a lack of crucial subcutaneous data but simply because of the fact that action cannot be reduced to or defined in terms of happenings.

II

This autonomy of action, its logical distinctness from mere behavior, is an autonomy which infects all of the subject-matters of the philosophy of mind. The important logical insight which lies at the basis of the separation of empirical psychology and philosophy of mind, and the uncovering of which is the theme of this article, is no more, then, than a generalization of the logical remarks above. But the fact of this infection must be shown. Only in this way is the generalization justified.

It is useful here to consider some remarks recently made by Strawson.

What I am suggesting is that it is easier to understand how we can see each other, and ourselves, as persons, if we think first of the fact that we act, and act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human nature. Now 'to see each other as persons' is a lot of things, but not a lot of separate and unconnected things. The class of P-predicates [i. e., predicates which we apply to persons] that I have moved into the centre of the picture are not unconnectedly there, detached from others irrelevant to them. On the contrary, they are inextricably bound up with the others, interwoven with them. The topic of the mind does not divide into unconnected subjects.⁴

There are two contentions here that are worth separate discussion. Both are necessary in order to justify our generalization. The first is that the concept of human action deserves to be given a central place in the picture of mind. The second is that the subject-matters of the philosophy

⁴ *Individuals*. Methuen & Co., 1959, p. 112.

of mind form an interconnected whole. Each of these contentions may be discussed in turn.

It can hardly be disputed that the concept of action has especial relevance to that branch of the philosophy of mind which we may call the philosophy of the practical. Surely it has been sufficiently pointed out by philosophers from Aristotle to the present that the concepts of motivation, intention, desire, deliberation, will, freedom, principle, character, and so on presuppose the concept of action. No sense can be made of any one of these concepts without referring to this logical connection. What is a motive but a motive to act in such and such a way? What is a desire if not the desire for that the means to which we must necessarily conceive as actions which we might well, if we could, perform? What is one's character as opposed to one's personality if not that motivational apparatus which serves as the ground of action?

It should also be clear that the necessary reference to action in the entire practical realm of man precludes its descriptive understanding. For example, it is a commonplace that the concept of motivation in empirical psychology has little if anything to do with the concept of motivation which arises in the discourse and affairs of man's practice. Whatever usefulness such a descriptive or scientific theory of motivation may have for understanding or predicting the events and happenings in and among human beings, it cannot help us similarly to understand or predict human action.

But given that this is so, that the concept of action is central to the entire field of the practical and that the autonomy of action infects it thoroughly, it would still appear to be doubtful that the practical deserves a central place in the field of mind as a whole. What, one might ask, has the body-mind problem or the problem of the nature of feelings and emotions to do with the practical? The proper answer to this is most complex. I can at best here only intimate some of the reasons for holding that such logical connections do obtain.

It would be out of order to do what really needs to be done, namely, to engage in painstaking piecemeal investigation of some of the more interesting areas of mind in order to show how the hand of the practical makes its presence felt. However, since a great number of such investigations would show the same basic logic of involvement, it will be sufficient for our purposes to consider here only the paradigm case of pain.

Now, the point I wish to make is incredibly simple, but since it is likely to be confused with a certain popular theory of pain, I must forewarn you against this possible misconstruction. I do not wish to call

attention to the purported fact, which I take to be simply an error of intellectual astigmatism, that pain is really a way we have of acting which we learn to recognize and to exhibit through learning a way of talking with others and that therefore pain is not really something someone could identify prior to learning the proper language. If this were true, then it would indeed follow that the investigation of pain could not get along without reference to the practical. But I cannot myself accept this position as in the least correct, and so far as I can see its only recommendation rests upon a misunderstanding of the logical point that though pain is, when it occurs, susceptible to phenomenological viewing, it is pre-eminently of practical interest as a set of spectacles through which we view the things of the world for the purposes of making our way among them. This is the point I do want to make. A pain cannot be *fully* understood as that which wells up in the confines of consciousness, has its day, and passes on, but such understanding must be supplemented by the more important fact that pain is that *through* which the world of objects is given a special practical significance. Pain can be investigated in its *nominal* dimension, so to speak, but it can also be studied in its *adjectival* dimension. We may treat the expression 'I feel the pain in my finger' as indicating that I am aware of such a pain-datum or as indicating that I am aware of my finger as painful, i. e., aware of it as a matter of a distinctive practical concern. Both of these approaches are necessary for a complete understanding of the matter. Pain, then, is not merely a distinctive datum but also an evaluative device. It is easy to see how this adjectival dimension of pain could be misread as a fact about adjectives.

There is also a danger here of hastily concluding that one's being painfully aware of x necessitates or probabilifies a specific range of actions in regard to it. But there can be no such specific range apart from the further presupposition of principles of action according to which it is indicated that such an object x so viewed is to be avoided, suffered, undergone, or perhaps prized.

Nor should this simple point of the dual aspect of the feeling of pain be confused with the Whiteheadian doctrine,⁵ possibly also true, that each awareness of pain is very likely to be also pained, and hence that we tend to feel pain in a pained way. The adjectival dimension of which I speak is not the attachment of the property of pain to the awareness itself. In that case there would be two pains — the pain of the object

⁵ Cf. *Adventures of Ideas*. Macmillan, 1933, pp. 235—6 and 321.

experienced and the pain of the experiencing of the object — rather than two dimensions of one pain. I refer instead to the fact that pain, unlike the sensation of a particular color or taste or sound, is both an item embedded in its given context and *at the same time* a practical appraisal of that context. The statement 'he felt pain in his finger but did not feel it as a reason for acting' is self-contradictory, though whether one *shall* make a choice or behaviorally react, or *how* in particular he should or will so choose or behave if he does, is not determinable by a mere analysis of the concept nor by a phenomenological description of the experience alone.

What is indicated here concerning pain applies similarly in the case of feelings, emotions, passions, and various other so-called states of mind. What I suggest is that such states of mind are indeed states of mind but not *states* of mind merely; they are also *ways* of evaluating the landscape for practical purposes.

Still, these considerations do not rule out the possibility of totally non-practical and purely theoretical orientations of mind. And surely a *prima facie* division of mental affairs into the practical and the theoretical is justified, though clearly it is hard to draw the line or to characterize each category with precision. That is to say, many affairs of consciousness and the mental life appear to be of a purely cognitive or theoretical sort (though of course they may not be), e. g., attention, thinking, dreaming, remembering, and so on. There is however one sense in which all such theoretical businesses are tainted with the practical from birth.

Of the two points of view which may be taken upon any item in our world, the practical (including the point of view of the agent) appears to be logically prior to the theoretical. Very persuasive reasons may be given for our accepting this priority. Unfortunately, the major of these reasons, namely, that no one of the other alternatives illumines so many philosophical problems, would require a treatise for its adequate presentation and defense. Let me mention only this curious fact. I cannot avoid the practical stance short of death, but whether I take the theoretical stance is largely, if not altogether, a matter of my decision and hence of my action. This does not mean that a purely descriptive or cognitive or scientific consideration of some item is impossible — there is no pragmatist reductionism suggested here — but it does mean that a practical familiarity, indeed a certain level of practical understanding of the same item has already been won. It might tell us this about man: he is primarily an agent and only secondarily a theoretician.

But have our nets of the practical truly snared all mental fish? Are there not perhaps some slippery customers among the topics of mind? For example, the aesthetic attitude is surely a concern of the philosophy of mind, yet it does not seem to fall within the meshes of either the theoretical or the practical stances. Religious experience and perhaps certain affairs or imagination too seem to fall outside the domain of human action. Even more obviously, perhaps, dreaming appears to be involuntary and in some very important sense alien to the practical affairs of man.

Now, I have my suspicions that no one of these named items of mind is in its nature logically independent of man's agency, but I do not think that the confirmation of these suspicions would serve to establish my case. The force of the objection lies not in the problem of whether *these* things are thoroughly non-practical but in whether it is conceivable that at least some thoroughly non-practical affairs of mind might not after all exist. And so far as I can see the only conclusive argument against this possibility would be to show that the very concept of mind contains as an integral part of its meaning the concept of the practical. But this cannot be shown for the very good reason that it is simply not true that the concept of mind contains the concept of the practical in the requisite fashion. It is not at all self-contradictory to assert that some possible mental state or orientation, considered in itself and apart from its connections with other affairs of mind, is thoroughly non-practical in nature. We must simply face up to the fact that the mind may well have its totally non-practical asides.

But let us admit it. What needs to be established here is not that every single affair of mind presupposes the practical in some important way, but that the concept of the practical is the *dominant* and *central* concept in the field of mind, and that furthermore, all topics of mind are so closely interconnected as to form an organized whole. It should be clear now that even were such thoroughly non-practical mental affairs to exist they would be, first, peripheral affairs and, second, thoroughly non-practical only in themselves and in abstraction from their many logical connections to other mental affairs which were practical in at least one of the senses already discussed. In this way and only in this way can it be said that the autonomy of action infects the whole of the field of mind.

It is at this juncture that we must consider the second of Strawson's contentions, viz., that "the topic of the mind does not divide into unconnected subjects."

It would, I think, be most surprising to discover that *all* subject-matters of the philosophy of mind have any single characteristic in common. To say that they are all *mental* phenomena is not to name such a common quality but merely to give a title to the overall picture. We are dealing here with an aspect or part of the panorama of the life of man, a life which we know as a multi-featured, adaptive, creative richness. The label 'mind' applies to a constellation of such human affairs which form a coherent interconnected whole by virtue of a multitude of separate but interlocking relationships, much as in a jig-saw puzzle. Obviously, the pieces of this puzzle fit together so as to form only a part, the mind-part so to speak, of a larger puzzle, which is man. The field of mind, then, is a picture puzzle without border pieces, and anyone who has put such puzzles together knows how very much more difficult this makes it.

Of course, this is only a metaphor, but, I believe, a helpful one. In this way we may understand how it can be that the philosophy of mind be both a connected whole in which the area of the practical is central, and at the same time a field which admits of the possibility of pieces which are not directly connected to the practical. I do not say that such pieces do exist, but they could. However, the important consequence must be drawn that such pieces, which are not directly interlocked with practical matters, are yet necessarily interlocked with pieces which are directly interlocked with practical matters. In this way the whole picture of mind is dominated by the central configuration, and indeed the whole vast tapestry of man is colored by the act.

III

My immediate conclusion is that no final understanding can be gained and no reasonable answers can be given to the problems of the philosophy of mind apart from an understanding of the realm of the practical and ultimately of an appreciation of the central role of human action. From this fact a broader conclusion may be established. The indifference shown by contemporary philosophers of mind to the theories of empirical psychology is a recognition of a logical truth and the avoidance of a logical error. The truth is that the subject-matters are logically distinct. Empirical psychology is dominated by the concept of behavior, whereas philosophy of mind is dominated by the concept of action. The error, then, would be that of trying to do philosophy of mind by doing empirical psychology.

It is important to attend to the logical *form* of this error. It may be put as a fallacy: any argument in which the sole premises are statements of psychological fact, i. e., statements which describe, predict, provide laws for the control and prediction of, or scientifically explain the happenings, movements, or processes of human beings, and in which the conclusion is a statement of mind, i. e., a statement which gives information concerning acts, motives, perceptions, dreams, or any other of the subject-matters of the philosophy of mind, cannot be valid. Terms *necessarily* occur in the conclusion which are not found in the premises, and this is because the modes of discourse are totally disparate. Mind-language, like normative language, can never be reduced to or derived from occurrence-language.

Moreover, this error may be put as a mistake of definition: mind-terms cannot be defined by means of occurrence-terms alone. An act is not an overt movement nor a covert event nor some combination of the two. A memory is not an image nor a warm image nor a mode of behavior. Perception is not a physiological process nor an elaborate complexity of mere processes, internal or external. And so on.

Furthermore, any such suggestion of the synonymy of a mind-term M with an occurrence-term O may be put to the question: But is O an M? This is a significant question just because (1) the species of meaning are truly different, as evidenced in the fact that the ways of talking appropriate to the two families of terms are distinct, (2) the different terms represent separate postures for regarding and making sense of a certain area of human life, postures which are largely coherent orientations even if only in a jig-saw sense, and which may be called the *descriptivist* and the *mentalist* points of view, and most importantly perhaps, (3) the very objects to which the mentalist posture is directed and with which the mentalist language is concerned, e. g., thoughts, motives, and memories, are neither mere occurrences nor theoretical entities inferred or invented in order to scientifically understand, forecast, or control occurrences.

We may call this logical mistake or family of logical mistakes the *descriptivist error*. I believe that its recognition, even if only implicitly made, is the major gain of the contemporary intensification of the philosophical study of mind. The future success of the philosophy of mind rests upon its continued avoidance.

But perhaps even more significant is the further logical point which emerges here concerning the relation of the philosophy of mind and ethics. It is clear that the form of this descriptivist error is the same as that of the familiar ethical syndrome often vaguely characterized as

"the naturalistic fallacy." We have found occasion to give especial significance to the application of this type of error to the distinction of human action and mere happenings, and indeed the more general case of the descriptivist error is no more than a warranted generalization of that special application. This form of error is hence separable from its more narrow exemplifications. It represents a *sui generis* type of philosophical insight the logic of which can be and no doubt ought to be investigated apart from confusion with its special applications in ethics, philosophy of mind, philosophical anthropology, or whatever.

But if the separateness of philosophy of mind from empirical psychology is assured by the recognition of the relevance of this logical insight, an intimate connection with the field of ethics is at the same time suggested. It would appear that the normative, the practical, the mental, and perhaps even the human form a family of concerns set forever and irrevocably over against the scientific and the descriptive. Hence, the successful development of the philosophy of mind rests not only upon its continued dissociation from empirical psychology but perhaps even more significantly upon a re-association with the philosophy of morals.

Afterword: Some Disclaimers

The foregoing discussion has as one of its main contentions the radical distinction between the subject-matters of philosophy of mind and empirical psychology. An easy avenue to the understanding of this separation lies in the recognition of the fact that the subject-matters of the former are incurably infected with the practical. Yet the pattern of this infection is quite complex; no quick and easy criterion would be sufficient for the purposes of justifying the sorting out of subject-matters into these two piles. But though the basis for the distinction is complex, it is fairly easy to *see* the difference in the failures of the attempts to define mind-terms solely by means of the terms of empirical psychology and the attempts to establish knowledge of the mind merely from the results of that field of investigation. We can often recognize a difference without knowing the reasons for it.

I make these remarks in order to forestall several almost inevitable misunderstandings of my thesis. Perhaps it would be useful to make some of these misinterpretations explicit.

First, it would be a mistake to think that the descriptivist error is somehow itself the basis for the distinction between empirical psychology and the philosophy of mind. The descriptivist error is simply a way of failing to recognize the difference. It is not, nor should it be confused with, the complex basis of the difference. Nor should it be considered as an adequate independent test of the difference. There is no "open question technique," for example, which can be employed in a wholesale and convincing fashion. If one does not already see the difference, it is not likely that the raising of

"the significant question" will be at all helpful. No logical gimmick will take the place of hard analysis and thorough phenomenology. What I suggest is rather that the difference can be formally put, that it can be seen to be formally identical to other significant distinctions, that this is very interesting in itself, and that furthermore the recognition of the descriptivist error is a profound insight into the nature of things.

Second, I draw a distinction between the two areas of investigation in terms of subject-matters, not in terms of their diverse methods or aims. It is a truism that philosophy of mind is a philosophical and not a scientific concern. It is also a truism that the questions asked and the entire manner of addressing the relevant material in order to answer these questions is distinctive in each case. But the business of arguing for truisms is a silly and shameful undertaking. I have not attempted it here.

Third, it is sure to be thought that the distinction of subject-matters which I have suggested is at bottom no more than the traditional one, namely, that between states of consciousness (held to be the distinctive subject-matters of the philosophy of mind) and physiological occurrences in a physical world (held to be the proper subject-matters of any science, including empirical psychology). This would be an unforgiveably perverse misconstruction. Some contemporary philosophers have become so haunted by the mind-body dichotomy that they project it into the positions of their opponents as a presupposition. I am myself far from being rattled at the thought of committing a Cartesianism, but I must disclaim any attempt here to bolster a mind-body dualism. It is in accordance with the position taken here that insofar as states of consciousness can be described, predicted, etc., i. e., insofar as they are processes, then empirical psychology may deal with them. The point is simply that empirical psychology is altogether a *datal* business, whereas philosophy of mind is not. Though the latter may concern itself partially and sometimes with data, it is always concerned with more than that. Empirical psychology concerns itself only with behavior, states of consciousness, physiological processes, or other data, and its explanations never do nor can go beyond an attempt to make such data intelligible.

Fourth, I am certainly not trying to distinguish the two fields by means of a criterion of public access or verifiability. That I am not doing this is obvious from the previous disclaimer, but such a crass misunderstanding should be set out in its own ugly right. In the first place, I do not hold with certain contemporary behaviorists that the business of empirical psychology is exhausted in the scientific investigation of the publicly observable; I hold, rather, that the introspective privacies of man, insofar as they exist and are describable, predictable, or controllable, fall within its proper domain. In the second place, neither can philosophy of mind be confined to only one of these spheres, the public or the private. Philosophy of mind is confined only to the study of the things of the mental sphere, whether these turn out to be inner or outer, secret or social, covert or open, or whether it be that some are one way and some another.

DOUGLAS BROWNING

University of Miami

THE TRACTATUS LOGICAE MINOR OF OCKHAM

Introduction

Among the works of William Ockham three "Summa" of logic are attributed to him, namely: the *Summa logicae*,¹ the *Elementarium logicae* or *Tractatus logicae medius*,² and the *Tractatus logicae minor*.³ Of these works, of which two remain still unpublished, we present here an edition of the last mentioned and smallest of the three, the *Tractatus logicae minor*.⁴ This *Tractatus* is conserved in Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, ms. 690, f. 227v—246v. A second copy, once conserved by the Würzburg Conventuals, ms. I. 63, f. 11r—12r was destroyed during the last war,⁵ and apparently no photocopy of it was preserved.

In our Introduction to the edition of the *Tractatus*, we shall describe the manuscript of Assisi, and what we know of the Würzburg codex, and then briefly discuss the authenticity of the tract and its date of composition. Thirdly we shall add a few remarks on the method used in the edition.

Before we deal with the manuscripts, however, a word of explanation must be given as to the reason why we have selected "Tractatus logicae minor" as the title of this work. The scribe of the lost Würzburg manuscript, in its colophon on f. 12r named it "Compendium logicae Oquam,"⁶ while the colophon of the Assisi codex, f. 246v calls it "minor tractatus

¹ Modern edition, as yet incomplete: William Ockham, *Summa logicae*, edit. P. Boehner, Pars Prima, first edit. St. Bonaventure 1951, 2d edit. *ibid.* 1957; Pars Secunda et Tertiae prima, *ibid.* 1954; of the old editions I shall refer to the one of Venice 1508.

² Contained in Munich, Staatsbibliothek clm 4379, f. 135ra—189vb; written between July 17, 1347 and January 18, 1348, when Ockham was still alive. In the article of P. Boehner, mentioned in the next note, the codex is called, mistakenly, clm 1060; also the references to the folios are not always accurate.

³ For all three, see P. Boehner, 'Three Sums of logic attributed to William Ockham' in FS 11 (1951) 173—193, reprinted in Ph. Boehner, *Collected articles on Ockham*, St. Bonaventure 1958, 70—96.

⁴ My edition of the *Elementarium* is now ready for the printer.

⁵ L. Meier, 'Aufzeichnungen aus vernichteten Handschriften des Würzburger Minoritenkloster' in AFH 44 (1951) 191—209, especially 193—199 and 202—203.

⁶ *Ibid.* 194.

nove loyce fratris Gwilemi ocham." We have adopted the appellation of the Assisi manuscript rather than the one of the Würzburg codex, because the scribe of the Munich manuscript clm 4379 refers explicitly,⁷ as does Ockham himself implicitly,⁸ to the *Elementarium* as a "compendium" also. By omitting this term we have avoided any possible equivocation.

I. THE MANUSCRIPTS

The Assisi manuscript is fully described here, not only because the description of Mazzatinti is inadequate,⁹ but also because the manuscript contains other items which may be of interest to historians of mediaeval logic. As regards the Würzburg manuscript, our information is necessarily second hand; in using the description of L. Meier, however, we have retained only what seemed relevant to the knowledge of the *Tractatus minor*.

A = Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Vetus 690.

Paper, first half of the 15th century (cf. *infra*), of Italian origin, 321 folios, mm. 140—100; f. 2r—97r in two columns, the balance in long lines; minuscules, decorated with red, by different hands, though mostly working together. The hands usually change with the signatures, and the first items of the codex have their own pagination at the bottom to the right on the rectos; to this oldest pagination, another was added on top to the right of the rectos; this second one runs through in order to connect the different items, but was quickly abandoned; both these early paginations are largely cut-off by the binder. A third foliotation, also on the right of the top of the rectos, which also includes the front and back protection leaves, was added in 1884; the same hand wrote in pencil the pagination, and, on f. 1r, "p. 321, 1884." The binding as such is old but the original cover has been replaced, probably in or just before 1884, by another of poor quality (thin cardboard and common paper), although the back is parchment.

The modern library number reads on the back: "Ms vetus 690," and on f. 1r, in pencil, "690." The manuscript formerly belonged to the

⁷ Clm 4379, f. 135ra, in the conclusion of the Prologue but according to me a copyist's note added to the text of Ockham: "Et si quis aliquid vitiosi vel non correcti in scriptura istius compendii reperierit, non studio scribentis imputetur sed velocitati etc."

⁸ Clm 4379, f. 189vb, Epilogue: "Haec de logica, saepe rogatus a pluribus, compendiose perscripsi".

⁹ G. Mazzatinti, *Inventari dei manoscritti delle biblioteche d'Italia* IV, Forlì 1894, 134—135.

Franciscan monastery of St. Mary of the Angels, Assisi,¹⁰ as is attested by the oval stamp below on f. 3r, f. 70v and f. 318v: "Bibliotheca Portiunculae" around the rim, and an "M" in the center.

Folio 1 is a protective leaf of modern origin; on the recto it bears the notes just mentioned; the verso is blank. The manuscript has nineteen signatures; they are not signed, but fasc. 1—4, 14 and 17 bear the traditional "réclame." The quires are of different size: of eight folios are signatures 13—15; of twelve 5 and 8—9; of sixteen 3, 11—12, and, originally, 16 although the last folio of this quire has been cut-out; of eighteen 17—19; of twenty 4 and 10; of twenty four 1—2 and 7; the sixth signature originally had 30 folios, but the last one has been cut-out, seemingly by the scribe himself, because f. 126r bears the correct "réclame." Folio 321 is a modern, protective leaf corresponding to f. 1; it has remained blank. Folio 2 and the last pages of the codex are damaged, and even more serious, in front of f. 2 an entire signature has gone; according to the second pagination, what is now f. 14 was f. 30, and consequently what is now f. 2 was counted as folio 18; supposing that the first folio was not numbered as the title page, we must conclude that a (now missing) quire of 18 folios began the codex.

Contents.

1) f. 2ra—77ra. Armandus [de Bellovisu (de Belvézer, de Beauvior), *Declaratio difficilium terminorum*].¹¹

Inc. in our manuscript: scilicet secundum rem quia non est in ipsis [per *ripped off*] successionis rationem quia ipsius est . . . The *incipit* of the complete work, as given by Stegmüller, is rather: Ut ergo circa dicenda ordinatius procedatur.¹² Expl. and colophon: . . . dominator ut maiestas, regnat ut princeps, medetur ut salus, revelat ut lux, cui honor et gloria in saecula saeculorum amen. Deo gratias. Explicit scriptum fratris armagni (*read* Armandi) ordinis fratrum praedicatorum.

The *explicit* corresponds to the one given by Stegmüller, but to the information given by him, our manuscript is to be added, as well as the editions of Cologne 1502 and Venice 1507, — Armand died around 1340.

¹⁰ Not noticed by Mazzatinti; cfr. *ibid.* 21—26, where he deals with the origin of the manuscripts.

¹¹ Cfr. C. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* III, reprint Graz 1955, 306—311; F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi* I, Würzburg 1947, 40.

¹² *Loc. cit.*; however, the word "ergo" makes one wonder if this is the real *incipit* of the work.

2) f. 77ra—82rb. Index to the preceding item.

Rubric: Incipiunt capitula et tituli conclusionum in hoc opusculo contentorum super omnes tres partes suas. Capitula et tituli primae partis sex capitula habentis de complexo et incomplexo.

Inc. Primum praeambulum est quid sit complexum et incomplexum.

Expl. and colophon: De nominibus divino supposito convenientibus in assumpta humanitate. Explicit tabula omnium contentorum in hoc libro.

Deo gratias amen. Anno domini m^o cccc^o xxxvi^o in sero hora xxiii^a ante diem conversionis doctoris gentium eximii sancti pauli ad laudem et gloriam patris et filii et spiritus sancti glorioseque genetricis marie.

This index carries on the margin references to the folios according to the second foliotation; those written on the outer margin have been frequently cut-off by the binder. Of greater importance is, of course, the date given by the scribe, which places the manuscript in 1435—1436, presuming that the midnight worker was not too sleepy to be accurate.

3) f. 82va—97rb. [Anonym:] *Philosophia abbreviata*.

Superscription: Iesus Christus beata maria beatus franciscus. Incipit phylosophya abreviata (*sic*).

Inc. Natura est principium et causa movendi et quiescendi eius in quo est per se et non per accidens . . .

Expl. and colophon: . . . sicut nos communiter dicimus de formis animalium brutorum. Et sic est finis. Deo gratias amen.

It is worthy of note that this tract was also found in the lost Würzburg codex I. 63, f. 14r—18v.¹³ It is to be compared with Item 21 of our Assisi codex.

4) f. 97v—98r: *Suppositiones secundum usum Oxoniae*.

Superscription: Iesus. Suppositiones secundum usum Uxoniae (*sic*).

Inc. Quia ignorantibus suppositiones terminorum latent veritatis propositionum . . .

Expl. . . . paria officialia, id est habentia equale officium confundendi terminos.

5) f. 98v—160v. Albertus [of Orlamünde O. P., *Philosophia pauperum*]

Inc. [*P*]hilosophia dividitur in tres partes, videlicet in logicam, ethicam et phisicam . . .

Expl. and colophon: . . . sit principium operabilium. Et hec de anima et potentiis eius ad presens dicta sufficiant. Explicit summa philosophie edita per albertum magnum de ordine praedicatorum. Deo gratias amen.

According to P. Glorieux, the work has been printed several times

¹³ L. Meier, *art. cit.*, 194.

under the name of Albertus Magnus, and in one manuscript it is found attributed to Roger Bacon.¹⁴ The Assisi manuscript, which is to be added to the lists of Glorieux, commits the common error of confusing the lesser Dominican of the end of the 13th century with his famous homonym.

6) f. 160v—161v. Interpretation of proper names and other words by a slightly later hand. Folio 162 was left blank.

7) f. 163r—173v. Robert Grosseteste, *Super octo libros Physicorum*. Superscription: Iesus Maria Franciscus. Incipit tractatus linconiensis super octo libris phisicorum.

Inc. In primo libro phisicorum cuius subiectum est corpus mobile . . .

Expl. and colophon: . . . incorruptibile, infatigabile, nullam habens magnitudinem. cui sit honor et gloria in infinita saecula. amen. Deo gratias. Explicit Linconiensis super octo libros phisicorum.

The manuscript of Assisi is to be added to the list of S. Harrison Thomson.¹⁵

8) f. 174r contains three longer notes, each preceded by a paragraph sign, and written by the scribe of the preceding. They may belong to the work of Grosseteste. Therefore we give the beginning and the end:

Inc. Nota quod hec auctoritas philosophi I Posteriorum: Numquodque propter quod . . .

Expl. . . cum quo stat quod sit ens artificiale.

Folio 174v remained blank.

9) f. 175r—189v. [Anonym,] *De sensu et sensato*.

Folio 175r on top of the page: Iesus Christus.

Inc. Cum omne nostrum appetitum movere debens boni rationem habere debeat . . .

Expl. and colophon: . . . et ideo semper verum intelligit. Ratio universalis dicitur quod omni philosopho est benefaciendum. De sensu et sensato.

10) f. 189v—196v. [Richardus Billingham], *Speculum puerorum*. Superscription: Incipit tractatus quidam valde bonus, qui intitulatur terminus in quem speculum puerorum.

Inc. [T]erminus est in quem resolvitur propositio ut subiectum . . .

Expl. and colophon: . . . et possibile est esse post sui corruptionem. sed ista est falsa. igitur et illa. amen. Explicit tractatus qui dicitur terminus in quem resolvitur propositio speculum puerorum.

¹⁴ *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIII^e siècle*, Paris 1933, I 75 = Albertus Magnus dl, and II 74 = Roger Bacon bz.

¹⁵ *The writings of Robert Grosseteste*, Cambridge 1940, 83.

Both in the inscription and the colophon the scribe confuses the title of this Nominalistic tract with its *incipit*.¹⁶

11) f. 197r—204r. Walter Burleigh, [*De puritate artis logicae tractatus brevior*].

Inscription: Incipiunt consequentie Borlei.

Inc. [U]t iuvenes in quolibet problemate disputantes possint esse exercitati . . .

Expl. . . venit fatigatus hodie in scolis sedet coronatus. This "explicit" must be an addition of a scribe.

P. Boehner published the tract on the faith of two manuscripts.¹⁷ The codex of Assisi however ought also to be considered, although it is posterior to the already known codices.¹⁸ The reason why it escaped the attention of the learned scholar is probably that the title given by the manuscript is "consequentie Borlei," and that the catalogue of Mazzatinti treated the work as part of the *Speculum puerorum*.¹⁹

12) f. 204r—221r. [Anonym] *Opus plurium questionum et solutionum super Donatum et magistrum Theobaldum*

Superscription: Incipit opus plurium quaestionum et solutionum super (praescientiam et *add. sed del.*) Donatum et magistrum Theobaldum de sensis.

Inc. [P]oeta quae est pars? Nomen est etc. Quia longus sermo solet esse . . .

Expl. and colophon: . . . quia declinatio in fine cognoscitur. De partibus ordinis. Hec sophismata sufficiant. Explicit opus plurium quaestionum super Donatum et magistrum Theobaldum.

Possibly we are dealing with two works or at least two parts of one work, because on f. 216r we read the superscription: Incipiunt plures questiones et solutiones supra summam magistri Theobaldi. The *explicit* of the first work, or part, is then, f. 216r: . . . ut coniungant vel disiungant et sic cessat obiectio; and the *incipit* of the second, f. 216r: [Q]ueritur primo quare actio determinavit prius de subiecto . . .

Donatus is the well known Latin grammarian of the 4th century. Theobald of Siena, also called of Piacenza, is an author of the 12th century.²⁰

¹⁶ Of Richard Billingham little is known; see E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, New York 1955, 511 (and F. Ehrle to whom he refers).

¹⁷ Walter Burleigh, *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior* with a revised edition of the *Tractatus brevior*, St. Bonaventure 1955, 190—260.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, XVI; they are both of the 14th century.

¹⁹ *Loc. cit.* 135; actually he treats f. 189—225 as containing nothing but the *Speculum puerorum*; cfr. our Items 10—13.

²⁰ M. Manitius, *Geschichte der Lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters* III, Munich 1931, 730—734, speaks of a Theobald of Siena, who also is called

13) f. 221r—226r. An anonymous work without superscription. Inc. [Q]uid est oratio? est congrua dictionum ordinatio, vel aliter oratio... Expl. Et Ovidius: Quam michi misisti verbis Leandre salutem.

Folio 226v remained blank.

14) f. 227r. Thirteen verses in a handwriting which does not otherwise appear in the codex. Inc. Anglorum regi scribit tota scola Salerni... The poem, called "de regimine sanitatis," is known to exist in some 45 manuscripts.²¹ Ours is to be added to these.

15) f. 227v—246v. William Ockham, *Tractatus logicae minor*. Inc. Loyca cum dicatur a logos, quod est sermo, et ideo merito latine sermocinatio...

Expl. and colophon: ... propositio affirmativa vel negativa, formata ex eisdem, sit vera vel concedenda. Explicit minor tractatus nove loyce fratris Gwilemi ocham. Deo gratias. amen. — Then follows a phrase, written in the same hand, but without indication where it belongs, possibly it was omitted somewhere in the tract: omnis propositio includens contradictionem potest inferre quodlibet illorum, ut tantum pater est, ergo non tantum pater est; tu scis te esse hominem, ergo tu scis te non esse lapidem.

Since this is the tract we are editing here, a few particulars may be given. The very first letter is written in black and red, and a certain amount of red is used throughout the tract to enliven the writing. The script itself is not too handsome and the contractions are numerous in accordance with the common style of the 15th century. The text is, however, on the whole good. The scribe usually understood what he was writing and frequently corrected himself immediately as he became aware he was making a mistake. A few additional corrections are due to a second hand; this corrector, however, paid less attention to the section on fallacies, which corresponds almost to one half of the entire tract. On the first pages of the work we read a few short marginal notes; they seem to be a reader's observations, sometimes introduced by the word "sup[p]le."

16) f. 251r—257v. Paulus of Pergola, *Tractatus de sensu composito et diviso*.

Placentinus or Parisiensis, and 734—735, of a Theobald (of Piacenza?). Both are of the 12th century but I am unable to make out which one is intended by our codex. It is probably the first, as the name is identical and a gloss on his work was written in the 13th—14th century; *ibid.* 733.

²¹ H. Walter, *Initia carminum et versuum medii aevi posterioris latinorum*, Göttingen 1959, 53.

Superscription: Christus Iesus. Compositionis et divisionis precolendi ac eximii artium doctoris magistri pauli pergulensis tractatus feliciter incipit. Inc. Cum sepe numero cogitarem non mediocrem iuvenibus fructum afferre . . .

Expl. . . . quod est subiectum quia sunt talia.

The tract has been re-printed recently,²² but, among others, the manuscript of Assisi should be considered, especially as it contains the work of Paul as copied during the lifetime of the author (d. 1451).

17) f. 258r—265v. William of Heytesbury (d. circa 1380), *Tractatus de sensu composito et diviso*.

Superscription: Christus Iesus maria beata. Franciscus. Incipit tractatus de sensu composito et diviso secundum Thisberium.

Inc. Arguendo a sensu composito ad sensum divisum et e converso saepe . . .

Expl. and colophon: . . . dicta sufficient ad utilitatem iuvenilium scholarium. Deo gratias. Explicit tractatus hesberi de sensu composito et diviso.

It is followed by two notes, probably forgotten in the course of the work. Heytesbury, or Thisberius as he was frequently called in the middle ages, still interests modern research.²³

18) f. 266r—297v. Cicero, *Rhetorica* in Italian translation.

Superscription: Christus Iesus. Maria. Franciscus. Prohemio della rhetorica nuova di Tulio translata per volare.

Inc. Advegna che per li impedimenti delle facende familiare . . .

Expl. and colophon: . . . in del tempio de Iove si redusse. Explicit rhetorica Marci Tullii Ciceronis in vulgare translata. Sit laus et gloria patri et filio et spiritui sancto.

19) f. 298r—304v. Leonardus Polarus, [*De arte memorativa*].

Superscription: Iesus.

Inc. [A]rs memorativa duobus perficitur, locis videlicet et ymaginibus . . .

Expl. and colophon: . . . ad finem manuductus fuerunt. pro nunc hec sufficient. Leonardus polarus virtute incliti atque mirifi[ci] fuit ingenii. recollegit sub doctissimo viro, viro magno petro huius artis novissimo dylacitatorum (*read dialecticorum?*) Explicit feliciter. deo gratias amen.

We have been unable to discover anything about this Leonard, but

²² Paul of Pergula, *Logica* and *Tractatus de sensu composito et diviso*, edit. M. A. Brown, St. Bonaventure 1961, 149—158 (text), and X—XI (list of manuscripts and editions).

²³ E. g. C. Wilson, William Heytesbury, *Medieval logic and the rise of mathematical physics*, Madison Wis. 1956; see also Prant, op. cit. IV, 89—93.

he seems to have been a disciple of Peter of Mantua,²⁴ and consequently practically a contemporary of our manuscript.

Folio 305 is blank.

20) f. 306r—313v. Alphabetical index to all the preceding parts of the manuscript; incomplete.

21) f. 314r—319r. *Termini notabiles seu physicales editi per magnum Albertum*; thus the inscription.

Inc. *Natura est principium motus et quietis eius in quo est . . .*

To be compared with the *incipit* of Item 3 of our manuscript. Since the end of the codex has suffered much from dampness, the *explicit* is simply unreadable. Due to the fact that this item seems to repeat a work already contained in the manuscript, although possibly in another version, and as it is preceded by a general analytical index to the manuscript, it may be queried whether Item 21 originally belonged to the codex.

F. 319v—320r are blank and f. 320v is illegible.

In brief we may say that the manuscript is of Italian and Franciscan origin, composed around 1436, philosophical in content but with a marked preference for matters of logic and grammar. That the codex is of Italian origin is sufficiently proved by the presence of Cicero's *Rhetorica* in Italian. The Franciscan origin is proved not so much by the fact that the manuscript comes from Portiuncula, but rather by the invocations to St. Francis on f. 82v, 163r, 258r and 266r. As to the date, the second Item was finished on January 25, 1436; not counting the foreign elements such as Item 6, 14 and possibly 21, the remainder of the manuscript seems to be contemporary with Items 1—2. This conclusion has its importance for the tract of Ockham, but especially for the one of Paulus Pergulensis because it would prove that it had been redacted before 1436.

For the history of logic, the main interest of the codex lies in the fact that it contains the tracts of Armand of Belvézer, Richard Billingham, Burleigh, Ockham, Heytesbury, and Leonardus Polarus, all of which are poorly attested by the codices.

W = Würzburg, Library of the Conventual Fathers, Codex I. 63.²⁵

This lost manuscript was mostly of paper, with a few parchment folios, and dated from the very beginning of the 15th century.²⁶ It contained 313 folios, written by several hands and in different styles.

²⁴ On Petrus Mantuanus, see Prantl, *ibid.* 176—180.

²⁵ See note 5.

²⁶ Ludger Meier, *loc. cit.* 193, says that the manuscript was of the 15th century, but parts of the codex are dated 1403 (p. 197) and 1404 (p. 199, twice).

The codex contained matters of an academic nature, philosophical and theological, but to a large extent of local importance, namely special lectures of the professors and exercises of the students.

The first item of the codex, f. 11r—12r was the *Tractatus minor* of Ockham, the *incipit* of which coincided with the one of the Assisi manuscript. This copy apparently also began without an inscription and without giving the title of the treatise or the name of its author. The *explicit* was slightly longer than the one of Assisi:²⁷ “Vel negativa formata ex eisdem sit vera vel . . . [?] universaliter tenenda,” which, compared with the Assisi codex, ought to have read: “vel negativa formata ex eisdem sit vera vel *concedenda et* universaliter tenenda.” The colophon of the tract is of greater importance: “Explicit compendium logicae Oquam collectum ab eodem et scriptum . . . [?] per manus Fratris Hugonis Kuenemani A. D. 1345 circa . . . Simonis et Iudae;”²⁸ on which L. Meier judiciously observes that the Würzburg codex was a copy of a model which was dated 1345, and that the tract, notwithstanding the poor spelling, was attributed to William Ockham. Meier goes on to add that nothing further is known of Friar Hugo Künemann other than that he must have been a German Franciscan, who copied a work redacted by Ockham in Munich or lectures of Ockham delivered in Munich.

II. AUTHENTICITY OF THE TRACT

The authenticity of the *Tractatus logicae minor* has been established by P. Boehner,²⁹ with a high degree of probability. We shall here summarize his arguments, and while correcting some and further confirming others, we shall add our own observations.

In favor of authenticity, we have the uncontested attribution made by two independent manuscripts. Due, however, to the fact that there are only two manuscripts, it may seem at a first glance not too weighty an argument in favor of the authenticity of the work, even given the absence of contestation. But *testes sunt ponderandi*, in ancient literature as much as in Law. The tract has at least one important witness, the manuscript of Würzburg, which goes back to a codex apparently written by a Franciscan of Southern Germany, a contemporary of the elderly Ockham who at that time was living in Munich. The authenticity, more-

²⁷ *Ibid.* 194; cfr. *infra*, p. 52.

²⁸ The feast of the apostles Simon and Judas is celebrated in the Latin liturgy on October 28.

²⁹ Article quoted in note 3.

over, of the *Tractatus minor* will be strengthened if the *Elementarium*, also called "tractatus medius," is proved to be by Ockham, because the very terminology "tractatus medius" presupposes that a *Tractatus minor* was known to the scribe of the *Elementarium*. On this point, external criticism favors the authenticity of the *Elementarium*, of which also there do not exist competing attributions. The copy in Munich, clm 4379 was written by a Friar Frederick of Nördlingen, between July 17, 1347 and January 18, 1348, while he was a student in Constance (Switzerland), and Frederick attributes the work not less than eleven times to Ockham.

In order to establish our claims in the present matter, it will perhaps be helpful here to say a word or two on the Franciscans of Germany in the 14th century, especially for such readers who may not be acquainted with the organization of the Franciscan Order in general and of that time in particular, as well as furnish further details concerning Frederick of Nördlingen and his codex.

The Franciscan Order is divided into administrative and legislative units, called Provinces. In the days of Ockham, every Province was divided into smaller administrative sections, called Custodies, which numbered several houses or friaries. Germany proper,³⁰ that is, as distinct from the so-called Roman Empire, had five Provinces: the *Saxonia* Province (Westphalia and Northern Germany), the Province of Lower Germany or Cologne Province (Lower Rhine, the Netherlands and the north-eastern portion of Belgium), the *Provincia Alemanniae Superioris* or Strasbourg Province (Alsacia, Luxemburg, Southern Germany and Switzerland), and the Provinces of Bohemia and Austria. The Strasbourg Province had six Custodies: Alsacia, Rhine, Bavaria, Swabia, Constance and Basle.³¹ Of the cities mentioned in the subsequent discussion it is to be noted that Würzburg belonged to the Custody of Swabia, Munich to Bavaria, Constance, of course, to the Custody of the Lake of Constance. Nördlingen is a city in Swabia.

³⁰ To be excluded is Italy; also the Scandinavian countries, although the *Saxonia* started a Franciscan Province there; to be included are parts of eastern France and Belgium, all of the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Switzerland, Austria, etc.

³¹ According to the statistics of 1316, c. 1340, c. 1384 and c. 1390, as given by H. Holzapfel, *The History of the Franciscan Order*, transl. A. Tebisar and G. Brinkmann, Teutopolis 1948, 131, the Strasbourg Province retained these six Custodies throughout the 14th century, while the number of friaries fluctuated between 49 and 54. The black death of the late forties did not change the Province much, although, according to N. Glassberger's *Chronica* (Analecta Franciscana II) Quaracchi 1887, 184, the epidemic killed about two-thirds of the Friars of the Order.

With these reflections before us we shall now give more details of external criticism on the *Elementarium* and its copyist, Frederick of Nördlingen. The codex clm 4379 of the Staatsbibliothek of Munich was formerly n. 79 of St. Ulrich in Augsburg.³² It is a paper manuscript in quarto of the 14th century, and has 239 folios. Of interest to us are folios 32r—220v, because it is precisely these folios of the codex that were written by Frederick. The part mentioned contains exclusively philosophical works, among them, on f. 135ra—189vb, the *Elementarium*, which the copyist attributes, as we have already pointed out, not less than eleven times to Ockham. Moreover, the scribe furnishes more details about himself, which make him for our present purpose an important witness; a thorough analysis of these details is therefore necessary.

On f. 130vb, after finishing his copy of *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior* of Walter Burleigh,³³ the scribe adds:

Explicit loyca magistri waltheri Burley anglici, scripta et completa in Constantia anno domini m^o ccc^o xlvii^o. In die beati Alexii confessoris etc. et qui hunc inveniatur fratri fridrico de nordlingen reddat.

Except for the place, Constance, and the date, July 17, 1347, this note could be considered ambiguous, were it not for the provisional table of contents covering the last fourteen lines of f. 197vb, and written by the scribe himself (who wrote everything else from f. 32 to f. 220, whether the ink is red or black):³⁴

In isto volumine continentur hec subscripta, videlicet conclusiones libri methaphisice. conclusiones libri phisicorum. principium philosophie cum divisione librorum naturalium et loycalium. propositiones totius philosophie et loyce conclusiones. quidam tractatus brevis de posituris. alius tractatus johannis coloniensis de posituris. quidam tractatus fallaciarum brevis et utilis. Item de quibus tractant liber de anima et perihermenias et alii libri loycales et hoc sub compendio. Item quedam theologialis et loycalis questio et solu-

³² See for instance the small ticket on the back of the manuscript, which reads: "Aug. S. Ulr. 79". — The codex will be fully described in another article.

³³ The manuscript was used by P. Boehner in the edition mentioned in note 17, but again wrongly as clm 1060; cfr. *ed. cit.* XV. The codex is described in *Catalogus codicum Latinorum bibliothecae regiae Monacensis*, edit. alt., Tomi I pars II, codices num. 2501—5250 complectens, Munich 1894, 182—183; it appears that the library number of our codex is "clm 4379", but in each volume of the *Catalogus* the codices are given a second marginal number, according to the place the manuscript occupies in that volume; thus, in the present volume, our manuscript has been given the marginal number "1060", which does not make it "clm 1060" since every volume of the *Catalogus* has in its marginal numbering a n. 1060, not of course a "clm 1060" of which there is only one, described in "Tomi I pars I".

³⁴ In the present case it is red. Frederick is a little inconsistent in the use of red ink. But the main point for us is that everything is written by Frederick himself and that no appeal was made to a professional rubricist.

tio una. Item loyca burley, cum declarationibus quarumdam propositionum communium cum regulis libri priorum. Item loyca okkam, cum expositione propositionum communium et conclusionibus libri posteriorum. Hec collecta sunt per fratrem fridricum de nördlinga prout studente in constantia. anno d. m. ccc. xlvij^o In catedra petri apostoli.

The "index" reads very much like a mediaeval library catalogue. Yet it is accurate; it describes what we find on fol. 35—197, nothing more and nothing less.³⁵ Even very small items, such as the tract on accents, which covers less than one folio,³⁶ are found in the index. More important for us, however, than this overall accuracy, is the fact that whenever the author of one of the tracts is identified (we omit Ockham for the time being), the identification is proved to be correct. The most obvious is the logic of Burleigh, of which a dozen manuscripts are known to exist. The other identification made here, "johannis coloniensis," is also correct. John of Cologne, O. F. M., indeed wrote the tract on figures of speech, entitled *Tractatus de posituris*.³⁷ Thirdly, what the index calls "some theological and logical question," is identified in the body of the manuscript as a question of "Franciscus de Provincia."³⁸ It is, in fact, the ninth question of the first *Quodlibet* of the famous Franciscan, born in Provence, Francis of Meyronnes.³⁹ Thus, the correctness of these three attributions is a strong indication that the *Elementarium* really is by Ockham.

The scribe, Frederick, worked in Constance and calls himself a Friar. Does it follow that he was a Franciscan? Not necessarily, because besides the Franciscans, other Mendicants lived in Constance in those days, namely the Dominicans and the Augustinians.⁴⁰ However, the works of Franciscans in the codex, even the small and almost unknown treatise of John of Cologne, point to a scribe working in a Franciscan school, and a Franciscan himself. It may well be that the *Tractatus longior* of Burleigh was in the library on account of Ockham's interest in the author, as could also be the case for the Assisi ms. 690. Again, the

³⁵ Frederick wrote the folios 32—34 later, as I shall prove elsewhere.

³⁶ F. 86ra—va; the preceding work ends on f. 86ra and the next starts on f. 86va.

³⁷ Cfr. F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium biblicum Medii Aevi* III, Madrid 1951, 323—324. Add to Stegmüller: Munich clm 4379, f. 86vb—91rb. — Our codex repeats the attribution on f. 86va, 86vb and 91rb.

³⁸ F. 97rb first in black, then in red "questio francisci de provincia". The text of the "questio" covers f. 96rb—97rb.

³⁹ Cfr. P. Glorieux, *La Littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320* II (Bibliothèque Thomiste 21) Paris 1935, 89; add to Glorieux: Munich clm 4379, f. 96rb—97rb.

⁴⁰ R. Mols, 'Constance (Diocèse)', in DHGE 13, Paris 1956, col. 538: the Franciscans since around 1240, the Dominicans since 1235 and the Augustinians from around 1270. The city was under papal interdict, with short interruption from about 1330 until 1349, *ibid.* col. 548.

Tract on Formalities and Scotus' Prologue to his Commentary on the Metaphysics, contained anonymously in clm 4379, indicate a Franciscan scribe.⁴¹

Assuming therefore — and not without reason — that Frederick of Nördlingen was a Franciscan,⁴² it must be concluded that he belonged to a rebellious Province or Custody which had taken sides with Ockham, since the friary of Constance only returned to the fold on July 6, 1348.⁴³ In other words, Frederick either belonged to the Custody of Constance, or to another rebellious Custody in Germany, very probably to the Custody of his own native Swabia, as it seems most unlikely that a non-rebellious Province or Custody would send a student to dissident Constance.⁴⁴ As a resident of the Constance friary, Frederick would certainly have known Ockham, the most notorious Friar in the Strasbourg Province, and until 1348, Vicar General of the dissident faction of the Order.⁴⁵ As will be seen then, this makes the scribe's attribution of the *Elementarium* to Ockham a very solid one. If, therefore, our knowledge of the scribe of the Würzburg codex were something more than the scanty detail that he was a German Franciscan, then an induction similar to the one made in regard to the *Elementarium*, might also be made in regard to the *Tractatus logicae minor*.

It has been stated that the codex clm 4379 ascribes the *Elementarium* to Ockham eleven times. The first occasion is found in the "index." The second is in the inscription, f. 135r (in red): "Incipit loyca magistri Gwilhelmi Okkam ordinis fratrum minorum, scilicet tractatus medius." The third and fourth are in the colophon: (in black) "Explicit loyca magistri wilhelmi Okkam ordinis fratrum minorum;" then in red:

⁴¹ Tract on Formalities (here anonymous, elsewhere attributed to Antonius Andreas or Nicholas Bonetus) f. 32ra—34rb and 203va—207rb; Prologue of Scotus, f. 220rb.

⁴² That Frederick would have been a Dominican seems to be most unlikely, since the Dominicans never joined the rebellion of Louis of Bavaria, and they would have kept Ockham's work out of a student's hands. This leaves the possibility that Frederick was either an Augustinian or a Franciscan. The latter seems to be more likely on account of the Franciscan works in the codex.

⁴³ Cfr. J. Hofer, 'Biographische Studien über Wilhelm von Ockham O. F. M.' in AFH 6 (1913) 655, note 3, where it is added that the Franciscans of Frankfurt am Main, Zürich and Strasbourg held out until 1350.

⁴⁴ Exchange of teachers and students between Provinces, even of different countries, was not uncommon; exchanges between Custodies inside one Province must have been frequent. Yet it seems unlikely that superiors would have compromised the future of their students, not to mention their own reputation, by sending their subjects to dissident friaries.

⁴⁵ Until he returned the seal of the Order to the legitimate General, probably in April 1348. See L. Baudry, *Guillaume d'Occam*, Sa vie, ses oeuvres, ses idées sociales et politiques I, Paris 1950, 241.

"Explicit medius tractatus loyce magistri gwilhelmi okkam." The others are found in the running titles, which, incidentally, testify to the keen mind and clear method of the scribe. The *Elementarium* is divided by its author into eight books. Whenever the codex is opened, the reader is immediately aware of which book he is reading, and what is the title of the book, because on top of the pages he always finds, once or twice: "primus — de terminis," "secundus — de propositionibus," . . . "octavus — de fallaciis." Whenever a new book starts, that is books two to eight, the name "okkam" is found consistently between number and title of the book, as for instance f. 143rb, "tertius — okkam — De suppositionibus," or f. 155r "sextus — okkam — de inductione."⁴⁶ There was no doubt in the mind of the scribe that he was copying a work of Ockham.

In summary then, external evidence favors the authenticity of both the *Tractatus minor* and the *Elementarium*, and the appellative "tractatus medius" given to the *Elementarium* strengthens our belief that in the mind of Frederick a *Tractatus minor* did exist. The problem remains: was it the treatise contained in the Assisi ms. 690? To answer this question we must recur to internal criteria.

The problem might be formulated in the following way: does the doctrine of the *Tractatus minor* agree with the teachings of the *Summa logicae* (and the *Elementarium*) of Ockham? Is not the *Tractatus minor* an abbreviation either of the *Summa* or of the *Elementarium*? Let us take the second question first.

The *Tractatus minor* is not an abbreviation of the *Summa logicae*, and the first proof of this is the plan of both works. P. Boehner has indicated that the division of the *Summa* is distinct from the division of the logical works of Petrus Hispanus, John Buridan, Walter Burleigh and Albert of Saxony.⁴⁷ The *Summa* of Ockham is divided as follows:

I. De terminis

1. de terminis in genere, 17 chapters
2. de quinque praedicabilibus Porphyrii, 8
3. de categoriis seu de praedicamentis, 36 or 37
4. de suppositione, 15

⁴⁶ Here is the full list, replacing the spaces between the words by a dash:
 f. 139r secundus — okkam — de propositionibus
 f. 143rb tertius — okkam — de suppositionibus
 f. 148rb quartus — okkam — de sillogismis
 f. 155v quintus — okkam — de inductione
 f. 157rb sextus — okkam — de locis seu consequentiis
 f. 163vb septimus — de demonstratione, and f. 164r okkam — de demonstratione
 f. 169vb octavus — okkam, and f. 170r de fallaciis.

⁴⁷ *Medieval Logic*. An outline of its development from 1250 to c. 1400, Chicago 1952, 77—93.

- II. De propositionibus
 - 1. de propositionibus categoricis, 20 chapters
 - 2. de conversione, 8
 - 3. de propositionibus hypotheticis, 8
- III. De syllogismis
 - 1. in genere, 68 chapters
 - 2. de demonstratione, 41
 - 3. de consequentiis (including de inductione),⁴⁸ 37 chapters
 - 4. de obligatione, 7
 - 5. de insolubilibus, 1
 - 6. de fallaciis, 18.

The manuscript of the *Tractatus logicae minor* has no plan, but analyzing the text we obtain the following schema:

- I. De terminis, f. 227v—229v
- II. De propositionibus, f. 230r—232v
- III. De suppositione, f. 232v—233r
- IV. De argumentis, f. 233r—236v
 - 1. de syllogismis, f. 233r—236v
 - 2. de inductione, f. 236r—v
- V. De locis seu de consequentiis, f. 236v—238v
- VI. De fallaciis, f. 238v—246v.

This plan is not that of Petrus Hispanus, Walter Burleigh, etc., but nor is it the one of the *Summa logicae* of Ockham either; demonstration,⁴⁹ obligation and the insolvable are not treated; supposition is taken out of the section on terms and put after "proposition;" in the section on proposition no particular part is devoted to "conversion," although conversion of the different types of categorical propositions is described; induction is not only separated from the tract on consequences but put before it; finally, fallacies are treated proportionately more than in the *Summa*.

The plan of the *Elementarium* comes much closer to the *Tractatus minor*:

- Lib. I. De terminis, f. 135rb—139ra
 - 1. in genere, f. 135rb—136vb
 - 2. de universalibus, f. 136vb—138rb
 - 3. de praedicamentis, f. 138rb—139ra
- Lib. II. De propositionibus, f. 139ra—143rb
 - 1. de categoricis, f. 139rb—142vb
 - 2. de hypotheticis, f. 142vb—143rb

⁴⁸ III—3, c. 31—35, edit. Venice 1508, 89rb—91ra.

⁴⁹ Demonstration is a very difficult topic in the Logic of Ockham. Maybe he considered it too difficult for beginners.

Lib. III. De suppositionibus, f. 143rb—148rb

Lib. IV. De syllogismis, f. 148rb—155va

Lib. V. De inductione, f. 155va—157rb

Lib. VI. De locis, f. 157rb—163vb

Lib. VII. De demonstratione, f. 163vb—169vb

Lib. VIII. De fallaciis, f. 169vb—189vb.

The arrangement here is the same as in the *Tractatus minor*, except that the treatise on demonstration is retained by the *Elementarium*. Again we notice the emphasis on fallacies. Is, then, the *Tractatus minor* an abbreviation of the *Elementarium*? It certainly is not an "abbreviatio" as this was understood in the 12th—14th centuries, just as in this sense the *Elementarium* is not an abbreviation of the *Summa logicae*. In the "flores," "excerpta," "abbreviationes," "notabilia" of those times, be they the excerpts which Abelard made of the *Retractationes* of St. Augustine, or the excerpts made by the scholars of the papal Curia for the benefit of John XXII, the original can always be followed easily, since entire phrases were copied and the abbreviator left aside only what he considered of minor importance. In our case we can practically never put the three "Summa" side by side and say that one was copied from the other. They read rather in such a way as to indicate that the author possessed his subject matter fully and was able to put it in different, although similar phrases. Furthermore, the *Elementarium*, especially in the treatise on fallacies, has a tendency to go beyond the *Summa logicae* and the *Tractatus minor*, whereas the latter in such cases goes beyond the *Summa* and sometimes even beyond the *Elementarium*.⁵⁰ It must be added that the author of the *Elementarium* refers to a "logica" he has written, which is the *Summa* in certain cases, but which can only be the *Tractatus minor* in others.⁵¹ Consequently the *Tractatus* cannot be called an abbreviation of the *Summa* or of the *Elementarium* even in the more modern sense of the term "abbreviation."

Since the authenticity of the *Summa logicae* is undisputed, and since further, the codices attribute the other tracts to Ockham, may it not be that the doctrine of the three "Summa" is such that they could have been written by the same author — namely Ockham? P. Boehner has studied the problem, especially in regard to the doctrine on fallacies, on which the smaller works go beyond the *Summa*, and in regard to material implication, on which the doctrine of the *Summa* is more developed.⁵²

⁵⁰ P. Boehner, 'Three Sums of logic attributed to William Ockham,' in *Collected articles on Ockham*, 83—93.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 79, 85, 88.
⁵² P. Boehner, 'Does Ockham know of material implication', in *Collected articles on Ockham*, 319—351.

Of the two it was the latter point which was to P. Boehner practically of greater importance, since he was originally of the opinion that in this matter there was a contradiction between the "Summa."⁵³ Yet on both counts he reached the conclusion that there is no conflict, but only difference in emphasis, and he drew the same conclusion when he compared the *Expositio super libros Elenchorum* of Ockham with the newly discovered tracts.⁵⁴

For the moment then we leave the question. In conclusion we may safely say that the elements of external and internal criticism combined point to Ockham as the author of the *Tractatus logicae minor*.

III. DATE OF COMPOSITION

In the opinion of P. Boehner the *Summa logicae* was completed at Avignon between 1324 and 1327.⁵⁵ On the other hand, however, if we consider the different statements which the same author made about the date of the *Tractatus minor* and the *Elementarium*, we may conclude that he was of the opinion that the *Tractatus minor* was composed between 1330 and 1346, or 1330 and about 1340, and the *Elementarium* between 1330 and 1348 or between 1340 and 1348.⁵⁶ The question is now whether or not these dates can be retained or even possibly be made more precise.

First, P. Boehner rightfully appealed to the *Elementarium* in dating the *Tractatus minor*, but we reject as false one of the reasons he alleged, namely, the terminology "tractatus minor-tractatus medius."⁵⁷ The expression "tractatus medius" was probably not coined by Ockham himself. We find it in the inscription of Frederick of Nördlingen, "scilicet tractatus medius," and in the second colophon, "Explicit medius tractatus loyce . . .," apparently as a clarification made by a scribe.⁵⁸ But once the three "Summa" existed, whether the *Tractatus minor* was written before the *Elementarium* or vice versa, anyone who knew the three "Summa" and their comparative length could have coined the expression "tractatus medius." Consequently, this name alone solves nothing. A

⁵³ P. Boehner, 'Three Sums . . .,' *ed. cit.* 96.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.* 88—89, 93—94.

⁵⁵ William Ockham, *Summa logicae*, *ed. cit.* I, p. XII; P. Boehner, 'Three Sums . . .,' *ed. cit.* 74.

⁵⁶ Cfr. 'Der Stand der Ockham-Forschung', in *Collected articles* 11—12, and 'Three Sums . . .,' *ibid.* 80 (here he suggests that the *Tractatus minor* would have been composed before 1340, the *Elementarium* after that date).

⁵⁷ 'Three Sums . . .,' *ed. cit.* 83.

⁵⁸ Cfr. *supra* p. 48.

more valid reason for accepting the chronological order *Tractatus minor-Elementarium* is that texts of the latter, as stated above, seem to refer to the former.

Since the *Elementarium* constitutes a *terminus ante quem* of the *Tractatus minor*, when, then, was the *Elementarium* composed? Certainly it was not composed later than 1347, because Frederick had copied it, at Constance, late in 1347 or during the first two-three weeks of 1348.⁵⁹ Presuming therefore, that Frederick transcribed from a copy made immediately — in the chronological sense — of the autograph, it may rightly be concluded that the *Elementarium* was composed at the very latest in 1347.

Other elements which help in dating the *Elementarium* are the following. The author says that he is "very busy," and therefore that he cannot write without interruptions;⁶⁰ he claims that he is composing the work "upon repeated request,"⁶¹ he makes reference to the *Summa logicae* as written "long ago,"⁶² in an example he refers to Italy as "rebellious to the emperor,"⁶³ once he expresses himself as a disabused man;⁶⁴ and the treatise is known only among the Friars of Germany and even there unable to compete with the *Summa logicae*. All these elements point to the period which Ockham spent at Munich (from 1330 onward), and, we think, more to the later years of the author; in other words to a date closer to the year 1347 than to the year 1330.

⁵⁹ Cfr. "index" *supra*, p. 12—13. The *Elementarium* is the last but one item transcribed. Between f. 130vb and f. 197vb six months elapsed, and of these 67 folios most contain the *Elementarium*, f. 135ra—189vb. Of course, we do not know what else Frederick was doing during those months which include the summer recess.

⁶⁰ *Incipit* of the treatise, f. 135ra: "Occupationibus, quas interrumpere mihi durum est, paucas per vices lucubratione morulas interponens... praesens duxi opusculum componendum, quod poterit *Elementarium* appellari..."

⁶¹ Beginning of the Epilogue, f. 189rb: Haec de logica, saepe rogatus a pluribus, compendiose perscripsi..."

⁶² In conclusion of the sixth book, on consequences, f. 163vb: Haec de locis ad praesens sufficient. Multa autem, quae omittuntur, in *Logica* quam dudum edidi... qui voluerit poterit invenire. — The notion of "long ago" is, of course quite relative and I hesitate here to speculate how many years this "dudum" of Ockham would mean.

⁶³ In the eighth book, on fallacies, f. 171vb: ... sicut ad habendum sensum improprium istius orationis 'Italia est rebellis imperatori' sufficit sic dicere 'Italici sunt rebelles imperatori'.

⁶⁴ In concluding his description of the second mode of equivocation, Ockham vigorously attacks the Byzantine terminology of the Scotists, f. 172vb, and he concludes on f. 173ra: "... ab antiquo adolevit modus loquendi improprius ut vix a quoquam valeat evitare. Quod scio mihi saepius accidisse scienter vel et brevitatis causa vel conformando me modo loquendi communi, etiam improprie locutus proprie. Propter quod forte aliqui in quibusdam dictis meis vel mihi contradictionem imponent, quae per distinctionem solvi debet, vel ab intentione mea penitus discordabunt."

What then are we to conclude regarding the date of the *Tractatus minor*? In the absence of an Epilogue to the tract and with only an impersonal Prologue, we are less informed about this treatise than about the *Elementarium*. The *terminus ante quem*, 28 October 1345, appears to be certain, although this depends on the faithfulness of the copyist from around 1400, and, with all due respect, of the notes of Ludger Meier. The *Tractatus minor*, too, was apparently exclusively known in the South, and, doctrinally, it stands closer to the *Elementarium* than to the *Summa logicae* (completed in 1324—1327) and the *Expositio super libros Elenchorum* (written at Oxford, apparently after the first redaction of the *Commentary on the Sentences*, but before the final redaction of the *Ordinatio*). Again we are lead to believe that it was composed at Munich.

With so much said, we are back almost (though not quite) at the point where we started, namely the *Tractatus minor* would have been composed between 1330 and 1345, and the *Elementarium* after the *Tractatus* but not later than 1347. To narrow this down let us consider the stay of Ockham at Munich during the years 1330—1347. The years of comparative peace, not occupied by the redaction of polemical works, are 1330—1332, 1335—1337 and 1342—1347.⁶⁵ The little publicity which the tracts received favors the years 1342—1347, or to be more accurate for the *Tractatus minor*, the years 1342—1345, and for the *Elementarium*, 1342—1347, but after the *Tractatus minor*. The fact that precisely during those years Ockham was the “de facto” Vicar General or supreme head of the dissident faction of the Franciscan Order does not constitute a serious objection against such a date, because the dissidence was decidedly beyond its height, and it is questionable whether the light amount of administration which was left, could fully occupy the time and the mind of Ockham.

IV. THE EDITION

Because of the lack of other manuscripts, this edition is based solely upon the codex of Assisi 690. For the sake of completeness we have added the few words which, due to Ludger Meier, are known from lost Würzburg codex. The text of the Assisi manuscript has been retouched as little as possible, and an attempt has been made to give every detail of the text proper. Marginal notes, however, which did not seem to have any bearing on the text, have been omitted.

⁶⁵ See Baudry, *Guillaume d'Occam*, 246—247.

The few references which the text makes to its sources have been identified and inserted among the variants. Cross-references to other works of Ockham will be added to the definitive edition. In the meantime the *Lexique philosophique de Guillaume d'Ockham* by L. Baudry will help the interested reader.⁶⁶

I think that the following more detailed survey of the tract may be useful to the student:

Prologue	
I. De terminis	
A. Divisiones terminorum diversae	
B. De universalibus	
C. De praedicamentis	
II. De propositionibus	
A. De categoricis	
B. De hypotheticis	
III. De suppositionibus	
IV. De argumentis	
A. De syllogismis	
1. De syllogismis sine determinatione in specie	
2. De syllogismis cum determinatione in specie	
3. De variis syllogismi speciebus	
B. De inductione	
V. De locis et de regulis consequentiarum	
A. Regulae generales	
B. Regulae speciales	
C. Regulae speciales de locis ab oppositis	
VI. De fallaciis	
A. Fallaciae in dictione	
1. Aequivocatio	
2. Amphibologia	
3.—4. Compositio et divisio	
5. Accentus	
6. Figura dictionis	
B. Fallacia extra dictionem	
1. Accidens	
2. Consequens	

⁶⁶ Paris 1958. — It is hoped that the present edition will bring to light one or more other codices of the tract.

3. Secundum quid et simpliciter
4. Secundum ignorantiam elenchi
5. Petitio principii
6. Non causa ut causa
7. Plures interrogationes ut unam facere.

Abbreviations used:

A = Assisi, Biblioteca Comunale, Vetus 690.

Ac = corrector of A (indicated only when it is certain that a correction was made by somebody who was not the original scribe).

W = Würzburg, Conventuals, Codex I. 63 (for the few words published by L. Meier).

[GUILIELMI OCKHAM TRACTATUS LOGICAE MINOR]

[PROLOGUS]

A 227 v

Logica cum dicatur¹ a *logos*, quod est sermo, et ideo merito Latine sermocinalis et rationalis scientia appellatur. Ipsa enim docet et tradit regulas quibus omnes ratiocinationes² in omni scientia et arte, mentales, vocales et scriptae debent ut non sint sophisticae regulari. Quamobrem non irrationabiliter scientia scientiarum et ars artium nuncupatur, quia in omni arte et scientia docet discernere sophisticum argumentum a vero. Et ideo nulla scientia potest perfecte et artificiose sine ipsa tradi et haberi, quia nullus sine ipsa regulante³ potest per artem, ex veritate nota, ratiocinando ignotam accipere veritatem, licet interdum nonnulli a casu et absque certitudine evidenti per notas ad alias ignotas perveniant veritates. Propter quod istius artis ignari decipiuntur in multis, ita ut multi in errores vix⁴ inopinabiles prolabantur⁵ quia argumenta sophistica et apparentia pro veris accipiuntur.

[I. DE TERMINIS]

Sicut argumentum est triplex, scilicet mentale quod componitur ex cogitationibus mentis, vocale quod componitur ex vocibus ab ore prolatis,

¹ dicat W

² omnes ratiocinationes Ac, casus ratiocinantes A

³ regulante Ac, regulative A

⁴ vix Ac, veras A

⁵ prolabantur Ac, probantur A

et scriptum quod componitur ex dictionibus scriptis, sic propositio est triplex, scilicet mentalis, vocalis et scripta. Et similiter terminus, qui est pars propositionis et per consequens argumenti, est triplex, scilicet mentalis, qui est cogitatio, et nonnumquam conceptus,¹ intentio animae, similitudo rei intellectae, passio et operatio animae² appellatur, et est signum naturale non ad placitum institutum; vocalis, [qui] est vox prolata; et scriptus, qui est aliquid scriptum; et isti termini, scilicet vocalis et scriptus,³ sunt signa ad placitum instituta. Nullas autem est terminus nisi mentalis, vocalis et scriptus. Propter quod omnis propositio et omne argumentum sive verum sive sophisticum ex terminis componitur. Nullum autem argumentum [et] nulla propositio ex rebus extra animam,⁴ quae non sunt signa ad placitum instituta, tamquam ex partibus suis componuntur.

[A. Divisiones terminorum diversae]

Termini propositionum principales sunt nomen et verbum; aliae partes propositionum⁵ minus sunt principales. Nomen autem vocale⁶ est vox significativa ad placitum sine tempore, cuius nulla pars separata⁷ aliquid significat, finita et recta.⁸ Verbum autem vocale est vox significativa ad placitum [cum tempore], finita et recta, cuius nulla⁹ pars separata(?) aliquid significat.¹⁰

Terminorum aliqui sunt categorematici, aliqui syncategorematici. Termini categorematici sunt qui aliquid determinatum significant, sive ponantur in oratione sive extra orationem, ut 'homo' 'animal' 'lapis' 'color' 'albedo' et consimiles. Termini syncategorematici sunt illi qui non significant aliquid determinatum sed quando terminis categorematicis adiunguntur in oratione magis aliquid consignant vel faciunt significare, ut haec dictio 'omnis' || quando additur huic dictioni 'homo' sic dicendo: 'Omnis homo est animal', facit quod 'homo' supponit confuse et distributive; et quando additur huic dictioni 'substantia' sic: 'Omnis substantia est ens', facit consimile. Et haec dictio 'tantum' quando additur [huic dictioni 'homo'] ut hic: 'Tantum homo est animal', facit quod per istam orationem significatur quod nihil aliud ab homine est animal; quod non significatur per istam: 'Homo est animal' nec per dictionem 'tantum', sive per se sive in alia oratione ponitur. Et ideo non incongrue

¹ *mg* A

³ *scriptum* A

⁵ *interl.* A

⁸ cuius nulla res ut pars verbi aliquid (*interl.*) significat *add. et del.* A

⁹ os(?) quando est *add. mg* A

¹⁰ vox significativa ad . . . separata(?) aliquid significat *mg* A

² *interl.* A

⁴ *naturam* A

⁶ *mg* Ac, verbum *add et del.* A

⁷ *nominis* A

dicitur quod sicut in algorismo ciphra per se nihil significat sed dat aliis significare, sic termini syncategorematici nihil significant sed faciunt alia significare, largissime tamen accipiendo 'significare' prout etiam 'supponere' continetur sub significatione.

Adhuc terminorum quidam sunt signa terminorum ad placitum institutorum vel¹¹ orationum compositarum ex huiusmodi terminis, sicut 'nomen' 'verbum' 'propositio' 'argumentum vocale' et alii multi; quidam sunt signa rerum, quae non sunt termini nec orationes compositae ex terminis, sicut 'homo' 'lapis' 'capra' 'bos' et huiusmodi consimilia.

Rursus terminorum qui¹² sunt signa rerum,¹³ quidam sunt signa rerum quae non sunt termini sicut 'homo' 'animal' 'lapis' et consimilia, et vocantur¹⁴ termini primae intentionis; quidam sunt signa terminorum mentalium et vocantur¹⁵ termini secundae intentionis, sicut huiusmodi intentio[n]es animae 'genus' 'mentale' 'species'.¹⁶ Et ideo prima intentio et prima¹⁷ operatio intellectus, qua intelligitur¹⁸ res, non est signum; intelligitur autem et vocatur a quibusdam actus rectus. Secunda intentio est operatio secunda intellectus, qua intelligitur intentio rei, quae non est signum; et vocatur a nonnullis actus reflexus.

Amplius terminorum quidam sunt aequivoci, quidam univoci. Terminus aequivocus est qui diversis impositionibus plura significat, sicut 'homo' diversis impositionibus significat hominem verum et hominem depictum; et similiter de cane,¹⁹ qui diversis impositionibus plura significat²⁰ ut animal latrabile et caeleste sidus et beluam marinam. Terminus univocus est qui impositione significat plura vel unum, sicut 'Plato' una impositione significat istum hominem, et 'homo' una impositione significat omnes homines.

Nomina autem quaedam sunt propria, quaedam communia. Nomen proprium est quod una impositione solum unum significat, sicut 'Sortes' et 'Plato'. Nomen commune est quod una impositione²¹ plura significat, sicut 'lapis' 'animal'.

Adhuc nomina quaedam sunt mere absoluta et quaedam sunt connotativa. Nomina mere absoluta sunt quae nihil significant nisi affirmative et in recto, ita quod in definitione eorum exprimente quid nominis nullus ponitur nisi affirmativus ¶ et rectus, sicut 'leo' 'lapis' 'animal' et huiusmodi. Nomina connotativa sunt quae aliquid — [praeter] quam

A 228 v

¹¹ ex *add.* A.¹³ qui . . . sunt signa (*mg*) ad placitum institutarum *add.* A.¹⁴ vocatur A.¹⁶ mentali *add.* *mg* A.¹⁸ *interl.* A.²⁰ *significant* A.¹² non *add.* A.¹⁵ vocatur A.¹⁷ *interl.* A.¹⁹ et de animali *add.* A.²¹ si est huiusmodi(?) *add.* *mg* A.

affirmative et quam in recto — aliud significativa sunt, [sic] quod in definitione eorum exprimente quid nominis poni debet aliquis terminus qui non est affirmativus vel rectus, sicut 'album' 'calidum' 'mundum' 'animatum' 'caecum' 'tenebrosum' et huiusmodi; nam album sic definitur: 'Album est habens albedinem', et caecus etiam sic: 'Caecus est qui non potest videre'. Nominum connotativorum quaedam sunt affirmativa, quae nihil significant nisi affirmative, sicut 'calidum' 'animatum' 'album' 'nigrum'; quaedam sunt negativa et privativa, quae aliquid aliud significant quam affirmative, sicut 'non ens' 'non homo' et huiusmodi, quia in definitione²² talium exprimente quid nominis ponitur haec dictio 'non' vel alia aequivalens: 'non homo' enim est qui non est homo,²³ 'caecus' est qui non potest videre.

Adhuc nominum quaedam dicuntur esse concreta et quaedam abstracta. Nomina concreta propriissime sunt nomina affirmativa connotativa, quae ut frequentius plura significant diversimode, id est unum in recto et aliud in obliquo, sicut 'animatum' significat animam in obliquo et aliud quod habet animam in recto, quia animatum est quod habet animam. Nomina abstracta sunt proprie illa quae correspondentibus nominibus concretis solummodo significant in recto illam rem, quae significatur per concretum in obliquo, sicut hoc nomen 'anima' significat in recto illam rem, quae significatur per animatum in obliquo. Propter quod talia: 'equinitas' 'animalitas' 'deitas' et huiusmodi non sunt proprie abstracta.

[B. De universalibus]

Post praedicta, de terminis communibus qui vocantur universales aliquid specialius est dicendum. Est autem primo sciendum quod universale est illud quod aptum natum est praedicari de pluribus, quorum nullum praedicatur vere et affirmative de alio. Et ideo universale est quod aptum est praedicari et supponere pro pluribus vel de pluribus ut 'animal' praedicatur de homine et de asino. Individuum est illud quod contra universale dividitur et quod non praedicatur de pluribus, quorum nullum potest vere et affirmative praedicari de alio; et ideo quando affirmative sumitur, praedicatur et supponit pro uno solo, ut hoc nomen 'Sortes' et iste terminus 'iste homo'. — Dicuntur autem quinque species universalium, scilicet genus, species, differentia, proprium et accidens.

Genus autem, secundum hoc nomen 'genus' prout accipitur in logica, est terminus praedicabilis de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod

²² talis *add. et del.* A

²³ rectum *add. et del.* A.

quid est, sicut 'animal', quando significative sumitur, praedicatur de homine et de asino et aliis nominibus animalium, non pro se sed ipsis animalibus quae significantur.²⁴ Et est tale genus triplex: mentale, vocale et scriptum. Generum vero quoddam est generalissimum supra quod non est aliud genus, sicut substantia; quoddam subalternum, sicut 'animal' quod est species respectu substantiae, genus respectu hominis.

‖ *Species* est terminus praedicabilis de pluribus differentibus numero A 229 r in eo quod quid est, sicut 'homo' praedicatur de Sorte et Platone. Et est triplex species, scilicet mentalis, vocalis et scripta. Specierum vero quaedam est specialissima, quae non praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie sed numero; quaedam est subalterna, media inter genus generalissimum et speciem specialissimam, quia etiam est genus subalternum, ut 'animal' est genus respectu hominis et est species respectu corporis animati.

Differentia est terminus praedicabilis non in quid sed esse potest medium concludendi propositionem, in qua unum vere negatur ab alio, sicut 'rationale' est terminus praedicabilis de homine, non in quid sed potest esse medium concludendi istam negativam veram 'nullus homo est asinus' sic: Nullum rationale est asinus, omnis homo est rationalis, igitur nullus homo est asinus. Accipitur autem terminus praedicabilis pro illo quod magis proprie praedicatur respectu alicuius quam subiciatur respectu eiusdem. Propter quod 'homo' non est differentia 'rationalis', licet 'rationale' sit differentia hominis, quia 'rationale' magis natum est praedicari de homine quam subici respectu hominis. Item aliter potest sic describi: Differentia est terminus per quem aliquid superius dividitur in suum inferius et convenientius addendum eidem superiori quam inferiori, sicut cum dicitur 'animal aliud [est] rationale, aliud irrationale', convenientius dicitur 'animal rationale' quam 'homo rationalis'. Accipitur autem hoc nomen 'differentia' tripliciter: communiter, proprie et magis proprie. Differentia communiter est omnis terminus cui possunt praedictae descriptiones competere, sive possint de eodem successive vere affirmari et negari sive non; et sic tam accidens quam proprium est differentia. Differentia vero proprie est talis terminus et ultra hoc non potest de illo hoc cuius est differentia proprie successive affirmari et negari, dum esse praedicatur in rerum natura de subiecto, sicut nigrum est differentia corvi. Differentia magis proprie²⁵ est huiusmodi terminus et ultra praedicta importat in obliquo partem rei quae importatur per ipsam in recto, sicut 'rationale' importat in obliquo

²⁴ significant A.

²⁵ propria A.

animam rationalem, quae est pars hominis, quae importatur per 'rationale' in recto; et vocatur differentia essentialis et specifica et est divisiva generis et pars definitionis speciei.

Proprium, secundum quod [hoc] nomen accipitur in logica, est terminus praedicabilis necessario de subiecto non in quid, indicans aliquid praeter rem pro qua in propositione stat seu supponit, ut 'risibile' est proprium hominis.

Accidens, secundum quod propriissime accipitur in logica, est terminus praedicabilis contingenter de aliquo, manente constantia subiecti, importans [aliquid] praeter rem pro qua stat seu supponit in propositione quando supponit significative, sicut album est accidens hominis. Et ideo accidens est quod adest per praedicationem et abest per praedicationem praeter subiecti corruptionem, hoc est absque hoc quod de eodem subiecto significative vere [affirmatur vel] negatur esse.

[C. De praedicamentis]

A 229 v ¶ Variantur autem termini categorematici praedicabiles²⁶ de aliis inter se, quae decem praedicamenta vocantur, scilicet substantia, quantitas, ad aliquid, qualitas, agere, pati, ubi, quando, situs et habitus. Est autem praedicamentum ordinatio terminorum praedicabilium, quorum aliqui significative sumpti de pluribus et alii de paucioribus praedicantur.

In praedicamento *substantiae* per se et directe sunt termini qui solummodo important in recto veras substantias, sicut 'homo' 'animal' 'lapis'; quorum quaedam sunt nomina propria et vocantur aliquando ab Aristotele²⁷ primae substantiae, aliquando vero sunt communes et vocantur secundae substantiae, quia per ipsas convenit respondere convenienter ad quaestionem factam per 'quid' de substantia prima, sicut quaerendo quid est Sortes, convenienter respondetur quod Sortes est animal et homo et²⁸ substantia.

In praedicamento *quantitatis* ponuntur termini qui important aliqua esse distantia vel distincta seu plura, per quos convenienter respondetur ad interrogationem factam per 'quantum' vel per 'quot' et termini superiores per se ad huiusmodi terminos; hoc est termini huiusmodi sunt linea, superficies, corpus, bicubitum, tricubitum, longum, breve, duo, tria et similia.

²⁶ principales A.

²⁷ *Categoriae* 5, 2a 11—19; transl. Boethii, ed. L. Mineo-Paluella (Aristoteles Latinus I, 1—5, Brugghe-Paris, 1961) 7.

²⁸ *interl.* A; est animal *add. et del.* A.

In praedicamento *ad aliquid* sunt termini seu nomina quibus in propositione seu in oratione addendus est casus obliquus, sicut pater-filii, duplum-dimidii et huiusmodi.

In praedicamento *qualitatis* sunt termini qui non sunt differentiae propriissime dictae, per quos respondetur ad quaestionem factam per 'quale', sicut album, grammaticum, musicum, forte et debile et huiusmodi.

In praedicamento *agere et pati* ponuntur verba habentia activam et passivam significationem, sicut uri, pati et huiusmodi.

In praedicamento *ubi* ponuntur termini per quos convenienter respondetur ad interrogationem factam per 'ubi', sicut sunt in loco, in domo, in foro, in ecclesia et huiusmodi.

In praedicamento *quando* sunt termini per quos convenienter respondetur ad interrogationem factam per 'quando', sicut hodie, heri, cras etc.

In praedicamento *situs* sunt termini qui significant determinatam positionem partium totius in toto per respectum ad locum, sicut stare, iacere et huiusmodi.

In praedicamento *habitus* sunt termini qui significant nos et alia animalia habere aliquid circa membra nostra vel partem, sicut calceatum esse, armatum esse, indui, vestiri etc.

Soli igitur termini ponuntur in praedicamentis tamquam partes eorum et res aliae sunt significata terminorum, qui sunt in praedicamento; et aliquando eadem res importatur²⁹ per diversos terminos, qui sunt in distinctis praedicamentis. Utrum autem possint poni alia praedicamenta praeter praedicta, hoc non est discutiendum ad praesens.

[II. DE PROPOSITIONIBUS]

|| Postquam dictum est de terminis qui sunt partes propositionum, A 230 r
videndum est nunc de propositione. Potest autem propositio sic describi: Propositio est oratio vera vel falsa. Et sic propositio est oratio indicativa sola, nam sola indicativa est vera vel falsa; nam aliae orationes, quamvis perfectam sententiam habeant, tamen neque sunt verae neque falsae. Si enim Sortes dicat Platoni: 'Addisce philosophiam', per hoc neque dicit verum neque falsum, licet praecipiat¹ valde bene.

²⁹ mg A.

¹ percipiat A.

Propositionum vero alia est categorica, alia hypothetica. Categorica est quae habet unum subiectum et unum praedicatum, sicut 'homo est rationalis'. Subiectum est terminus qui praecedit praedicatum; praedicatum est quod sequitur subiectum. Propositio hypothetica est illa quae componitur ex duabus vel pluribus categoricis, sicut tales: Si homo currit, homo movetur; Sortes dormit et Plato² studet.

[A. De categoricis]

Propositionum categoricarum alia est affirmativa, in qua non additur haec dictio 'non' vel alia aequivalens, sicut ista 'homo est animal'; alia est negativa, in qua negatio additur verbo, sicut hic 'homo non est animal'.

Amplius propositionum categoricarum alia est universalis, alia particularis; alia indefinita, alia singularis. Universalis est illa in qua subicitur terminus communis signo universali determinatus, sicut hic 'omnis homo est animal', 'nullus homo est animal'. Particularis est illa in qua subicitur terminus communis signo³ particulari determinatus, sicut hic 'quidam homo est animal', 'quidam homo non est animal'. Signa universalia sunt quae faciunt terminum, cui adduntur, stare pro omnibus suis significatis. Alia signa ex opposito dicuntur particularia. Indefinita est in qua subicitur terminus communis significative sumptus sine signo, sicut hic 'homo est animal'; et aequipollet ipsa secundum proprietatem vocis particulari, licet saepe in scientiis pro universali proferatur. Singularis est in qua subicitur terminus discretus vel nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum vel etiam terminus communis cum pronomine demonstrativo, sicut hic 'Sortes currit' vel 'iste homo currit'.

Iuxta praedictas propositiones et alia praedicta fiunt tres interrogationes per tria distincta interrogativa, ad quae diversimode est respondendum. Nam ad interrogationem factam per 'quae' respondendum est categorica vel hypothetica; ad interrogationem factam per 'qualis' respondendum est affirmativa vel negativa; ad interrogationem factam per 'quanta' respondetur quod propositio est universalis, particularis, indefinita vel singularis. Unde versus:

Quae ca vel hyp
qualis ne vel af
u quanta par in sin.

Rursus propositionum categoricarum quaedam sunt de inesse, quaedam modales. Propositio modalis est in qua ponitur aliquis modus per quem potest toti propositioni competere et per ipsam notatur quod ex

² disputat *add. et del.* A.

³ signo *add.* A.

consequenti competit alteri propositioni compositae ex terminis ibi expressis, sicut tales 'omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium', 'hominem esse susceptibilem disciplinae est demonstrabile'. Sunt enim tales modi innumeri, facientes propositiones modales. Tamen communiter ponuntur quatuor: possibile, impossibile, contingens, necessarium. Aliae propositiones ex opposito dicuntur de inesse, sicut hic 'homo est animal', 'asinus currit' et sic de aliis.

|| Propositionum de inesse, quae habent idem subiectum et idem A 230 v
praedicatum commune, quaedam sunt contrariae, quaedam contradic-
toriae, quaedam subcontrariae et quaedam subalternae. Haec patebunt
per figuram postpositam. Nam universalis affirmativa et universalis
negativa sunt contrariae; subcontrariae sunt particularis negativa et
affirmativa; contradictoriae sunt universalis affirmativa et particularis
negativa vel universalis negativa et particularis affirmativa; subalternae
sunt universalis affirmativa et particularis affirmativa, et e converso
universalis negativa et particularis negativa. Indefinita non ponitur in
figura quia aequipollet vel universali vel particulari. Singularis similiter
non ponitur in figura quia inter unam singularem et aliam de eisdem
terminis non potest nisi contradictio solum esse ex eo quod in eis non
possunt esse, nisi duae propositiones de eisdem terminis.

Natura contrariarum talis est quod numquam possunt esse [simul]
verae sed quandoque sunt simul falsae, sicut, istae 'omnis homo est
albus', 'nullus homo est albus'. Natura subcontrariarum talis est quod
numquam possunt simul esse falsae sed possunt simul esse verae quando
universales, quae eis sunt contradictoriae, sunt simul falsae, sicut hic
'aliquis homo est albus', 'aliquis homo non est albus'. Natura contra-
dictoriarum talis est quod numquam possunt simul esse verae neque
simul falsae; sed si una est vera, reliqua semper est falsa. Natura⁴ subal-
ternarum est quod possunt simul esse verae et simul falsae; quarum
etiam natura est quod si universalis est vera, particularis est vera, et
non e converso.

Omnis homo est animal — contrariae — Nullus homo est animal

subalternae contra contradictoriae subalternae
 contra contradictoriae

Quidam homo est animal — subcontrariae — Quidam homo non est animal

⁴ subcontrariarum *add. et del.* A.

Circa aequipollentias propositionum quae stant in figura, quae variari non possunt nisi per hanc dictionem huius adverbii 'non', est sciendum quod quando haec dictio 'non' praeponitur toti dictioni, ipsa aequipollet suae contradictoriae, sicut ista 'non omnis homo est animal' aequipollet huic 'aliquis homo non⁵ est animal', et ista 'nonnullus homo est animal', igitur 'aliquis homo est animal'. Quando vero negatio postponitur, aequipollet suo contrario, sicut hic 'omnis homo non currit', igitur 'nullus homo currit', et e converso 'nullus homo non currit', igitur 'omnis homo currit'. Quando vero negatio praeponitur et postponitur, tunc aequipollet suae subalternae, sicut hic 'non omnis homo non currit', igitur 'aliquis homo currit'; et ista 'nonnullus homo non currit', ergo

A 231r 'aliquis homo non currit', et similiter e converso. Quod patet || per verum:

Prae contradic, post contra, prae postque subalter.

Circa conversionem propositionum est sciendum quod conversio est transpositio terminorum quando de subiecto fit praedicatum, et e converso. Et est conversio triplex, scilicet simplex, per accidens et per contrapositionem. Simplex conversio est quando manet vel convenienter manere potest eadem qualitas et quantitas. Et ista descriptio competit conversioni simplici, quando uterque terminus propositionis convertendus est, ut terminus communis. Generalissime autem loquendo potest sic dici quod conversio simplex est conversio mutua, quando scilicet una propositio convertitur in aliam, manente eadem qualitate et quantitate, nulla alia variatione facta circa subiectum vel praedicatum. Conversio per accidens est conversio non mutua. Conversio per contrapositionem est quando fit transmutatio terminorum, ita quod termini finiti mutantur in terminos infinitos, vel e converso.

Propositiones mere de inesse et pure affirmativae vel negativae, in quibus nulla ponitur determinatio verbi, convertuntur, nulla variatione facta alia praeter transpositionem praedictam.

Aliae propositiones sunt modales et de praeterito et de futuro et aequipollentes, copulative compositae ex affirmatione et negatione et in quibus ponitur determinatio verbi. [De illis] non est similis conversio sed saepe oportet aliquam aliam variationem facere praeter transpositionem praedictam.

Propositio[n]es de praeterito et de futuro et de modo, quando accipiuntur in sensu divisionis vel aequivalenti et in quibus ponitur aliqua determinatio verbi, non totaliter convertuntur sicut praecedentes sed oportet aliam variationem facere, scilicet ponendo determinationem si est

⁵ *interl. A.*

conversio⁶ ex parte subiecti et addendo hanc additionem 'quod⁷ est' vel 'quod⁸ fuit' vel 'quod erit'; sicut de⁹ istis: 'Aliquis senex fuit puer' convertitur sic 'ergo aliquis, qui fuit puer, est senex'; et ista: Aliquis vivus erit mortuus, ergo aliquis, qui erit mortuus, est vivus; et ista: Sortes currit velociter, ergo aliquis, qui velociter currit, est Sortes; et ista: Quoddam lucens super hanc domum est¹⁰ necessario sol, ergo aliquid, quod de necessitate est sol, est lucens super hanc domum; et ista: Aliquid album potest esse nigrum, ergo aliquid, quod potest esse nigrum, est album, et convertitur in istam: Aliquid, quod potest esse nigrum, potest esse album.

[B. De hypotheticis]

Dictum est de propositione categorica. Nunc dicendum est de hypothetica. Et propositio hypothetica est illa quae componitur ex pluribus propositionibus categoricis, mediante aliquo adverbio vel coniunctione. Et communiter dicuntur¹¹ quinque vel sex || species propositionis hypotheticae, scilicet conditionalis, disiunctiva, causalis, copulativa, temporalis vel localis.

A 231 v

Conditionalis componitur ex pluribus categoricis per hanc coniunctionem 'si', sicut ista: Si homo est animal, homo est corpus. Ad cuius veritatem neutrius partis veritas¹² requiritur. Haec enim est vera: Si homo est asinus, homo est irrationalis, et tamen neutra pars est vera. Et sic conditionalis verae quandoque neutra pars est vera, quandoque altera tantum. Sed si altera tantummodo est vera, oportet quod illa sit consequens, quia¹³ quodcumque antecedens est vera, oportet quod consequens sit vera, quia in nulla condicionali vera est possibile quod antecedens sit verum et consequens sit falsum. Omnis enim condicionalis est vera in qua antecedens non potest esse verum sine consequente.

Copulativa est illa, quae componitur ex pluribus categoricis mediante coniunctione copulativa 'et', sicut ista: Sortes currit et Plato disputa[t]. Et ad veritatem ipsius requiritur veritas cuiuslibet partis.

Disiunctiva est, quae componitur ex pluribus categoricis mediante coniunctione disiunctiva 'vel'. Et ad veritatem ipsius requiritur et sufficit veritas unius partis.

Causalis est illa, quae componitur ex pluribus categoricis mediante aliqua coniunctione causali, sicut: Sortes irascitur quia Plato percutit

⁶ consequentia A.

⁷ quod *add.* Ac.

⁸ *interl.* Ac.

⁹ in A.

¹⁰ sol *add. et del.* A.

¹¹ dicunt A.

¹² neutrius partis veritas] neutra pars requiritur (*add. et del.*) veritatis A.

¹³ *interl.* A.

eum. Et ad veritatem illius requiritur quod utraque pars sit vera, et maxime quod secunda sit vera, quia prima est vera.

Temporalis est, quae componitur ex pluribus categoricis mediante aliquo adverbio temporali, sicut: Sortes currit dum Plato disputat; Petrus vixit postquam pater suus fuit mortuus. Hic ad veritatem uniuscuiusque partis requiritur veritas ipsius sed quandoque pro eisdem terminis, quandoque pro diversis secundum diversitatem adverbiorum.

[III. DE SUPPOSITIONIBUS]

Tactum est de terminis et propositionibus. Nunc agendum est de quadam proprietate terminorum quae competit terminis quando sunt in propositione, quae suppositio appellatur. Et potest dici quod suppositio est 'pro aliquo positio', pro quo dicitur in propositione supponere pro quo ponitur et stat, hoc est pro quo utimur illo termino. Non enim semper propositiones proferendo vel scribendo utimur terminis pro ipsis terminis sed saepius utimur terminis et nominibus pro rebus, [quae], cum saepissime sint absentes, uti non possumus; et istas quae praesentes sunt, scribere non possumus nec proferre. Solummodo igitur terminus, qui est pars propositionis mentalis, vocalis vel scriptae, supponit.

Potest autem terminus vocalis tripliciter supponere, quia aliquando supponit pro suo significato, qualiscumque res sit quae significatur, et tunc supponit significative; sicut in istis 'homo est animal', 'homo est risibilis', non denotatur quod haec vox sit 'animal' vel 'risibile', sed significatur quod res significata per ipsam vocem sit animal vel risibile. Aut supponit terminus vocalis pro signo mentali seu pro intentione animae; et tunc supponit simpliciter, sicut hic: 'Homo est universale quoddam, naturaliter praedicabile de pluribus'. Non enim denotatur ||
A 232 r quod aliquis verus homo, compositus ex vero corpore et anima intellectiva, sit praedicabilis naturaliter de pluribus, sed denotatur quod quidam conceptus animae est taliter praedicabilis. Aut supponit pro aliquo signo ad placitum instituto seu pro quocumque quod potest scribi vel proferri; et tunc supponit materialiter, sicut in talibus: '*Homo* est vox significativa', '*homo* est dictio scripta', '*bu* est vox non significativa'.

Sunt autem tres suppositiones, scilicet personalis seu significativa et simplex et materialis. Suppositio materialis potest competere omni illi, quod potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum in propositione vocali vel scripta. Ita vox non¹ significativa potest talem suppositionem habere,

¹ interl. A.

sicut hic 'bu' est vox non significativa; aliqua vox non significativa est 'bo'. Sed suppositio personalis seu significativa non potest competere nisi terminis categorematicis. Termini syncategorematici, quando significative sumuntur, non supponunt, sicut hic 'omnis' non supponit in ista 'omnis homo est animal', licet supponit in ista '*omnis* est signum universale', quia in una est subiectum et non in alia.

Suppositio autem personalis seu significativa pluribus modis sumitur, et dividitur [plus] quam aliqua aliarum et magis est in usu. Prima autem divisio suppositionis personalis est in suppositionem communem et discretam. Suppositio discreta est quando terminus discretus significative sumptus supponit, ut [hic]: 'Philosophus est animal'. Suppositio communis vocatur quando terminus communis significative sumptus supponit, ut hic: 'Homo est rationalis' vel 'homo est iustus'.

Suppositionis personalis et communis quaedam est determinata, quaedam confusa. Suppositio determinata est quando ad veritatem propositionis, in qua terminus(?) sic supponit, requiritur et sufficit veritas pro quocumque uno determinato significato, sicut ad veritatem istius 'aliquis² homo est animal', requiritur et sufficit veritas alicuius talis: 'Iste homo est animal', quocumque homine demonstrato et 'aliquis homo est hoc animal', quocumque alio demonstrato.³ Suppositio confusa est quando non requiritur vel non sufficit veritas alicuius talis, sicut ad veritatem istius 'omnis homo est albus' non sufficit veritas unius talis 'iste homo est albus' nec requiritur veritas alicuius talis 'omnis homo est hoc album'; et ideo nec 'homo' nec 'albus' supponit determinate in propositione⁴ praescripta. Suppositio igitur determinata est illa quando contingit descendere ad singularia per aliquam disiunctivam,⁵ nulla variatione facta circa aliquod extremum, et a quocumque singulari contingit descendere. Sequitur enim: Aliquis homo est iustus, ergo iste homo est iustus vel iste homo est iustus et sic de aliis; vel etiam sic: Iste homo est iustus, quocumque homine demonstrato, ergo aliquis homo est iustus. Sed si dicatur hic: 'Omnis homo animal', tunc non convenit⁶ praedicto || modo descendere sub praedicto nec convenit⁷ ascendere⁸ A 232 v isto modo ad subiectum, et ideo nec subiectum nec praedicatum supponit in ea determinate sed confuse. Est itaque suppositio confusa quando non contingit descendere per disiunctivam ad singularia vel non contingit ab uno solo singulari ascendere ad terminum communem.

² *mg* A.⁴ *praedicta add. et del. A.*⁶ *sic* A.⁸ descendere *l. o.* A.³ *mg*; determinato *in textu, del. A.*⁵ *distinctionem* A.⁷ *sic* A.

Et dividitur suppositio confusa in suppositionem confusam et distributivam et in confusam tantum. Suppositio confusa et distributiva est quando aliquo modo copulativa contingit descendere ad omnia singularia vel ad aliqua, nulla alia variatione facta, sicut hic: Omnis homo est animal, ergo iste homo est animal et iste homo est animal et sic de singulis. Similiter sequitur: Omne animal praeter hominem est irrationale, ergo iste asinus est irrationalis et iste bos est irrationalis et sic de omnibus, exceptis hominibus, sunt irrationales. Quando enim non contingit descendere ad omnia sed ad aliqua, facta variatione aliqua, ponitur terminus singularis termini communis cum signo universalis, sicut patet in ultimo exemplo. Est suppositio confusa et distributiva; sed a quodam⁹ vocatur immobilis quia non contingit descendere ad omnia nec contingit descendere ad ista, nulla alia variatione facta. Alia vocatur suppositio confusa distributiva mobilis. Suppositio confusa tantum est quando non contingit descendere ad singularia nec per disiunctivam nec per copulativam, licet conveniat¹⁰ ascendere de singulari quocumque, sicut ista: Omnis homo est animal, ergo omnis homo est hoc animal et omnis homo est istud animal, licet contingat ascendere sic: Omnis homo est hoc animal, quocumque demonstrato, ergo omnis homo est animal.

Supponit autem terminus confuse et distributive quando additur signum universale, nisi dictio negativa praecedens impediat, sicut in talibus: Non omnis homo est musicus, Plato non est omnis homo, et sicut in talibus: Non aliquis homo est asinus, non asinus est homo. Quando vero negatio praecedit praedicatum et non subiectum, tunc praedicatum supponit confuse et distributive et non subiectum, nisi subiecto addatur signum universale. Unde in talibus: Aliquis homo non est albus, aliquis homo non est musicus, praedicatum supponit confuse et distributive et non subiectum. Omnem enim terminum, — qui prius non supposuit confuse et distributive, — quem praecedit haec dictio 'non', facit eum stare seu supponere confuse et distributive; sed super terminum praecedentem haec dictio¹¹ 'non' nullam habet veritatem.

Terminus supponit confuse tantum quando praedicatum ponitur in propositione universalis affirmativa, sicut in ista 'omnis homo est animal'. Subiectum etiam¹² in exclusiva affirmativa supponit confuse tantum,

⁹ G. Burleigh, *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior*, ed. P. Boehner, St. Bonaventure, 1955, 25; notandum tamen quod terminologia iam nota erat Guilelmo Ockham in *Summa logicae*, ed. P. Boehner, St. Bonaventure, 1957, 192.

¹⁰ sic A.

¹¹ haec dictio] hanc dictionem A.

¹² interl. A.

sicut in ista 'tantum homo est animal', terminus 'animal' confuse supponit¹³ quia non convenit¹⁴ descendere nec per copulativam nec per disiunctivam et a quolibet singulari convenit¹⁵ ascendere.

[IV. DE ARGUMENTIS]

¶ Postquam tractatum est de terminis, propositionibus et suppositi- A 233 r
onibus,¹ dicendum est modo de argumentis, quae ex terminis et propositionibus componuntur. Communiter autem dicuntur esse quattuor species argumentorum, scilicet syllogismus, inductio, enthymema² et exemplum. Syllogismus est oratio, quae ex duabus propositionibus componitur; ex tribus terminis infertur conclusio, composita ex duobus terminis istorum trium, sicut hic: Omne animal est substantia, omnis homo est animal, ergo omnis homo est substantia. Inductio est progressio a singularibus ad universale, sicut hic: Iste homo est animal et iste homo est animal et sic de singulis hominibus, ergo omnis homo est animal. Enthymema propriissime est illatio conclusionis syllogismi ex una sola praemissa, sicut hic: Omne animal est substantia, ergo omnis homo est substantia. Exemplum est quando unum probatur de alio per aliud tamquam per simile, sicut hic: Rector navis est maior nautis, ergo rector scholae est maior scholaribus.

[A. De syllogismis]

Syllogismus itaque componitur ex tribus propositionibus, quarum duae primae, quae sunt antecedens, praemissae vocantur; tertia vero, quae est consequens, vocatur conclusio. Prima praemissa vocatur maior, secunda minor. Istae tres propositiones componuntur ex tribus terminis, quorum unus vocatur maior extremitas et ponitur tam in maiori quam in conclusione; secundus vocatur minor [extremitas] et ponitur in minore et etiam in conclusione; tertius vocatur medium sive medius terminus et ponitur in utraque praemissa et numquam in conclusione.

Omnis syllogismus solet fieri in modo et in figura. Figura accipitur ex ordinatione terminorum secundum praedicata et subiecta. Sunt tres figurae. In prima medium subicitur in maiori et praedicatur in minori; et in secunda idem praedicatur in utraque; in tertia idem subicitur in utraque. Unde versus:

Sub prae prima, bis prae secunda, tertia bis sub.

¹³ qui est animal *add. et del. A.*

¹⁴ *sic A.*

¹⁵ *sic A.*

¹ propositionibus et suppositionibus] et propositionibus A.

² entimena A.

Modus est dispositio propositionum secundum qualitatem et quantitatem. Quando[que] conclusio est directa, [quandoque indirecta]. Potest enim [modus] variari secundum quod conclusio est directa vel indirecta, absque omni variatione propositionum secundum qualitatem et quantitatem. Est autem conclusio directa³ quando maior extremitas praedicatur in conclusione et minor subicitur in ea; indirecta conclusio est quando fit e converso. Quando autem conclusio directa est, tunc modi non variantur nisi ex variatione propositionum secundum qualitatem et quantitatem.

Et notandum quod tantum sunt quattuordecim modi concludentes, scilicet quatuor in prima et quatuor in secunda et sex in tertia. Quod intelligendum est quando omnes⁴ tres termini et syllogismi sunt communes, et nullus terminus est discretus, praeterquam in quattuor modis primae figurae, concludentibus indirecte; et adduntur eis⁵ quinque concludentes et indirecte. Et sic || ponuntur undeviginti, qui notantur per hos versus:

Barbara celarent darii ferio baralipton,
celantes dabitis fapesmo frisesomorum,
cesare camestres festino baroco darapti,
felapton disamis datisi bocardo ferison.

In istis modis, quoniam omnes termini sunt communes, tunc 'a'⁶ designat universalem affirmativam, 'e' universalem negativam, 'i' particularem affirmativam, 'o' particularem negativam.

Sufficiencia istorum modorum probatur per⁷ hoc quod quando propositiones sunt vocaliter in aliquo istorum modorum dispositae, impossibile est invenire syllogismos⁸ quoscumque ubi praemissae possunt esse verae sine conclusione, nisi ibi assignetur fallacia aequivocationis vel amphibologiae vel compositionis vel divisionis vel accidentis vel figurae dictionis. In uno casu excipitur casus secundum theologos, de quo non est dicendum⁹ ad praesens. Et haec intelligenda sunt quando omnes propositiones sunt mere de inesse et mere de praesenti et pure affirmativae vel pure negativae. Si autem propositiones non disponuntur in aliquo praedictorum modorum, est invenire syllogismos¹⁰ in quibus praemissae possunt esse verae, conclusione existente falsa. Per quem modum probat Aristoteles I *Priorum*¹¹ quae coniugationes sint inutiles et quae sint utiles.

³ quam(?) *add. et del. A.*

⁵ adduntur eis] attribuuntur ei A.

⁷ est quod quando omnes termini vocales sunt communes *add. vel rep. A.*

⁸ terminos A.

¹⁰ terminos A.

¹¹ Potius II *Priorum* 21, 66b 18 ss; *transl.* Boethii, *ibid.* (Aristoteles Latinus III, 1—4, 1962) 129—130.

⁴ quattuor *add. et del. A.*

⁶ *interl. A.*

⁹ secundum *add. et del. A.*

[I. De syllogismis sine determinatione in specie]

Ex his quaedam regulae inferuntur, quarum una est quod ex omnibus particularibus vel indefinitis, quae non aequipollent universalibus, nulla conclusio sequitur quae veritatem habet, nisi medium sit terminus singularis seu¹² discretus in secunda figura; tunc bene sequitur conclusio quia bene sequitur: Aliquis homo est Sortes, aliquid album est Sortes, ergo aliquid¹³ album est homo.

Alia est regula quod existentibus ambabus praemissis pure negativis, nihil sequitur quia oportet semper alteram praemissarum esse affirmativam, sicut in communibus modis praenotatis patet. Falsa est autem ista regula quod aliqui dant quod ex singularibus nihil sequitur, quia semper loco propositionis universalis licet ponere singularem. Sicut enim sequitur: Omne animal est substantia, omnis homo est animal, ergo omnis homo est substantia, ita sequitur: Hoc animal est substantia, homo est hoc animal, ergo omnis homo est substantia. Et probatur hoc per modum praedicandi quia non contingit inveniri syllogismos,¹⁴ in quibus praemissae sint verae et conclusio falsa. Regula illa, quae dicit quod oportet semper alteram || praemissarum esse universalem, veritatem habet sicut A 234 r et aliae plures quando omnes termini sunt communes et in his est terminus discretus.

Amplius circa modos syllogismorum est sciendum quod, quamvis nullus sit modus concludens¹⁵ directe et concludens primariam conclusionem de eisdem terminis perfecte¹⁶ contentis¹⁷ in versibus suprascriptis, quando omnes termini sunt communes; tamen plures sunt praeter istos concludentes indirecte et concludentes secundariam¹⁸ de eisdem terminis. Nam cuilibet modo secundae figurae et tertiae, concludenti universalem negativam vel particularem affirmativam, potest correspondere unus¹⁹ modus concludens indirecte conversam conclusionis principalis syllogismi. Et probantur eo modo quo probantur tres primi modi, concludentes indirecte primae, scilicet *Baralipon celantes dabitis*. Rursum omni syllogismo concludenti universalem affirmativam vel negativam potest correspondere unus modus concludens subalternam primae conclusionis, scilicet particularem negativam vel affirmativam.

Rursus est sciendum quod quattuor modi primae figurae sunt perfecti et per se concludentes, ita quod nullo egent ad hoc quod appareant evidentes. Sed alii syllogismi in aliis modis non sunt perfecti nec per se

¹² se l. o. A.¹⁴ terminos A.¹⁶ illeg. A.¹⁸ secundarias A.¹³ mg A.¹⁵ conclusivus l. o. A.¹⁷ contentos A.¹⁹ interl. A.

evidentes sed omnes reducendi sunt in primos quattuor modos primae figurae; et probandi sunt per eos dupliciter, scilicet per conversionem et per impossibile.

Per impossibile omnes modi praescripti probari²⁰ possunt. Omnes enim qui sunt in secunda figura probantur,²¹ quia ex opposito conclusionis contradictoriae et maiore inferendo in prima figura contradictorium minoris. Facto enim syllogismo in *Cesare* sic: Nullus lapis est animal, omnis homo est animal, ergo nullus homo est lapis, probatur quod iste syllogismus sit bonus per hoc quod ex contradictorio conclusionis et maiore praedicta infertur contradictorium minoris in *Ferio* sic: Nullus lapis est animal, aliquis homo est lapis, ergo aliquis homo non est animal. Etiam facto syllogismo in *Camestres* sic: Omnis homo est rationalis, nullus asinus est rationalis, ergo nullus homo est asinus; probatur quod iste syllogismus sit bonus quia ex maiore praedicta et contradictorio conclusionis infertur contradictorium minoris in *Darii* sic: Omnis homo est rationalis, aliquis asinus est homo, ergo aliquis asinus est rationalis. Et etiam facto syllogismo in *Festino* sic: Nullus asinus est rationalis, aliquod animal est rationale, ergo aliquod animal non est asinus. Et
 A 234 v probatur quod sit bonus quia ex maiore praescripta et contradictoria || conclusionis infertur contradictoria minoris in *Celarent* sic: Nullus asinus est rationalis, omne animal est asinus, ergo nullum animal est rationale. Similiter facto syllogismo in²² *Baroco* sic: Omnis homo est animal, aliquod album non est animal, ergo aliquod album non est homo. Et probatur quod est bonus quia ex eadem maiore et contradictoria conclusionis sequitur contradictoria minoris in *Barbara* sic: Omnis homo est animal, omne album est homo, ergo omne album est animal.

Omnes syllogismi, qui fiunt in tertia figura, probantur per quattuor modos primae figurae quia ex contradictoria conclusionis et eadem minore infertur contradictoria vel contraria maioris in aliquo quattuor modorum primae figurae. Fiat ergo syllogismus in *Darafti* sic: Omne musicum est homo, omne musicum est animal, ergo aliquod animal est homo. Et probatur quod est bonus quia ex contradictoria conclusionis cum altera praemissarum seu²³ minore infertur contradictoria maioris in *Celarent* sic: Nullum animal est homo, omne musicum est animal, ergo nullum musicum est homo. Et similiter convenit in aliis quinque modis sequentibus. Tenet autem iste modus probandi per istam regulam: Ex contradictoria conclusionis cum altera praemissarum, sequitur contradictoria vel contraria²⁴

²⁰ *mg*; praedicari in *textu*, *del.* A.

²² *bocardo add. et del.* A.

²⁴ vel contraria *mg* A.

²¹ praedicantur *l. o.* A.

²³ et A.

alterius praemissae. Ergo primum argumentum fuit bonum, quod numquam fallit. Et ex ista patet quod syllogismus quandoque est verus ex falsis, immo nonnumquam syllogismus ex falsis est evidentior et perfectior quam syllogismus ex veris de eisdem terminis, quia saepe syllogismus qui est ex veris probatur esse verus per illum qui est ex eisdem terminis et syllogismis, ut patet per exempla scripta.

Per conversionem autem omnes modi in secunda figura et in tertia²⁵ reducuntur in quattuor modos primae figurae, probantes per eos, praeter *Baroco bocardo* quia illi possunt probari²⁶ per impossibile. Unde omnes modi, praeter quattuor primos, incipientes ab ista littera 'b'²⁷ reducuntur in *Barbara*, incipientes a 'c' in *Celarent*, incipientes a 'd' in *Darii* et incipientes a 'f' in *Ferio*. Rursus in quocumque 'p' ponitur, notata²⁸ per vocalem immediate²⁹ praecedentem, debet converti per accidens, vel magis proprie loquendo debet dici quod debet accipi ista propositio quae per accidens in ipsam convertitur. Ubi autem ponitur 's', propositio denotata per vocalem immediate praecedentem debet converti simpliciter. Quando autem ponitur 'm' in medio dictionis, illa debet transponi. Quando autem ponitur 'c' in medio dictionis, modus ille non debet probari nisi per impossibile. Unde *Baralippton* probatur per *Barbara*, quia accepta illa propositione, quae per || accidens convertitur in conclusione ipsius^{A 235 r} per³⁰ *Baralippton*, et posita conclusione, est bonus syllogismus in *Barbara*; sic etiam de aliis. Et tenet iste modus probandi per istam regulam, quae numquam fallit: Quidquid sequitur ad consequens, sequitur ad antecedens. Et ideo, quia conclusio est in *Baralippton*, sequitur per conversionem per accidens ad conclusionem in *Barbara*. Et oportet quod sequatur ad praemissas illas in *Barbara*, quae eadem sunt in *Baralippton*, sicut probatur *Cesare* per *Celarent* quia in *Cesare* sine omni alia variatione ponitur ista propositio, quae convertitur in istam, quae est maior in *Celarent*; quia, si ista, quae est conclusio in *Cesare*, sequitur ex maiore et minore in *Celarent*, oportet quod sequatur in *Cesare* ex maiore, quae convertitur in maiorem ipsius et eadem minore. Sicut enim quidquid sequitur ad consequens nullo addito alio [sequitur ad antecedens nullo addito alio], ita quidquid sequitur ad consequens cum addito sequitur ad antecedens cum eodem addito.

[2. De syllogismis cum determinatione in specie]

Praedicta, sicut dictum est, intelligenda sunt quando omnes propositiones [sunt] mere de praesenti et mere de inesse et mere affirmativae

²⁵ ad *add. et del. A.*

²⁸ ponitur, notata] notatur A.

²⁶ praedicari A.

²⁹ sequentem *add. et del. A.*

²⁷ i *add. A.*

³⁰ in A.

vel negativae et nulla determinatio adverbialis vel alia modalis additur verbo³¹ principali. Et quia³² in aliis casibus multis non sufficiunt isti versus, scilicet *Barbara* etc., etiam quando omnes termini sunt communes; ideo³³ pro diversis oporteret tradere regulas speciales, aliquas pro illis de praeterito et futuro et aliquas pro modalibus sicut Aristoteles I *Priorum*,³⁴ aliquas pro illis in quibus additur aliqua determinatio verbo vel aliquas quando aliqua praemissarum non est pure affirmativa vel pure negativa. Ad praesens, pro causa brevitatis, dicendum est de modo syllogizandi quando aliqua determinatio additur solummodo verbo, sive sit determinatio modalis sive alia.

Circa quod sciendum [est], quod, si in prima figura talis determinatio ponitur in maiori, licet non cum negativa, est syllogismus bonus primae conclusionis cum eadem determinatione. Bene enim sequitur: Omnis planeta velociter movetur, sol est planeta,³⁵ ergo etc.; et etiam sic ista: Omnis homo de necessitate est animal, aliquod album est homo, igitur etc. Si autem determinatio ponitur in minori et non in maiori, non valet syllogismus istius³⁶ conclusionis cum eadem determinatione, quia non sequitur: Omne lucens super hanc domum sive super terram est corpus caeleste,³⁷ aliquis planeta contingenter est lucens super terram, ergo aliquis planeta est corpus caeleste.

In secunda figura requiritur quod determinatio huiusmodi ponatur in utraque praemissa, et tunc bene sequitur conclusio sine determinatione. Bene enim sequitur: Omnis homo de necessitate est animal, nullus lapis de necessitate est animal, ergo nullus lapis est homo; et sequitur: Omnis homo contingenter est musicus, nullus asinus contingenter est musicus,
 A 235 v ergo nullus asinus est homo. || Sed e converso cum determinatione, eadem affirmativa non sequitur. Non enim sequitur in *Baroco*: Omne illuminans hanc domum necessario est corpus caeleste, igitur aliqua candela necessario est illuminans hanc domum. Sed si³⁸ determinatio est necessaria,³⁹ syllogismus est bonus quia sequitur ex praemissis ista conclusio: Aliqua candela non est necessario illuminans hanc domum. Si autem determinatio sit in negativa et non in affirmativa, syllogismus non est bonus quia non sequitur: Nullus planeta contingenter movetur, sol non movetur, ergo soi non est planeta. Sed si determinatio ponatur in affirmativa et non in negativa et non est distrahens vel diminuens, bene sequitur:

³¹ de praesenti *add. et del.* A.

³³ sed A.

³⁵ plane A.

³⁷ sive super terram est corpus caeleste] est corpus caeleste sive super terram A.

³⁸ necessario *add. et del.* A.

³² neutrum ex medio *add.* A.

³⁴ Cfr. II *Priorum*, 12, 95a 10ss.

³⁶ ista A.

³⁹ necessario A.

Omne corpus caeleste necessario movetur, sed A non movetur, ergo A non est corpus caeleste.

In tertia figura, si determinatio sit in utraque praemissa, sequitur conclusio cum determinatione. Bene enim sequitur: Omne illuminans hanc domum necessario est⁴⁰ corpus caeleste, omne illuminans hanc domum est luminosum, ergo aliquod luminosum est corpus caeleste. Etiam sequitur conclusio cum determinatione eadem quia bene sequitur: Omne illuminans hanc domum necessario est corpus caeleste, sed omne illuminans hanc domum est illuminans hunc⁴¹ angulum; sed ad illuminandum hunc angulum est necessarium⁴² corpus caeleste, — etiam si determinatio ponitur in maiori et non in minori. Sed si determinatio ponitur in minori et non in maiori, non sequitur conclusio cum determinatione quia non sequitur: Omnis planeta lucens est super terram, omnis planeta est necessario corpus caeleste, ergo aliquod corpus caeleste est necessario lucens super terram.

[3. De variis syllogismi speciebus]

Post praedicta dicendum est breviter quomodo sunt diversi syllogismi propter diversitatem⁴³ propositionum, quantum ad veritatem vel falsitatem vel quantum ad alias quasdam conditiones propositionum. Aliquis ergo syllogismus est verus ex propositionibus veris et aliquis est ex propositionibus falsis. Et quandoque est ex propositionibus falsis et quandoque non, quia ambae praemissae sunt falsae et conclusio vera; quandoque una sola praemissa est falsa et conclusio vera. Similiter aliquis est ex contingentibus, aliquis ex necessariis.

Syllogismorum ex necessariis aliquis est ex omnibus [non-] contingentibus et aliquis non. Syllogismorum⁴⁴ ex necessariis quidam sunt ex praemissis evidenter notis, facientibus conclusionem evidenter notam;⁴⁵ et talis syllogismus vocatur demonstratio seu syllogismus demonstrativus. Aliquando ¶ autem sunt ex necessariis, quae nec sunt nec possunt esse nota evidenter; tamen sunt ex his, quae communiter reputantur esse vera, maxime sapientibus; et iste vocatur syllogismus topicus quia est ex solis probabilibus, quae scilicet sunt necessaria et videntur⁴⁶ omnibus vel pluribus, maxime sapientibus, quamvis non sint evidenter nota. Alius est syllogismus ex necessariis, quae non sunt de facto evidenter nota, tamen possunt esse evidenter nota et praemissae possunt facere conclusionem notam. Et [est] syllogismus non demonstrativus sed poterit esse

⁴⁰ con *add.* A.

⁴² *sic* A.

⁴⁴ quidam sunt *add.* A.

⁴⁶ videntur] evidenter nota A.

⁴¹ angulum *add. et del.* A.

⁴³ syllogismorum *add. et del.* A.

⁴⁵ pro *add.* A.

demonstrativus, quia poterit esse demonstratio illi, qui scit evidenter conclusionem propter praemissas, et alteri⁴⁷ poterit esse syllogismus topicus, vel esse sibi neque topicus neque demonstrativus.

[B.] De inductione

Postquam dictum est de syllogismo, dicendum est breviter de inductione. Circa quod sciendum est quod, quando universales et similiter particulares sunt de inesse vel modales ita quod modus est determinatio verbi, semper a singularibus ad universale est syllogismus bonus vel argumentum bonum, et e converso; sicut sequitur: Iste homo contingenter est animal et iste homo contingenter est animal et sic de singulis, ergo omnis homo est animal. Et e converso, sicut sequitur: Iste triangulus ignoratur a te habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis et iste triangulus ignoratur et iste triangulus ignoratur etc., et sic de singulis, ergo omnis triangulus etc.; et sic: Hoc contingens non est necessario verum nec hoc nec hoc, ergo nullum contingens est necessario verum, et e converso.

Circa modales est sciendum quod, quando modus denotatur competere toti propositioni compositae ex terminis praemissis, [qui] a quodam vocatur sensus compositionis sicut alius vocatur sensus divisionis, non est bonum argumentum semper a singularibus ad universale, nec e converso. Et potest contingere dupliciter. Uno modo, quando est aliqua universalis non habens singularem sicut est haec universalis 'omnis corvus albus est animal', et tamen ista nullam singularem habet et ideo non sequitur: Haec universalis est falsa, ergo aliqua singularis est falsa. Alio modo, quando modus potest competere singulari quamvis non competeret universali, vel e converso.

Et quantum ad hoc, dantur diversae regulae per quas constat quod talis inductio non semper valet. Quarum una est quod omnes singulares alicuius universalis possunt esse contingentes, quamvis universalis sint necessaria, sicut singularia huiusmodi universalis necessariae: Omne ||
 A 236 v verum contingens est verum contingens. Alia est quod quaelibet singularis alicuius universalis potest esse possibilis, licet universalis sit impossibilis sicut haec universalis est impossibilis:⁴⁸ 'Omnis propositio contingens est vera', [quamvis] quaelibet singularis est possibilis. Alia est quod quaelibet singularis potest esse ignota, licet universalis sit nota; sicut haec 'ista⁴⁹ mula est sterilis', licet sciatur ista universalis 'omnis mula est sterilis'. Alia est quod quaelibet singularis non est de modalibus et universalis est de modalibus, sicut materia singularis istius⁵⁰ universalis

⁴⁷ alius A.

⁴⁹ omnis A.

⁴⁸ possibilis A.

⁵⁰ tenet add. et del. A.

tenet: 'Istum⁵¹ triangulum habere etc. est demonstrabile', quia est necessaria; et tamen universalis est demonstrabilis.

Ex istis poterit studiosus plures regulas colligere de singularibus et universalibus et modalibus secundum quod huiusmodi innumerabiliter variantur. Et haec de inductione dicta sufficiant.

[V. DE LOCIS ET REGULIS CONSEQUENTIARUM]

Sequitur videre de locis et de regulis consequentiarum. Locus¹ secundum quosdam² est maxima propositio, id est regula, ex qua trahitur argumentum [et] tenet et probari³ potest; et illud videtur esse bonum contra pueros vel ignaros. Consequentia autem aliquando vocatur argumentum, quo ex una propositione categorica vel hypothetica infertur conclusio; aliquando vocatur omne argumentum. Unde syllogismus et inductio possunt dici consequentiae quia in eis consequens sequitur antecedens.

Consequentia autem dividitur, quia quaedam vocatur formalis et est illa, quae tenet ratione formae propositionum in materia omni ubi est syllogisticus modus arguendi; sic syllogismus et inductio, conversio et multi alii modi ordinandi sunt consequentiae formales. Consequentia materialis vocatur illa, quae tenet solummodo gratia terminorum ibidem positorum, et in aliis terminis non tenet talis modus arguendi.

Amplius consequentiarum quaedam est ut nunc et quaedam simplex. Consequentia ut nunc est illa, quae non tenet omni tempore determinato sicut ista: 'Omnis homo est animal, ergo Iacobus est animal', ista non tenet omni tempore sed solummodo quamdiu Iacobus vivit et est homo. Et talis consequentia communiter per medium intrinsecum tenet, formatum de eisdem terminis quod est contingens, sicut praedicta consequentia tenet per hoc medium 'Iacobus est homo'. Consequentia simplex vocatur, quae omni tempore tenet. Et talis est simplex: Omnis homo est coloratus, ergo aliquod animal est coloratum. Et tenet communiter talis consequentia per medium necessarium intrinsecum, non formatum cum eisdem terminis, sicut praedicta consequentia tenet per⁴ hanc regulam: Ab

⁵¹ omne A.

¹ uno modo *add. mg* A.

² Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summulae logicales* 5.06 et 5.07, ed. I. M. Bochenski (Torino, 1947) 45--46: Locus est sedes argumenti vel id unde ad propositam quaestionem conveniens trahitur argumentum . . . Locus maxima idem est quod ipsa maxima. Maxima autem est propositio, qua non est altera prior vel notior . . .

³ praedicari A.

⁴ hoc medium *add. et del.* A.

inferiori ad suum superius non distributum sed particulariter sumptum, est bona consequentia.

[A. Regulae generales]

A 237 r

Sunt autem regulae tales per quas [tenent consequentiae] tamquam per media⁵ extrinseca, quae possunt vocari loci, innumerae;⁶ quarum aliquae sunt magis generales. Quarum una est: Si aliqua consequentia est bona, quidquid sequitur || ad consequens, sequitur ad antecedens. Unde consequentia, si est bona: 'Omnis substantia est ens, ergo omne animal est ens', quidquid sequitur ad istam 'omne animal est ens' etiam sequitur ad istam 'omnis substantia est ens'. Tamen aliquando una istarum consequentiarum est simplex, alia solammodo ut nunc, sicut haec: Omne animal est homo, ergo omnis homo est animal; omnis homo est animal, ergo Franciscus est animal. Ex ista regula sequitur alia regula generalis, quae est haec: Quando aliqua consequentia est bona, quidquid antecedit ad antecedens, antecedit ad consequens. Alia est: Si ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis, prima erit bona; et haec numquam fallit. Et intelligendae sunt regulae [istae] quando tam antecedens quam consequens est tantum una propositio categorica. Si autem in antecedente sunt plures propositiones categoriae, tunc istae regulae sic sunt intelligendae: Si aliqua consequentia est bona ex opposito consequentis et una parte antecedentis sequitur oppositum alterius partis, prima consequentia erat bona. Et istae regulae numquam fallunt. Accipiat [autem] hic 'oppositum' pro contradictorie opposito.

Alia regula est: Quidquid repugnat consequenti, repugnat antecedenti et non e converso. Alia est: Quidquid stat cum antecedente, stat cum consequente et non e converso. Alia est: Si oppositum consequentis non stat cum antecedente, prima consequentia erat bona. Alia est: Quando oppositum consequentis non stat cum antecedente sed ei repugnat, est bona.

[B. Regulae speciales]

Regulae speciales loci sunt innumerabiles; de quibus subiunguntur paucae.

Est ergo locus a definitione et definito quia argumentum a definitione ad definitum et e converso tenet per hanc regulam: Quidquid praedicatur de definito affirmative vel negative, praedicatur eodem modo de definitione et e converso. Nam sequitur: Lapis non est animal, ergo lapis non est substantia animata sensibilis, et e converso. Et ista regula intelligenda est quando in consequentia definitio et definitum supponunt solummodo

⁵ intrinseca *add. et del.* A.

⁶ in numero A.

significative et propositiones sunt mere de inesse; vel si sunt de modo, sumuntur in sensu divisionis et tam definitio quam definitum ponuntur a parte subiecti et non a parte praedicati. Et ideo tales consequentiae non sunt bonae: 'Animal rationale' est definitio hominis, ergo est definitio animalis; iste triangulus scitur a te esse triangulus, ergo iste triangulus scitur a te habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis.

Alius est locus, qui vocatur a descriptione. Descriptio tenet per hanc regulam: Quidquid praedicatur de descriptione, et de descripto, et e converso. Et ideo sequitur: Iacobus est animal susceptibile disciplinae, ergo Iacobus est homo; et e converso.

Alius est a nominis interpretatione, tenens per hanc regulam: Quidquid dicitur de interpretatione, et de nomine interpretato, et e converso.

Alius posset vocari a synonymo, tenens per hanc regulam: Quidquid || A 237 v
dicitur de uno synonymorum, dicitur et de alio, et e converso.

Alius posset vocari a convertibili, tenens per hanc: Quidquid dicitur de uno convertibilium, et de reliquo.

Alius posset vocari a proprio subiecto vel a propria passione, tenens per hanc regulam: De quocumque dicitur subiectum, de eodem dicitur propria passio.

Locus a toto secundum quosdam dividitur in plures secundum quod plures sunt, quorum quodlibet vocatur totum, quia aliud dicitur esse universale, aliud integrale, aliud in quantitate, aliud in loco, aliud in modo, aliud totum in tempore.

Locus a toto universali potest vocari quando arguitur a superiori ad suum inferius; de quo possunt dari plures regulae. Una est quod ad negationem superioris sequitur negatio inferioris, quia sequitur: Anima non est colorata, ergo non est alba. Alia est quod a superiori distributo ad inferius est bona consequentia, quia sequitur: Omne corpus habet partes distantes, ergo sol habet partes distantes. Sed talis consequentia non est simplex in affirmativis nisi quando praedicatio⁷ de inferiori est necessaria; et haec non est simplex consequentia: 'Omne coloratum est corpus, ergo omne album est corpus', quia si nihil esset album, antecedens esset verum et consequens falsum.

Et loco⁸ a superiori posset correspondere locus ab inferiori, de quo possunt dari plures regulae et diversae. Quarum una est quod, quando ad superius ab inferiori non distribuitur affirmative, est consequentia bona quia sequitur: Necessario homo currit, ergo animal currit. Alia est quod ab inferiori ad superius non distributum negative, non est cons-

⁷ praedicta A.

⁸ Et loco] est locus A.

quentia simplex nisi praedicatio superioris de inferiori sit necessaria, quia non sequitur: 'Album non est corpus, ergo coloratum non est corpus', quia si nihil esset album, antecedens esset verum et consequens falsum.

Locus a toto in modo vocatur quando arguitur ab aliquo cum determinatione ad ipsum per se sumptum; et valet talis consequentia quando determinatio non est distrahens nec diminuens. Bene enim sequitur: Aliquod album est homo⁹ mortuus, ergo aliquod album est homo; sed non sequitur: Caesar est homo mortuus, ergo Caesar est homo. Vocatur autem determinatio distrahens illa, quae per se sumpta non competit illi cui additur, si per se sumatur; sicut haec dictio 'mortuus' est ita distrahens hominis quia nullus homo est mortuus, immo eo ipso quo aliquis est mortuus non est homo. Vocatur vero determinatio diminuens, quae exprimit aliquam partem totius de quo potest praedicari terminus,¹⁰ licet non praedicetur de nomine totius, sicut 'album secundum dentes' exprimit dentes, qui possunt esse albi, licet homo cuius sunt dentes non sit albus; et ideo non sequitur: Aethiops secundum dentes est albus, ergo Aethiops est albus.

Quid sit dicendum de loco a toto in tempore et de toto in loco, ex praecedentibus patere potest quia in talibus arguitur ab universali, sicut hic: Semper Deus fuit, ergo Deus fuit crastino die; Deus est ubique, ergo est in loco.¹¹

A 238 r

|| Locus a toto integrali magis proprie vocatur locus a nomine totius integralis. De quo datur regula talis: A nomine totius integralis et a nomine partium singularium¹² simul sumptarum, sine quibus esse non potest, est bona consequentia. Respectu huius verbi est quando praedicatur secundum adiacens sed non respectu aliorum praedicatorum. Bene enim sequitur: Domus componitur ex lignis et lapidibus, ergo fundamentum componitur etc.

Locus a toto in quantitate vocatur quando arguitur ab universali ad singulare; de quo ex praecedentibus patere potest.

[C. Regulae speciales de locis ab oppositis]

Sequitur videre de locis ab oppositis; et vocantur hic 'opposita', scilicet termini oppositi, quae non sunt propositiones. Et dantur quattuor genera oppositorum: Quidam enim termini sunt contrarie oppositi, quidam relative oppositi, quidam privative et quidam contradictorie.

Pro loco a contrarie oppositis datur talis regula: De quocumque dicitur unum contrariorum, de eodem negatur reliquum, sicut: Franciscus

⁹ non A, sed del.

¹¹ locus a toto integraliter add. A.

¹⁰ nomine A.

¹² signantium A.

est albus, ergo non est niger. Et tenet haec regula de propositionibus mere de inesse et de praesenti. Falsum est enim de propositionibus de praeterito et futuro et¹³ in propositionibus modalibus, quia non sequitur: Franciscus fuit albus, ergo non fuit niger; nec sequitur: Iacobus potest esse albus, ergo non potest esse niger.

Locus a relative oppositis aliquando tenet tam affirmative quam negative respectu esse, scilicet quando propositio, in qua subicitur, relativum est mere de inesse; et quandoque non tenet, quando scilicet huiusmodi propositio non est mere de inesse sed aequivalet propositioni de possibili. Et ideo sequitur: Pater est, ergo filius est; et e converso. Sed non sequitur: Calefactivum est, ergo calefactibile est; et non e converso.

Pro loco a privative oppositis datur regula talis: Si unum privative oppositorum verificatur de aliquo, reliquum negatur de eodem, et e converso; posita tamen constantia¹⁴ subiecti aliter, non sequitur. Et ideo non sequitur: Iste est videns, ergo iste non est¹⁵ caecus; sed non e converso nisi posita constantia subiecti. Et ideo non sequitur: Homo mortuus non est caecus, ergo est videns.

Pro loco a contradictorie oppositis datur regula talis: De quocumque dicitur unum contradictoriorum, de eodem negatur reliquum, sed non e converso nisi posita constantia subiecti. Et ideo bene sequitur: Iacobus est albus, igitur Iacobus non est non albus; et similiter bene sequitur: Homo non est asinus, ergo homo est non asinus. Sed non sequitur: Homo albus non est grammaticus, ergo albus¹⁶ est non grammaticus, — si nullus homo esset albus. Quando [autem] de subiecto significative sumpto vere negatur esse in rerum natura, utrumque contradictoriorum vere negaretur ab eodem; et ideo si nullus homo est albus, utraque istarum est vera: 'Homo albus non est albus', 'homo albus non est non albus', proprie loquendo || 'albus non est albus' [et] 'albus non est non albus' propter falsam implicationem, quia implicat quod aliquod est album. Et ideo sua contradictoria, scilicet ista 'nullum album est album' est vera quia habet unam causam veritatis, scilicet 'nihil est album'. A 238 v

[VI.] DE FALLACIIS

Sicut scire malum ut vitetur est bonum, sic scire fallacias et deceptiones sophisticas, ut¹ apertius cavea[n]tur, est perutile omnibus volentibus in quacumque arte vel scientia ratiocinando percipere veritatem. Post-

¹³ nec A.

¹⁵ caecus *add. et del. A.*

¹ *interl. A.*

¹⁴ circumstantia A.

¹⁶ est grammaticus *add. et del. A.*

quam tractatum est de argumento agendum est nunc de fallaciis, quae sunt defectus et vitia argumentorum. Et quia saepe² in disputando committuntur fallaciae, ideo primo dicendum est de disputatione. Et ponuntur quattuor genera disputationum, scilicet doctrinalis, quae procedit ex necessariis propositionibus; dialectica, quae procedit ex probabilibus; tentativa, quae procedit ex his, quae videntur [respondenti] possibilia; et sophistica, quae procedit per argumenta, quae videntur] vera esse et non sunt. Propter quod ille non dicitur sophisticus esse, qui scit sophistica facere, sed qui per sophistica arguit. Intendit autem sophisticus arguendo inducere respondentem negare concessum vel concedere negatum vel ad falsum, cum nitatur³ per argumentum sophisticum cogere concedere aliquid quod est inopinabile; vel in soloecismum,⁴ cum nitatur⁵ capere respondentem vel ducere ad⁶ regulam nugatoriam. Est autem 'nugatio' eiusdem dictionis inutilis et superflua repetitio.

Fallaciarum autem quaedam dicuntur esse in dictione. Et sunt tres, quae numquam vel raro accidunt⁷ in argumentis mentalibus [sed tantum in] vocalibus et scriptis. Et sunt sex [species]: aequivocatio, amphibologia, compositio, divisio, accentus et figura dictionis. Quaedam sunt extra dictionem, quae indifferenter accidunt in argumentationibus vocalibus et scriptis. Et sunt septem, scilicet accidens, consequens, secundum quid [et] simpliciter, ignorantia elenchi, petitio principii, non causa⁸ ut causa, plures interrogationes ut unam facere.

[A. Fallaciae in dictione]

[I. Aequivocatio]

Fallacia aequivocationis est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod talis terminus,⁹ qui non est propositio, potest diversimode seu aequivoce accipi, ita quod causa apparentiae est unitas naturalis vocis, quae non est¹⁰ habens completam sententiam. Causa non existentiae est diversitas accipiendi seu variandi sub¹¹ termino uno. — Sunt tres modi fallaciae huiusmodi.

Primus est quando aliqua dictio proprie et aequivoce significat plura, sive sit unius partis sive sit duarum partium orationis, sive etiam existens unius partis orationis habeat diversa generalia accidentia sive non.¹² Exemplum primi modi: Omnis canis est latrabilis, caeleste sidus

² est vel cum add. et del. A.

⁴ in soloecismum] ad syllogismum A.

⁶ vel ducere ad] antecedens A.

⁸ interl., et in textu del. A.

¹⁰ interl. A.

¹² sit add. A.

³ vitiatur A.

⁵ vitiatur A.

⁷ nisi add. A.

⁹ terminus add. A.

¹¹ hic A.

est canis, ergo caeleste sidus est latrabile. Maior est vera si 'canis' accipitur pro animali irrationali, et minor est vera si accipitur pro quodam corpore caelesti. Et sic: Omnis ornatus est adveniens alicui alteri, iste || A 239 r
homo est ornatus, ergo iste homo est alteri adveniens. Nam maior est vera si 'ornatus' est nomen, et minor est vera si sit participium. Et sic: Omnes episcopi sunt sacerdotes, isti boves sunt episcopi, ergo isti boves sunt sacerdotes. Nam maior est vera quia 'episcopi' est¹³ pluralis numeri, et minor est vera si sit singularis numeri.

Penes istum modum peccant infinita argumenta, quae his diebus insolubilia et concludentia reputantur, propter quod ignoratur aequivocatio multorum vocabulorum, quae in voce accipiuntur in diversis sensibus et in locutione communi et similiter in logica et aliis scientiis, sicut tales orationes in paralogismis reduci possunt: Destructo genere destruitur species, ergo species non potest existere sine genere; et sic: Universale est in singularibus, ergo universale non est aliquid distans in anima localiter a singularibus; nam haec dictio 'destruitur' accipitur aequivoce in logica et in aliis scientiis, quia in logica accipitur pro negari et affirmari in propositione, et aliter accipitur in scientia naturali et in communi locutione.

Secundus modus aequivocationis est quando aliqua dictio potest accipi proprie et improprie, et sic: Omne quod habet aliquid distinguitur ab illis quae habet, anima habet plures potentias, scilicet memoriam, intellectum et voluntatem, ergo anima distinguitur etc. Nam maior est vera si 'habere' sumitur proprie, quia proprie loquendo nihil habet se; minor est vera si sumatur improprie, scilicet pro 'esse' quia dicitur 'habere' memoriam, intellectum et voluntatem quia anima 'est' memoria, intellectus et voluntas.

Tertius modus est quando aliquis terminus videtur stare seu supponere vel accipi diversimode pro diversis. Unde iste modus accidit quando idem terminus in aliqua propositione potest habere suppositionem personalem vel simplicem vel materialem. Similiter quando idem terminus potest¹⁴ sumi significative vel materialiter. Similiter quando idem terminus in propositione de praeterito videtur supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae fuerunt; vel in propositione de futuro potest supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae fuerunt aut erunt; vel pro his in propositione de possibili quae sunt vel pro his quae possunt esse; et in propositione de contingenti pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae contingunt.

Penes istum modum peccant talia sophismata: 'Homo' et 'animal rationale' sunt idem realiter, 'homo' est definitum, 'animal rationale'

¹³ sunt A.

¹⁴ sumi add. et del. A.

est definitio, ergo definitio et definitum sunt idem realiter. Nam prima est vera si 'homo' et 'animal' et 'rationale' sumuntur significative seu personaliter; secunda est vera si 'homo' et 'animal rationale' habeant
 A 239 v suppositionem simplicem vel materiale. ¶ 'Bene' est adverbium, tu comedis bene, ergo tu comedis adverbium; nam prima est vera sumpto hoc adverbio significative; secunda est vera sumpto ipso materialiter. Qui fuit sanatus est sanus, aeger fuit sanatus, ergo aeger est sanus; nam in prima, si subiectum supponit pro eo, qui nunc est aeger, ipsa est falsa; si autem supponit pro eo, qui aliquando fuit aeger, ipsa est vera sed tunc non valet discursus. Iste est vivus, iste erit mortuus, ergo aliquis mortuus est vivus; nam si in conclusione iste terminus 'mortuus' supponit pro illo, qui est mortuus, discursus valet; si autem pro eo, qui erit mortuus, conclusio est vera. Nullus caecus potest videre, iste potest esse caecus, ergo iste non potest videre; nam in maiore potest 'caecus' accipi pro his, qui sunt caeci, et tunc est vera sed discursus non valet; vel potest accipi pro his, qui possunt esse caeci, et tunc est falsa. Omne album contingit esse musicum, [omnem hominem contingit esse album, ergo contingit omnem hominem esse musicum, su]ponendo quod nihil sit album nisi homo. Adhuc: Omnem asinum contingit esse album, ergo contingit omnem asinum esse musicum; nam maior est distinguenda eo quod 'albus' potest accipi pro his, quae sunt alba, et tunc est vera sed discursus non valet; vel pro his, quae contingunt esse alba, et tunc est falsa.

[2. Amphibologia]

Secunda fallacia in dictione vocatur amphibologia. Et dicitur secundum quosdam¹⁵ ab *amphi* quod est dubium et *bole* quod est scientia et *logos* quod est sermo, quasi 'dubia scientia sermonis'. Est autem deceptio proveniens ex eo quod una oratio non variata naturaliter habens completam sententiam potest habere diversos sensus. Causa apparentiae est unitas orationis. Causa non existentiae est diversitas sensuum. — Et habet tres modos.

Primus est quando eadem oratio accidit ratione totius orationis et non ratione unius termini extremi potest habere plures sensus proprios. Et accidit saepe iste modus ex hoc quod in eadem oratione est diversa constructio sicut in ista: 'Audio graecos vicisse romanos'; unus sensus est 'audio quod graeci vicerunt romanos'; alius sensus est 'audio quod graecos vicerunt romani'.

¹⁵ Cf. Petrus Hispanus, *Summulae logicales* 7. 16, ed. cit. 70: Et dicitur "amphibologia" ab "amphi" quod est dubium, et "bole" quod est sententia, quasi "dubia sententia." *Definitio verbalis non invenitur in* Ockham, *Summa logicae*, III, iv, 5, ed. Venet. 1508, 96.

Penes istum modum distinguendae sunt orationes in quibus ponitur ablativus casus absolutus quia talis oratio potest exponi per se quia potest aequivalere conditionali, causali, temporali; sicut haec: 'Nullo homine existente, nullus homo est animal'; unus sensus est 'si nullus homo existit, nullus homo est animal'; alius est 'quia nullus homo existit, ideo nullus homo est animal'; alius est 'dum nullus homo existit, nullus homo est animal'.

Penes istum modum, secundum quosdam, omnes orationes possunt distingui, in quibus inter terminos ponuntur dictiones facientes hypotheticas, scilicet coniunctiones, disiunctivas, conditionales,¹⁶ causales, copulativas et adverbia¹⁷ || temporis et loci, quia tales orationes, si sunt A 240 r propositiones, possunt eadem esse categoricae et hypotheticae. Et sic fiunt talia sophismata: 'Omne animal est rationale vel irrationale, ergo omne animal est irrationale'; haec maior est distinguenda eo quod potest esse categorica de disiuncto extremo et tunc discursus non valet, vel potest esse disiunctiva et tunc maior est falsa; 'omnis homo si est susceptible disciplinae est rationalis, omnis lapis est homo si¹⁸ est susceptible disciplinae, ergo omnis lapis est rationalis': haec maior potest esse categorica et tunc est falsa, vel potest esse conditionalis et tunc est vera sed discursus non valet.¹⁹

Penes istum modum, secundum quosdam, possunt distingui omnes orationes, in quibus ponitur dictum propositionis cum dictione faciente propositionem modalem, sicut hic: 'Omne album esse nigrum est possibile'; unus sensus est 'haec est possibilis: omne album est nigrum', et iste sensus est falsus; alius est iste 'omne album potest esse nigrum'. Secundum aliquos, tales propositiones sunt distinguendae secundum compositionem et divisionem.

Secundus modus est quando oratio significat unum proprie et aliud improprie ita quod per talem orationem unum significatur de virtute sermonis et aliud secundum intentionem loquentium, sicut ista oratio: 'Iste quaerit modum in cippo', unum [significatur] proprie et aliud improprie, scilicet 'iste perdit opera'. Penes istum modum distinguendi

¹⁶ tales vel causales *add. et del.* A.

¹⁷ temporis *add. et del.* A.

¹⁸ homo si est *mg* Ac.

¹⁹ 'omnis homo si est susceptible disciplinae est rationalis, omnis lapis est homo si est susceptible disciplinae, ergo omnis lapis est rationalis': haec maior potest esse categorica et tunc est falsa, vel potest esse conditionalis et tunc est vera sed discursus non valet.] omnis homo si est susceptible disciplinae est rationalis, ergo omnis lapis est rationalis; haec maior potest esse categorica et tunc est falsa, vel potest esse conditionalis et tunc est vera sed discursus non valet, omnis lapis est homo si est susceptible disciplinae A.

sunt omnes modi tropici,²⁰ et figurativi qui²¹ non sunt tropici. Propter quod aliqua dictio potest accipi proprie et improprie, sive de eisdem terminis sit ars tradita sive non.²²

Tertius modus est quando aliqua oratio primo posita non est distinguenda, si addatur alia potest habere diversos sensus, sicut ista 'iste non fecit iustitiam' non habet nisi unum sensum quia li 'iste' non potest esse relativum; sed si praeponatur sibi oratio sic: 'Aliquis homo fuit iustus et iste non fecit iustitiam' potest habere diversos sensus quia tunc ibi pronomen 'iste' potest esse relativum et demonstrativum. Et ideo in hoc exemplo tertius modus correspondet cum primo aequivocationis.

[3—4. Compositio et divisio]

Tertia fallacia in dictione vocatur compositio et quarta divisio. Circa quas non est curiose disputandum an sint una fallacia vel plures, aut quis vocandus sit sensus compositionis et quis divisionis. Hoc enim parum vel nihil prodest ad alias scientias intelligendas. Est autem fallacia compositionis et divisionis deceptio proveniens ex hoc quod partes orationis eiusdem possunt diversimode componi vel dividi ab invicem. Unde causa apparentiae est identitas orationis; causa non existentiae²³ est diversitas sensuum propter quam dictiones eiusdem orationis aliter et aliter possunt componi et dividi ab invicem. — Sunt autem duo modi principales.

Primus est quando, retento eodem ordine dictionum,²⁴ patenter in tardis et rudibus possunt esse diversi sensus propter hoc quod aliqua dictio potest componi vel dividi ab alia, quod apparet ex sola punctuatione diversa. Sic distinguendae sunt tales: ¶ 'Quidquid vivit semper est', haec dictio 'semper' potest componi cum hoc verbo 'vivit' et est vera, vel potest dividi ab eo et tunc est falsa; 'omne currens velociter movetur', haec dictio 'velociter' potest componi cum hoc participio 'currens' et est vera, vel dividi ab eo et tunc²⁵ est falsa.

Secundus modus est quando eadem dictio non habet patenter tales sensus, retento eodem dictionum ordine, sed in explicatione sensuum est aperta et patens diversitas sensuum propter hoc quod aliqua vel termini diversimode componuntur vel dividuntur ab invicem; sicut patet hic: 'Quinque sunt duo et tria', nam unus sensus est iste 'quinque sunt duo et quinque sunt tria', ubi iste terminus 'quinque' componitur ibi in

²⁰ thopici A.

²¹ quae A.

²² sit ars tradita sive non] sive non sit ars tradita A.

²³ non add. et del. A.

²⁴ eodem ordine dictionum] secundum eundem ordinem dicto cum A.

²⁵ interl. A.

diversis propositionibus cum illis duobus terminis 'duo' et 'tria'; alius sensus est 'quinque sunt duo et tria coniunctim', 'quinque sunt aliqua, quae comprehendunt duo et tria'. Dicitur autem quod iste modus compositionis coincidit cum primo modo amphibologiae quantum ad orationes in quibus ponuntur dictiones inter terminos facientes propositiones hypotheticas. Etiam dicitur quod penes secundum modum distinguendae sunt propositiones, in quibus ponitur dictum propositionis cum dictione faciente propositionem modalem.

Sensus compositionis exprimitur per propositionem, in qua modus praedicatur de propositione de inesse, sicut sensus istius compositionis 'omnem hominem esse animal est scitum a te' exprimitur per istam 'omnis homo est animal est scita a te'. Sensus divisionis explicatur per propositiones, in quibus modus est determinatio compositionis vel in ipsis ponitur verbum modale, sicut praedictae propositiones; et taliter 'omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium' explicatur per istam 'omnis homo necessario est animal'.

[5. Accentus]

Quinta fallacia in dictione vocatur accentus; quae est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod eadem vox, et scripta eodem ordine et punctuatione retenta,²⁶ potest diversimode pronuntiari vel scribi. Unde causa apparentiae est identitas orationis; causa non existentiae est diversitas in pronuntiando vel scribendo. Et possunt esse diversi modi istius fallaciae, et sunt tot quot propter diversam pronuntiationem et diversum modum scribendi possunt esse diversi sensus.

Unde unus est quando eadem syllaba, maxime in medio dictionis, potest esse longa vel brevis; sicut si scribatur talis 'iste irritat²⁷ regem', unus sensus est si media syllaba istius dictionis 'irritat'²⁸ sit brevis, et alius si sit longa. Alius modus est quando eadem dictio potest proferri cum aspiratione et sine aspiratione, sicut posset talis distingui 'omnis (h)ara est in templo'. Alius potest esse quando aliqua vox potest esse una dictio vel plures, sicut 'hostis sua-vi-ter²⁹ intravit civitatem'. Alius potest esse quando eadem oratio || potest proferri interrogative et depressive. Alius est quando eadem oratio potest proferri ironice et non ironice. Et quot³⁰ possunt tales diversimode proferri ex quibus concipiuntur diversi sensus eiusdem orationis, retentis eodem ordine et eadem punctuatione, tot possunt esse modi huiusmodi fallaciae.

A 241 r

²⁶ retento A

²⁸ irrigat A.

³⁰ quando A.

²⁷ irrigat A.

²⁹ superavit A.

[6. Figura dictionis]

Sexta fallacia in dictione vocatur figura dictionis, quae non est deceptio proveniens ex multiplici[tate] orationis distinguendae sed est deceptio proveniens ex apparentia simili³¹ unius³² dictionis ad alias, propter quod creditur quod sit alius modus arguendi in aliis dictionibus, ita quod valeat modus arguendi, accepta dictione. Unde causa apparentiae est apparens similitudo alicuius dictionis ad aliam. — Et habet tres modos.

Primus modus est quando argumentum est bonum in quibusdam dictionibus et apparet simile argumentum in aliis, [quod] non valet propter accidens diversum grammaticale alicuius dictionis acceptae. Verbi gratia, talis modus arguendi est bonus: 'Omnis substantia corporea est colorata, petra est substantia corporea, ergo petra est colorata'; [sed] si propter hoc credat aliquis tale argumentum esse bonum: 'Omnis substantia³³ corporea est colorata, ergo lapis est colorata', decipitur hic per primum modum figurae dictionis. Non enim valet secundus discursus; conclusio est incongrua quia 'lapis' est masculini generis et non est feminini generis sicut hoc nomen 'petra'.

Secundus modus est quando aliquis modus arguendi valet in quibusdam terminis et in quibusdam aliis videtur valere similis modus; qui tamen non valet nisi propter diversitatem modorum significandi logicalem nec etiam propter diversitatem accidentium grammaticalium. Verbi gratia, iste modus arguendi est bonus: Iste non habuit equum coloratum, iste nunc habet equum coloratum, ergo iste nunc habet equum coloratum quem non habuit. Si propter hoc credatur quod iste modus arguendi, qui videtur similis priori: [Iste non habuit equum album, iste nunc habet equum album, ergo iste habet equum quem non habuit,] sit bonus, accidit deceptio penes secundum modum principalem figurae dictionis. Non enim valet secundum argumentum cum hac dictione 'album' sicut valet primum cum hac dictione 'coloratum', [non] propter illud [quod] accidens grammaticale huiusmodi dictionis 'album' [est aliud] quam huiusmodi dictionis 'coloratum' nisi propter alium modum significandi logicalem; sed propter diversitatem significatorum, scilicet quod haec dictio 'album' significat solummodo albedinem sine qua³⁴ potest esse equus et³⁵ hoc nomen 'coloratum' significat in obliquo omnes colores sine quibus³⁶ nullus equus potest esse.

³¹ simile A.³³ colorata est *add. et del.* A.³⁵ sed A.³² dictionis *add. et del.* A.³⁴ quibus omnis *l. o.* A.³⁶ omnibus *add.* A.

Tertius modus est deceptio proveniens ex diversitate modorum significandi || diversarum dictionum, propter quas modus arguendi in quibusdam dictionibus valet, in quibusdam non. Huiusmodi autem modi significandi sunt tales significare categorematice vel syncategorematice, ut nomen proprium et³⁷ appellativum significant mere absolute et connotative; et affirmative et negative significare istis modis, quae diversa praedicamenta significant. Saepe enim valet modus arguendi cum dictione categorematica et tamen, si loco ipsius poneretur dictio syncategorematica quae faceret terminum diversimode supponere, non valeret. Bene enim sequitur: 'Unus homo est sapiens, ergo sapiens est unus homo'; et tamen, si loco istius nominis ['unus'] poneretur haec dictio 'omnis', non valeret quia non sequitur: 'Omnis homo est sapiens, ergo sapiens est omnis³⁸ homo' quia dictio 'omnis', addita isti termino³⁹ 'homo', facit tam subiectum quam praedicatum aliter supponere; quod non facit haec dictio 'unus', quae est categorematica.

De ista autem diversitate modorum significandi multae regulae inveniri possent. De quibus multis, dantur duae. Quarum una est quod a termino stante confuse tantum ad eundem vel alium stantem determinate vel confuse vel distributive, haec est figure dictionis; sicut hic: Omnis homo est animal, ergo animal est omnis homo.

Alia est quod a termino supponente determinate vel confuse tantum ad eundem terminum stantem confuse et distributive, est figura dictionis; sicut hic: Ab homine differt Sortes, ergo Sortes differt ab homine. Rursum saepe valet aliquis modus arguendi, accepto termino mere absoluto; et tamen, si loco alterius poneretur terminus connotativus, non valeret. Signa distributiva sunt diversa secundum diversitatem praedicamentorum ita quod sub uno convenienter accipiuntur termini in praedicamento substantiae et omnes termini mere absoluti, sub alio autem accipiuntur in praedicamento quantitatis, sub alio in praedicamento qualitatis, sub alio in praedicamento 'ubi', et sic de aliis ubi vocabula nobis deficiunt; quorum sunt talia universalia distributiva: quidquid, quocumque, qualiscumque, quantumcumque. Et ideo quando sub signo universali distributivo unius praedicamenti et praemissae non disponuntur in modo et in figura, est fallacia figurae⁴⁰ dictionis. Exemplum: Quidquid heri emisti hodie comedisti, heri emisti carnes crudas, igitur etc. Hic est fallacia figurae dictionis, nam, si loco istius⁴¹ termini 'carnes crudas' poneretur terminus mere absolutus, esset bonum argumentum sic arguendo: Quid-

³⁷ *mg* Ac, vel A.

³⁹ isti termino] sicut iste terminus A

⁴¹ dictionis *add. et del.* A.

³⁸ hominis A.

⁴⁰ *interl.* A.

quid heri emisti hodie comedisti, gallinam heri emisti, ergo gallinam hodie comedisti. Rursum si loco istius signi 'quidquid' poneretur hoc signum 'qualecumque', quod pertinet ad praedicamentum qualitatis, esset bonum argumentum sic: Qualecumque heri emisti hodie comedisti, carnes crudas etc. Non igitur est fallacia figurae dictionis ex hoc quod commutatur unum praedicamentum in aliud sed propter hoc quod extra formam syllogisticam sub signo distributivo, pertinente ad unum praedicamentum, accipitur terminus alterius praedicamenti et ex hoc quod sub

A 242 r

signo distributivo, || spectante ad mere absolutos, accipitur extra formam syllogisticam terminus connotativus vel e converso.

[B. Fallaciae extra dictionem]

Post fallacias in dictione sequuntur fallaciae extra dictionem. Quarum prima vocatur accidens.

[I. Accidens]

Et vocatur accidens omnis terminus discretus ab alio termino. Est autem fallacia accidentis deceptio proveniens ex hoc quod aliqui termini creduntur uniri inter se, quia uniuntur cum termino tertio non variato. Causa apparentiae est⁴² unitas termini cum quo alii termini uniuntur. Causa non existentiae est quando non est necesse aliqua coniungi inter se licet coniungantur cum tertio per significationem; et ista debet esse responsio generalis ad omnia generalia argumenta sophistica, peccantia per fallaciam accidentis. Sed praeter istam generalem oportet dare speciales ad diversas sophisticationes huiusmodi; et sunt duo modi.

Primus est quando ex hoc quod duo extrema in praemissis uniuntur cum tertio termino non variato per praedicationem affirmativam vel negativam, et tamen non est necesse eos sic uniri; et ita iste modus est directe contra formam syllogisticam. Unde ad cognoscendum istum modum oportet scire regulas, quae traduntur de syllogismo, et regulas per quas cognoscuntur coniugationes, quae sunt utiles. Penes istum modum peccant tales: 'Aliquod animal est homo, asinus est animal, ergo asinus est homo', nam in prima figura maior debet esse universalis; similiter: 'Omnem hominem esse animal est scitum a te, veniens est homo, ergo⁴³ veniens animal est scitum a te', nam in prima figura, si maior sit de hoc modo 'scitum' et accipiatur in sensu compositionis et minor sit de inesse, est coniugatio inutilis et fallacia accidentis. Unde quando omnes propositiones sunt mere de inesse et mere de praesenti et mere affirmativae vel negativae et non est aliqua determinatio, ibi facile est cognoscere hunc

⁴² un *add. et del. A.*

⁴³ ergo *add. A.*

modum quia cognoscitur per hos versus *Barbara celarent* etc., quia quancumque peccatur contra hos versus, committitur fallacia accidentis. Sed quando aliqua praemissa est de praeterito vel de futuro vel non pure affirmativa vel negativa vel etiam determinatio verbi, si accipiat de esse vel de modo, non est ita facile immo est difficile propter multitudinem et ignorantiam solam rerum, per quas oportet scire quae coniugationes sunt utiles et quae inutiles in talibus.

Secundus modus [est] quando ex hoc quod duo extrema coniunguntur separatim tertio, sophistice concluditur quod coniunctim praedicantur affirmative vel negative de eodem tertio non variato. Propriissime autem iste modus accidentis est quando propositiones sunt mere de inesse et mere de praesenti et pure affirmativae vel negativae, et nulla determinatio vel modus ponitur in eis, et propositiones omnes ¶ sunt congruae, si terminus sumptus sit terminus discretus; sed tunc poterit esse fallacia aequivocationis vel figurae dictionis. Hic enim proprie est fallacia aequivocationis: Iste canis est eius, iste canis est pater, ergo est pater eius; et non est proprie fallacia accidentis quia aliter accipitur haec dictio 'eius' in praemissa et in conclusione. Haec autem: 'Iste est albus, iste est animal, ergo iste est animal albus', magis proprie est fallacia figurae dictionis quam accidentis. Sed quando terminus sumptus est discretus, tunc potest esse fallacia accidentis si propositiones aliquae sunt de praeterito vel de⁴⁴ futuro vel de modo⁴⁵, sicut in talibus: Sortes fuit puer, Sortes fuit sapiens, ergo Sortes fuit sapiens puer; Sortes est senex, Sortes erit robustus, ergo erit robustus senex; Sortes dubitatur decrepitis esse, Sortes dubitatur esse sanus, ergo Sortes dubitatur esse decrepitis sanus. Quando autem terminus tertius est terminus communis, etiam in propositionibus mere de praesenti et de inesse, fallacia nonnumquam fit accidentis sic arguendo: Aliquod animal est corvus, aliquod album est animal, ergo aliquod animal est corvus albus.

Quando autem in tali modo arguendi est fallacia accidentis et quando non, semper vel frequenter potest sciri per hanc regulam: Quando ex huiusmodi praemissis, in quibus praedicantur aliqua divisim, si determinatio potest syllogistice inferre unum istorum de reliquo, tunc potest illa determinatio inferri coniunctim nisi aequivocatio vel incongruitas locutionis impediat. Et ideo hic non est fallacia accidentis: 'Omne animal est corvus, aliquod animal est album, ergo aliquod animal est albus corvus', quia ex praemissis infertur conclusio ista⁴⁶ 'aliquod album est

⁴⁴ *interl.* A.

⁴⁵ *vacat* A.

⁴⁶ conclusio ista] discursus iste A.

corvus', quae infertur ex praemissis secundum discursum. Quando autem ex praemissis huiusmodi infertur, ubi praedicatur unum istorum dictorum de reliquo, scitur quae de syllogismis tradi debent. Et ita potest cognosci iste modus fallaciae accidentis.

[2. Consequens]

Secunda fallacia extra dictionem vocatur fallacia consequentis, quae est deceptio proveniens ex hoc quod consequens, vel [illud quod] denotatur habere modum consequentis, ponitur loco antecedentis. Unde causa apparentiae potest dici convenientia⁴⁷ consequentis cum antecedente; causa non existentiae est modus⁴⁸ consequentis. Est autem sciendum quod duplex dicitur esse consequens. Quoddam est terminus superior seu communior aut quia affirmative convenit vere arguere ad ipsum, sicut sequitur: 'Sortes est homo, ergo est animal'; unde 'animal' vocatur consequens respectu istius termini 'homo'. Aliquando consequens vocatur propositio, quae sequitur ex alia vel ex⁴⁹ aliis. Iuxta istam distinctionem ponuntur duo modi.

Primus est quando sumitur⁵⁰ consequens primo modo; quod denotatur per aliam propositionem assumptam habere modum consequentis circa alterum terminum, quantum ad hoc quod denotatur praedicari de ipso universaliter vel sequitur ad ipsum, in consequentia ponitur loco antecedentis. Penes istum modum peccant tales: || 'Asinus est animal, ergo asinus est homo'; ad hoc quod ex istis terminis esset bona consequentia oporteret poni primo hunc terminum 'homo' et non 'animal', qui est consequens, sic: Asinus est homo, ergo asinus est homo animal; — 'omne fel est rubeum, omne mel est rubeum, ergo mel est fel', per istam 'omne fel est rubeum' denotatur quod iste terminus 'rubeum' habet modum consequentis et per istum terminum 'fel' quantum ad praedicari de ipso⁵¹ universaliter sumpto, habet modum antecedentis et ita⁵² illud quod denotatur habere modum consequentis ponitur loco antecedentis, hoc quod res deberet subici universaliter; et ideo, si 'rubeum' fieret subiectum, esset bonum argumentum sic: Omne rubeum est fel, omne mel est rubeum, ergo mel est fel. Et propter hoc semper est fallacia consequentis in prima figura quando maior est universalis affirmativa et minor negativa, sic: 'Omnis fur est avarus, iste non est fur, ergo non est avarus', nam per maiorem denotatur 'avarus' habere medium consequentis, quia, quando ponitur in negativa respectu alterius termini, deberet poni in antecedente et non in consequente, cuius contrarium fit hic.

⁴⁷ consequentia A.

⁵⁰ vere A.

⁴⁸ vacat A.

⁵¹ interl. A.

⁴⁹ all add. et del. A.

⁵² quod add. et del. A.

Et ideo hic etiam est fallacia consequentis: 'Si Sortes currit Sortes movetur, ergo si Sortes non currit Sortes non movetur', nam per istam conditionalem 'si Sortes currit' etc. denotatur quod 'movere' habet modum consequentis respectu 'currere', quia ex ista conditionali sequitur ista: 'Omne currens est motum' et per consequens, quando arguitur negative ab uno istorum terminorum ad alterum, 'moveri' debet poni in antecedente et non in consequente. Et ita quandocumque arguitur in secunda figura ex maiori universalis affirmativa et minore negativa et in prima figura, semper est fallacia consequentis, non accidentis.

Secundus modus est quando illa propositio, quae vere est consequens vel per aliquam conditionalem expresse denotatur esse consequens, ponitur loco antecedentis, sic: 'Omnis homo currit, ergo omne animal currit', nam sequitur e converso et non sic; istud enim quod est vere consequens, ponitur loco antecedentis. 'Si domus est paries est, nulla domus est, ergo nullus⁵³ paries est', nam per istam conditionalem 'si domus est' denotatur quod ista 'nulla domus est' est consequens respectu alterius 'nullus⁵⁴ paries est', per istam regulam: Si aliqua conditionalis est bona, oppositum consequentis est antecedens ad oppositum antecedentis. Et ideo, quia ista 'nulla domus est' ponitur in antecedente, in praedictis sophisticis committitur fallacia consequentis, quia in consequentia, qua una propositio infertur ab una consequentia, ponitur [consequens] loco antecedentis. Et ideo non sequitur sic sed e converso.

Non sufficit una regula generalis sed pro diversis sophismatibus oportet habere diversas, ita quod pro uno oportet habere duas regulas et pro alio duas alias; sicut hic, quia est fallacia consequentis: 'Omnis homo est risibilis, ergo omne animal est risibile', oportet scire istam regulam: A superiori distributo ad inferius distributum est bona consequentia; ab inferiori distributo ad superius distributum non valet. Et sic de aliis.

[3. Secundum quid et simpliciter]

¶ Tertia fallacia extra dictionem vocatur secundum quid et simpliciter; A 243 v quae est deceptio proveniens ex hoc quod creditur quod, sumpto termino cum determinatione ad terminum sumptum per se vel e converso, sit bona consequentia quandoque, cum non valeat. Causa apparentiae est convenientia alicuius sumpti cum alio ad ipsum per se sumptum, et causa non existentiae est diversitas inter ipsa. — Et habet duos modos.

Primus est quando sophistice arguitur ab hoc verbo 'est' sine addito ad ipsum sumptum cum addito, vel e converso, affirmative vel negative

⁵³ nulla A.

⁵⁴ nulla A.

sic: Domus est fictibilis, ergo domus est; homo est, ergo homo⁵⁵ fictibilis est; nullus homo est, ergo nullus homo [fictibilis] est; castrum non est, ergo castrum non est fictibile. Quare in talibus est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter quia pro diversis oportet diversas rationes ponere et assignare, quia etiam in quibusdam terminis est talis modus arguendi bonus et in quibusdam non valet. Ideo oportet assignare pro diversis [regulas] speciales.

Secundus modus est quando arguitur sophisticè a subiecto vel a praedicato, distinguendo copulam, sumpto cum determinatione ad terminum per se sumptum, vel e converso, affirmative vel negative. Et tunc iste modus habet unum quod est adiectivum et aliud quod est substantivum; et adiectivum est dictio privativa vel negativa, quae de nullo pure posito vere praedicatur affirmative, sic: 'Homo est mortuus'. Unde propter hoc est hic fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter: Sortes est homo mortuus, ergo Sortes est homo. Si autem talis dictio privativa potest vere affirmative praedicari de aliquo termino pure posito et de aliquo non, tunc, si addatur termino de quo non potest vere praedicari ad eundem terminum per se sumptum, est fallacia ista. Sed ad alios terminos superiores ad terminum de quo potest vere praedicari, est bona consequentia. Quare est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter: Iste est falsus denarius, ergo est denarius; et hic: [Iste] est falsus syllogismus, ergo est argumentum; sed non hic: Iste est falsus syllogismus, ergo est oratio. Sed in talibus a subiecto cum adiectivo per se sumpto est fallacia ista, licet forte posset esse vera,⁵⁶ sicut hic est bonum argumentum: Iste est syllogismus sophisticus; ergo est sophisticus; iste est homo mortuus, ergo est mortuus.

Et est etiam iste modus quando verbo additur adverbium vel aliud aequivalens quod significat negative, sicut in talibus: Iste fere⁵⁷ cecidit, ergo cecidit; iste est potentialiter rex, ergo est rex; iste fur est rex, ergo est rex.

Et accidit iste modus quando additum significat partem, ad cuius denominationem non sequitur denominatio totius, sicut hic: Aethiops est albus secundum dentes, ergo est albus.

Et accidit iste modus ¶ quando determinatio addita facit totam propositionem aequivalere conditionali, sicut hic: Vellem esse in luto cum centum marchis, ergo vellem esse in luto. Et propter hoc hic non est fallacia talis: Sto in luto cum centum florenis, ergo sto in luto.

⁵⁵ est *add. et del.* A.

⁵⁶ alia A.

⁵⁷ vere A.

Item accidit iste modus quando de aliquo sumpto cum pluribus pars alia totius non praedicatur, sicut in talibus: Iste vult cavere malum, ergo vult malum; iste desiderat impedire⁵⁸ iustitiam, ergo desiderat iustitiam, quia tales non sunt verae: Volens cavere malum vult malum, desiderans impedire iustitiam⁵⁹ desiderat iustitiam. Hic etiam est iste modus: Secare est bonum huic aegroti,⁶⁰ ergo secare est bonum; comedere carnes est malum febricitanti, ergo comedere carnes est malum.

Ex istis patet quando est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, arguendo negative ex opposito consequentis affirmative. Est ista fallacia sicut hic: Sortes non est homo mortuus, [ergo non est mortuus]; iste non desiderat impedire iustitiam, ergo non desiderat iustitiam.

[4. Secundum ignorantiam elenchi]

Quarta fallacia extra dictionem est⁶¹ secundum ignorantiam elenchi. Et accipitur specialiter sive stricte pro argumento sophistico propter additionem aliquorum inferentium⁶² contradictionem; haec habetur deceptio. Causa apparentiae est apparens repugnantia in praemissis, qualis est propositionum remanentium illis additionibus demptis; causa non existentiae est [in]compossibilitas propositionum, stante⁶³ non absoluta⁶⁴ repugnantia seu impossibilitate propositionum remanentium illis additionibus demptis. Verbi gratia, istae sunt verae contradictoriae: Hoc est bonum, hoc non est bonum. Et si credatur quod ista contradictio sequatur ex talibus propositionibus, addatur alia sic Sortes Platoni; et tunc sic: 'Hoc est bonum Sorti, hoc non est bonum Platoni, [ergo bonum non est bonum]', accidit deceptio secundum ignorantiam elenchi quia taliter deceptus ignoraret quae est vera contradictio vel quando aliqua inferrent contradictionem. Et talis haberet ignorantiam elenchi, qui est syllogismus contradictionis. — Possunt autem tot modi esse huius fallaciae quot huiusmodi possunt addi in propositionibus repugnantibus reddentes propositiones aequales non repugnantibus.

Unus est secundum quod aliquid comparatur ad⁶⁵ diversa relative vel per modum relativorum, id est quando adduntur diversi obliqui, facientes propositiones totales esse compossibiles; sicut hic: Sortes est filius Platonis, Sortes non est filius Ioannis, ergo est filius et non filius.

Alius modus est quando aliquid comparatur ad idem secundum diversa, sicut: Sortes est similis Platoni [secundum albedinem] et non

⁵⁸ reperire A.

⁶⁰ *interl.* A.

⁶² inferentes A.

⁶⁴ absolute A.

⁵⁹ vult iustitiam *add. et del.* A.

⁶¹ extra dictionem est] est extra dictionem A.

⁶³ *vacat* A.

⁶⁵ si *add. et del.* A.

[est] similis Platoni [secundum grammaticam, ergo est similis et non similis Platoni].

A 244 v Alius modus est quando adduntur diversa adverbia vel aequipollentia, quae reddunt⁶⁶ || propositiones compossibiles, sicut hic: Sol movetur velociter, sol non movetur tarde, ergo movetur et non movetur.

Alius modus est quando propositiones propter addita possunt verificari de diversis temporibus, sicut hic: Sortes fuit albus heri, Sortes non fuit albus ante heri, ergo Sortes fuit albus et non albus.

Alius modus est quando addita important diversa loca, sicut hic: Sortes currit in agro, Sortes non currit in lecto, igitur currit et non currit.

Alii modi plures possunt poni propter diversitatem istorum, quae, si addantur, reddunt propositiones impossibiles. Unde ad istam fallaciam possunt reduci omnes fallaciae propter huiusmodi addita, inferentes quascumque impossibiles de aliquo absque expressa conditione prima, sicut in talibus: Comedere carnes est bonum sano, comedere carnes est malum febricitanti, ergo est bonum et malum.

Est autem sciendum quod ista fallacia semper coincidit cum fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, quia semper ab una praemissa ad alteram partem conclusionis est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, sicut in isto totali argumento est [fallacia] secundum ignorantiam elenchi: 'Sortes est filius Platonis, Sortes non est filius Ioannis, ergo est filius et non filius', quia a secunda praemissa ad secundam partem conclusionis est fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, arguendo sic: Sortes non est filius Fabiani, ergo non est filius. Et ista fallacia ita faciliter cognoscitur per fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter.

[5. Petitio principii]

Quinta fallacia extra dictionem vocatur petitio principii; quae est deceptio proveniens ex hoc quod accipitur sine probatione quod probari deberet. Causa apparentiae est assumptio alicuius probandi, id est ut veri;⁶⁷ causa non existentiae est assumptio probandi sine probatione. Accipitur autem hic 'principium' pro antecedente vel assumpto ad probandum aliquam conclusionem. Et non peccat haec fallacia contra illationem consequentis ex antecedente sed contra praemissae⁶⁸ probationem, quia scilicet accipit ut ponens absque probatione quod probare deberet. Ista enim fallacia non committitur nisi in disputatione inter opponentem et respondentem. Quae causa dicitur fallaciae extra dictionem, quamvis non committatur per signa⁶⁹ ad placitum instituta;

⁶⁶ retinent A.

⁶⁸ .b. A.

⁶⁷ ut veri] non ei A.

⁶⁹ singula A.

quae omnibus illationibus et partibus earum, si modo sit aliqua alia fallacia, correspondent⁷⁰ consimiles illationes et partes earum mentales et non correspondent.⁷¹ ¶ Hoc accipitur quia non committitur nisi in A 245 r disputatione inter opponentem et respondentem. Ideo argumentum potest esse uni respondenti petitio principii et alteri non, quia si unus potest rationabiliter petere probationem alicuius assumpti, tamen⁷² non alter quia forte alter iam concessit illud assumptum in disputatione quam⁷³ habuit vel habet cum aliquo. Et hinc est quod possunt esse multi modi huius fallaciae.

Unus est quando arguitur ab uno syllogismorum ad reliquum, sicut⁷⁴ si unus neget istam 'omnis lapis est durus' et postea arguat [alter] contra ipsum sic: 'Omnis petra est dura, ergo omnis lapis est durus', potest respondens dicere quod est sibi petitio [principii] hic quia ex hoc [quod] scit quod ista negatur 'lapis et petra sunt synonyma' aequè ignotum est sibi antecedens sicut consequens; et ideo si prius non concessit antecedens, potest rationabiliter petere probationem eius. Sed si concessit prius antecedens, non posset rationabiliter dicere quod ista consequentia esset sibi petitio principii.

Alius est quando arguitur a definitione exprimente quid nominis ad definitum, vel e converso, si sic respondens sciat definitionem quid rei⁷⁵ de definito. Et ita demonstratio potissima esset alicui petitio principii sicut multis non est demonstratio, scilicet nescientibus conclusionem propter praemissas.

Alius modus est quando arguitur ab universali ad singulare, quia saepe talis consequentia est magis⁷⁶ ignota respondenti quam singularis; sed si concessisset universalem, non posset sibi assignare fallaciam petitionis principii.

Alius est quando arguitur a singularibus ad universalem. Unde omnis vera inductio potest alicui esse petitio principii, cui singulares non sunt magis notae quam universales, — nisi prius concessisset singulares.

Alius modus generalis, comprehendens omnes praedictos et alios⁷⁷ innumeros, potest esse quando arguitur ab una propositionum aequi-pollentium seu convertibilium ad aliam, sicut hic: Nullus homo est asinus, ergo nullus asinus est homo.

Alii modi innumeri possunt poni quia in argumentis innumeris potest respondens petere rationabiliter probationem antecedentis et dicere quod antedecens est sibi ignotum vel ignotius quam conclusio.

⁷⁰ correspondens A.

⁷² et A.

⁷⁴ sicut Ac, sic A.

⁷⁶ *mg* A.

⁷¹ consimiles illationes *add. et del.* A.

⁷³ quod A.

⁷⁵ re A.

⁷⁷ praedictos et alios] alios praedictos et A.

[6. Non causa ut causa]

A 245 v Sexta fallacia extra dictionem vocatur non causa ut causa; quae non committitur in argumentis ostensivis sed in ducentibus ad impossibile sive ad falsum; quae est deceptio proveniens ex hoc quod falsum est vel quod || putatur esse falsum creditur saepe, non⁷⁸ propter falsitatem alicuius propositionis praeconcessae — propter quam non sequitur — sed propter aliquod aliud falsum coassumptum. Causa apparentiae est assumptio propositionis praeconcessae, propter quam videtur sequi falsum; causa non existentiae est quod non sequitur falsum propter propositionem praeconcessam praecise sed propter alia.⁷⁹ — Et habet duos modos.

Primus est quando in argumento ducente ad falsum accipitur⁸⁰ propositio praeconcessa tamquam necessaria ad illationem; quae causa est superflua, sicut si repondens concedat quod anima et vita sunt idem et opponens volens probare eam esse falsam, quia ex ipsa cum aliis sequitur falsum, arguet sic: Anima et vita sunt idem, mors et vita sunt contraria, generatio et corruptio sunt contraria, mors est corruptio, ergo vita generatio. Haec conclusio est falsa et non ista 'mors et vita sunt contraria' nec ista 'generatio et corruptio sunt contraria' nec ista 'mors est corruptio; ergo ista est falsa 'anima et vita sunt idem' quia committitur primus modus istius fallaciae,⁸¹ quia ista propositio 'anima et vita sunt idem' est superflua illatio conclusionis ex praemissis, quia sine ipsa sequitur. Et ideo oportet quod sit aliqua fallacia, si conclusio est falsa.

Secundus modus est quando propositio praeconcessa non est superflua illatio; tamen accipitur falsum circa eam. Et iste modus potest dividi quia aliquando infertur falsum propter solam falsitatem propositionis coassumptae, sicut concessa [a] respondente hanc esse necessariam 'nullum album est nigrum', opponens sic arguat: Hoc est necessarium nullum album est nigrum, album non potest fieri nigrum nisi idem tunc sit album et nigrum, ergo nullum album potest esse nigrum. Conclusio [est] falsa, ergo aliqua praemissarum; non minor, ergo maior. Dicendum est quod committitur secundum non causam⁸² ut causam fallacia, quia conclusio falsa non sequitur propter maiorem sed propter minorem [coassumptam].

Secundus modus istius secundi modi est quando includitur impossibilis propositio, non⁸³ propter impossibilitatem coassumpti sed impos-

⁷⁸ quod A.⁸⁰ vel A.⁸² non causam *transp.* A.⁷⁹ et hoc duobus *add. et del.* A.⁸¹ est *add.* A.⁸³ nec A.

sibilitatem⁸⁴ eorum, sicut quia Sortes est niger et opponens arguat sic: 'Sortes est niger, Sortes non est niger, ergo ista est impossibilis "Sortes est niger"' ; et per consequens committitur fallacia secundum non causam ut causam quia est conclusio impossibilis: Contradictoria sunt simul vera; non sequitur propter impossibilitatem alicuius || praemissae nec falsitatem 'Sortes est niger' sed propter impossibilitatem praemis-
sarum.⁸⁵ A 246 r

[7. Plures interrogationes ut unam facere]

Septima fallacia extra dictionem [est] plures interrogationes ut unam facere quando opponens per interrogationem, quae plures est, intendit decipere respondentem dum proponit aequivocata quasi esset una, ut respondens det unam responsionem et sic decipiatur. Et est deceptio proveniens ex eo quod ad interrogationem, quae plures est, datur una responsio quando non est unica danda. Causa apparentiae est similitudo interrogationis, quae plures est, ad unum; causa non existentiae est pluralitas interrogationis. Dicitur autem hic esse plures primo modo quando propositio vel oratio dicitur esse plures. Propositio autem dicitur duobus modis esse plures, uno modo quando est proprie propositio categorica, alio⁸⁶ hypothetica quae⁸⁷ proprie habet contradictoriam.⁸⁸ Sed tamen tripliciter potest dici plures, scilicet vel quia est hypothetica, vel quia⁸⁹ alterum extremum aut utraque est compositum ex pluribus terminis categoricis, quorum quilibet significative sumptus potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum in propositione, vel quia alterum extremum vel utraque est pluralis numeri. Aliter autem dicitur propositio esse plures oratio, quae non est proprie propositio nec habet unam contradictoriam sed una propositio habet unam et alia aliam; sicut est de propositione vel oratione in qua subintelligitur quod alia dictio debeat vel debeant sumi cum dictione, faciente propositionem hypotheticam, totiens replicari quot sunt distinctae partes positae post verbum, sicut: Iste gaudet de honore Dei, de bono communi, de bono proprio, de prosperitate bonorum, de poena malorum. Istis modis potest interrogatio dici plures et iuxta istos modos possunt poni duo modi principales.

Primus est quando interrogatio est plures primo modo; per quem decipi potest respondens quia sic, si putaverit esse dandam unicam responsionem affirmativam, saepe decipietur. Si enim interrogetur quis: Putasne est Aethiops homo albus, est Sortes⁹⁰ musicus et grammaticus, sunt mel et

⁸⁴ impossibilitatem A.

⁸⁶ vel A.

⁸⁸ sed *add. et del.* A.

⁹⁰ ne *add.* A.

⁸⁵ praemissorum A.

⁸⁷ quod A.

⁸⁹ aliquid A.

fel amara vel dulcia, sunt isti leones vel asini? — demonstrato⁹¹ uno leone et asino, — si voluerit [dare] unicam⁹² responsionem affirmativam, decipietur; sed si talis voluerit dare unicam responsionem negativam, A 246 v non est necesse eum decipi. || Si enim dixerit quod isti non sunt leones⁹³ vel isti non sunt asini, nullum inconueniens sequitur; et sic est de aliis. Sed si dixerit quod isti sunt leones,⁹⁴ ad inconueniens ducetur.

Secundus modus est quando interrogatio est plures secundo modo; si respondens dederit unicam responsionem affirmativam sive negativam, poterit decipi. Si enim interrogatur sic: 'Putasne Sortes dolet de prosperitate amicorum suorum, de prosperitate inimicorum, de adversitate malorum, de adversitate⁹⁵ bonorum?'⁹⁶ sive responderit sic sive non, deduci poterit ad inconueniens. Debet ergo dare plures responsiones dicendo quod Sortes dolet de prosperitate inimicorum et non dolet de prosperitate amicorum, dolet de adversitate⁹⁷ bonorum et non dolet de adversitate malorum. Tot enim debet dare responsiones quot includuntur interrogationes [in] huiusmodi propositiones [et] interrogationes sunt distinctae. Est autem ista fallacia extra dictionem quia potest quis, solummodo mentaliter respondendo, huiusmodi responsiones formare et decipi, putando quod una alia propositio affirmativa vel negativa, formata ex eisdem, sit vera vel concedenda⁹⁸ et⁹⁹ universaliter tenenda.¹⁰⁰

ELIGIUS M. BUYTAERT, O.F.M.

Rome

⁹¹ vel *add. et del. A.*

⁹³ boves A.

⁹⁵ bona *add. et del. A.*

⁹⁷ mal *add. et del. A.*

⁹⁸ concedenda] Explicit minor tractatus nove loyce fratris Gwilemi ocham. Deo gratias. amen. *add. A. Deinde:* omnis propositio includens contradictionem potest inferre quodlibet illorum, ut tantum pater est, ergo non tantum pater est; tu scis te esse hominem, ergo tu scis te non esse lapidem *add. A.*

⁹⁹ concedenda et *lect. dubia W.*

¹⁰⁰ universaliter tenenda *om. A, sed addidimus ex W.* Explicit Compendium Logicae Oquam collectum ab eodem et scriptum . . . (?) per manus Fratris Hugonis Kuenemani A. D. 1345 circa . . . (?) Simonis et Iudae *add. W.*

⁹² veram A.

⁹⁴ boves A.

⁹⁶ sive de *add. et del. A.*

PETRUS SUTTON(?), O. F. M., QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE

INTRODUCTION

Since Peter Sutton's(?), *Quodlibeta* were published in last year's volume of *Franciscan Studies*,¹ there is little need for a long introduction to the present edition. We might mention once again the scholarly "spade-work" done by V. Doucet² and P. Glorieux³ which has greatly facilitated and prepared the way for the editions of the *Quodlibeta* and the *Quaestiones disputatae*.

The codex

The text of these Disputed Questions is taken from its only known source, viz. codex Edilia no. 164 from Florence's Bibliotheca Laurenziana. Originally there were 14 questions, but the first three questions are now missing, indicating that one quarto has been lost from the manuscript. We have two proofs for this: first, what is now the first question in this present edition, has been labeled *quaestio quarta* in the margin of the manuscript. Secondly, explicit reference is made to the missing first question in q. 5 of our edition.⁴ The final sentence of q. 11 was never completed and three of the objections were left unanswered. However, in this case, the incompleteness stems from the very beginning of the manuscript, because a new question starts on the same page. Thus, we are dealing with an incomplete set of Disputed Questions. With the present edition, we now have at our disposal, all of the works presently known to exist of Peter Sutton(?), O. F. M.

¹ Petrus Sutton(?), O. F. M., *Quodlibeta*, ed. F. Etzkorn in *Franciscan Studies*, 23 (1963) 68—139.

² Matthaeus ab Aquasparta, *Quaestiones disputatae de gratia*, ed. V. Doucet, O. F. M., Quaracchi (1935), BFS, XI, pp. xlv—xlvii.

³ P. Glorieux, "Peut-on identifier P. de Ang.?" in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, (1960), XXVII, pp. 148—153.

⁴ "De qua quaestione tactum est aliquid supra, quaestione prima, ubi quaeritur an intellectus sit potentia passiva in prima opinione." Cf. quaest. 5, p. 188.

The author

This text has revealed to me no new information regarding the identity of *Pe. de Ang.*, which is the appellation appearing on f. 1 and likewise on f. 112 at the beginning of the index of questions. At this point, however, I would like to insert an excerpt from a letter from Msgr. Glorieux wherein he candidly indicates his opinion regarding the authorship of this present text:

"Je crois, pour ma part, que ce P. de Ang. est bien Pierre Sutton; mais comme vous dites, en cas de nouvelle trouvaille ou suggestion, ce serait dommage d'employer un titre qu'on devrait changer." 23 Octobre 1963.

It is hoped that with the editions of the *Quodlibeta* and the *Disputed Questions*, scholars may better be able to bring their erudition to bear on a more precise identification of the author.

Date of text

There is no new external evidence which would permit us to date the present writings of Peter more exactly than the *Quodlibeta*, whose extreme *termini* are 1285—1323. If the author is Peter Sutton, we may place his activity at Oxford around the year 1310. Perhaps new insights regarding the time of composition may be gained from a precise identification of the sources of the various opinions referred to by Peter before proposing his own solution.

Doctrine

The contents of these questions, as in the case of the *Quodlibeta*, reveal a philosopher who is a follower of the Franciscan School, but one who is sensitive to the arguments advanced by a variety of opponents to the traditional theses of the school. He is likewise highly conscious of the multiplicity of views regarding the topics of which he treats.

This keen awareness of the plurality of opinion at this period, surely indicates that late Scholasticism was not a monolith of Thomism or Scotism or Augustinianism, nor the Franciscans versus the Dominicans. Rather, we are dealing with men who had a fine regard for the relativity of so many "truths" and felt free to express themselves on such matters.

It is regrettable that other occupations and lack of time, have made it necessary for me to leave this edition so meagerly documented. It is my hope that other scholars will supply for this lack by a more learned and detailed examination of the contents and a more precise identification of the sources.

QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE*

[1. Utrum intellectus intelligat singularia.]

Quaestio est utrum intellectus intelligat singularia.

1. Quod non: Philosophus II, *De anima*,¹ "Sensus est singularium, scientia universalium," ergo etc.

2. Item. Sicut se habet sensus ad sensibile, sic intellectus ad intelligibile. Ergo permutatim: sicut sensus se habet ad intellectum, sic sensibile ad intelligibile. Sed sensus numquam fit intellectus, ergo nec sensibile fiet intelligibile. Singularia sunt sensibilia, ergo numquam poterunt fieri intelligibilia, | 191 | ergo per accidens non poterunt intelligi.

3. Item. Cognitio intellectiva vel est per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, sicut vult Commentator.² Sed singularia nec definiri possunt nec demonstrari, secundum Philosophum in VII *Metaphysicae*,³ ergo non possunt cognosci intellective.

4. Item. Sufficienter cognoscuntur singularia per sensus. Nam singula praesentia cognoscimus per sensum particularem, singula absentia per imaginationem. Ergo frustra ponerentur cognosci ab alia virtute in eodem homine. Sed natura nihil agit frustra,⁴ ergo videtur quod intellectus non cognoscat singularia.

5. Item. Omne singulare, in quantum tale, continetur sub aliqua certa differentia loci vel temporis. Sed obiectum intellectus, in quantum huiusmodi, est abstractum ab hic et nunc, hoc est, ab omni differentia

* SIGNA ET ABBREVIATIONES

[]	= supplendum	f.	= folium/folia
add.	= addidit	in mg.	= in margine
al.	= alia	m.	= manus
cap.	= capitulo	MS	= codex manuscriptus
ead.	= eadem	scrip.	= scripsit
exp.	= expunxit		
CCAA	= Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, publ. Medieval Academy of America, Cambridge, Mass.; VI, 1, ed. F. Crawford.		
CCL	= Corpus Christianorum Latinorum, publ. Brepols, Turnhout, Belg.		
EPM	= Etudes philosophiques médiévales, ed. E. Gilson, publ. Vrin, Paris.		
FIP	= Franciscan Institute Publications, publ. St. Bonaventure's Univ., N. Y.		
PG	= Migne, Patrologia Graeca		
PL	= Migne, Patrologia Latina.		

¹ *De anima*, II, 5; 417 b 21—23.

² *In II Analyt. poster.*, t. c. 107; ed. Iuntas (1574), Ib, f. 567

³ *Meta*, VII, 15; 1039 b 27.

⁴ *De anima*, III, 9; 432 b 21.

loci vel temporis. Ergo singulare, in quantum tale, non potest esse obiectum intellectus. Et si hoc, ergo non potest intelligi.

6. Item. Materia est principium individuationis et singularitatis. Sed id quod intelligitur, oportet denudari a materia et conditionibus eius. Ergo singulare, secundum quod huiusmodi, non est intelligibile.

7. Item. Cognitio intellectiva terminata est. Sed cognitio singularium est interminata, tum quia sunt in continua corruptione, tum quia non habent ordinem ad invicem, tum quia quantum est de se currunt in infinitum. Ergo cognitio intellectiva non est singularium.

8. Item. Si cognoscatur singulare cum suo universali, aut per eandem speciem aut per aliam et aliam. Non per aliam et aliam, quia species non multiplicatur nisi vel a parte subiecti in quo est — et hoc est unum tantum, quia intellectus meus vel tuus — vel a parte originis — et haec est res una tantum quia iste homo et homo, quae non sunt duae res sed una tantum, secundum Philosophum IV *Metaphysicae*.⁵ Ergo nullo modo potest species ista multiplicari. Relinquitur ergo quod sit una species per quam cognosco particulare et universale. Sed hoc est impossibile quia impossibile est [per] speciem unam simplicem repraesentare rem sub oppositis differentiis, sicut quod una species repraesentet rem sub differentia albedinis et nigradinis simul. Sed intentio universalis et particularis oppositae sunt. Ergo impossibile est quod per unam speciem simplicem⁶ repraesententur. Non potest ergo repraesentari per eandem speciem cum universali, nec per aliam, ergo per nullam. Ergo nullo modo potest particulare intelligi.

9. Item. Omnis potentia habet a materia unam speciem obiecti per se, sub cuius ratione omnia referuntur ad ipsam, verbi gratia, sicut omnia referuntur ad visum sub ratione una coloris, ad auditum sub ratione una soni. Sed per se obiectum intellectus est universale secundum quod universale, secundum Philosophum.⁷ Ergo omnia quae referuntur ad intellectum, sub ratione universalis referuntur. Particulare, secundum quod particulare, non potest inducere rationem universalis. Ergo particulare, secundum quod particulare, non potest intelligi.

a) Ad oppositum. Intellectus intelligit hanc propositionem 'Sortes est homo', ergo intelligit quamlibet eius partem. Sed 'Sortes' est quaedam eius pars. Ergo intelligit 'Sortem'. Ergo intelligit singulare, cum Sortes singularis sit.

⁵ *Meta.*, IV, 2; 1003 b 25—30.

⁶ simplicitatem MS.

⁷ *Physic.*, I, 5; 189 a 5—7.

b) Item. Intelligit seipsum, et ipse singularis est, intelligit ergo singulare.

c) Item. Intellectus practicus dirigit nos in agendis. Sed agenda sunt singularia, non universalia. Ergo intelligit singularia.

Ad istam quaestionem, dicendum quod omnes communiter tenent quod intellectus aliquo modo intelligit singulare sive particulare, quia potentia quae habet iudicare alietatem inter aliqua, oportet esse unam comprehendentem utrumque extremum alietatis, secundum Philosophum II *De anima*.⁸ Ratio enim sensus communis, una potentia ponitur, quia habet iudicare diversitatem inter obiecta diversorum sensuum. Nos autem iudicamus alietatem et differentiam inter universale et particulare. Igitur oportet quod hoc sit per veram potentiam unam. Haec non potest esse aliqua potentia sensitiva, quia nulla potentia sensitiva apprehendit universale ut universale est. Relinquitur | 19v | ergo quod sit potentia intellectiva. Intellectus ergo apprehendit utrumque, scilicet universale et particulare. Et hoc est quod vult Commentator super II *De anima*⁹ dicens, “Universalitas vel individualitas et particularitas comprehenduntur per intellectum, scilicet alietas et differentia universalis et individui.”

Sed in modo ponendi, diversimode processerunt. Quod patet sic: quia comprehendere aliqua duo potest esse dupliciter, scilicet vel ita quod utrumque aequè principaliter, [vel unum principaliter] et alterum secundario. Primo modo, posuerunt quidam quod intellectus comprehendit universale et particulare aequè primo et per se, quia per speciem universalem universale per se, per speciem particularem particulare per se, quia speciem habet utriusque abstractam, scilicet universalem — quantum ad conditiones universalis — et particularem — quantum ad conditiones particularis. Et hoc videtur consonare verbis Avicennae¹⁰ qui ponit quod postquam abstracta fuerit species hominis ab isto homine singulari, adveniente alio homine, non oportet iterum abstrahere speciem hominis, nisi forte quantum ad conditiones istius hominis singularis. Vult ergo, ut videtur, per hoc quod intellectus recipit in se et speciem hominis et speciem istius hominis, et ita aequaliter per illas duas species utrumque intelliget.

Sed illud non videtur verum, quia quandocumque aliqua plura referuntur ad potentiam primam, oportet quod hoc sit per aliam potentiam unam, ut lignum et lapis ad visum referuntur per rationem coloris,

⁸ *De anima*, III, 2; 426 b 21.

⁹ *In II De anima*, t. c. 65; CCAA, VI, 1, p. 228.

¹⁰ *VI Naturalium*, V, 3; f. 24 ra.

et sic de omnibus. Si ergo universale et particulare referuntur ad intellectum, oportet hoc esse per aliam unam rationem. Sed hoc potest esse dupliciter, scilicet vel ita quod unam reducat ad alterum, vel ambo ad tertium quod sit commune utrique. Sed universale et particulare non possunt ad aliquid tertium reduci commune utrique quod nec sit universale nec particulare, quia nihil tale est. Nam omnis ratio vel est universalis vel particularis, nec potest fugere alterum horum. Igitur oportet vel reducere universale ad particulare vel particulare ad universale, ita quod alterum intelligatur primo et directe, alterum vero secundario et indirecte. Et secundum hoc fuerunt aliqui qui posuerunt quod intellectus principaliter intelligit particulare et secundario universale. Nam cum species abstracta abstrahatur a phantasmate singulari et recipiatur in subiecto singulari, ipsa tota singularis erit et ita primo et directe representabit singulare. Et ex consequenti universale; in quantum intellectus — habitis multis partibus — innatus est reflecti super se et super species in se receptas et iudicare diversitatem et convenientiam inter illas et per consequens abstrahere intensionem universalis, et sic intelligit universale.

Sed secundum hoc videtur esse diversitas inter sensum et intellectum quantum ad per se et primum obiectum utriusque, nisi forte per maiorem et minorem spiritualitatem¹¹ speciei abstractae, sicut est inter sensum particularem et alios sensus interiores. Sed talis diversitas non mutat gradum vel genus sensibilitatis. Igitur non esset differentia essentialis inter intellectum et sensum, quod fuit error antiquorum quem improbat Philosophus in II *De anima*.¹² Et propter hoc posuerunt alii conversam huius, scilicet quod primo et directe intellectus intelligit universale et secundario particulare. Sed hoc adhuc licet communiter teneatur, tamen diversimode a diversis. Nam communiter tenetur quod primo intelligit universale et directe, et particulare secundario vel per continuationem speciei universalis abstractae cum singulari subiecto in quo consistit, vel per continuationem speciei abstractae cum phantasmate singulari a qua abstrahitur, vel per continuationem quidditatis abstractae cum singulari extra per existentiam actuale.

Primum patet |20r| sic: ponunt enim quidam quod sicut idem diversis respectibus potest esse genus et species, ut animal respectu hominis genus¹³ est respectu corporis, vel substantiae est species, sic una et eadem species abstracta diversis respectibus est universalis et

¹¹ spiritualem MS.

¹² *De anima*, II, 5; 417 b 20—25.

¹³ genu MS

particularis sive singularis. Et hoc etiam vult Avicenna V *Metaphysicae*,¹⁴ nam respectu obiectorum universalis est, respectu subiecti, particularis quia existit in subiecto singulari et particulari. In quantum ergo universalis est, habet repraesentare universaliter et hoc est directe quia respectu obiectorum, in quantum singularis, habet repraesentare singulare et hoc indirecte quia per respectum quem habet ad subiectum. Et sic patet secundum eos quomodo habet intelligi particulare.

Sed illud non est probabile, quia species per respectum ad subiectum nihil habet repraesentare sed tantum subsistere. Ergo per illum modum non videtur via rationabilis ponendi particulare intelligi neque directe neque indirecte.

Et ideo dicunt alii¹⁵ quod intelligit universale directe quia species abstracta a phantasmate directe repraesentat universale, sed particulare indirecte, scilicet per continuationem ipsius cum phantasmate a quo abstrahitur, quia enim nihil intelligimus sine conversione ad phantasmata, secundum Philosophum.¹⁶ In ipsa conversione fit quaedam continuatio ipsius speciei intelligibilis cum phantasmate proprio eiusdem, et quia species in phantasmate sunt singulares, ideo ex consequenti et indirecte intelligimus singulare.

Sed illud videtur non posse stare quia species, quae est principium intellectionis, debet esse in intellectu ut in subiecto. Sed species illa singularis non est in intellectu sed in phantasmate, ut dictum est. Ergo non potest esse principium intellectionis nec universalis nec particularis. Posset forte dici quod species, quae est principium intellectionis directe, oportet esse in intellectu ut in subiecto, indirecte vero non oportet. Verbi gratia, in sensu ego video rem per speculum. Imago in speculo per continuationem cum specie in oculo est principium videndi rem. Et tamen imago non est in oculo ut [in] subiecto. Sic potest esse de specie in phantasmate et [de] specie quae est in intellectu.

Sed hoc videtur difficile intelligere nec videtur omnino simile, quia species in oculo et imago in speculo sunt eiusdem coordinationis et sub eodem lumine videretur. Sed species quae est in intellectu et species quae [est] in phantasmate non sunt eiusdem coordinationis nec sub eodem lumine videntur, quia una universalis, alia particularis, una videtur in lumine corporali, alia in lumine intellectuali ut in lumine intellectus agentis. Ergo non est simile hinc inde.

¹⁴ *Meta.*, V, 2; ed. Venetiis (1508), f. 87 va.

¹⁵ in *mg. ead. m.* opinio quarta et est Thomae; Cf. *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 5; *Summa Th.*, I, q. 18, a. 4.

¹⁶ *De anima*, III, 7; 431 a 16.

Propter hoc dicunt alii quod intelligit particulare per continuationem rei obiectae cum existentia actuali. Quod sic patet quia, secundum Philosophum,¹⁷ quod quid est rei materialis est per se et primum obiectum intellectus, et ideo per se et primo intelligit quidditatem rei. Sed quia illa quidditas non habet existentiam actualem nisi in singulari, ideo ex consequenti intelligit singulare. Verbi gratia, visus per se et primo videt colorem. Sed quia color existentiam suam actualem non habet nisi in corpore, et ideo ex consequenti videt corpus, sic ex parte alia intellige. Et ut melius adhuc intelligas, sciendum quod aliquid videt visus mediante colore sine quo color existere non potest, ut quantitatem vel superficiem sine quo aliquid bene posset existere. Tamen ex quo actu existit in illo, videt illud mediante colore in ipso existente, ut Sortem vel Platonem, nam accidit colorato quod sit Sortes. Hic ergo sunt tria visibilia per ordinem, scilicet color et illud sine quo color existere non potest et illud sine quo potest existere. Primum videtur per se et primo, secundum per se sed non primo, tertium nec per se nec primo | 20 v | sed per accidens quia accidentaliter in illo existit. Sic videre poteris ex parte intellectus. Primum est enim ibi considerare quidditatem rei et existentiam eius actualem, non concernendo aliquam certam differentiam temporis — et vocatur particulare vagum ut 'aliquis homo' — et existentiam actualem sub certa differentia temporis, puta praesentis vel praeteriti vel futuri. Quidditas ergo est per se et primum obiectum intellectus, secundum Philosophum,¹⁸ ut dictum est. Sed quia illa quidditas non habet existentiam actualem nisi in aliquo individuo, ideo particulare vagum est obiectum intellectus per se — non primo sed secundario — quia particulare vagum immediate est coniunctum naturae sive quidditati subiectae intentioni specialitatis. Et propter hoc ingreditur etiam definitionem, ut¹⁹ dicit Avicenna libro *Physicorum* q. 2.²⁰ Quia autem sit in hoc particulari signato vel illo, hoc accidit sibi et ideo intelligit. Particulare signatum praesens apprehenditur per se, sensu particulari. Subtracto autem sensu particulari, non habemus de illo notitiam utrum sit vel non sit, nisi solum aestimationem, ut dicit Philosophus VII *Metaphysicae*.²¹ Et eodem modo appareret de particulari signato praeterito, si possemus ita sensibiliter deprehendere quanto esset elapsum de memoria sensitiva, sicut deprehendere possumus hoc de sensu particulare. Sed quia non possumus, ideo credunt homines esse intellectivae

¹⁷ *De anima*, III, 6; 430 b 27—29.

¹⁸ *De anima*, III, 6; 430 b 27—29.

¹⁹ nec MS

²⁰ *Sufficientia*, I, 1; ed. Venetiis (1508), f. 13 vb.

²¹ *Meta.*, VII, 15; 1039 a 26—1040 a 8.

partis, quod tamen est memorativae sensitivae vel alicuius alterius potentiae sensitivae. Cum tamen melius esset iudicare ea quae latent per ea quae patent, nisi maior ratio compelleret ad contrarium, ideo dico ad praesens quod particulare intelligitur modo supra dicto, sine praeiudicio tamen cuiuscumque.

[Ad 1.] Ad primum cum dicit 'sensus est singularium', dicendum est quod sensus directe est singularium, universalium intellectus directe. Sed praeter hoc potest esse particularium indirecte, ut dictum est.

[Ad 2.] Ad secundum, cum dicit quod sicut²² se habet sensus ad sensibile etc., dicendum quod ille modus arguendi non tenet nisi quando est eadem proportio in permutatione quae fuit in prima connexione. Si enim cum permutatione terminorum, mutetur etiam proportio, non valet argumentum. Verbi gratia, in proposito, cum dicit 'sicut se habet sensus ad sensibile, sic intellectus ad intelligibile,' quantum ad quid tenet ista propositio, scilicet quantum ad hoc solum quod sicut sensus comprehendit suum sensibile, ita intellectus intelligibile. Et quando permutat terminos 'ergo sicut sensus ad intellectum, sic sensibile ad intelligibile,' si arguat secundum eandem proportionem, nullum sequitur inconveniens, quia tunc est sensus 'sicut sensus non potest comprehendere intellectum, sic nec sensibile intelligibile' et hoc est verum, sed nihil est ad propositum. Et ideo ipse non sic permutat, sed dicit 'sed sensus numquam fit intellectus, ergo nec fit sensibile intelligibile'. Et planum est quod cum permutatione terminorum, mutat etiam habitudinem eorum ad invicem, et ita male.

[Ad 3.] Ad tertium, cum dicit quod cognitio intellectiva fit per definitionem, etc., dicendum quod, secundum Avicennam,²³ particulare vagum ingreditur definitionem, licet non particulare et signatum, ut dictum est supra. Vel dicendum quod definitio non est nisi eorum de quibus est intellectus per se et primo, ut quidditatis rei, non de his de quibus est secundario et indirecte.

[Ad 4.] Ad quartum, cum dicit quod sufficienter cognoscuntur per sensus etc., dicendum quod verum est modo sensibili, si non cognoscuntur particularia modo intelligibili sufficienter nisi per intellectum. Et quia oportet hominem esse perfectum quantum ad omnem modum cognoscendi, ideo oportuit eum habere utrumque modum.

[Ad 5.] Ad quintum, cum dicit quod singulare in quantum tale continetur sub certa differentia temporis etc., dicendum quod istud argumentum non plus concludit nisi quod intellectus non intelligit

²² quod sicut *bis scrip.*

²³ *Sufficientia*, I, 1; f. 13 vb.

obiectum singulare per se et primo | 211 | — et hoc concedimus — non autem quin cognoscatur aliquo modo indirecte vel per accidens.

[Ad 6.] Ad sextum, materia est principium individuationis etc., dicendum quantum ad obiectum suum per se et primum, abstrahit a materia. Per accidens tamen et indirecte potest materiam intelligere sive aliquid quod concernit materiam.

[Ad 7.] Ad septimum, cum dicit quod cognitio intellectiva est terminata etc., dicendum quod illud argumentum concludit tantum de particularibus signatis, quia illa sunt corruptibilia et infinita et inordinata, et ideo non intelliguntur nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Particulare vero vagum non est huiusmodi, et ideo potest per se intelligi modo supra dicto.

[Ad 8.] Ad octavum, cum dicit aut per unam speciem aut per plures etc., dicendum quod secundum iam dictum modum, per unam tantum aliter et aliter se habentem. Et per talem non est inconveniens rem repraesentari sub oppositis differentiis, quia species una in anima continet in se utramque differentiam, sicut res una extra animam habet in se rationem utriusque.

[Ad 9.] Ad nonum, cum dicit quod omnis potentia una habet unam rationem etc., dicendum quod verum est. Ita est in proposito, nam sicut visus habet unam rationem primam — scilicet colorem — et aliam non primam seu secundariam — ut quantitatem, tertiam per accidens ut Sortem — sic intellectus habet quidquid est per se et primo, particulare vagum per se non primo, particulare signatum nec per se nec primo sed quoddammodo per accidens, ut supra dictum est. Et sic patet ad²⁴ obiecta.

[2. Utrum sit ponere memoriam in parte intellectiva.]

Consequenter quaerebatur utrum sit ponere memoriam in parte intellectiva.

1. Quod non videtur, quia memoria est praeteritorum, secundum Philosophum *De memoria et reminiscentia*.²⁵ Sed intellectus non concernit praeterita quia abstrahit ab omni differentia temporis. Ergo memoria non est in intellectu.

2. Item. Per intellectum differimus a brutis. Nihil ergo ponendum est in intellectu in quo cum brutis convenimus. Sed per memoriam convenimus cum brutis — habent enim bruta memoriam. Ergo non est ponenda in intellectu.

²⁴ ab MS.

²⁵ *De memoria et reminiscentia*, cap. 1; 449 b 15.

3. Item. Si esset memoria in intellectu non indigeremus in intelligendo iterum converti ad phantasmata, sicut nec imaginatio indiget iterum converti ad sensum communem ad hoc quod imagnetur, quia habet speciem repositam et conservatam. Sed secundum Philosophum²⁶ et etiam doctrinam magnorum, nos nihil intelligimus sine conversione ad phantasmata, etiam illorum quorum species prius fuerunt abstractae. Ergo videtur quod [in] intellectu non sit memoria.

4. Item. In parte sensitiva non potest conservari species absque actuali consideratione, quia sensitiva est virtus organica et propter hoc conservatur species in organo corporeo. Sed intellectus non est virtus organica. Ergo videtur quod non possit ibi conservari species sine actuali consideratione. Sed non ob aliud ponitur memoria, nisi ut conservet species dum actualiter non considerat. Ergo non debet poni memoria in intellectu.

5. Item. Secundum Commentatorem super III *De anima*,²⁷ intelligere non est aliud nisi informari specie intelligibili. Ergo dum species actu informat, semper intellectus actu intelliget. Sed quamdiu conservatur species semper actu informat. Ergo quamdiu conservatur actu intelliget. Desinente ergo intellectu actu intelligere, cessabit species conservari. Ergo non est conservatio speciei in intellectu, cessante actuali intellectione, et per consequens non erit ibi memoria.

a) Ad oppositum. Beatus Augustinus ponit memoriam esse unam partem imaginis X libro *De Trinitate*.²⁸ Sed imago est in parte intellectiva, et tantum in parte intellectiva,²⁹ sicut vult idem Augustinus XII *De Trinitate*.³⁰ Ergo memoria est in parte intellectiva.

b) Item. In parte intellectiva conservantur species post actualem intellectionem. Sed memoria non est aliud nisi quaedam vis conservativa specierum. Ergo memoria ponenda est in parte intellectiva.

c) Item. Non minoris virtutis est intellectus quam sensus. Sed sensus potest conservare species post actualem sensationem, ergo intellectus post intellectionem. Sed talis conser | 21v | vatio, memoria dicitur, ergo etc.

Responsio. Haec est opinio Avicennae³¹ quod in intellectu non est thesaurus specierum intelligibilium postquam actu desinit intelligere. Quoniam si maneret species post actualem intellectionem, aut ergo in

²⁶ *De anima*, III, 7; 431 a 16.

²⁷ *In III De anima*, t. c. 18; CCAA, VI, 1, p. 439.

²⁸ *De Trinitate*, X, 11 & 12; PL 42, 983—4.

²⁹ et tantum . . . intellectiva *bis scrip.*

³⁰ *De Trinitate*, XII, 4; PL 42, 1000.

³¹ *VI Naturalium*, V, 6; f. 26 ra & rb.

corpore aut in seipsis aut in intellectu. Sed in corpore manere non possunt, quia species intelligibiles sunt incorporeales omnino nec recipi possunt in corpore. Sed nec in seipsis manere possunt quia accidentia sunt et egent subiecto in quo existant, nisi quis vellet resuscitare ideas Platonis. Ergo manent in intellectu. Sed intellectus secundum se totum intellectivus est, non secundum partem et secundum partem. Non ergo intellectus actu indiget per illas [intelligere]. Non ergo possunt poni species conservari absque intellectione actuali. Sed³² haec opinio non tenetur nec a Philosopho nec a sancto Augustino nec ab aliquo alio, quia si sic esset, non esset³³ differentia inter sapientem et insipientem quando actu non intelligeret, nec in eodem homine ante addiscere et post addiscere sicut docet Philosophus,³⁴ quamvis ipse Avicenna respondeat ad omnia ista sicut patet VI *Naturalis* parte 5a.³⁵ Sed quia respondendo supponit aliquid erroneum, scilicet quod species effluent in animas nostras ab intelligentia agente, ideo tenendum est quod in intellectu oportet ponere aliquam vim conservativam specierum postquam actu cessat intelligere. Sed duplex est vis conservativa: una, scilicet specierum sensibilium et haec vocatur memoria sensitiva et ponitur in parte sensitiva — et per illam convenimus cum brutis quia talem memoriam habent bruta — alia est vis conservativa specierum intelligibilium et haec vocatur memoria intellectiva et est pars imaginis, secundum Augustinum X *De Trinitate*³⁶ — et per illam non convenimus, immo differimus a brutis, sicut docet idem Augustinus XII *De Trinitate*³⁷ — et haec memoria ponenda est in parte intellectiva. Et sic patet ad quaestionem propositam. Utrum autem sit eadem potentia cum actuali intellectiva est alia quaestio differens ab ista. Et ideo non respondeo hic ad illam ne omnia in omnibus dicamus. Sed si proponatur, dicemus quod Deo inspirante sentimus.

[Ad 1.] Ad primum in contrarium, cum dicit quod memoria est praeteritorum etc., dicendum quod memoria intellectiva sic est praeteritorum, sicut intellectus singularium. Nam si concesserimus quod intellectus intelligat singularia per se, memoria intellectiva erit praeteritorum per se, si per accidens, per accidens. Unde omni eodem modo quo concedimus in uno,³⁸ debemus concedere in alio. Et de hoc fuit nobis quaestio praecedens.

³² reprobatio in mg. ead. m.

³³ exp. sapientia.

³⁴ *De anima*, II, 5; 417 a 22—b 17.

³⁵ VI *Naturalium*, V, 6; f. 26 ra & rb.

³⁶ *De Trinitate*, X, 12; PL 42, 984.

³⁷ *De Trinitate*, XII, 2; PL 42, 999.

³⁸ suo MS.

[Ad 2.] Ad secundum, cum dicit quod per memoriam convenimus cum brutis etc., dicendum est quod per memoriam — quae est conservativa intentionum sensibilium — convenimus cum brutis, et ideo illa non ponitur in parte intellectiva. Per memoriam vero — quae est vis conservativa specierum intelligibilium — non convenimus cum brutis, et ideo illa ponenda est in intellectu, ut dictum est.

[Ad 3.] Ad tertium, cum dicit quod si esset ibi memoria, non indigeremus converti ad phantasmata etc., dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod non indigemus conversione ad phantasmata ad hoc quod intelligamus ea quae habemus in memoria — maxime illa quae proprium phantasma non habent, ut sunt Deus, angelus, et huiusmodi spiritualia. Unde Augustinus in *Epistola ad Nebridium*³⁹ dicit⁴⁰ expresse quod, intelligendo ipsam Dei aeternitatem et similia, non indigemus converti ad phantasmata. Sed videtur experimentum esse in contrarium. Experimur enim in nobis quod nihil possumus intelligere nisi prius moveamur ab aliquo phantasmate sensibili, sive fuerit spirituale intelligibile sive corporale. Tamen de hoc est quaestio difficilis. Supponendo tamen ad praesens, quod nihil intelligimus sine conversione ad phantasmata, dicendum est ad argumentum quod converti ad phantasma contingit duplici de causa, scilicet vel ad abstractionem speciei intelligibilis, vel ad excitationem ipsius intellectus. Primo modo indigemus converti ad phantasmata in his quorum species non |22r| habemus in memoria. Secundo modo indigemus in his quorum species habemus in memoria, non ad iterum abstrahendum — quia tunc memoria serviret nobis de nihilo, sicut arguit in contrarium — sed tantum ad excitandum intellectum, ut convertat se ad illa quae habet in memoria, et sic actu intelligat.

[Ad 4.] Ad quartum, cum dicit quod virtus organica potest servare speciem absque actuali consideratione propter organum corporeum etc., dicendum quod totam virtutem quam habet potentia organica, et ratione sui et ratione organi, habet virtus immaterialis in sua potentia simplici. Et ideo sicut virtus organica, ratione organi, recipit speciem et retinet, ratione sui sentit et considerat, sic intellectus habet unice et simpliciter utramque virtutem, scilicet et retinendi ratione memoriae, et considerandi ratione intelligentiae. Quomodo autem hoc possit intelligi, declarare nimis esset longum.

[Ad 5.] Ad quintum, cum dicit Commentator⁴¹ quod intelligere nihil est nisi informari specie etc., dicendum quod si intelligatur causaliter,

³⁹ *Ad Nebridium*, cap. 1; PL 33, 68.

⁴⁰ sicut MS.

⁴¹ *In III De anima*, t. c. 18; CCAA, VI, 1, p. 439.

verum est, quia informari specie intelligibili est causa intelligendi et principium eius. Si vero intelligatur formaliter, quod scilicet ipsa actualis consideratio, falsum est. Vel aliter et in idem redit. Quod informari specie est intelligere habitualiter, et sic est verum, vel actualiter, et sic non est verum.

[3. Utrum memoria et intelligentia sint una potentia.]

Quaeritur utrum memoria et intelligentia sint una potentia.

1. Quod sic videtur. In potentiis organicis differunt virtus receptiva faciliter et fluuntur retentiva. Nam corpus humidum de facili recipit sed male retinet, sicut aqua et aer, si recipiant impressionem sigilli faciliter, eadem facilitate amittunt. Sed sicca corpora et dura de difficili recipiunt sed bene retinent. Et ideo oportet ponere aliam virtutem et potentiam in his quae alligatae sunt organis corporeis per quam recipiunt et per quam retinent. Sed virtus intellectiva non est organica. Ideo non oportet ponere aliam virtutem recipiendi et retinendi. Per eandem ergo potest recipere et retinere. Sed virtus receptiva est intelligentia, memoria retentiva. Ergo una sunt potentia.

2. Item. II *De anima*, Philosophus,⁴² potentiae distinguuntur per actus, et actus per obiecta. Sed eadem est ratio formalis obiecti memoriae et intelligentiae. Ergo sunt eadem potentia. Probatio minoris est quia ratio formalis obiecti utriusque est verum sub ratione veri, ergo etc.

3. Item. Actus primus et actus secundus non diversificant potentiam, immo ad eandem potentiam debet pertinere. Sed memoria se habet ad modum actus primi quia conservat tantum, intelligentia ad modum actus secundi. Ergo ad eandem potentiam pertinent.

4. Item. Intelligentia et memoria non videntur differre nisi sicut notitia habitualis et actualis. Sed illa non faciunt differre potentias. Ergo nec memoria et intelligentia differunt ut diversae potentiae. Et probatio minoris: habitus et actus, ex quibus generantur, sunt in eadem potentia. Sed habitus intellectuales generantur ex actibus intelligentiae. Ergo habitus generati sunt in intelligentia. Si ergo habitus et memoria non differunt, memoria erit in intelligentia et sic erunt una potentia.

5. Item. [Qui] habet⁴³ habitum non indiget aliquo extra se ad exequendum actum suum. Sed habitus scientifici sunt in intelligentia. Ergo non indiget intelligentia alia memoria, quia frustra poneretur ex quo sufficit habitus.

6. Item. Si memoria est alia potentia, homo erit in potentia essentiali post addiscere sicut ante. Sed hoc [est] falsum secundum Philoso-

⁴² *De anima*, II, 4; 415 a 16—22.

⁴³ hunc MS.

phum,⁴⁴ ergo primum. Probatio maioris: quando desinit intelligentia actu intelligere aut remanet species in ipsa actu aut non. Si sic, ergo frustra poneretur alia memoria. Si non, ergo est in potentia essentiali, quia tunc indiget iterato recipere speciem ad hoc quod intelligat. | 22 v | Sed hoc est esse in potentia essentiali, secundum Philosophum.⁴⁵ Ergo post addiscere est in potentia essentiali sicut ante, quod est falsum.

7. Item. Secundum Philosophum I *Physicorum*,⁴⁶ quod potest fieri per pauciora, melius est quam per plura. Sed quidquid tu feceris cum memoria, si fuerit diversa potentia, potest fieri per eandem si fuerit tantum una cum intelligentia, differens solum secundum actum et habitum. Ergo melius est ponere quod sit una quam plures.

8. Item. Potentiae essentialiter distinguuntur per respectum ad actus primos. Sed actus primus memoriae et intelligentiae — quae sunt species quibus informantur — sunt eiusdem speciei quia una generatur ab alia generatione univoca, ergo et ipsae potentiae. Sed impossibile duas potentias eiusdem speciei esse simul in eodem subiecto primo. Ergo impossibile est memoriam et intelligentiam esse simul in intellectu — dato quod sint diversae potentiae. Non sunt ergo diversae, sed una tantum quia simul sunt.

a) Ad oppositum. Imago creata debet conformari imagini increatae. Sed consistit in tribus personis et una essentia. Ergo ista debet consistere in tribus potentiis et una essentia. Memoria ergo et intelligentia sunt potentiae diversae.

b) Item. Potentiae distinguuntur per actus. Sed alius est actus retinere et recipere,⁴⁷ ergo alia potentia. Memoria retinet, intelligentia recipit, ergo etc.

c) Item. Si non esset memoria alia potentia ab intelligentia, quia non esset ibi ponere parentem et prolem, et sic non esset ibi ponere veram rationem imaginis. Probatio: memoria se habet in ratione gignentis, intelligentia in ratione geniti. Sed impossibile est⁴⁸ idem numero esse gignens et genitum, secundum Augustinum I *De Trinitate*,⁴⁹ "Nulla res seipsam gignit ut sit." Ergo impossibile est memoriam et intelligentiam esse eandem potentiam.

d) Item. Quaecumque susceptiva sunt diversorum habituum, sunt diversae potentiae. Sed memoria et intelligentia sunt susceptiva diver-

⁴⁴ *De anima*, II, 5; 417 a 22—417 b 17.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Physic.*, I, 6; 189 a 15—16.

⁴⁷ et recipere *bis scrip.*

⁴⁸ eius MS.

⁴⁹ *De Trinitate*, I, 1; PL 42, 820.

sorum habituum, ergo sunt diversae potentiae. Minoris probatio: nam in statu viae memoria susceptiva est habitus spei, intelligentia fidei, secundum illud Augustini super *Matthaeum* XXIII,⁵⁰ *Diliges Dominum Deum tuum*, etc., “‘ex toto corde’ in intellectu sine errore; ‘ex tota anima’ in voluntate sine contradictione; ‘ex tota mente’ in memoria sine oblivione.” In statu patriae est memoria susceptiva tentionis, intelligentia visionis. Et propter hoc dicit Bernardus⁵¹ quod “Deus futuros intelligentiae plenitudo lucis, voluntati multitudo pacis et memoriae continuatio aeternitatis.”

Ad istam quaestionem dicunt quidam quod sunt diversae potentiae, tum propter perfectam conformitatem increatae imaginis, quae consistit in trinitate personarum et emanationum distinctarum, ut dictum est, tum propter diversitatem actionum suarum. Sed quoniam haec omnia satis expresse salvari possunt ponendo esse unam et eandem potentiam differentes solum secundum actum et habitum — et natura semper agit breviori via qua potest et paucioribus quantum potest — debemus nos in hoc viam naturae, quantum possumus, imitari. Dico ergo ad praesens, salvo meliori iudicio, quod non sunt diversae potentiae. Ad quod possumus sic aliquantulum manu duci: potentiae non distinguuntur nisi duobus modis tantum, scilicet vel per subiectum in quo sunt vel penes actus ad quos sunt. Potentiae ergo quae ad diversos actus⁵² genere et [specie] ordinantur, in eodem subiecto se compatiuntur, ut patet quia potentia quae ordinatur ad quantitatem et potentia quae ad colorem sunt in eodem, quia color non recipitur in subiecto nisi mediante quantitate.

Potentiae vero quae ad eosdem actus genere vel specie ordinantur, non se compatiuntur in eodem. Nam si fuerint idem actus genere, diversi specie sunt actus contrarii, et tunc non compatiuntur se in eodem subiecto simul sed successive tantum propter repugnantiam, quia contraria mutuo se expellunt, ut albedo et nigredo. Et ideo impossibile est quod simul reci | 23r | piantur in eadem parte subiecti. Si autem fuerint idem actus genere et specie solo numero differentes, tunc non compatiuntur se propter convenientiam, quia impossibile est duas formas substantiales vel accidentales eiusdem speciei simul recipi in eodem subiecto. Si ergo sunt duae potentiae eiusdem speciei, oportet quod sint in alia parte subiecti ut formas eiusdem speciei simul recipere possint. Potentiae autem animae omnes fundantur in suo subiecto simplici et impartibili,

⁵⁰ Cf. Anselmus Laudunensis, *Enarrationes in Matthaeum*; PL 162, 1441. Cf. S. Bonaventura, *Omnia opera*, ed. Quaracchi (1882—1902), I, p. 81, not. 8.

⁵¹ Bernardus Claravallensis, *Sermones in Cantica*; PL 183, 826B.

⁵² ad diversos genere et actus MS.

scilicet in ipsa essentia animae. Igitur penes subiectum differre non possunt.

Restat ergo, ut distinguantur penes actus et formas ad quas sunt, sed formae intelligibiles omnes sunt eiusdem generis, quia in eadem potentia recipiuntur. Iterum sunt eiusdem speciei, quia mutuo non se expellunt nec sunt contrariae, et una gignitur ab alia, generatione univoca, ut dictum fuit in arguendo. Ergo impossibile est in eodem subiecto; igitur penes actus nulla est distinctio. Non ergo possunt media et intelligentia distingui penes subiectum, nec penes actum, ut visum est, ergo nullo modo. Non ergo sunt duae potentiae sed una tantum, et hoc est intentum.

Quod si obicias quod per eandem rationem posses dicere quod media sensitiva non essent diversae potentiae quia sunt ad eosdem actus specie, dicendum quod non est simile, quia distinguuntur per subiectum in quo sunt, scilicet organa sua. Nam in alia parte corporis est potentia memorativa, in alia potentia aestimativa. Unde planum est quod hoc non est contra declarationem praedictam. Rationes ergo quae sunt pro ista parte, quamvis non omnes bene procedant, tamen gratia conclusionis conceduntur.

[Ad 1.] Ad rationes in oppositum respondendum est. Ad primum, quando dicit quod imago creata debet conformari imagini increatae etc., dicendum quod non conformatur in omnibus, immo maior est dissimilitudo habitus et actus ad parentem et prolem quanta memoriae et intelligentiae — posito quod sint diversae potentiae. Et hoc sufficit ad conformitatem praedictam.

[Ad 2.] Ad secundum, cum dicit quod potentiae distinguuntur per actus etc., dico quod verum est si sint actus eiusdem ordinis, verbi gratia, quod ambo actus sint actus secundi vel ambo actus primi, non autem quando diversi ordinis, puta quod unus sit actus primus, alter actus secundus. Si ergo intelligat de actibus eiusdem ordinis, sic dico quod unus est actus utriusque sive sit actus primus sive actus secundus. Nam utraque potentia habet unum actum primum, scilicet speciem intelligibilem numero unam. Habet etiam utraque unum actum secundum, qui est intelligere. Nec pono actualiter recordari alium actum ab intelligere ullo modo. Si autem intelligat de actibus diversi ordinis ut de actu primo et secundo, sic dico quod penes istos actus non debet sumi differentia inter potentias secundum quod nunc loquimur de potentiis, quia licet sint diversi actus inter se, unus tamen ordinatur ad alium, ut primus qui est scire vel tenere ad secundum qui est considerare. Tales sunt actus memoriae et intelligentiae, et sic se habent ad invicem sicut actus primus

ad secundum. Et propter hoc non diversificant potentias. Hoc non est nisi penes potentiam essentialem et accidentalem quia actus primus respicit potentiam essentialem, actus secundus potentiam accidentalem, sed sic non loquimur de distinctione potentiarum in proposito.

[Ad 3.] Ad tertium, cum dicit quod sunt susceptiva diversorum habituum quia memoria est susceptiva spei in via et tentionis in patria etc., dico quod non est verum, immo spes in via est in voluntate ut in subiecto in parte irascibili, ut dicunt ipsimet in III libro *Sententiarum*.⁵³ Similiter dico te tentione quod est in eadem voluntate, nec differt realiter a fruitione, ut dicunt multi et magni. Et propter hoc dico quod assumit falsum in arguendo, et ideo non concludit. | 23 v |

[4. Utrum intellectus moveat voluntatem vel e converso.]

Quaestio est utrum intellectus moveat voluntatem vel e converso.

1. Et primo probo quod neuter moveat alterum, secundo quod voluntas non moveat voluntatem. Primum probo sic: quando aliqua duo concurrunt ad unum principium motus, neuter movet alterum. Sed intellectus et voluntas sunt unum principium motus ex III *De anima* ubi dicit Philosophus⁵⁴ quod nec intellectus per se nec voluntas per se movet, sed utrumque simul. Ergo neuter movet alterum.

2. Item. Quando aliquae duae potentiae sunt determinatae per formas suas, impassibilia sunt ad invicem ut corpora caelestia. Sed intellectus et voluntas sunt huiusmodi, nam intellectus determinatus est ad verum sub ratione veri, voluntas ad bonum sub ratione boni. Ergo non possunt ab invicem pati seu moveri.

3. Item. Elementa ideo patiuntur ab invicem quia habent aliquid commune ut materiam. Intellectus et voluntas nihil habent commune praeter essentiam animae ratione cuius nec agunt nec patiuntur. Ergo nec movent nec moventur ab invicem.

4. Item. Quod intellectus non moveatur a voluntate probo sic: nulla potentia agens ex necessitate naturae nata est alteri obedire, ex I *Ethicorum*.⁵⁵ Sed intellectus est huiusmodi, recessatur enim a principiis et a conclusionibus demonstrationum. Unde Augustinus III *De libero arbitrio*⁵⁶ non est in potestate nostra quibus visis tangamur. Ergo intellectus non est natus obedire voluntati et per consequens nec moveri ab eadem.

⁵³ Thomas de Aquino, *Senten.*, III, d. 26, q. 1, a. 2.

⁵⁴ *De anima*, III, 9; 432 b 26—433 a 8.

⁵⁵ *Ethic. Nicom.*, I, 9; 1099 b 21.

⁵⁶ *De libero arbitrio*, III, 25; PL 32, 1307.

5. Item. Illud quod prae-exigitur ad rationem moventis, in quantum movens est, non subiacet motui. Sed actus intellectus prae-exigitur quia ad nihil movetur voluntas appetendo vel fugiendo nisi praecognoscatur. Nihil enim amatur nisi cognitum, secundum Augustinum VIII et X *De Trinitate*.⁵⁷ Ergo intellectus non movetur a voluntate. Si dicat quod non potest movere intellectum ad primum actum, sed existentem sub primo actu potest movere ad ceteros, contra: sicut primus actus est incognitus antequam sit, ita secundus, tertius et quartus, et sic deinceps. Sicut ergo non potest movere ad primum actum antequam sit — quia incognitus — sic nec ad aliquem sequentium.

6. Item. Intellectus movet voluntatem. Ergo voluntas non movet intellectum. Probatio minoris: bonum apprehensum est obiectum voluntatis, sed apprehensio fit per intellectum, ergo obiectum voluntatis fit per intellectum. Sed unaquaeque potentia movetur a primo obiecto. Ergo voluntas movetur ab intellectu.

7. Item. Quod voluntas non moveatur ab intellectu probo: quia unumquodque movet secundum quod est actu. Sed intellectus est actu ex necessitate, ut supra ostensum.⁵⁸ Ergo si movet voluntatem, movet ex necessitate. Et si haec voluntas non erit libera, et ita peribit in nobis liberum arbitrium, peribit totum humanum meritum quod est erroneum.

Responsio. Ad istam quaestionem potest dici quod moveri potest aliquid dupliciter, scilicet vel proprie, vel transsumptive sive metaphorice. 'Metaphorice' sicut finis movet agentem, sicut dicitur II *De generatione*.⁵⁹ 'Proprie' autem dicitur aliquid moveri, quando educitur de potentia ad actum. Sed hoc potest esse dupliciter, scilicet per se vel per accidens. 'Per accidens' sicut removens prohibens dicitur movere, nam removens trabem, dicitur — scilicet per accidens — movere grave deorsum. 'Per se' potest esse dupliciter: vel educendo ad actum primum — et sic generans grave dicitur movere grave deorsum in quantum dat sibi formam gravitatis qui est actus primus et principium movendi deorsum, unde tantum dat sibi de loco deorsum, quantum dat sibi de forma, secundum Commentator super VIII *Physicorum*⁶⁰ — vel ad actum secundum, et hoc dupliciter: scilicet per modum elicientis motum — et sic grave movet se deorsum per formam gravitatis suae, eliciendo scilicet actum movendi proprium — vel per modum imperantis et impellentis sicut dominus movet servum, dux⁶¹ exercitum et huiusmodi. Et sic habemus

⁵⁷ *De Trinitate*, VIII, 4; PL 42, 951—X, 2; PL 42, 974.

⁵⁸ Cf. q. 2, arg. 5, pp. 113—114.

⁵⁹ *De generatione et corruptione*, II, 9; 335 a 25—336 a 14.

⁶⁰ *In VIII Physic.*, t. c. 32; ed Iuntas (1562) IV, f. 371.

⁶¹ duxi MS.

in universo quinque modos movendi, scilicet metaphoricum, per accidens, educendo ad actum primum, ad actum secundum per modum elicientis, ad actum per modum | 24r | imperantis.

Loquendo ergo primo modo, sic movet intellectus voluntatem, in quantum, scilicet bonum apprehensum — quod se habet per modum finis — movet ipsam voluntatem. Secundo vero modo potest dici quod excitans dormientem movet simul intellectum et voluntatem, in quantum removet prohibens, scilicet somnum qui impendebat usum utriusque. Tertio autem modo, obiectum dicitur movere tam intellectum quam voluntatem, in quantum — mediante specie ab ipso multiplicata — educit intellectum de potentia ad actum primum, et mediante intellectu similiter movet voluntatem. Quarto modo intellectus et voluntas movent seipsas, in quantum intellectus per speciem receptam movet se de actu primo ad actum secundum, hoc est, exit de otio ad actum eliciendo actum intelligendi; et voluntas similiter, eliciendo actum diligendi sive volendi. Quinto autem modo voluntas sola habet movere intellectum et omnes vires inferiores tamquam domina in regno animae. Unde Bernardus, *De libro arbitrio*, cap. 2,⁶² "Voluntas est," inquit "motus rationalis sensui et appetitui praesidens. Unde quocumque se voluerit, habet rationem comitem, et quodam modo pedissequam."

Ex praedictis patet quomodo intellectus et voluntas moventur ab obiectis suis per modum generantis, quomodo a seipsis per modum elicientis, quomodo etiam voluntas movetur ab intellectu per modum firis, et intellectus a voluntate per modum imperantis, et quodam modo per modum impellentis. Inter quos motus, iste est ordo: quia primo movet obiectum intellectum motu apprehensionis, secundo intellectus voluntatem per modum ostensionis, tertio voluntas seipsam motu volitionis, et quarto voluntas intellectum et vires inferiores motu extensionis ad obiectum. Et fit quidam circulus, incipit enim motus ab obiecto et terminatur ad idem. Unde obiectum est movens non motum, intellectus et voluntas movens motum, vires inferiores sive membra exteriora motum tantum non movens, secundum doctrinam Philosophi III *De anima*.⁶³

[Ad 1.] Ad argumentum primum, cum dicit quod voluntas et intellectus sunt unum principium motus etc., dicendum quod Philosophus⁶⁴ loquitur ibi [de] motu locali et exteriori, et sic sunt unum principium

⁶² *De gratia et de libero arbitrio*, cap. 2; PL 182, 1003 B.

⁶³ *De anima*, III, 10; 433 b 16—19.

⁶⁴ *De anima*, III, 9; 432 b 26—433 a 8.

motus. Nihilominus tamen utraque habet motum suum simplicem intrinsecus quo seipsam movet et aliam.

[Ad 2.] Ad secundum, cum dicit quod sunt potentiae determinatae per formas suas etc., dicendum quod verum est, et ideo ad aliam formam non possunt moveri. Unde voluntas non potest moveri ad aliam formam quam ad rationem boni, nec intellectus nisi ad rationem veri. Potest tamen voluntas moveri ad hoc bonum vel ad illud, et appetere hoc vel fugere. Et sic moveri dicimus voluntatem in proposito. Et similiter intellectus ad hoc verum vel ad illud. Et sic dicimus moveri intellectum.

[Ad 3.] Ad tertium, cum dicit quod elementa moventur ad invicem quia habent communem materiam etc., [dicendum] quod non est simile quia elementa moventur motu qui est actus imperfecti. Hic autem loquimur de motu qui est actus perfecti, vel loquitur de motu qui fit per contactum. Hic autem non, et ideo non est simile.

[Ad 4.] Ad quartum, cum dicit quod intellectus agit ex necessitate naturae etc., dicendum quod verum est quantum ad aliquid et quantum ad aliquid non. Nam in intellectu duo sunt, scilicet actu cogitare sive considerare, et assentire rei consideratae ut principiis vel conclusioni alicui. Quantum ad primum, est in potestate nostra — nam cogitare de hoc ‘omne totum est maius sua parte,’ possum si volo et quando volo et quamdiu volo — et ideo quantum ad hoc, subiacet voluntati. Sed assentire veritati ipsius, cogitur intellectus necessario ex ipsa evidentia rei, et quantum ad hoc, non subiacet voluntati nec imperio cuiusquam, et sic procedit argumentum.

[Ad 5.] Ad quintum argumentum, cum dicit quod nihil amatur nisi cognitum, et ita cognitio | 24v | prae-exigitur ad motum etc., dicendum quod duplex est cognitio, in universali scilicet et in particulari. Unde nihil amatur nisi cognitum cognitione universali, verum est. Et sic potest voluntas movere intellectum ad hoc quod cognoscat in particulari, sicut cum anima appetit scire geometriam, novit quid sit scire, novit etiam in generali quid sit geometria, scilicet scientia de magnitudinibus sive mensuris, et hoc est scire in universali. Et ideo voluntas movet intellectum ad addiscendum illam scientiam magis in speciali, et sic de aliis.

[Ad 6.] Ad sextum, cum dicit quod intellectus movet voluntatem, ergo non e converso etc., dicendum quod si argueret de eodem genere motus, bene argueret. Nunc autem non est ita, nam intellectus movet voluntatem per modum finis, voluntas vero movet intellectum per modum imperantis. Et ita alio modo movet et alio modo movetur ab eodem. Et hoc non est inconveniens.

[Ad 7.] Ad septimum, cum dicit quod si intellectus moveret voluntatem, necessitaret eam etc., dicendum quod si intellectus moveret per modum imperantis vel efficientis, verum esset quod dicitur. Sed quia movet per modum finis, ideo non valet.

[5. Utrum intellectus possibilis intelligat per species sibi impressas formaliter.]

De qua quaestione tactum est aliquid supra, quaestione prima, ubi quaeritur an intellectus sit potentia passiva in prima opinione. Et si magis exquisite volueris videre eam, quaere in quaestionibus magistri Henrici de Gandavo.⁶⁵ Ego enim propter defectum illius et ad vitandum nimiam prolixitatem, volui istam quaestionem plus pertractare. Indiget enim perscrutatione maxima et prolixitate nimia ad videndum, primo intentionem positionis — quomodo scilicet anima coniuncta intelligit absque specie impressa per speciem obiectam in phantasmate et quomodo anima separata — et secundo quomodo angelus, ac deinde ad recte probandum, et ultimo ad bene solvendum rationes quas pro se facit quae multae sunt nimis. Et ideo dimitto totum ad praesens.

[6. Utrum ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat illa quae habet penes se indigeat necessario conversione ad phantasmata.]

Utrum ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat illa quae habet penes se indigeat necessario conversione ad phantasmata.

1. Et quod⁶⁶ non videtur. Augustinus in epistola *Ad Paulinam* 'De videndo Deum'⁶⁷ dicit quod sicut sensu exteriori videmus sensibilia quae praesto sunt corporis sensibus, sic sensu mentis videmus intelligibilia quae praesto sunt sensibus mentis sicut voluntatem, fidem, providentiam et alias virtutes. Sed si praesto sunt de se, non indigemus phantasmate, ergo etc.

2. Item. Non indigemus conversione ad phantasmata nisi ad cognitionem illorum quae habent ibi similitudines suas. Sed multa sunt quae ibi nullam habent similitudinem. Ergo ad illorum⁶⁸ intellectionem saltem, non indigemus converti ad phantasmata. Probatio minoris: Augustinus XII *Super Genesim*,⁶⁹ post principium, "Illa substantia quae nullam corporis similitudinem habet, sicut Deus, sicut mens ipsa

⁶⁵ *Summa quaestionum*, Pars I, art. 1, q. 11; ed. Paris (1520) — FIP reprint, S. Bonaventure, N. Y. (1953) f. 21 r.

⁶⁶ hoc MS.

⁶⁷ *De videndo Deum*; PL 33, 598.

⁶⁸ illos MS.

⁶⁹ *De Genesi ad litteram*, XII, 3; PL 34, 455—456.

hominis, vel intelligentia, vel ratio, sicut prudentia, iustitia, caritas, castitas et quaecumque aliae sunt virtutes, quas intelligendo atque cogitando enumeramus, discernimus, definimus, non utique in videndo eorum lineamenta vel colores aut quomodo sonent, aut oleant etc., sed alia quadam visione, alia luce, alia rerum evidentia etc.”

3. Item. In eodem circa finem libri,⁷⁰ dicit quod intellectualis visio potest esse sine corporali et imaginaria. Sed visio intellectualis nihil aliud est quam ipsa intellectio. Ergo intellectus esse potest sine imaginatione sive phantasmate.

4. Item. Si oppositum est causa oppositi et propositum propositi. Sed aversio a phantasmatibus est causa intelligendi. Ergo conversio ad phantasmata erit causa impedimenti. Probatio minoris: Augustinus VII *Super Genesim*,⁷¹ anima cum vult intelligere Deum vel divina vel etiam semetipsam, suasque | 251 | considerare virtutes, ab ipsa luce oculorum se averit eam ad hoc negotium, non tantum adiumento, verum etiam non nullo impedimento esse sentiens. Hoc idem vult, 83 [*Quaestio-num*] q. 10,⁷² et in multis aliis locis. Hoc idem vult Avicenna VI *Naturalium*, parte quinta.⁷³

5. Item. Si semper indigeret recurrere ad phantasmata, frustra poneremus memoriam in parte intellectiva. Consequens falsum, ergo antecedens.

6. Item. Operatio debet proportionari potentiae a qua procedit. Sed potentia intellectiva non dependet ab aliquo organo corporeo, ergo nec operatio.

7. Item. Nulla virtus activa cuius actio manet intra, indiget aliquo extrinseco ad hoc quod exeat in actum suum, secundum Commmentatorem super IV *De caelo et mundo*.⁷⁴ Sed intellectus habens habitum scientiae penes se est virtus activa. Ergo non indiget phantasmate.

Contra. Philosophus III *De anima*,⁷⁵ nihil intelligimus sine phantasmate, ergo etc.

Responsio. Circa istam quaestionem sunt opiniones. Dicunt enim quidam quod secundum Augustinum XII *De Trinitate*,⁷⁶ mens humana duplicem habet aspectum, unum scilicet per comparisonem ad superiora et maxime ad Deum cuius imago est, et vocatur portio su-

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, XII, 24; PL 34, 475.

⁷¹ *De Genesi ad litteram*, VII, 14; PL 34, 363.

⁷² 83 *Quaestio-num*, q. 9; PL 40, 13.

⁷³ VI *Naturalium*, V, 3; f. 24 ra.

⁷⁴ In IV *De caelo et mundo*, t. c. 2; ed. Iuntas, V, f. 239.

⁷⁵ *De anima*, III, 7; 431 a 16.

⁷⁶ *De Trinitate*, XII, 2—4; PL 42, 999—1000.

perior quae regulis inhaeret aeternis. Alium habet ad inferiora prout est perfectio corporis, et vocatur o inferior quae corporalibus et inferioribus administrandis intendit. Et similem distinctionem facit Avicenna *VI Naturalis*, parte prima.⁷⁷ Dicunt ergo quod sicut notitiam inferiorum colligit mens nostra per sensus corporis et mediantibus phantasmatis, ita superiora per semetipsam apprehendit. Unde Augustinus IX *De Trinitate*, cap. 3,⁷⁸ "Mens sicut rerum corporearum notitiam per sensus corporis colligit, sic incorporearum per semetipsam quia incorporea est." Et *Ad Nebridium*, epistola 109,⁷⁹ "Intelligere," inquit, "in nobis duobus modis fit: uno modo ipsa mente sive ratione intrinsecus ut cum intelligit seipsum esse intellectum, alio modo admonitione a sensibus corporis ut dum intelligimus corpus esse." Utroque autem modo intelligimus Deum. Non ergo, secundum istos, indigemus conversione ad phantasmata nisi in intellectione rerum corporearum, et videntur satis expresse, secundum superficiem verborum, habere Augustinum pro se.

Alii dicunt magis cum Philosopho quam cum Augustino, scilicet quod nihil intelligere possumus in statu praesenti sine conversione ad phantasmata quod probant ratione et experimento. Rationabilis: obiectum per se intellectus nostri, secundum Philosophum,⁸⁰ est quod quid est rei materialis existentis in rebus sensibilibus et singularibus. Completus autem intellectus non habetur nisi cognoscatur res secundum modum suum existendi. Igitur non habebitur intellectus completus de rebus sensibilibus nisi cognoscantur secundum quod in ipsis singularibus extra existunt. Singularium sensibilibus cognitio fit per vires inferiores, scilicet sensitivas. Igitur necesse est converti ad phantasmata ad hoc quod habeatur cognitio completa.

Adhuc est experimentum, quia aliter possemus intelligere in somnis sicut in vigilia, nam species intelligibilis ita existit in intellectu in somno sicut in vigilia. Sed quia phantasmata non sic se habent ad intellectum in somno sicut in vigilia, ideo non intelligimus dormientes. Igitur manifestum est quod oportet converti ad phantasmata ad hoc quod actu intelligamus illa quorum species sunt apud intellectum.

Ista opinio, ut credo, magis concordat cum hoc quod experimur in nobis, si bene investigaverimus modum nostrum communem intelligendi. Unde credo quod quantum ad cognitionem naturalem dicat verum. Quantum vero ad cognitionem quae fit per viam supernaturalem et per revelationem divinam, nec nego nec affirmo, quia non est praesentis speculationis.

⁷⁷ *VI Naturalium*, I, 5; f. 5 va.

⁷⁹ *Ad Nebridium*; PL 33, 78.

⁷⁸ *De Trinitate*, IX, 3; PL 42, 963.

⁸⁰ *De anima*, III, 6; 430 b 27—29.

[Ad 1.] Ad primum, cum dicit quod fides et ceterae virtutes praesto sunt intellectui, verum est — praesupposita conversione ad phantasmata.

[Ad 2.] Ad secundum, dicendum quod substantiae separatae, ut Deus, non habent similitudinem in phantasmate propriam. Effectus tamen earum habent similitudines suas, et quia non intelligimus | 25 v | naturaliter Deum nisi per suos effectus, ideo non intelligimus naturali intellectione Deum sine conversione ad phantasmata.

[Ad 3.] Ad tertium, cum dicit quod intellectualis visio potest esse sine imaginaria, concedo; non tamen sine conversione ad ea quae in imaginatione continentur.

[Ad 4.] Ad quartum, cum dicit quod oportet averti a phantasmatibus, secundum Augustinum⁸¹ et Avicennam⁸² etc., dico quod oportet aliquo modo averti et aliquo modo converti. Nam triplicem modum cognoscendi Deum per creaturas docet Dionysius,⁸³ scilicet per causalitatem, per eminentiam et per remotionem. 'Per causalitatem' quando arguimus ab effectu [ad] causam, ut a moto perpetuo, motorem aeternum. 'Per eminentiam' quando attribuimus Deo per eminentiam quidquid perfectius est in creaturis, ut sapientiam in creaturis, Deo attribuimus supereminenter. 'Per remotionem' removendo ab eo quod est imperfectionis. In omnibus his modis, inchoatio cognitionis est per ista sensibilia, terminus et completio est supra sensibilia. Et ideo oportet averti a phantasmatibus quantum [ad] cognitionis terminum, converti tamen quantum ad principium.

[Ad 5.] Ad quintum, dicendum quod indigemus conservatione specierum quantum ad rationem universalem rei, et indigemus conversione quantum ad phantasmata, quantum ad rationem particularem. Et ideo neutrum est frustra.

[Ad 6.] Ad sextum, potentia intellectiva non dependet ab organo tamquam ab instrumento, dependet tamen tamquam ab obiecto.

[Ad 7.] Ad septimum, dicendum quod non indiget aliquo extrinseco extra animam, hoc est, obiecto vel praesentia obiecti extra, quia intelligimus cum volumus, secundum Philosophum,⁸⁴ ea quorum speciem intus habemus. Indiget tamen conversione ad phantasmata quae non sunt extra animam, licet sint extra potentiam, quia ambae potentiae in una animae essentia radican-
t

⁸¹ *De Genesi ad litteram*, VII, 14; PL 34, 363.

⁸² *VI Naturalium*, V, 3; f. 24 ra.

⁸³ Ps-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, cap. 7; PG 3, 869; PL 122, 1155A; ed. P. G. Thery, *Etudes Dionysiennes II*; EPM 19, p. 253.

⁸⁴ *De anima*, II, 5; 417 b 24.

[7. Utrum intellectus intelligat actum voluntatis.]

Quaeritur utrum intellectus intelligat actum voluntatis.

1. Quod non, quia omnis cognitio intellectiva fit ex prae-existente cognitione sensitiva, secundum Philosophum I *Posteriora*,⁸⁵ sed actus voluntatis non cadit sub cognitione sensitiva, ergo nec sub intellectiva.

2. Item. Habitus cognoscuntur per actus et actus per obiecta, secundum Philosophum II *De anima*,⁸⁶ sed intellectus non potest cognoscere obiectum voluntatis, ergo nec actum. Probatio minoris: obiectum voluntatis est bonum sub ratione boni, obiectum intellectus verum sub ratione veri. Sed nulla potentia excedit rationem formalem sui obiecti. Ergo intellectus non excedit verum sub ratione veri. Non ergo potest intelligere bonum sub ratione boni.

3. Item. Aut intelligit actum voluntatis per essentiam sive praesentiam, aut per speciem aliquam. Non per praesentiam, quia non est praesens intellectui sed voluntati tantum, est enim in voluntate ut in subiecto. Non per speciem, quia species in intellectu est simplicior quam in re a qua abstrahitur. Sed ea quae sunt in intellectu non sunt simpliciora quam ea quae in voluntate. Ergo non intelliguntur per speciem abstractam.

4. Item. Intellectus non potest cognoscere habitum, ergo nec actum. Consequentia patet, quia si cognosceret actum, per actum posset devenire in cognitionem habitus. Falsitas antecedentis patet per hoc, quod caritas est habitus voluntatis. Sed nemo potest cognoscere se habere caritatem, *Ecclesiastae* IX, 1, *Nemo scit utrum odio an amore dignus sit*. Ergo nemo potest cognoscere habitum voluntatis.

a) Contra. Augustinus X *De Trinitate*.⁸⁷ 'Quidquid volo, memini et scio.' Sed voluntas vult actum suum. Ergo intellectus intelligit actum, cum nihil sit volitum vel amatum nisi prius sit cognitum et intellectum, sicut docet Augustinus in eodem.⁸⁸

b) Item. Habitus non cognoscuntur nisi per actus, sed habitus voluntatis cognosci possunt, ergo et actus. Probatio minoris: Philosophus in libro *Posteriorum*⁸⁹ "Inconveniens est,"⁹⁰ "inquit, "nos habere nobilissimos habitus principiorum et nos latere."

Responsio. Circa istam quaestionem tria sunt declaranda: primo quod actus voluntatis sit cognoscibilis, secundo de cognoscendi modo, | 26r |

⁸⁵ *Analytica posteriora*, I, 3; 72 b 24.

⁸⁶ *De anima*, II, 4; 415 a 16—22.

⁸⁷ *De Trinitate*, X, 11; PL 42, 983.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, X, 1—2; PL 42, 971—975.

⁸⁹ *nulibi inveni*.

⁹⁰ ens MS.

tertio de cognitionis medio, scilicet utrum cognoscatur per speciem vel non.

Circa primum, sciendum quod unumquodque, sicut se habet ad esse, sic ad cognoscibilitatem. Sunt autem quaedam entia in potentia tantum et quia potentia secundum quod huiusmodi dicitur per respectum ad actum, ideo entia in potentia non cognoscuntur nisi per respectum ad actu. Et ideo ens actu prius cognoscibile est secundum se quam ens in potentia. Praecedit enim actus potentiam cognitione, definitione et tempore, secundum Philosophum IX *Metaphysicae*.⁹¹ Ens vero actu aliud est actus purus, ut Deus, vel nimis habens de actualitate respectu nostri ut aliae substantiae separatae. Et tale ens, etsi secundum se sit maxime cognoscibile, non tamen nobis est cognoscibile propter suam excellentiam et debilitatem intellectus nostri. Unde secundum Philosophum II *Metaphysicae*,⁹² intellectus noster se habet ad manifesta in natura, sicut oculus vespertilionis ad lucem solis. Et propter hoc dicit Avicenna VI *Naturalis*, parte 5,⁹³ quod quaedam male intelliguntur a nobis propter esse diminutum ut entia in potentia, ut materia, motus, tempus, privationes, negationes, relationes et huiusmodi, quaedam propter esse excellens quia excedunt intellectum nostrum, ut Deus et substantiae separatae. Actus autem voluntatis non habet esse diminutum cum non sit ens in potentia. Sed actus non habet esse excellens et improporcionatum cum sit in eadem animae essentia. Igitur actus voluntatis et secundum se intelligibilis est et quoad nos, quare necesse est ponere quod cognoscatur a nobis. Hoc de primo articulo sufficiat.

Circa cognoscendi modum, sciendum quod tripliciter possumus devenire in cognitionem talis actus, uno modo ex parte obiecti ipsius, alio modo ex redundantia actus in ipsum intellectum, et tertio modo ex parte essentiae in qua ambo radican-
 tur.

Ex primo sic procedit intellectus, primo enim intelligit obiectum proprium quodcumque sit, non solum secundum rationem veri, sed secundum omnem rationem in obiecto reparatam. Unde cognoscit in eo rationem boni, entis, unius et huiusmodi. Cognoscendo ergo rationem boni, arguit ex ratione tali quali potentia et actu indiget anima tendendi in tale obiectum, sive arguit ex proportionem obiecti qualiter actu tendat in ipsum. Et tamen invenit hoc esse per modum inclinationis et appetitus, quia bonum est quod omnis optat, secundum Philosophum I

⁹¹ *Metaphy.*, IX, 8; 1049 b 11—12.

⁹² *Metaphy.*, II, 1; 993 b 10.

⁹³ *VI Naturalium*, V, 5; f. 25 vb.

Ethicorum.⁹⁴ Concludit actum voluntatis esse inclinare sive appetere bonum sub ratione boni.

Alio modo hoc concludit ex parte essentiae, nam intellectus natus est reflecti super actum suum, et per actum super potentiam, et mediante potentia super potentiam, et mediante potentia super essentiam. Et sic cognoscendo essentiam suam, cognoscit eam secundum totam virtutem suam. Cum igitur in essentia animae omnes vires radicentur, ex consequenti cognoscit potentiam voluntatis cognoscendo potentiam, [et] arguit actum talis potentiae debere esse talem etc., et sic cognoscit voluntatem et eius actum.

Ex redundantia etiam unius actus in alium hoc fieri potest, quia intellectus quodam modo movet voluntatem et voluntas movet intellectum. Movet autem voluntas intellectum ad intelligendum aliquid quod non actu intelligit, et copulando intentionem etiam cum eo quod actu intelligit, et etiam removendo intentionem ne amplius intelligat, vel ad aliud intelligibile se transferat ex qua quidem motione experimentaliter quodam modo cognoscit ipsum actum, mediante quo movetur. Sic ergo triplici via devenire potest intellectus in cognitionem actus voluntatis et eorum quae in voluntate sunt.

Restat nunc videre de medio cognitionis, utrum scilicet cognoscat actum voluntatis per speciem aliquam vel non. Ad cuius intellectum, sciendum quod triplex est cognitio: scilicet intuitiva sive directa quando scilicet directe intuetur obiectum sicut sensum visus coloratum. Alia est cognitio collativa sive arguitiva vel discursitiva, quae non est directe, sed arguendo | 26 v | per illud quod cognoscitur directe ad aliquid aliud sicut ab effectu qui directe cadit in intellectu, ad causam quae non cadit directe, ut ad Deum vel substantias separatas. Tertia est cognitio experimentalis qua homo experitur aliquid in se, licet illud non intelligat obiective. Exemplum horum possumus quodam modo habere in sensu. Sensus communis sentit obiecta quinque sensuum quasi intuendo ipsa per speciem receptam ab eis, sentit ipsos sensus quinque quasi experimentaliter. Dum enim omnis aperit oculum movendo ad id quod appetit videre, experitur quodam modo se oculo clauso vel ideo sic moto id non videre, et ita sentit se non videre dum non videt, ac per consequens necesse est ut sentiat se videre dum videt, sicut docet Augustinus II *De libero arbitrio*.⁹⁵ Sentiendo autem sic intuitive aliquod animal, puta lupum, statim aestimat esse inimicum quasi naturali quodam instinctu — qui est quasi quoddam naturale argumentum, quo, per speciem talis

⁹⁴ *Ethic. Nicom.*, I, 1; 1094 a 3.

⁹⁵ *De libero arbitrio*, II, 4; PL 32, 1246.

coloris et talis figurae, arguit esse amicum vel inimicum per virtutem aestimativam quae est in brutis. Prima cognitio fit per speciem rei propriam, tertia per speciem alienam — et quodam modo speciei intentionem, sicut docet Avicenna VI *Naturalis*⁹⁶ — sed media per speciem nullam, sed per ipsius rei experientiam. Loquendo ergo de cognitione intellectiva, qua cognoscit actum voluntatis, dicendum quod intellectus intuitive primo cognoscit obiectum proprium — puta rem naturalem extra — per speciem propriam. Et per eandem speciem reflectitur super actum suum vel super rationem boni quod est obiectum voluntatis — et sic arguit actum voluntatis — vel per speciem aliquam ipsius actus, sed per speciem obiecti quasi per speciem alienam sive speciei intentionem aliquam. Et ita primo et tertio modo cognoscit actum voluntatis per speciem alterius. Medio vero modo — qui⁹⁷ est per actus redundantiam — nec per speciem propriam nec per alienam cognoscit, sed per ipsius actus praesentiam. Et isto modo est intelligendum quod dicit Augustinus XII *Super Genesim*,⁹⁸ quod ea quae sunt de tertio genere visionis non habent speciem aliam a se, sed intelliguntur per suam praesentiam, quia, scilicet, experimur ea esse praesentia per⁹⁹ modum consimilem, modo iam dicto.

[Ad 1.] Ad primum, tu dicis quod actus voluntatis non cadit sub sensu secundum se. Quantum ad id tamen unde cognitio sua oritur, cadebat in sensu, scilicet quantum ad obiectum ipsius intellectus, sicut Deus non cadit sub sensu secundum se. Quantum tamen ad effectus suos¹⁰⁰ per quos cognoscitur, cadit sub sensu. Et hoc sufficit quantum ad intentionem Philosophi.¹⁰¹ Non enim vult quod cognitio intellectiva sistat in sensitiva, sed quod ortum habeat ab illa. Sic est in proposito.

[Ad 2.] Ad secundum, cum dicit quod bonum non potest esse obiectum intellectus etc., dico quod tam bonum quam ratio boni possunt esse obiectum intellectus, sed non sub ratione boni, [sed] sub ratione veri. Et hoc sufficit ad hoc quod obiectum voluntatis intelligatur.

[Ad 3.] Ad tertium, cum quaerit aut per praesentiam aut per speciem, dicendum quod utroque modo, ut visum est supra. Tu dicis quod non per praesentiam, quia actus ille non est in intellectu, sed in voluntati. Dico quod est in voluntate per existentiam sicut accidens in subiecto, sed est in intellectu per redundantiam in quantum per illum, voluntas movet intellectum. Iterum tu dicis quod non per speciem quia species est

⁹⁶ VI *Naturalium*, I, 5; f. 5 rb.

⁹⁷ quae MS.

⁹⁸ *De Genesi ad litteram*, XII, 6; PL 34, 458—459.

⁹⁹ quem add. MS.

¹⁰⁰ duos MS.

¹⁰¹ *Analy. post.*, I, 3; 72 b 24.

simplicior etc., dico quod licet bene arguit quod non intelligitur per speciem propriam, non autem quod non per alienam, ut dictum est.

[Ad 4.] Ad quartum, tu dicis [quod] non potest cognoscere habitum etc., dico quod non est simile de habitu caritatis qui includit quamdam acceptationem divinam, quae non potest in praesenti a nobis cognosci nisi per revelationem ipsius, et de actibus et habitibus naturalibus qui naturaliter habent a nobis cognosci. | 27r |

[8. Utrum Deus possit producere extra se aliquem effectum actu infinitum.]

Utrum Deus possit producere extra se aliquem effectum actu infinitum.

1. Quod sic, quia si tanta virtus potest in tantum effectum, et maior potest in maiorem, ergo infinita in infinitum. Sed virtus divina potest esse in infinita, ergo potest in effectum infinitum.

2. Item. Omnis potentia quae operatur se tota — si est infinita — producit effectum infinitum. Sed potentia Dei infinita est et operatur se tota, cum sit simplex non habens partem et partem. Ergo producit effectum infinitum.

3. Item. Ideae sunt rationes cognitivae et factivae rerum. Sed Deus habet infinitas ideas penes se. Ergo potest infinita producere quia secundum quamlibet ideam potest producere aliquam creaturam.

4. Item. Hoc idem patet ex parte creaturae. Nec dicas quod Deus potest facere, sed creatura non potest suscipere quia possibile fuit mundum fuisse productum ab aeterno. Sed si mundus fuisset aeternus, infinita essent actu, ut probabo. Ergo possibile fuit Deo infinita producere. Quod possibile fuit Deo producere mundum ab aeterno patet, quia omne agens — non per motum sed per mutationem — potest habere effectum coaevum, sicut ignis quam cito est, producit splendorem sibi coaevum. Sed Deus est agens sine motu. Ergo potest producere effectum coaeternum sibi. Quod autem — hoc posito — sequatur infinitas actualis esse, ostendere [potest] ex hoc quod si mundus esset aeternus, quaelibet pars mundi essentialis aeterna esset. Et si quaelibet pars, ergo homo. Ergo infiniti homines praecessissent¹⁰² hunc hominem. Et si infiniti homines, infinitae animae. Cum ergo animae sint incorporales et semper actu maneant, corruptis corporibus, sequitur quod omnes animae actu existentes essent actu infinitae.

5. Item. Quidquid est in potentia passiva creaturae, est in potentia activa creatoris, a quo talem potentiam accepit. Sed creatura aliqua est

¹⁰² licet *add.* MS.

in potentia passiva ad divisionem infinitam ut omne continuum, secundum Philosophum III *Physicorum*.¹⁰³ Ergo Deus potest dividere in infinita. Sed completa tali divisione, essent numero infinita actu. Ergo Deus potest producere infinita numero.

6. Item. In additione magnitudinis, quantum potest aliquid esse in potentia, tantum potest esse in actu. Sed possibile est additionem fieri ad magnitudinem in infinitum, ut probabo. Ergo possibilis est magnitudinem esse actu infinitam. Probatio minoris: Commentator super III *Physicorum*,¹⁰⁴ dicit quod propositio dicens quod possibile est ad omnem lineam imaginari maiorem illa, est vera in geometria. Ergo est vera simpliciter.

7. Item. Sicut in additione magnitudinis, quantum est aliquid in potentia tantum potest esse in actu, sic — ut videtur — erit in additione ad multitudinem. Sed multitudini semper potest fieri additio in infinitum in potentia, secundum Philosophum in III *Physicorum*.¹⁰⁵ Ergo potest esse infinita actu.

8. Item. In his quae vadunt ad formam et actum, quantum est aliquid in potentia tantum est in actu vel potest esse, secundum Commentatorem super III *Physicorum*.¹⁰⁶ Sed in additione multitudinis itur ad formam et actum, quia quaelibet unitas addita facit novam formam et dat novum actum. Ergo si multitudo potest augeri in infinitum, potest esse actu infinita.

Contra. *Omnia in numero, pondere et mensura disposuisti, Domine* dicitur in *Sapientia* XI, 21. Sed huiusmodi non sunt infinita. Ergo Deus nec facit nec potest facere actu infinitum vel infinita, cum nihil possit facere sine numero, pondere et mensura, secundum Augustinum.¹⁰⁷

Ad quaestionem istam, dico quod Deus non potest producere effectum actu infinitum quia hoc includit contradictionem. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum quod secundum Philosophum,¹⁰⁸ finitum et infinitum quantitati congruunt. Duplex est autem quantitas, molis scilicet et virtutis. Quantitas vero virtutis, alia est extensiva, alia intensiva. Virtus autem extensive infinita bene potest esse in potentia, sicut patet in materia quae habet virtutem recipiendi infinitas formas successive. Caelum etiam habet | 27v | virtutem producendi formas simpliciter infinitas in materia successive et intellectus virtutem intelligendi succes-

¹⁰³ *Physic.*, III, 7; 207 b 15.

¹⁰⁴ *In III Physic.*, t. c. 60; ed. Iuntas, IV, f. 114D.

¹⁰⁵ *Physic.*, III, 6; 206 b 16.

¹⁰⁶ *nullibi inven.*

¹⁰⁷ *De Genesi ad litteram*, IV, 3; PL 34, 299.

¹⁰⁸ *nullibi inven.*

sive infinita. In actu autem et simul, impossibile est quod sit in aliquo virtus extensive infinita nisi etiam sit infinita intensive. Nam impossibile est quod caelum producat formas simul infinitas in materia, nisi habeat virtutem infinitam simul intensive et extensive. Virtus autem infinita intensive et extensive non potest esse virtus receptiva in materia sive in corpore, sicut ostendit Commentator, *De substantia orbis*,¹⁰⁹ quia omne tale dividitur ad divisionem corporis cuius quaelibet pars minor est toto et in minori minor et in maiori maior, quod omnino repugnat infinitati actuali. Nec potest etiam recipi in aliqua essentia vel natura determinati generis, quia sic non excedet illud genus. Restat ergo quod sit virtus in se subsistens et actus purus, nihil habens admixtum de potentia, et nihil tale produci potest de nihilo. Iterum, omne tale est esse suum per essentiam et nihil huiusmodi recipit esse suum ab alio. Si igitur creatura — eo quod creata est ab alio — suum esse recipit et de nihilo ad esse proficit, nullo modo potest creatura esse actu infinita. Immo sequitur quod esset simul creatura et non esset creatura, quod est plena contradictio.

Quantitas autem molis duplex est, scilicet multitudinis et magnitudinis. Multitudo autem licet infinita esse possit in potentia, secundum Philosophum III *Physicorum*,¹¹⁰ actu tamen non potest. Nam omnis multitudo actu est per ultimam unitatem complementem suam speciem. Nullum autem infinitum habet ultimum. Ergo actualitas multitudinis repugnat actualitati infinitatis. Neque magnitudo potest esse actu infinita nec potentia etiam ut probat Philosophus III *Physicorum*¹¹¹ et in I [De] *caelo et mundo*,¹¹² quoniam omnis magnitudo vel est linea vel superficies vel corpus. Linea autem actualis recta terminos suos actu habet duo puncta, superficies vero lineas, corpus autem superficies. Et sic omnis magnitudo actu existens finita est. Necessario patet ergo quod actualis infinitas magnitudinis et multitudinis repugnat actuali existentiae creaturae. Nullo ergo modo potest Deus producere effectum aliquem actu infinitum.

Sed ulterius sciendum propter argumenta quod aliquid includat repugnantiam sive contradictionem. Hoc potest esse tripliciter, scilicet vel quia repugnat rationi agentis vel rei factibilis vel ipsius factionis. Verbi gratia, repugnare potest rationi agentis vel quia repugnat essentiae ipsius — ut posse corrumpi posse mori et huiusmodi — vel quia

¹⁰⁹ *De substantia orbis*, cap. 3; ed. Iuntas, IX, f. 8—9.

¹¹⁰ *Physic.*, III, 6; 206 b 16.

¹¹¹ *Physic.*, III, 6; 206 b 20.

¹¹² *De caelo et mundo*, I, 5; 272 b 17—24.

repugnat potentiae ut posse vinci — quod non ponit potentiam in victo sed in vincente secundum Anselmum¹¹³ — vel quia repugnat sapientiae — ut posse ignorare, oblivisci et huiusmodi — vel quia repugnat eius bonitati — ut posse mentiri et universaliter posse peccare. Haec omnino non potest Deus, quia repugnant sibi ipsi, non autem quia repugnant effectui, nam huiusmodi posse non est posse sed repugnans potentiae. Alia sunt quae non potest, non quia repugnant sibi, sed quia repugnant effectui. Et hoc vel ratione materiae, ut non idem potest facere de corpore spiritum — secundum aliquos — vel ratione formae, ut quod idem corpus sit simul album et nigrum, vel quod aliquis sit simul homo vel asinus, vel ratione coniuncti, ut quod simul sit et non sit et huiusmodi. Alia vero repugnant ipsi factioni, ut facere alium Deum, nam Deo repugnat fieri. Ista omnia non potest Deus facere, non propter repugnantiam a parte sui, sed propter repugnantiam a parte factionis vel facti. Infinitum esse actu non repugnat agenti sed effectui, ut supra dictum est. Igitur quod non possit facere¹¹⁴ aliquid tale esse actu, non est quia Deus non potest facere proprie loquendo, sed quia illud non potest fieri. Hoc est dictu, non quia repugnat rationi agentis | 28r | sed rationi effectus. Et per hoc possunt solvi omnia argumenta quae fiunt a parte Dei, sicut patebit applicando ad singula.

[Ad 1.] Ad primum, cum dicit si tanta virtus potest in tantum effectum etc., dico quod hoc verum est de tali virtute quae potest habere effectum sibi proportionatum extra se. Virtus autem divina, quia infinita est, non potest. Et causa dicta est non propter repugnantiam aliquam a parte agentis, sed a parte rei factibilis, ut supra dictum est.

[Ad 2.] Ad secundum, omnis virtus quae operatur se tota, se est infinita, producit effectum actu infinitum etc., dicendum quod haec ratio deficit tripliciter. Uno modo, quia etsi operetur se tota — quia simplex — non tamen totaliter, quia infinita et immensa est. Alio modo, quia etsi infinitas potentiae divinae non manifestaretur effectui producto, manifestari tamen potest in producendi modo, quia de nihilo. Tertio quia — sicut dictum est — concesso toto, non plus concludit nisi quod non est defectus a parte Dei quin producat infinitum actu, sed a parte rei propter repugnantiam supra dictam.

[Ad 3.] Ad tertium, cum dicit quod habet infinitas ideas actu etc., dicendum quod hoc probat bene quod causa quare infinitum actu non producitur, non est defectus cognitionis divinae, sed repugnantia contra-

¹¹³ Anselmus, *Cur Deus homo*, II, 18; PL 158, 422B; ed. Schmitt, Cap. 17; II, p. 123.

¹¹⁴ facere *add. in mg. al. m.*

dictionis implicitae. Et sic respondendum est ad omnes rationes sumptas ex parte Dei quod causa impossibilitatis non est propter repugnantiam a parte Dei, nec essentiae nec potentiae, quia infinita est, nec scientiae, quia infinitas ideas habet, sed a parte rei fiendae vel factae.

[Ad 4.] Ad quartum, si Deus produxisset infinita actu, essent quia infinitae animae etc., dico ad praesens [quod non sequitur quia] tamquam unum impossibile ex alio impossibili. Unde pono quod mundum posse produci ab aeterno est impossibile et implicat contradictionem. Tu probas quod possibile fuit mundum ab aeterno produci, quia productus est non per motum. Respondeo: in motu duplex est causa quare effectus non simul potest esse cum efficiente, scilicet una divisibilitas motus quia omnis motus est divisibilis, alia impossibilitas extremorum quia omnis motus est inter extrema impossibilia¹¹⁵ ut inter album et non album, motus dealbationis et huiusmodi. Remota ergo una causa, manet alia, sicut remota divisibilitate motus in mutatione, manet adhuc impossibilitas¹¹⁶ extremorum. Et ideo, etsi mundus producat non per motum, producitur tamen per mutationem, et ideo impossibile est ut sit agenti coaeternus, sicuti¹¹⁷ declarabitur diffusius.¹¹⁸

[Ad 5.] Ad quintum, quidquid est in potentia passiva creaturae est in potentia activa creatoris etc., dicendum quod sicut est in potentia passiva, sic oportet quod sit in potentia activa. Est autem in potentia passiva ut semper dividatur, non ut sit actu divisum in infinitum, et ideo sic habet Deus potentiam activam ut semper dividat. Hoc autem non excludit infinitatem actualem, sed potentialem tantum, tam a parte agentis quam a parte suscipientis.

[Ad 6.] Ad sextum, cum dicit quod ad omnem lineam convenit imaginari maiorem etc., dicendum quod geometria considerat quantitatem secundum quod habet esse, non in materia sed in imaginatione tantum. Et ideo non repugnat sibi imaginatio magnitudinis in infinitum. Nos autem loquimur in proposito de magnitudine sive quantitate secundum quod est in effectum, et ideo non est simile.

[Ad 7.] Ad septimum, cum dicit quod qua ratione iri potest in infinitum in additione multitudinis et magnitudinis etc., dicendum, secundum Commentatorem III *Physicorum*,¹¹⁹ quod non est simile. Cuius causam assignat quia in magnitudine cuiuslibet partis generatae, possibilitas est pars unius possibilitatis demonstrare. Et ideo necesse est quod

¹¹⁵ impossibilia MS

¹¹⁶ impossibilitas MS

¹¹⁷ sicut ita MS.

¹¹⁸ Cf. infra q. 10, p.

¹¹⁹ In III *Physic.*, t. c. 69; IV, f. 118.

talis possibilitas quocumque modo ponatur in potentia, alioquin sequeretur ut talis potentia inveniatur in actu.¹²⁰ In multitudine vero cuiuslibet partis generatae, possibilitas est alia a possibilitate alterius partis, et non sunt omnes partes unius possibilitatis simpliciter, sed plurium. Et ideo non oportet ut quantum est | 28v | in potentia tantum sit in actu.

[Ad 8.] Ad octavum, cum dicit quod in additione numeri, itur ad actum permixtum potentia, quia quilibet actus comportat secum novam potentiam. Nam ternarius est in potentia ad quaternarium, addatur sibi unitas et est actu quaternarius. Et similiter ibi addatur unitas et fit actu quinarium, et potentia senarius, et sic deinceps, quaelibet unitas additum dat actum et potentiam, et quia dat potentiam, ideo iri potest in additione in infinitum, non ratione actus sed ratione potentiae. Quamvis ergo in additione numeri eatur ad actum quodam modo, tamen itur ad actum,¹²¹ non simpliciter sed permixtum potentia. Et ideo potest iri in additione numeri in infinitum, non ratione actus sed ratione potentiae.

[9. Utrum videntes Verbum eodem actu videant Verbum et ea quae in Verbo continentur.]

Quaestio est utrum videntes Verbum eodem actu videant Verbum et ea quae in Verbo continentur.

1. Quod non videtur. Actiones numerantur secundum numerum rationum agendi, non secundum numerum agentium, quia idem ignis numero habet ascendere et calefacere. Sed alia ratione videtur Verbum et ea quae in Verbo sunt, ergo alia actione. Minor probatur sic: non minoris simplicitatis est intellectus divinus quam noster, immo in infinitum maioris. Sed intellectus divinus sive ipsum Verbum non eadem ratione cognoscit se et ea quae in se continentur, quia se cognoscit per essentiam suam, alia per rationes ideales. Ergo multo minus intellectus creatus.

2. Item. Si intellectus beatus per impossibile separaretur a visione Verbi, sicut fuit in raptu Pauli, possibile esset quod recordaretur aliquorum quae in Verbo vidisset. Ergo cognosceret ea, non per Verbum quia non videt Verbum, sed per aliquam aliam rationem. Sed per eandem rationem recordatur absens per quam praesens intuebatur. Ergo praesens videbat Verbum per aliam rationem, et per aliam ea quae in Verbo. Et si hoc, sequitur ut prius, quod per aliam actionem.

3. Item. Verbum est speculum voluntarium. Potest ergo nunc ostendere oculo beato quod prius non ostendebat. Quo facto, aliqua mutatio

¹²⁰ sequitur ut inveniatur in actu alioquin talis potentia MS.

¹²¹ ad actum *add. in mg. ead. m.*

fieret: non videre ergo in vidente. Quaero ergo, aut sit mutatio in habitu aut in actu. Quocumque dato, non erit idem actus qui prius, ergo etc.

4. Item. Si angeli vident uno actu omnia quae vident in Verbo, et etiam ipsum Verbum. Ergo non esset¹²² necesse ut unus alium illuminaret. Sed consequens falsum, ergo antecedens.

Contra. Quando unum propter alterum utrobique tantum unum. Sed res in Verbo videtur per Verbum. Ergo res et Verbum sunt unum visum, ergo unico actu videri possunt.

Responsio. Est considerare in actu visionis Verbi, unitatem generis, unitatem speciei, et unitatem numeri. Unitatem generis habet ab unitate potentiae a qua procedit et in qua est, secundum Philosophum V *Metaphysicae*.¹²³ Unde velle et videre sunt actus diversi generis, quia a diversis potentiis procedunt, voluntate scilicet et intellectu. Unitatem speciei habet ab obiecto, non quocumque, sed formali, Unde visio albi et nigri non differt sensitive, licet diversa specie videat, quia per unam rationem formalem videtur utrumque, scilicet sub ratione coloris actu illuminati. Unitatem vero numeri habet ab unitate temporis. Unde licet fuerit una potentia et unum obiectum formale, dummodo tamen non simul videat omnia sed successive discurrendo ab hoc in hoc, non erit unus actus numero. Patet ergo quod ad unitatem generis sufficit unitas potentiae, ad unitatem speciei unitas obiecti, ad unitatem numeri sive simpliciter requiruntur simul omnia. Et hoc est quod dicit Philosophus V *Physicorum*¹²⁴ quod ad unitatem motus simpliciter requiritur unitas subiecti, termini et temporis. Actus autem videndi Verbum unius est potentiae sive subiecti materialis quia intellectus unius obiecti formalis, quia ipsius Verbi quod est obiectum formale visionis beatæ unius momenti temporalis, quia in patria non erunt volubiles cogitationes nostrae sed omnia simul uno conspectu videbimus, ut ait Augustinus XV *De Trinitate*.¹²⁵ Igitur ac | 29r | tus ille erit simpliciter unus.

[Ad 1.] Ad primum, ergo, cum dicit quod non eadem ratione, dicendum quod eadem ratione videtur Verbum et ea quae videntur in Verbo. Et quod arguit contra, quod Deus non eadem ratione etc., dicendum quod Deus unica ratione videt omnia, scilicet essentia sua. Ideae vero ab essentia non differunt, immo sunt idipsum quod essentia divina, vel potest dici quod ideae non sunt rationes intelligendi Deo, sed obiecta intellecta ut dicunt aliqui, et propter hoc non concludit argumentum.

¹²² esse MS.

¹²³ *Metaphy.*, V, 6; 1016 a 24—32.

¹²⁴ *Physic.*, V, 4; 227 b 21—31.

¹²⁵ *De Trinitate*, XV, 16; PL 42, 1079.

[Ad 2.] Ad secundum, cum dicit quod separatus potest recordari etc., dicendum quod hoc potest per vestigium aliquod delictum in anima ex praesentia ipsius, quemadmodum recordabimur nos fidei evacuare quando in patria videbimus facie ad faciem, sicut docet sanctus Augustinus XIV *De Trinitate*,¹²⁶ vel forte per aliquid de novo creatum, ut dicunt alii. Sive ergo dicatur quod per aliquid delictum sive per aliquid de novo collatum, evacuatum est argumentum.

[Ad 3.] Ad tertium, cum dicit quod mutatio fieret, dico quod fieret mutatio materialis, et secundum rationem, non secundum rem. Et talis bene stat cum unitate reali. Vel dici potest quod fieret mutatio in ipsa ratione videnti Verbum, quia videt ipsum Verbum intensius quam prius. Et per consequens non probatur quod alio actu videt Verbum et ea quae in Verbo videntur, sed quod alio actu videt Verbum nunc et prius. Et hoc non negamus quia non est ad propositum.

[Ad 4.] Ad quartum, cum dicit quod angeli non illuminarent vel illuminarentur ab angelis aliis etc., dicendum quod angeli non illuminantur de his quae vident in Verbo, sed de his quae non vident ibi. Illuminantur a Deo vel ab his qui vident ibi ea quae ipsi videre non possunt.

[10. Utrum anima Christi potuerit produci ab aeterno.]

Utrum anima Christi potuerit produci¹²⁷ ab aeterno.

1. Quod sic probo: qua ratione produci potuit in instanti in quo producta fuit, eadem ratione produci potuit in instanti priori, et adhuc in instanti priori illo, et sic in infinitum. Ergo pari ratione ab aeterno.

2. Item. Omne creabile habet ideam in Deo, et omne quod habet ideam in Deo est creabile. Sed anima Christi ab aeterno habuit ideam in Deo. Ergo anima Christi ab aeterno creabilis fuit et creari potuit.

3. Item. Anima Christi ab aeterno fuit intellecta. Sed quia potuit intelligi ab aeterno, potuit produci ab aeterno. Ergo anima Christi potuit produci ab aeterno. Probatio minoris: quia rei non repugnat esse sicut intelligitur, ergo, si potuit intelligi ab aeterno, potuit esse vel produci in esse ab aeterno.

4. Item. Omne instans est medium duorum temporum praeteriti et futuri. Ergo ante omne instans fuit tempus, et ante omne tempus fuit instans. Igitur impossibile est dare instans primum et per consequens tempus non potest incipere. Et si non tempus, nec motus, et si non motus, nec mobile nec aliqua creatura.

¹²⁶ *De Trinitate*, XIV, 2; PL 42, 1038.

¹²⁷ duci MS.

5. Item. Agens creatum quam cito est, potest habere effectum sibi coevum, sicut ignis splendorem, ut dicit Augustinus VI *De Trinitate*.¹²⁸ Unde si ignis esset aeternus, et splendor eius esset coaeternus secundum ipsum. Si ergo hoc potest agens creatum, ergo multo fortius increatum, scilicet Deus potuit aliquam producere ab aeterno, et maxime animam Christi.

Contra. Qua ratione potuit producere ab aeterno animam Christi, eadem ratione et animas aliorum hominum, et alios homines. Sed si alii homines fuissent ab aeterno producti, ideo fuissent homines infiniti praeteriti, et per consequens cum animae hominum sint incorporales, fuissent animae actu infinitae, quod est contra philosophiam et contra superius¹²⁹ determinata de infinitate actuali.

Responsio. Sic dicendum est de anima¹³⁰ Christi quantum ad propositam pertinet quaestionem, sicut de quacumque alia creatura. Sunt autem quidam qui dicunt possibile esse Deo producere mundum sive universitatem creaturae ab aeterno. Quod ostendunt tam a parte agentis quam rei factibilis, quam ipsius factionis. Puer enim non statim cum est, potest habere filium sibi coevum, tum propter impotentiam virtutis generantis — quia scilicet non habet statim perfectam generandi virtutem — tum propter resistantiam mobilis | 29v | sive generabilis, quia materia non statim est disposita ad recipiendum formam agentis; et dato quod agens haberet virtutem perfectam agendi statim; — tum propter distantiam generationis — generatio enim vel motus est vel non sine motu, motus autem agentis sive actionis est medium inter agens et effectum, et si motus, et tempus, et si tempus, ergo impossibile est effectum esse coevum agenti per motum. Istis ergo causis sublatis, causa a parte agentis quam acti quam actionis, agens statim cum est, habere potest effectum sibi coevum, sicut patet in sole respectu illuminationis medii et igne respectu splendoris producti. Nam virtus solis activa statim in principio sui esse est perfecta in medio [ubi] nulla est resistantia. Illuminatio etiam est actio instantanea, quare statim cum est, illuminare medium potest. Cum igitur virtus divina sit in infinitum perfectior, actio velocior et in nihilo nulla sit resistantia — immo perfecta obedientia — videtur quod Deus ab aeterno sui esse producere potuit creaturam de nihilo ad esse.

Sed videtur mihi ad praesens quod praedicta positio eisdem viis improbari potest in quibus probatur. Et primo a parte agentis: posito secundum fidem et veritatem quod Deus sit vere agens et non super-

¹²⁸ *De Trinitate*, VI, 1; PL 42, 923.

¹³⁰ divina MS.

¹²⁹ Cf. supra q. 8, p. 130 ss.

ficientenus, nam de ratione veri est quod sit principium actionis et acti. In quibusdam autem ita est quod mensura effectus cum effectu non producitur sed praesupponitur. Et in talibus potest agens esse principium productionis effectus absque hoc quod sit principium durationis ipsius, ut patet in exemplis supradictis. In quibusdam vero effectus cum sua mensura simul producuntur. Et in his, impossibile est quod agens sit principium productionis absque hoc quod sit principium durationis ipsius. Creatura autem tota simul cum sua mensura a Deo producitur. Igitur impossibile est quod Deus sit principium productionis creaturae absque hoc quod sit principium durationis suae. Deus ergo totus simul cum sua duratione — quae est aeternitas — est principium creaturae et eius durationis — quae est tempus. Ergo impossibile est has duas durationes esse coevas, et hoc posito — ut dixi — quod Deus sit vere agens et non superficientenus, sicut ponunt omnes ponentes mundi aeternitatem. Unde Commentator super XI *Metaphysicae*,¹³¹ dicit quod modus loquendi quo dicimus quod hoc sequitur ex hoc vel producit hoc, aut agit aut similia verba, sunt verba metaphorica et non vera. Et super IV *Caeli et mundi*¹³² in principio dicit quod aeterna non habent causam nisi formalem tantum. Et si dicantur habere agens, hoc non est nisi inquantum est forma eis et conservans.

Secundo, hoc ostenditur ex parte factibilis. Nam cum dicitur aliquid fieri ex contrario, hoc non est quia contrarium fiat ex contrario formaliter, sed ex subiecto contrarii. Verbi gratia: ex non-albo fit album vel ex non-ente ens, hoc non est quia non-entitas vertatur in entitatem, sed quod ens fit ex subiecto non-entis, scilicet materia prima quae est in potentia ens. Et similiter de non-albo. Sed nihil dicit non-entitatem absque omni subiecto. Ergo impossibile est de nihilo fieri ens, sive formaliter sive materialiter. Igitur necesse est quod hoc intelligatur ordinaliter ut sit sensus: 'hoc fit ex nihilo' id est 'post nihil.' Sed nullum tale potest esse Deo coaeternum. Ergo, cum omnis creatura sic fiat ex nihilo, impossibile est aliquam creaturam coaeternam esse Deo.

Ex parte productionis sic: quia in his quae producuntur per motum, duplex est causa quare effectus producenti non est coevus. Una scilicet divisibilitas motus. Quia enim motus quantus est et divisibilis et necessario cadit medius inter agens et suum effectum, ideo facit necessario effectum distare ab agente, et non posse simul esse. Alia est impossibilitas extremorum. Quia enim omnis motus est inter extrema impossibilia, sicut motus dealbationis inter album et nigrum vel album et

¹³¹ *nullibi inveni.*

¹³² *In IV De caelo et mundo*, t. c. 1; ed. Iuntas, V, f. 234.

non-album, ideo impossibile est album simul esse cum dealbitate sicut impossibile est album simul | 3or | esse cum nigredine. In mutatione autem, licet una tollatur causa, scilicet divisibilitas motus, remanet tamen alia, scilicet impossibilitas extremorum. Cum igitur mundus productus fuerit sine motu, non sine mutatione, non potuit mundus producenti coaevus esse.

[Ad 1.] Ad argumenta respondendum est. Ad primum, cum dicit quidquid habet ideam in Deo, ideabile est etc., dicendum quod hoc verum est pro tunc sive pro illo instanti in quo provisum est a Deo produci, non autem ab aeterno. Et tamen ab aeterno ideabile est, sed non pro aeterno, sed pro determinato instanti temporis. Si quaeris causam, dicta est ipse *De sentiētiis*.¹³³

[Ad 2.] Ad aliud: potuit produci in priori instanti et adhuc in priori etc., dicendum quod totum verum est usque ad conclusionem, scilicet 'ergo ab aeterno.' Nam hoc non conceditur. Conceditur bene ire in infinitum in accipiēdo esse, non tamen in esse accepto. Et quia aeternum dicit infinitum non-acceptum, ideo est negandum. Nec sequitur ex praemissis, nam ex infinitis in potentia, numquam sequitur infinitum in actu.

[Ad 3.] Ad aliud, cum dicit quod potuit intelligi, potuit produci, quia rei non repugnat esse sicut intelligitur etc., dicendum quod res habet duplex esse, scilicet in effectu et in intellectu. Si loquamur de esse rei in effectu, sic aliquoties aliter intelligitur et aliter est. Nam mathematicus intelligit quantitatem non ut in materia, et tamen esse non potest nisi in materia in effectu. Et sic potest creatura intelligi ab aeterno, et tamen produci in effectu ab aeterno non potest, sed pro tunc pro quando intelligitur producenda. Si vero loquamur de esse cognito, sic habuit esse ab aeterno, sicut intellectus fuit ab aeterno, scilicet in mente divina, non in effectu extra.

[Ad 4.] Ad aliud, cum dicit quod instans est medium duorum temporum etc., dicendum quod verum est de omni instanti quod est inter primum et ultimum, de primo et ultimo non est verum. Nam primum instans ita est principium futuri quod nullo modo finis praeteriti. Et ultimum est ita finis praeteriti quod nullo modo principium futuri, sicut de primo puncto lineae et ultimo. Omnia tamen puncta intermedia sunt et principium et finis. Et in hoc fuit deceptus Philosophus¹³⁴ cum aestimavit sic de ultimis sicut de mediis.

[Ad 5.] Ad aliud, cum dicit quod ignis potest habere splendorem coaezum etc., dicendum quod non est simile propter duo. Unum est

¹³³ *nullibi inveni.*

¹³⁴ *Physic.*, IV, 11; 220 a 13—20.

quia est principium splendoris, ita quod non mensurae ipsius, et ideo non repugnat eis una mensura, puta uno instanti mensurari. Cuius contrarium dictum est supra de Deo et creatura. Aliud est quia ignis et splendor sibi coevus, non solum uno instanti verum etiam una mutatione, producantur. Alioquin impossibile esset illa simul esse repugnantiam extremorum, ut supra dictum est. Hoc autem de Deo dici non potest, et ideo argumentum non valet.

[11.] Utrum Deus produxerit angelos ex necessitate.]

Utrum Deus produxerit angelos ex necessitate.

1. Et quod sic, probatio: primo ex necessitate naturae vel essentiae quia omne immutabile, si agit, aliquid agit ex necessitate. Si enim potest non agere cum agit, potest mutari et ita non est immutabile. Sed Deus est omnino immutabilis per essentiam. Ergo Deus, quidquid agit, ex necessitate agit.

2. Item. Ex parte scientiae arguitur hoc idem: quidquid Deus praescit se facturum, si praescit de necessitate, de necessitate facturum est illud. Sed Deus praescivit se facturum angelos. Ergo si praescivit de necessitate, de necessitate produxit eos. Probatio: quod de necessitate praescivit se facturum angelos quia omne aeternum est necessarium. Deus ab aeterno praescivit. Ergo de necessitate praescivit.

3. Item. A parte voluntatis arguitur idem sic: Deus quidquid vult extra se, vult propter seipsum tamquam propter finem principalem. Sed Deus vult seipsum de necessitate. Ergo quidquid vult extra se, vult de necessitate. Sed Deus non produxit angelos extra nisi volendo. | 30v | Ergo de necessitate produxit eos.

4. Item. Augustinus I *De doctrina christiana*,¹³⁵ "Quia Deus bonus est, sumus." Si ista consequentia sit bona, ergo eodem addito, utrobique adhuc erit bona secundum regulam Philosophi.¹³⁶ Ergo si Deus de necessitate bonus est, de necessitate sumus et eodem modo angeli.

5. Item. Emanationes personarum sunt causa et exemplar emanationis creaturarum. Sed personae divinae de necessitate procedunt a Deo. Ergo et creaturae et per consequens angeli.

Contra. Omne quod de necessitate producit ab aliquo, producit quanto citius et quanto melius potest. Sed angeli non fuerunt producti quam citius potuerunt, potuit enim Deus ante produxisse si voluisset potuit etiam plures et meliores fecisse. Ergo non produxit eos de necessitate.

¹³⁵ *De doctrina christiana*, I, 32; PL 34, 32; CCL 32, 26.

¹³⁶ *nullibi inveni.*

Responsio. Circa hanc quaestionem fuit error omnium fere philosophorum qui — ponentes Deum omnino immutabilem et per se et per accidens — posuerunt simul cum hoc quod Deus omnia produxit ex necessitate naturae vel immutabilis voluntatis. Nescierunt enim videre qualiter posset stare cum immutabilitate Dei ponere eum sic producere res ut simul possit non producere. Ac per hoc in multos alios errores defluerunt, ut quod Deus nihil de novo producere potuit, et quod nonnisi unum immediate produxit et similia, quae omnia sunt erronea et a fide aliena. Propter quod iste est unus articulus condemnatus Parisius.¹³⁷

Dicendum est ergo ad quaestionem quod Deus Pater produxit Filium de necessitate naturae, produxit Spiritum Sanctum de necessitate immutabilis voluntatis. Deus Trinitas produxit creaturam nulla necessitate sed mera libertate, quod ostendo triplici via ad praesens.

Primo sic: omne agens ex necessitate naturae, si semper eodem modo se habet, est agens determinatum ad unum. Ideo enim ignis semper calefacit et numquam frigescit. Unde Philosophus in libro *De generatione*,¹³⁸ idem manens idem semper est natum facere idem. Si ergo Deus est agens ex necessitate naturae et semper eodem modo se habens, semper faciet idem, et ita impossibile est tantam multitudinem rerum, quanta est in creaturis, procedere immediate a Deo, quod est falsum et erroneum. Unde Philosophus in XI *Metaphysicae*,¹³⁹ si agens est¹⁴⁰ unum et materia una et potentia una, impossibile est multitudinem esse. Et propter hoc Philosophus¹⁴¹ attribuit istam multitudinem rerum, quam videmus, multitudini potentiarum in materia et multitudini motuum caelestium et non Deo immediate. Avicenna¹⁴² attribuit multitudinem rerum multitudini causarum mediarum dicens quod Deus non potest producere immediate nisi unam intelligentiam, et illa produxit orbem suum et intelligentiam sequentem et animam orbis, et sic deinceps usque ad ista inferiora, quod simpliciter erroneum est. Totus autem iste error philosophorum processit ex hoc quod posuerunt Deum producere res ex necessitate naturae.

Alia via ostenditur hoc ipsum sic: nullum agens vel movens ex necessitate naturae est agens vel movens ex se, sed est agens directum ab alio. Ideo enim gravia et levia non moventur ex se, secundum Philo-

¹³⁷ Cf. *Chart. Univ. Paris.*, I, 544—546: art. no. 48 et no. 64.

¹³⁸ *De generatione et corruptione*, II, 9; 336 a 28.

¹³⁹ *Metaphy.*, XII, 2; 1069 b 15—35.

¹⁴⁰ enim MS.

¹⁴¹ *Metaphy.*, XII, 2; 1069 b 15—35.

¹⁴² *Metaphy.*, tr. IX, 3; f. 104 rb.

sophum VIII *Physicorum*,¹⁴³ sed moventur a generante quia, scilicet non habent in se principium motus et status sicut alia quae ideo moventur ex se, secundum ipsum ibidem. Si ergo Deus produceret aliquid extra se ex necessitate naturae, non esset agens ex se sed esset agens directum ab alio a se. Et ita non esset agens primum, et per consequens nec Deus, quod est erroneum. Igitur non producit aliquid extra se ex necessitate naturae.

Hoc idem ostenditur tertio sic: Deus est agens propter finem, non propter finem aliquem alium a se, quia *omnia propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus*, *Prov.* 16, 4. Sunt autem quaedam quae necessarium ordinem habent ad istum finem, ut omnia intrinseca. Et ideo omnia talia eadem necessitate facit, qua vult ipsum finem. Quaedam autem sunt quae non habent ordinem necessarium ad hunc, ut sunt omnia sine quibus finis haberi potest et possideri complete et perfecte. Et talia non vult de necessitate. Cum igitur sine omni creatura Deus |311| seipsum habet et possidere potest perfecte — *quia bonorum nostrorum non indiget Psalm.* 15, 1 — in primo patet quod nullam creaturam de necessitate vult nec producit, cum non producat nisi volendo. Sic ergo patet quod in principio dictum est quod Deus non produxit angelos ex necessitate naturae, nec ex necessitate voluntatis sed mera libertate.

[Ad 1.] Ad argumentum primum, cum dicit 'Deus est immutabilis per essentiam etc.,' dicendum quod verum est. Unde si Deus produceret creaturam per mutationem sui, valeret argumentum. Sed cum producat per mutationem factam a parte producti, nulla mutatione facta in ipso, patet quod argumentum non valet.

[Ad 2.] Ad secundum, cum dicit 'Deus de necessitate praescivit etc.,' dicendum quod in praescientia duo includuntur, scilicet actus sciendi et ordo ad futurum. Quantum ad actum, necessarium fuit, quantum ad ordinem illum, non fuit necessarium.

[Ad 3.] Ad tertium, cum dicit 'Deus vult . . .'¹⁴⁴

FERDINAND ETZKORN, O.F.M.

Quincy College
Quincy, Illinois

¹⁴³ *Physic.*, VIII, 4; 255 b 8—256 a 3.

¹⁴⁴ *Hic terminatur textus.*

TRACES OF GOD IN NATURE ACCORDING TO ROBERT GROSSETESTE

With the Text of the Dictum "Omnis creatura speculum est."

"The world machine most evidently speaks of the eternal art by which it has been made . . . it is a sort of visible word of that art and of the invisible Word."¹ "For, every kind of creature is an example . . . of something true in the divine ideas."²

No medieval thinker would hesitate to approve these statements of Robert Grosseteste. They were a common doctrine, an inheritance of Plato and Augustine. No one doubted that the ideal world, conceived by the Academy as more or less separately existing, really existed but, as Augustine taught, in the divine Wisdom or the Word of God. All agreed that the divine ideas were the ontological basis of finite realities and their knowability, and that they were the exemplary principles of creation. So common were these views that the Franciscan chronicler, Salimbene, could put them in the form of a jest. He tells that he once had a superior, a certain Aldevrandus of Flaniani, of whom a fellow friar jokingly said that he must have had an ugly idea in God, for, his head was rather misshapen and formed like a helmet of the ancients, with many hairs on the forehead.³

This doctrine, generally known as exemplarism,⁴ was particularly developed in the Franciscan Schools. The followers of the Poverello of

¹ Robert Grosseteste, *Dictum* 48: "... mundi machina manifestissime loquitur aeternam artem per quam facta est . . . est quoddam illius artis et invisibilis Verbi visibile verbum." (Cambridge, *Gonville & Caius College*, 380*/380, f. 39va).

² Robert Grosseteste, *Sermo* 19: "Omnis enim creaturae species exemplar est honesti alicuius in nostris moribus et veri alicuius in divinis et aeterni rationibus," (London, *Brit. Mus.*, *Royal 7. F. II*, f. 52rb).

³ Salimbene de Adam, *Cronica*, ed. O. Holder-Egger, Hannoverae et Lipsiae 1905—13, 137: "Habui quendam ministrum in ordine fratrum Minorum, qui dictus est frater Aldevrandus, et fuit de oppido Flaniani, quod est in episcopatu Imole, de quo frater Albertinus de Verona, cuius est 'Sermonum memoria', ludendo dicebat, quod turpem ydeam in Deo habuerat. Habebat enim caput deforme et factum ad modum galeae antiquorum et pilos multos in fronte."

⁴ On exemplarism cf.: E. Dubois, *De exemplarismo divino seu doctrina de trino ordine exemplari et de trino rerum omnium ordine exemplato*, 4 vols,

Assisi felt at home with the Augustinian tendency to care little about perishable created things, considered in themselves, and to see them essentially related to their Creator, in whom alone creatures can find stability. Robert Grosseteste, who is justly held the founder of the Franciscan School of Oxford, was also strongly influenced by this Augustinian concept. In his treatise *De veritate*⁵ he describes created being in this way:

Omnis creatura ex se, si sibi relinqueretur, sicut est ex nihilo sic relabere-tur in nihilum. Cum igitur non ex se sit, sed in se solum consideratum in-veniat labile in non esse: ubi vel quomodo videbitur quod sit, nisi in coaptatione ad illud, quod supportat ipsam ne fluat in non esse, et in con-secptione quod hoc supportatur ab illo? Hoc est igitur, ut videtur, alicui creaturae esse, quod ab aeterno Verbo supportari . . . Et ita in omni esse, quod est adhaerere esse primo, videtur aliquo modo esse primum, licet etiam nesciat videns se videre esse primum, nec videtur esse posterius, nisi in comparatione eius ad esse primum quod supportat illud.

It is this metaphysical dependence upon eternal Being that gives genuine significance to the often used metaphors that characterize creatures as "words announcing the hidden mysteries of God," or "letters and words that tell of sensible causes until they reach the principles in the divine mind," or "copied books" from which the original text in the eternal ideas of God can be understood.⁶

Romae 1899—1900; J. M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaven-ture*, Paris 1929; T. Szabó, *De SS. Trinitate in creaturis refulgente doctrina S. Bonaventurae*, Romae 1955; A. Ampe, *Exemplarisme*, in *Dict. Sp. Spir.* IV/2, Paris 1961, 1870—8.

⁵ L. Baur, *Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste* (Beitr. Gesch. Phil. MA., 9), Münster i. W. 1912, 141—2; cf. also *Comm. in Psalmos*: "... creantur enim omnia ut essent. Ex se vero deficient quaecumque deficient. Igitur quod sunt et formosa sunt, in Ipso ente et Ipso formante sunt . . . nec hoc dicitur quasi [Ipse] esset pars continens et pars essentialis creaturae suae, sed sic est creaturam formans per revocationem et adhaesi-onem creaturae ad Se sicut vas figurat aquam, extra quod figuram et formam non retinet," (Bologna, *Archiginnasio*, A. 983, f. 43ra).

⁶ Grosseteste, *De operationibus solis*: "Ipsae figurae et formae et species rerum sensibilibus quasi quaedam creaturae sunt seu quaedam verba an-nuntiantia naturas rerum occultas et annuntiantia Dei invisibilia" (Madrid, *Bibl. Nac.*, 3314, f. 91va); "Item cum species et formae rerum quasi quaedam litterae sint et verba loquentia sensibiles causas usque ad rationes in men-te divina . . ." (*ibid.* f. 92vb); *Dictum* 19: "... Quid est 'manus missa' [cf. *Ezech.* 2, 9] nisi Verbum Patris per quod facta sunt omnia, 'Verbum' in quantum a Patre dicitur, 'manus' eo quod per ipsum omnia Pater operatur. In hac manu bene dicitur 'liber' esse, quia in Verbo, per quod facta sunt omnia, descriptae sunt factorum omnium rationes aeternae. Liber autem involvitur, dum factorum non factae rationes in secreto Verbo Patris abscon-duntur. Idem quoque liber expanditur, dum in factorum speciebus aeternae rationes velut in exemplis exemplaria dinoscuntur," (Oxford, *Bodl.* 798, f. 17va).

But the exemplarism of Grosseteste does not end with reducing creatures to the eternal ideas. Already Augustine proceeded much farther. Strictly speaking, a pagan philosopher, departing from the creatures, could also attain to the eternal principles in God.⁷ A Christian thinker, however, to whom it is given to penetrate deeper into the nature of things, can detect the footprint, resemblance and image of the Holy Trinity in the created world. He knows that God in the work of creation manifests Himself externally, and knows Him to be triune. Therefore, creatures as the work of His hands must reveal in some way the trinitarian nature of their Maker: *Omnis creatura speculum est, de quo resultat similitudo Creatoris, unitatis scilicet et trinitatis*.⁸

As a matter of course, the littleness of creatures falls short in representing the greatness and the unfathomable depths of God's mystery. So, the resemblance which things borrow from their Creator should necessarily be understood, not on the level of equality, but in the order of imitation:

Etsi enim res omnis secundum sui totalitatem sit Creatoris vestigium, non tamen possibile est ut ipsa sit vestigium totalitatis Ipsius . . . nec etiam totam simul creaturam existimo esse vestigium, imitationem et enarrationem completam totalitatis ipsius infinitissimae et simplicissimae Deitatis unitatis et trinitatis.⁹ Non enim potest creatura factori suo com-

⁷ Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* IX, 2, 2 and XIV, 16, 22 (*PL* 42, 962 and 1052—4); Grosseteste, *Dictum* 33: "Philosophi et curiosi amatores potentiae et sapientiae et non habentes amorem ordinatum, et ideo habentes oculum cordis obscuratum, plus noverunt in se — licet impure tamen noverunt — memoriam gignentem intelligentiam et intelligentiam genitam de memoria quam amoris ordinem, et ideo in speculo animae plus cognoverunt duas personas quam tertiam. Unde quidam eorum tetigerunt de duabus, nihil dicentes de tertia. Quidam obscure valde aliquid intellexerunt de tertia, magis limpidè agnoscentes duas. Quidam vero illorum, qui plus accesserunt ad amorem ordinatum et habuerunt oculum mentis puriorem, etiam trinitatem investigaverunt, sicut ille qui dixit: Monas monadem genuit et in se suum treflectit ardorem," (Oxford, *Bodl.* 798, f. 27rb).

⁸ *Dictum* 60, see below p. 153; cf. *Dictum* 91: "In omnibus quoque, sicut idem Augustinus monet, cum mensuras et numeros et ordinem videas, artificem quaere. Nec alium invenies nisi ubi summa mensura et summus numerus et summus ordo est, id est, Deum de quo verissime dictum est, quod omnia in mensura, numero et pondere disposuit. Sic fortasse uberiorem fructum capies, cum Deum laudas in humilitate formicae, quam cum transis flumen in alicuius iumentum altitudine . . . Quin etiam creaturarum magnitudo, species et ordo nos erigunt in Trinitatis cognitionem. Ipsa enim creaturarum magnitudo Patris demonstrat potentiam, species Filii sapientiam, ordo Spiritus Sancti bonitatem. Unde, cum Trinitatis cognitio sit res utilissima et in hanc utilitatem nobis serviat creatura etiam minima, totius creaturae nobile ministerium nos excitare debet merito in amorem excedentem modum," (Oxford, *Bodl.* 798, f. 71ra).

⁹ *Comm. in De Div. Nom.* I: "Etsi enim res omnis secundum sui totalitatem sit Creatoris vestigium, non tamen possibile est ut ipsa sit vestigium totalitatis Ipsius qui creavit; sicut vestigium pedis in pulvere imitatio et

parari nec cum Eo in aliquo univocari; potest tamen per modum aliquem imitari.¹⁰

According to their greater or lesser nobility, that is to say, according to their proper grade of participation in being, all creatures in some manner express the unity and trinity of God. This hierarchy passes from the angels and the souls of Saints to man in this world.¹¹ In him the reflection of the Trinity extends itself from the higher to the lower parts of his being. Along these lines Grosseteste writes in his *Hexaemeron*.¹²

enarratio quaedam est longitudinis et latitudinis et figurationis subterioris superficiei ipsius pedis, et per consequens simpliciter pedis, sed non ipsius profunditatis, nec eorum quae sunt in profunditate, nec etiam coloris qui est in subteriori superficiei; sed nec etiam totam simul creaturam existimo esse vestigium, imitationem et enarrationem completam totalitatis ipsius infinitissimae et simplicissimae deitatis, unitatis et trinitatis, ut est in seipsa," (*Vat. Chigi A. V. 129*, f. 283rb; this text was edited from a Paris MS by F. Ruello in *Arch. Hist. Doctr. Litt. M. A.* 34 [1959] 1418).

¹⁰ *Hexaemeron* VII, 1: "Similitudo autem dupliciter est, aut aequalitatis vel paritatis aut imparitatis et imitationis. Quapropter et imago dupliciter est: aut summa videlicet similitudo secundum paritatem aut summa similitudo secundum imitationem. Secundum primam acceptionem imaginis solus Filius est imago Dei Patris . . . Homo vero similitudo est Dei Trinitatis per imitationem. Non enim potest creatura factori suo comparari nec cum eo in aliquo univocari; potest tamen per modum aliquem imitari," (Oxford, *Bodl. lat. theol. C. 17*, f. 224ra). Some parts of the *Hexaemeron* we used for this paper have been edited from several MSS by J. T. Muckle in *Med. Stud.* 6 (1944) 151—174. However, we prefer to cite the MS *Bodl. lat. th. C. 17*, as it is the copy of Grosseteste himself, corrected by his own hand. It came to light only in 1948.

¹¹ *Comm. in De Div. Nom.* II: "Unde subdit: vere quidem, id est in quo et ex quo manifesto in exemplo corporeo et sensibili, dicimus supersubstantialem unitatem seu unionem, id est divinae essentiae unitatem in tribus hypostasibus in ad invicem inconfuse manentibus, supercollocari et superfirmari non solis his unionibus quae in corporibus, sed et his, unionibus videlicet, quae in ipsis animabus . . . et in ipsis intellectibus, id est angelis, qui per deformitatem consimilem habent unionem. Quas, uniones videlicet, deiforma et supercaelestia lumina, id est sanctae animae et angeli, tota per tota, per mutuam videlicet cognitionem et mutuum amorem, in se ad invicem manentia habent inmixte et supermundane, id est immaterialiter, secundum participationem unionis superelevatae omnibus, hoc est unionis divinae. Participationem dico analogam participantibus. Non enim habent sancti angeli et sanctae animae unionem et mansionem in ad invicem unitam et inconfusam nisi secundum participationem unitatis divinae ipsis participantibus analogam," (*Vat. Chigi A. V. 129*, f. 296vb).

¹² *Hexaemeron* VII, 5 (Oxford, *Bodl. lat. th. C. 17*, f. 225ra—rb); cf. *Comm. in De Div. Nom.* I: "Similiter subfiguramus eam [Trinitatem] per omnia intelligibilia et species ex his natas, quae coniunctae intellectui faciunt eum actu intelligentem, et conjunctionem intentionis virtutis intellectivae cum intellectu. Similiter subfiguramus eam per omnem vim apprehensivam et actum ex ea genitum et complacentiam virtutis apprehensivae in actu apprehendente; et universaliter per omnem vim activam et actum ex ea genitum et naturalem complacentiam activae virtutis in actu de se progenito. Innuimus etiam eam symbolice et subfigurative per materiam et formam et per habentia se ad invicem ut materia, forma et compositio, et universaliter per omne gignens et genitum et naturalem gignentis et geniti mutuum amplexum," (*Vat. Chigi A. V. 129*, f. 285vb).

Vicinissimum exemplum Dei Trinitatis est memoria, intelligentia et amor in suprema facie rationis, qua sola vi suprema Deus Trinitas sine nubilo phantasmatum et non per corporeum instrumentum memoratur, intelligitur et diligitur . . . Et ita secundum hanc supremam virtutem unam et simplicem dicto modo memorantem, intelligentem et diligentem est homo summa similitudo et per hoc imago unius Dei Trinitatis . . . Et haec pars animae suprema, sic renovata et deiformis effecta, vires animae inferiores singulas secundum receptibilitatis sua facultates in sui traicit similitudinem et imitationem, et, per consequens, ipsarum virium actus et corpus organicum agens assimulat sibi, et in sui trahit imitationem et quandam conformitatem. Totum igitur hominem sibi subiugatum imprimit et signat et figurat haec pars animae suprema Trinitatis vestigio principaliter et primo et nullo interiecto medio in seipsa expresso, per se mediam imprimens eodem vestigio formatius quod sibi subicitur vicinius, et minus formiter quod a se distat longius, in totum tamen hominem transfundit quod ipsa immediate recipit.

In a preceding chapter Robert Grosseteste had given a notable list of trinitarian examples, following an inverted order, that is, beginning with the material world and ending with the well known Augustinian triad, memory, intelligence and love, which is closer to the exemplato or prototype, the Trinity Itself, than all the others.¹³

¹³ *Hexaemeron* VII, 4: "Inter res autem corporeas manifestissimum Trinitatis exemplum est ignis sive lux, quae necessario de se gignit splendorem, et haec duo in se reflectunt mutuam fervorem. In coniunctione autem corporei cum incorporeo prima exempla sunt in formis sensibilibus et speciebus formarum sensibilium, generatis in sensibus, et intentione animi coniungente speciem genitam in sensu cum forma gignente quae est extra sensum. Et huius rei evidentior est exemplatio in visu. Color enim rei coloratae gignit de se speciem sibi similem in oculo videntis, et intentio animi videntis coniungit speciem coloris genitam in oculo cum colore gignente exterius, et sic unit gignens et genitum quod apprehensio visus non distinguit inter speciem genitam et colorem gignentem, fitque una visio ex gignente et genito et intentione copulante genitum cum gignente. Consequenter species genita in sensu particulari gignit de se speciem sibi similem in sensu communi, et est iterum intentio animae coniungens et uniens hanc speciem genitam cum specie gignente in unam imaginationem. Et est hoc exemplum Trinitatis propinquius exemplum quam illud quod proximo dictum erat. Tertio, species genita in phantasia sensus communis gignit de se speciem sibi similem in memoria et est intentio animi coniungens speciem genitam cum gignente, et efficitur ex tribus una fixio memoriae. Similiter contingit videre exemplum Trinitatis in apprehensionibus intellectivis et quae sunt propriae animae rationalis. Species enim apprehensibilis ratione sive intellectu sive intelligentia generat in sibi correspondente virtute suam similitudinem; quam similitudinem genitam coniungit animae intentio cum specie gignente eam. Et sic ex tribus fit una apprehensio in effectum, quae apprehensio una et trina exemplum est et elocutio unius substantiae divinae in Personarum trinitate. Item quaelibet species primo genita in aliqua rationalis animae virtute apprehensiva gignit sui similitudinem in retentiva memoria, illi apprehensivae comproporcionata, et unit intentio animae gignentem speciem et genitam retentamque similitudinem in unam memoriam. Memoria autem nostra, cum receperit et retinuerit formam memorabilem, non semper memoratur; sed cum fit de non actualiter memorante actualiter memorans, gignit et exprimit de se actualem intellectum sive intelligentiam sibi omnino

It must be noted that what we here call examples are, in Grosseteste's view, not simply figures or mere poetic fictions, but real arguments from which the Trinity can effectively be proved: *non solum sunt exempla, sed evidenter summae Trinitatis collata sunt argumenta, ipsa Trinitem efficaciter probantia*.¹⁴ Yet, anxious to know what kind of proof Grosseteste will offer, we cannot but feel slightly disappointed by what follows: *non tamen, propter vitandam prolixitatem, afferimus illa nunc sicut argumenta, sed sicut exempla imaginationem iuvantia*.¹⁵ That this apology, however, was not a subterfuge, we fortunately are able to verify with the help of one of those casual notes, jotted down by Grosseteste when he was in the schools, as an aid to his memory.¹⁶ The *Dictum* 60, that we edit below for the first time, is entirely dedicated to our question.

After a general remark that every creature is a mirror from which at least three images of the triune Creator result, Grosseteste gives a remarkable specimen of how to construct an argument to prove the Trinity. Here follows a summary.

Let us suppose, he says, there are only two creatures: a rational one and a corporeal one. For the latter we choose one as insignificant as possible: *atomus qualis volitat in sole*, a fleck of dust whirling in the sunlight. Nevertheless it will turn out to be a sufficient starting point for arguing the existence of a triune Creator. Let us see how.

The existence of the particle of dust supposes a Creator of infinite power, for, the passing from nothing to being, however tiny the being involved, is infinite and, consequently, requires an infinite efficient power. Now since the particle of dust is a body, the mind realizes that it is tridimensional. But in every tridimensional body it is possible to describe a sphere, and in that sphere infinite circles, and in every circle infinite figures. And since of every one of these infinite figures a demonstrative science may be developed, there must be inscribed in the dust an infinite science. Yet, this is only possible if there is an infinite wisdom. So we

similem; quae gignens memoria et intelligentia genita in se mutuam reflectunt unientem et copulantem amorem. Et est hoc exemplum Trinitatis ceteris dictis exemplis vicinius exemplato," (Oxford, *Bodl. lat. th. C. 17*, f. 225^{ra}).

¹⁴ *Hexaemeron* VII, 4 (*ibid.* f. 224^{vb}).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ In many of the MSS that contain the whole collection of these 147 *Dicta*, the following recapitulation can be found: "In hoc libello sunt capitula 147, quorum quaedam sunt breviter verba quae, dum in scholis morabar, scripsi breviter et in composito sermone ad memoriam. Nec sunt de una materia nec ad invicem continuata. Quorum titulos posui ut facilius quae vellet lector possit invenire. Spondentque plerumque plus aliquo titulo quam solvant capitula lectori. Quedam vero sunt sermones, quos eodem tempore ad clerum vel ad populum feci," (Oxford, *Bodl.* 798, f. 121^{rb}—*va*).

come to the conclusion that the dust has been created by an infinite power through an infinite wisdom.

To arrive at such important knowledge is certainly a great achievement for the mind. Therefore, by creating the dust, the Creator made a very useful thing for the mind. Furthermore, since the mind itself cannot account for this good, the Creator must be a *good* Creator. On the other hand, the same utility the dust affords to one single mind, it affords *quantum in se est* to an infinite number of minds, provided they be created. Hence it appears that the utility of the dust, considered in itself, is infinite, and this, again, supposes that the infinite power which created the dust through His infinite wisdom, is infinitely good. In this way, starting from a fleck of dust, Grosseteste argues for the infinite power, infinite goodness and infinite wisdom of the Creator.

Needless to say, Grosseteste does not presume to prove or explain the strict mystery of the three divine Persons within the single divine Nature, by this kind of argument. To such an understanding not even the highest similitude of the Trinity, the Augustinian triad, memory, intelligence, and love, can lead. Every human comprehension of the mystery remains enigmatical.¹⁷ Nevertheless, Grosseteste was convinced that by these arguments or proofs one could arrive at the Holy Trinity as the ultimate principle and cause of all the trinitarian examples found in nature, though the proper nature of the Trinity would remain hidden to us. Thus he concludes in his commentary on the *De Divinis Nominibus*:¹⁸

Per huiusmodi igitur subfigurativas et symbolicas enarrationes et laudes comprehenditur superbeata Trinitas in unitate essentiae Deitatis, non ut est in se, sicut praetactum est, sed quod ipsa, id est, in se ipsa extendit super omnem mensuram et modum omnem trinitatem in ratione gignentis et geniti et naturalis horum amplexus ad invicem se habentem, et quod ipsa est principium et causa omnis trinitatis praedicto modo se habentis.

¹⁷ *Hexaemeron* VII, 4: "Omnia tamen haec exempla magnam habent ad summam Trinitatem dissimilitudinem," (Oxford, *Bodl. lat. th. C. 17*, f. 225ra); *Comm. in De Div. Nom.* I: "... quae et quid est in se est incomprehensibile et inexpressibile," "... Trinitas ut est aeternaliter in se ipsa, id est, inexpressibilis et ineffabilis est, ut patet ex verbis prophetae dicentis: 'generationem eius quis enarrabit.' Si enim Filii generatio inenarrabilis est, nec Patris paternitas nec Spiritus processio enarrari potest. Subfigurative et symbolice enarratur" (*Vat. Chigi A. V. 129*, f. 285vb—vb); *Sermo* 59: "in anima potest reperiri imago Trinitatis potior quam in corpore vel in intellectu ... [sed] propter defectum nostrum ... clare non percipimus" (London, *Brit. Mus.*, *Royal 7. D. XV*, f. 54v); *Dictum* 60: "Ad quam intelligentiam [Trinitatis], licet adhuc aenigmaticam, non potest homo pervenire expressius quam per speculum mentis propriae" (below p. 157).

¹⁸ *Comm. in De Div. Nom.* I (*Vat. Chigi A. V. 129*, f. 285vb).

At the end of his *Dictum Omnis creatura speculum* Grosseteste adds some moral reflections, suggested by the making of a medieval looking glass, which he applies to the mirror of the soul, and finally some anagogic conclusions we can omit.

To what extent trinitarian exemplarism pervades the teaching of Robert Grosseteste, may clearly be seen from the fact that his light metaphysics, the real backbone of his doctrine, is shaped in the trinitarian mode. Indeed the bishop goes so far as to affirm: *Quod autem Deus sit in personis trinus, inde sequitur quod Deus est lux . . .*¹⁹

As to the sources of this exemplarism, much more information is needed than is available at present. Certainly a general Augustinian trend is manifest. Incidentally, however, Grosseteste quotes this sentence of Trismegistus: *monas monadem genuit et in se suum reflectit ardorem*,²⁰ and he is also well acquainted with the number speculation of Erigena and the Schools of Chartres.²¹

We are even less well informed about the influence of Grosseteste's doctrine in this specific sector. First of all we may think of St. Bonaventure, the champion of medieval trinitarian exemplarism.²² It is worth noting that the Seraphic Doctor had a copy made for himself of the treatise *De subsistentia rerum* of Grosseteste.²³ Of some interest also is the remarkable summary of Grosseteste's light metaphysics found in the unpublished work *De mystica theologia*.²⁴ Though this diffuse writing is wrongly ascribed to St. Bonaventure, it is undoubtedly the work of an immediate disciple who developed some *memorialia* of the Saint. But, to

¹⁹ *Hexameron* VII, 3 (Oxford, *Bodl. lat. th. C. 17*, f. 224va). This subject we treated at some length in a dissertation as yet unpublished *De metaphysica lucis apud Robertum Grosseteste*, Romae 1953, 84—89 (exemplarismus lucis) and 95—104 (dialectica interna divinae lucis).

²⁰ See note 7. The text is to be found in Ps.-Hermes Trismegistus, *Liber XXIV Philosophorum*, prop. 1 (ed. Cl. Baeumker, in *Festgabe zum 70. Geburtstag G. von Hertling*, Freiburg i. Br. 1913, 31). It may be noted that a disciple of Grosseteste, the Franciscan Thomas of York, mixes up references of Macrobius, Avencebrol, Jerome, Augustine, Boethius, Averroes and Aristotle to strengthen this same thesis in his *Sapientiale* I, 16 (*Vat. lat. 430r*, f. 20ra—rb). Cf. Alexander de Hales, *Summa theologica* I, Quaracchi 1925, 18 note 6.

²¹ On the sources of Grosseteste's light metaphysics, which are closely related to our question, see our dissertation *De metaphysica lucis*, 29—55.

²² Cf. J. M. Bissen, *L'exemplarisme divin selon saint Bonaventure*, Paris 1929; T. Szabó, *De SS. Trinitate in creaturis refulgente doctrina S. Bonaventurae*, Romae 1955.

²³ Assisi, *Bibl. Comun.* 138, f. 262rb—va. It is the only MS known of this treatise.

²⁴ Toulouse, *Bibl. munic.* 232, f. 42r—86v. The passage on Grosseteste's light metaphysics is found on f. 61v—63r. Cf. Servus of Sint Anthonis, *The pseudo-Bonaventurian work «Symbolica theologia»*, in *Miscellanea Melchor de Pobladora*, Romae 1964, 173—195.

our knowledge, no one has as yet undertaken a comparative study of the bishop of Lincoln and the cardinal of Albano. On the other hand, this will be impossible until far more texts of Grosseteste are brought to light. We hope that the present edition of the Dictum: *Omnis creatura speculum*, will be a modest step in this direction.

For our edition we have used the following fairly good manuscripts:

Cambridge, *Gonville & Caius College*, 380*/380, f. 55va—56vb (C)

Oxford, *Bodleian Library*, Bodley 798, f. 47rb—48va (O)

Praha, *Národní Museum*, XII. E. 5, f. 54vb—55rb (P)

DICTION 60: OMNIS CREATURA SPECULUM EST

[C f. 55va; O f. 47rb; P f. 54vb] Omnis creatura speculum est de quo resultat similitudo Creatoris, unitatis scilicet et trinitatis. Nec de unica creatura quasi de unico speculo resultat tantum similitudo una, sed quaelibet creatura est quasi speculum unum sic artificialiter compositum, ut de eo resultent unius faciei simulacra plura, utpote omne compositum quasi unam similitudinem trinitatis reddit esse potentiale materiae,¹ esse actuale formae, et compositionem formae cum materia.

Alia quaedam² similitudo trinitatis est in qualibet creatura numerus, pondus et mensura.

Item alia similitudo est in qualibet creatura quod ad unum tendit, similitudine et qualitate pulchra est, ordinemque servat. Esse quidem potentiale et initium³ et ad unum tentio Patrem innuunt, cui attribuitur potentia, qui est principium non solum creaturarum sed et Filii et Spiritus Sancti. Esse actuale, perfectio et pulcritudo Filium innuunt,⁴ qui est Patris sapientia, splendor gloriae et figura substantiae eius. Compositio vero et⁵ in esse conservatio in ordineque collocatio Spiritum Sanctum [innuunt], qui est amor et connexio Patris et Filii et benignitas qua res in ordine et in esse servatur.⁶

Augustinus autem aliam similitudinem insinuat trinitatis in⁷ numeris dicens:⁸ "Numerus ab uno incipit, aequalitate et similitudine pulcher est, et in ordine copulatur. Quam ob rem, quisquis fatetur nullam esse creaturam vel naturam⁹ quae non, ut sit quicquid est, appetat unitatem, sui similisque — in quantum potest — esse [O 47va] conetur, atque ordinem proprium in locis et temporibus, vel in corpore quodam libramento salutem suam teneat: decet fateri ab uno principio per aequalem sibi ac similem speciem divitiis bonitatis eius, qua intra se unum et de uno unum carissima¹⁰ ut ita dicam cura¹¹ reguntur, omnia facta esse atque condita quaecumque sunt, in quantumcumque sunt."

¹ suae *add.* C.

³ et initium] inchoatio O.

⁵ et *om.* O.

⁷ in *om.* C.

⁹ vel naturam *om.* C.

¹¹ cura] ea OP; charitate PL 32, 1191.

² quaedam] quoque O.

⁴ innuunt *om.* O.

⁶ servatur] servantur CO.

⁸ *De musica* VI, 17, n. 56: PL 32, 1191.

¹⁰ carissima] carisma CP; et *add.* COP.

Item¹² omnis creatura est, et ab eo quod non est discernitur,¹³ suisque partibus sibi congruit. [C 55^{vb}] Sed aliud est quod est, aliud quod discernitur,¹⁴ aliud quod sibi congruit. Causam igitur oportet esse trinam.¹⁵

Item ponamus quod non esset creatura nisi una rationalis et una corporalis, eademque vilissimum et minimum et minus utile corporum, utpote¹⁶ [P 55^{ra}] atomus qualis volitat in sole; videamusque qualiter rationalis creatura possit in hoc corpore quasi in speculo deprehendere trinitatem creatricem. Ecce quam prope est ut videatur, et non obscure, licet tamen in vili speculo. Ratione, si ratio consideret atomum, inveniet eum¹⁷ compositum, mutabilem et materialem, discurreretque¹⁸ ratiocinando ad hoc, quod factorem habuit qui illum ex nihilo fecit. Ex factore igitur discurrit¹⁹ ad facere, et a facere discurrit²⁰ ad potentiam, nec ad finitam sed ad immensam et infinitam. Videbit enim ratio investigans, quod omnis potentia mensuratur per proportionem facti ad illud²¹ ex quo fit. Tanta est enim facientis potentia, quanto factum excedit illud ex quo fit.²² Omne autem²³ quantumcumque vile et parvum in²⁴ infinitum excedit nihilum. Igitur, cum ratio invenerit atomum esse aliquid²⁵ ex nihilo, et discurreret²⁶ ab eo ad potentiam facientis mensuraveritque eam per proportionem facti ad illud ex quo fit, videbit atomum egressum in esse non a minori quam ab infinita potentia. Sic igitur egressus atomi in esse aliquid ex nihilo simulacrum est infinitae potentiae efficientis.

Item ratio eadem considerans amplius inveniet atomum esse corpus, et in eo tres lineas intersecantes se ad angulos rectos, in qua sectione posito pede circum describere²⁷ poterit sphaeram intra atomum, et in sphaera infinitos circulos et omnia corpora sphaerae inscriptibilia, et in circulis omnes figuras inscriptibiles circulis quae sunt infinitae. Videbit-

¹² Cf. Augustine, *Liber de diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII*, quaest. 18: "Omne quod est, aliud est quo constat, aliud quo discernitur, aliud quo congruit. Universa igitur creatura si et est quoquo modo, et ab eo quod omnino nihil est plurimum distat, et suis partibus sibi tem congruit, causam quoque eius trinam esse oportet, qua sit, qua hoc sit, qua sibi amica sit. Creaturae autem causam, id est auctorem, Deum dicimus. Oportet ergo esse Trinitatem, qua nihil praestantius, intelligentius et beatius invenire perfecta ratio potest. Ideoque etiam cum veritas quaeritur, plus quam tria genera quaestionum esse non possunt, utrum omnino sit, utrum hoc an illud sit, utrum approbandum improbandumve sit" (PL 40, 15).

¹³ discernitur] distinguitur C.

¹⁵ trinam] trinitatis C.

¹⁷ eum] illum O.

¹⁸ discurreretque] distingueretque C; decurreretque O.

¹⁹ discurrit] discurritur C; decurrit O.

²¹ illud] id C.

²³ aliquid add. O.

²⁵ esse aliquid] aliquod C.

²⁷ describere] discipere C.

¹⁴ discernitur] distinguitur C.

¹⁶ utpote] ut puta O.

²⁰ discurrit om. O.

²² fit om. C.

²⁴ in om. CO.

²⁶ discurreret] decurreret O.

que ratio, quod supra quamlibet illarum infinitarum figurarum²⁸ potest erigi scientia demonstrativa. [O 47vb] Invenietque in atomo descriptionem²⁹ infinitae scientiae, non solum³⁰ de magnitudinibus sed etiam de numeris. [C 56ra] Cum igitur invenerit ratio atomum factum ex nihilo ab infinita potentia videritque in atomo descriptionem³¹ infinitae scientiae, perpendet eandem infinitam potentiam descripsisse in atomo a se facto infinitam scientiam. Sed non posset infinitam scientiam describere nisi per infinitam sapientiam. Videbit ergo infinitam potentiam fecisse atomum per infinitam sapientiam.

Iam ergo ex atomo deducta est ratio in cognitionem potentiae et sapientiae infinitae.

Sed huius summae rei cognitio magnum est bonum rationis cognoscentis, quia bonorum honorabilium notitiam opinamur. Creator igitur atomi rem valde utilem creavit rationi, et hoc sine meritis rationis praecedentibus. Igitur creator bonus. Sed quam utilis est atomus uni rationi creatae, tam utilis — quantum in se est — esset infinitis rationibus si creatae essent. Igitur atomi utilitas, quantum in se est, infinita est. Et etiam non aliquantum utilis est atomus uni rationi quin etiam ipse³² eidem posset esse utilior, quia non aliquantum percipit in eo scientiae quin etiam per amplius posset in eo percipere. Ergo³³ infinitae utilitatis est atomus. Igitur³⁴ potentia per sapientiam creans est infinitum bona.

Ecce qualiter videre potest ratio in atomo infinitam potentiam, infinitam sapientiam, infinitam bonitatem creatoris. Et hoc videre est videre trinitatem creatricem.

Tali itaque modo quasi de speculo uno de qualibet creatura una resultant plura trinitatis creatricis simulacra. Nec³⁵ solum quae dicta sunt, sed credo quod alia plurima.

Quaedam autem similitudines trinitatis resultant eadem de qualibet creatura, quaedam autem sunt propriae quibusdam creaturis, ut de igne velut similitudo trinitatis resultat lux, calor et splendor.³⁶ Nec de alio quam de igne videtur haec similitudo trinitatis depromi, nam astra et aether a philosophis ignis nominantur;³⁷ aut,³⁸ si de alio quam de igne haec similitudo resultat, de paucis aliis [C 56rb] resultat.

²⁸ infinitarum figurarum *om.* C.

³⁰ solum] solis C.

³² ipse *om.* O.

³⁴ Igitur] Ergo O.

³⁶ lux, calor et splendor] lux, splendor, calor O.

³⁷ Cf. Honorius of Autun, *De philosophia mundi* II, 1: "Ignis igitur est spatium a luna sursum, quod idem aether dicitur. Ornatus vero illius est quidquid super lunam videtur, scilicet stellae tam fixae quam erraticae"

(PL 172, 57).

²⁹ descriptionem] discriptionem C.

³¹ descriptionem] discriptionem C.

³³ Ergo] Igitur O.

³⁵ Nec] non O.

³⁸ aut] at C.

Verisimileque est, licet non temerarie asserendum, de qualibet specie creaturarum propriam trinitatis creatricis resultare similitudinem, quae de [O 48ra] alia specie non resultat, velut de rationali creatura et non de alia resultat haec trinitatis similitudo, scilicet: memoria, intelligentia et amor.³⁹ Et hoc est limpidissimum speculum trinitatis, scilicet creatura rationalis.

Nec est similitudo tam clara nec tam summa trinitatis increatae ut memoria, intelligentia et amor rationalis creaturae. Unde haec similitudo non solum similitudo est sed etiam imago trinitatis, maxime memoria, intelligentia et amor rationalis creaturae cum meminit, intelligit et amat trinitatem creatricem. Imago enim suprema similitudo⁴⁰ est.

Expresse autem valde, ut dictum est,⁴¹ potest videri trinitas creatrix in hac sui similitudine. Consideret enim unusquisque mentem suam propriam, et inveniet in sua memoria quasdam scientias repositas, quas actu non intelligit quarumque scientiarum actualem intelligentiam potest memoria de se gignere et in actum ducere. Intelligat itaque memoriam⁴² suam gignentem de se actualem intelligentiam quarundam scientiarum. Cum vero actu intelligit quae prius meminit, ipse actus intelligendi non destruit memoriam, sed potius confirmat et roborat eam in nobis. Simul itaque possunt esse in nobis, et sunt, memoria et actualis intelligentia de memoria genita. Nec potest⁴³ esse quin amet intelligentia memoriam se gignentem, et memoria intelligentiam de se genitam.

Potest itaque homo in se videre memoriam actu gignentem intelligentiam, quarum utraque in reliquam amorem reflectit. Per memoriam itaque suam, quae non omnia simul meminit et quae quandoque intelligentiam actu de se non gignit, sed quaedam meminit et aliquando intelligentiam actualem intelligentem quaedam de se gignit,⁴⁴ intelligat homo memoriam quandam omnia memorabilia simul memorantem, nec praecedentem intelligentiam de se generabilem sed semper de se gignentem intelligentiam⁴⁵ omnia intelligibilia intelligentem, harumque utramque in reliquam amorem reflectentem. Intelligatque has tres, scilicet memoriam gignentem, intelligentiam genitam et amorem mutuum, [O 48rb] nec incepisse nec desitutum esse nec alicui permutabilitati aut vicissitudini subiacere; quarum scilicet trium, sicut indivisa substantia et essentia, sic indivisa potentia, tamque efficax ut quicquid meminit et in-

³⁹ Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* X, 11—12, n. 17—19: *PL* 42, 982 ss.

⁴⁰ similitudo *om.* C.

⁴¹ dictum est] diximus O.

⁴² memoriam] memoria CO.

⁴³ potest] possunt C.

⁴⁴ per memoriam *add.* C.

⁴⁵ intelligentiam . . . Est autem regula] this passage is written in C. by the same hand on a supplementary leaflet and added here.

telligit cum beneplacito ut sit, solo illo⁴⁶ beneplacito ut sit, sic et⁴⁷ tunc in esse prodit quomodo et quando in esse prodire beneplacitum est.

Has igitur tres, scilicet memoriam talem aeternam gignentem, et intelligentiam aeternam de tali memoria genitam, et amorem aeternum quo se mutuo diligunt memoria gignens et intelligentia genita, has inquam tres intelligere unius et indivisae simplicisque essentiae, est intelligere trinitatem unum Deum.

Ad quam intelligentiam,⁴⁸ licet adhuc aenigmaticam, non potest homo pervenire expressius quam per speculum mentis propriae, sicut praedictum est.

Omni igitur diligentia⁴⁹ observandum est, ne speculum istud sit prave figuratum et distortum aut sordidum. Sicut enim nullum corporale speculum nisi solum planum repraesentat rem in eo visam talem qualis est, sic nisi animae speculum planum sit non repraesentat Deum talem qualis est.

Fiunt autem corpora plana per regulam rectam. Sic animae speculum fit planum per suae regulae rectitudinem.

Est autem regula ad quam plana fit anima voluntas divina, ut omnem scilicet suam voluntatem voluntati divinae subiciat, dicens cum Christo: *Non quod ego volo, sed quod tu.*⁵⁰ Cum autem ab hac sua⁵¹ regula separatur anima, fit distorta, et sicut distortum speculum pulchrae faciei reddit distortum simulacrum, faciesque in se pulchra in distorto speculo apparet distorta, sic in distorta anima apparet Deus, qui in se rectissimus est, distortus et perversus.

Hinc est quod quidam, ex distortionem animae suae Deum iudicantes, reputant Deum aut crudelem cum iuste⁵² punit, aut remissum vel non curantem mundum⁵³ cum malorum dissimulat et differt⁵⁴ supplicia, aut iniquum cum sinit malos in temporalibus prosperari et bonos adversis deprimi. Noli sic de Deo iudicare. Non sunt haec⁵⁵ distortionem in Deo, sed in animae tuae distorto speculo. Qui⁵⁶ taliter de Deo iudicas, facias animae tuae speculum ad regulam suam planum et nihil in Deo apparebit tibi,⁵⁷ sicut nec est in eo aliquid distortum.

[O 48va] Vas⁵⁸ pulverulentum debet⁵⁹ pulvere confricari et sic⁶⁰ pulvis adhaerens non adhaerentis⁶¹ pulveris con-[P 55rb]-fricatione separari. Sic si quid terreni pulveris speculo animae tuae adhaeserit, recordatio propriae fragilitatis, dicens cum Abraham: *Loquar ad Domi-*

⁴⁶ illo] ipso O.

⁴⁹ diligentia *rep.* P.

⁵² iuste] iustos O.

⁵⁴ differt] defert O.

⁵⁶ quasi *add.* C.

⁵⁸ Vas] Solet vas O.

⁶⁰ sic *om.* O.

⁴⁷ et] erit C.

⁵⁰ Mc. 14, 36.

⁵³ mundum] in iudicium C; in mundum P.

⁵⁵ haec] verae C.

⁵⁷ apparebit tibi] apparebitur C.

⁵⁹ debet *om.* O.

⁶¹ non adhaerentis *om.* C.

⁴⁸ genitam *add.* C.

⁵¹ sua] summa O.

*num meum, cum sim cinis et pulvis.*⁶² Pulverem adhaerentem tolle, ut confricatione pulveris in memoria separetur pulvis qui latet⁶³ in amore.

Deinde ablue speculum lacrimis paenitentiae et absterge molli panno laetitiae. Dolendum est enim de peccato et de dolore gaudendum tandem.

Ne igitur speculum tuum sordidetur aut a sua [C 56va] rectitudine flectatur, capsulam illi facias in⁶⁴ cavo humilitatis. Humilitas namque custodia virtutum est.

Cum autem per similitudines trinitatis in creaturis perspectas sic ad eius speculationem ascendimus, ut fructuosus sit ascensus iste, decet ut ab eadem summa trinitate nobis impressas similitudines eius reportemus, ut de potentia sit nobis impressus timor, de sapientia veritas, de bonitate benignitas, ut timor peccatum occidat, veritas sepeliat, benignitas ad vitam gratiae resuscitet.⁶⁵

Timor autem impressus de potentia sub quadam oppositione imprimentis potentiae gerit similitudinem, velut cum de sigillo habente figuras cavas imprimitur cera, cera⁶⁶ impressa reportat figuras similes sed convexas et ordine converso legendas. Unde similitudinem sigilli sub quadam contrarietate reportat cera. Taliter videtur timor impressus a potentia.

Aliter vero veritas et benignitas a sapientia et bonitate, quia non est haec similitudo contraria sed solum imitatoria.⁶⁷

Item debemus et hanc similitudinem de summa trinitate reportare, ut sicut sunt trinitatis opera indivisa, sic in nobis indivisibiliter operentur potentia, sapientia, voluntas recta. Cum enim in nobis operatur potentia sine sapientia, efficit errorem; cum vero operatur potentia sine voluntate recta, efficit iniquitatem; cum vero potentia operatur sine utrisque, efficit errorem et iniquitatem. Cum vero vel⁶⁸ utraque vel altera⁶⁹ praedictarum operari incipit absque potentia, efficit defectionem invenitque idem probrosum. Hic incipit aedificare et non potuit consummare.⁷⁰

FR. SERVUS GIEBEN

Rome, May 1964

⁶² Gen. 18, 27.

⁶³ latet] haeret O.

⁶⁴ in] de C.

⁶⁵ Cf. Grosseteste, *Sermo* 20: "... nihil aliud restat nisi ut renovemus spiritum mentis nostrae ad summae Trinitatis reformatam similitudinem et imaginem, ut in potentia Patris omnia possimus, in sapientia Filii nihil quod ad salutem pertinet ignoremus, in benignitate Spiritus Sancti omnia ordinate velimus, referamusque de lumine potentiae divinae timoris, de lumine sapientiae divinae veritatis, de lumine bonitatis divinae caritatis et sic simus perfecti et integri, in nullo deficientes praestante Domino etc." (MS London, *Brit. Mus.*, *Royal 6. E. V.*, f. 91 va).

⁶⁷ sed solum imitatoria om. C; imitatoria] imitatio O.

⁶⁶ cera om. C.

⁶⁸ vel] vult P.

⁶⁹ quam add. P.

⁷⁰ Lc. 14, 30.

EUSTRATIUS OF NICAEA'S DEFENSE OF THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS

"Et nihil valent rationes suae, et commentator solvit eas"

I

The noted passage in St. Bonaventure's *Collationes in Hexaemeron* in which the Seraphic Doctor traces all the errors of Peripateticism to the Stagirite's denial of exemplarism,¹ has figured once more rather prominently in recent historical literature as a result of the reopening on the part of Professor Ferdinand Van Steenberghen of the question of the character of the movement which E. Renan and Father Mandonnet have taught us to identify as Latin Averroism.²

This eminent scholar from the University of Louvain denied that Siger of Brabant, the leading spirit of the so-called school of Latin Averroism at the University of Paris, can be called an Averroist, contesting that the very term, "Latin Averroism," as a formula descriptive of the philosophical heresy of the sixth and seventh decades of the thirteenth century, should be eliminated from the vocabulary of historians.

It is Van Steenberghen's claim that in its thirteenth century usage, the vocable, "Averroist," had a very specific meaning and reference;

¹ S. Bon., *In Hexaemeron, Collatio VI, 2. Opera Omnia*, ed. Quaracchi, V, 360—361.

² E. Renan, *Averroès et l'Averroïsme*, 3rd ed. (Paris, 1869), 219—321; Pierre Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin au XIII^e siècle*, 2nd ed., *Les Philosophes Belges*, VI (Louvain, 1911) I, 29, 142—195. Professor Van Steenberghen questioned the validity of characterizing the heterodox trend between 1265 and 1277 among the Aristotelians of the University of Paris as "Latin Averroism" in his *Les Oeuvres et la doctrine de Siger de Brabant* (Brussels, 1938) and in his more definitive treatment of the case of Siger of Brabant in his *Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites*, vol. II: *Siger dans l'histoire de l'aristotélisme*, *Les Philosophes Belges*, XIII (Louvain, 1942). Since, he has defended his position and answered critics in "Siger of Brabant," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXIX (1951), 11—27, A. Forest, F. Van Steenberghen, M. de Gandillac, *Le Mouvement doctrinal du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, in *Histoire de l'église depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours*, vol. 13 (Paris: Bloud and Gay, 1951), 265—284, *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century* (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1955), 75—93, and in his *Aristotle in the West: The Origins of Latin Aristotelianism* (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1955), 198—238. See also F. Van Steenberghen, "Nouvelles recherches sur Siger de Brabant et son école," *Rev. Philos. de Louvain*, 3m série, 54 (1956), 130 ff.

devised by St. Thomas Aquinas, it was used by him to signify a partisan of monopsychism, the characteristic doctrine of Averroes.³ We may add, indeed, that if M. Bouyges is proved correct in suggesting that the term, "averroista," as this appears in St. Thomas' *De unitate intellectus*, is only one of the many Latin transcriptions of name "Ibn Rouchd" (Averroes),⁴ the vocable, "Averroist," did not figure in the scholastic vocabulary of the time at all. Such a fact would surely lend support to Van Steenberghen's contention that the contemporaries of Siger did not see in the unorthodox teaching of certain members of the faculty of Arts at Paris a school of thought inspired primarily and in a special sense by Averroes. Siger himself, according to Van Steenberghen, by virtue of his adherence to the doctrine of the unicity of the passive intellect in his *Questiones in Tertium de Anima*, a work antedating the censure of 1270, is an Averroist in the true sense of the term. After 1270, however, affected principally by the force of St. Thomas' argument in the *De unitate intellectus*, Siger became more hesitant in his defence of monopsychism and ultimately succeeded in persuading himself that the doctrine of the unicity of the passive intellect was indefensible as a doctrine.⁵ The formula descriptive of the

³ Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, II, 494—495; see also Van Steenberghen in *Le Mouvement doctrinaire du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, 279; *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century*, 83, and *Aristotle in the West*, 205.

⁴ "Attention: 'averroistae,'" *Revue du Moyen Age Latin* IV (1948), 173—176. Father Bouyges suggests that in the *De unitate intellectus*, ed. L. W. Keeler (Rome, 1936), 12, 817, instead of reading "averroistae . . . volunt" it may well be that we ought to be reading "Averroes . . . voluit."

⁵ Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, II, 629—662, 700—703; cf. *Le mouvement doctrinaire du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, 274—279; "Siger of Brabant," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXIX (1951), 19—24; *Aristotle in the West*, 216—218; *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century*, 83—84. On the influence of St. Thomas Aquinas on members of the Arts Faculty, see also O. Lottin, "St. Thomas d'Aquin à la faculté des arts de Paris aux approches de 1277," *Revue de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale*, 16 (1949), 292—313; cf. R. A. Gauthier, *Magnanimité* (Paris, 1951), 466—480. The contestation that there was a development in Siger's thought resulting in the attenuation or abandonment of the radicalism of his earlier position on such matters as the eternity of the world and the unicity of the human intellect is founded upon the acceptance of the anonymous *Quaestiones in libros tres De anima*, and the commentaries by question on the *Physics* and *Generation* contained in *Munich cod. lat. 9559*, as authentic works of Siger. Among the scholars who refused to accept this attribution are B. Nardi and E. Gilson. See Nardi, "Il preteso tomismo di Sigieri di Brabante," *Giornale critico di Filosofia Italiana*, 17 (1936), 26—35 and 18 (1937), 160—164; see also Nardi, *Review of Les oeuvres et la doctrine de Siger de Brabant*, by F. Van Steenberghen, *Giorn. crit. Filos. Ital.*, 20 (1939) 453—471 and *Studi danteschi*, 25 (1940), 149—156. For Gilson's reaction to this question and to the Louvain scholar's thesis as a whole, see Gilson, *Review of Siger de Brabant d'après ses oeuvres inédites*, *Bulletin Thomiste*, VI (1940—2), 5—22 and *Dante et la philosophie* (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin 1949, 258—272, 310—325. G. Sayo, "Boèce de Dacie et les commentaires anonymes inédits de Munich sur la Physique et sur la Génération attribués à Siger de Brabant," *Archives Hist.*

doctrinal position and philosophical complexion of Siger and of his followers is Neoplatonizing Aristotelianism, or simply, heterodox or radical Aristotelianism: *Neoplatonizing*, because in the heterodox peripateticism of Siger, the Stagirite's philosophy is developed and completed under the influence of Neoplatonic currents of thought, and *radical*, because Siger's Neoplatonizing Aristotelianism is immoderate, uncorrected and unyielding, supporting conclusions incompatible with Christian doctrine.⁶ To be sure, monopsychism was not the only philosophical heresy of which Siger was guilty. He also adhered to the doctrines of the eternity of the world and that of the uniqueness and necessity of God's immediate effect.⁷ But these doctrines are not peculiar to Averroes and there is no reason why a philosopher who defends them should be classified as an Averroist.⁸ The truth is that Siger's attention was fixed upon the figure behind Averroes, and he gave his assent to the Stagirite, not to the Cordovan. Monopsychism he accepted as an Aristotelian, not as an Averroistic doctrine. Averroes' commentaries were for Siger and his followers, what they were for Albert the Great, St. Thomas and others: "un instrument de travail précieux". Averroes himself plays the role of a secondary source, an authority whose weight of testimony is of the same order as that of Plato or Avicenna, so that the synthesis of Siger, considered as a whole, is not more Averroist than it is Plotinian, Avicennian or even Thomist.⁹

Doctr. littér. Moyen Age, 25 (1958), 21—58, has argued convincingly that the commentaries on the *Physics* and on *Generation* are the work of Boethius of Dacia and not of Siger. In his review of this monograph, O. Lottin, *Bulletin de théol. anc. et méd.*, VIII (1960), 652, admitted that there is in favor of Boethius "such an accumulation of probabilities" that the conclusion that the author of these commentaries is not Siger is "morally certain." The removal of these two treatises from the list of Siger's works fatally weakens the argument that Siger experienced a development in a less radical direction. It also undermines the thesis that Siger ended by surrendering monopsychism, for if the treatises on the *Physics* and *Generation* can be shown not to be works of Siger, the attribution of the *Quaestiones in libros tres De anima* to Siger all but becomes unwarrantable.

⁶ Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, II, 490, 668—700; *Le mouvement doctrinale du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, 270—28; *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century*, 76—92; *Aristotle in the West*, 208, 229.

⁷ Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, II, 608—614; *Le Mouvement doctrinale du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, 273—275; *Aristotle in the West*, 223—224.

⁸ While the doctrine of the eternity of the world is "a fundamental Aristotelian doctrine . . . found in all the Arab Aristotelians," the doctrine of "the singleness of God's immediate effect was pure Neoplatonism." Van Steenberghen, *The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century*, 88—89.

⁹ Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, II, 710; *Le Mouvement doctrinale du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, 277—279, 282; *The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century*, 82, 90—91.

In sum, to speak of Latin Averroism in connection with Siger of Brabant and the philosophical heresy which he represents, is to use a misleading formula which distorts the facts of the case and falsifies historical perspective.¹⁰ Indeed, after 1220—1225 and before the rise of what Van Steenberghen calls Neo-Augustinism, Aristotelianism, mingled with different elements of Neoplatonism, was the only philosophy current in the West. M. Van Steenberghen singles out three variants of Neoplatonizing Latin Aristotelianism: the eclectic Neoplatonizing Aristotelianism of St. Bonaventure, the purer, more authentic Peripateticism of St. Thomas, and the radical, heretical Aristotelianism of Siger of Brabant and certain other masters of the Arts Faculty of the University of Paris.¹¹

One of the claims made by M. Van Steenberghen in support of his thesis that the term, *Latin Averroism*, is singularly inappropriate as a formula descriptive of the heretical tendencies of the extreme Aristotelians of the University of Paris, is the assertion that the contemporaries of Siger understood the spiritual crisis of the late 1260's and the 1270's to have been precipitated not by the cult of Averroes in particular, but by a perilous philosophical rationalism and an excessive attachment to the categories of pagan thought. Neither in the censures of 1270 and 1277, nor in Giles of Rome's *De erroribus philosophorum*, is Averroes singled out as the philosopher whose general influence or specific inspiration was primarily responsible for the philosophical tendencies or doctrinal aberrations singled out for condemnation. The fact that the new menace was not considered to be specifically Averroistic is also attested by the attitude of St. Bonaventure; in seeking to identify the actuating influence responsible for the new pa-

¹⁰ Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, II, 490—497, 706—710; *Le Mouvement doctrinal du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, 282; *Aristotle in the West*, 229.

¹¹ Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, II, 446—464, 490—97, 706—708, 728—730; *Le Mouvement doctrinal du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, 218—236, 265—285. *The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century*, 58—61, 71—72, 100—103; *Aristotle in the West*, 147—197; see also idem "Travaux récents sur la pensée du XIII^e siècle," *Revue Néoscholastique de Philosophie*, 42 (1939), 467—470. Van Steenberghen, in his assertion that St. Bonaventura's philosophy is basically Aristotelian, has been questioned among others by E. Gilson, *Bulletin Thomiste* VI (1940—42), 5—22, Frederick C. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, II (Westminster, Maryland, 1960), 249 and Patrice Robert "Le Problème de la philosophie bonaventurienne," *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 6 (1950), 145—163 and 7 (1951), 9—58. Robert, *ibid.*, 7 (1951), 57, offers it as his conclusion that Bonaventura's philosophy is fundamentally and essentially a medieval Augustinianism influenced by Neoplatonizing Aristotelianism but not "spécifiquement caractérisé par lui." See also *ibid.*, 6 (1950), 161.

ganism, the Seraphic Doctor pointed directly at Aristotle and Aristotle's denial of exemplarism.¹²

To E. Gilson's objection that the Aristotle which St. Bonaventure attacked was *Aristotle as he had been revealed by Averroes*, that is, an Aristotle considerably different from the one presented by Avicenna,¹³ Van Steenberghen replied that the Aristotle described by St. Bonaventure is, in general, "the authentic Aristotle." The fundamental error from which all the others were deduced, that is to say the denial of divine exemplarism, must certainly be attributed to Aristotle; and not only did St. Bonaventure not attribute it to Averroes, but he asserted that Averroes combated Aristotle on this essential point: *et nihil valent rationes suae et Commentator solvit eas*, ("the arguments of Aristotle against exemplarism are worthless and Averroes [sic] refutes them").¹⁴

It is not our intention to pursue further this troublesome and controverted question.¹⁵ The task we have set for ourselves in this paper

¹² Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant*, II 728—730; *Le Mouvement doctrinal du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, 280—282; *The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century*, 79—82, 90; *Aristotle in the West*, 210.

¹³ *Bulletin Thomiste*, 6 (1940—1942), 19: "Sans doute l'expression d'averroïsme latin n'est pas du XIII^e siècle, mais le nom d'Averroès nous semble avoir évoqué des lors un bloc doctrinal complexe, dont l'unicité de l'intellect possible n'est qu'un élément. Le P. Mandonnet paraît bien avoir posé un jalon qui ne sera plus jamais déplacé en citant le texte désormais fameux de S. Bonaventure (*In Hexaemeron*, coll. VI), qui condamne solidement chez Aristotle la négation des Idées, de la prescience et de la providence divines, du commencement du monde dans le temps, de la pluralité des intellects, et des sanctions de la vie future. On nous fait observer, il est vrai, qu'il s'agit là d'Aristote et non d'Averroès. C'est exact, mais il s'agit dans une large mesure de l'Aristote que venait de révéler Averroès, si différent de celui qu'avait présenté Avicenne."

¹⁴ Van Steenberghen, *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century*, 89; the same assertion is made in *Mouvement doctrinal du IX^e au XIV^e siècle*, 280—281.

¹⁵ The conclusion of F. Van Steenberghen that "Averroism" is a highly inappropriate term to use in describing the philosophical radicalism of the last quarter of the thirteenth century at Paris is corroborated by R. A. Gauthier, "Trois commentateurs 'averroïstes' sur l'Éthique à Nicomaque," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 22—23 (1947—1948), 334—336: taking issue with M. Grabmann, *Der lateinische Averroismus des 13. Jahrhunderts und seine Stellung zur christlichen Weltanschauung*, Sb. Akad. Munich, 1931, Heft 2, 30—37, 51—55, Gauthier argued that the commentators described by Grabmann as "Averroists" represent a position which can be characterized only as "integral Aristotelianism." Cf., however, K. Giocarinis, "An Unpublished Late Thirteenth Century Commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle," *Traditio*, 15 (1959), 322—326. J. J. Duin, *La doctrine de la providence dans les écrits de Siger de Brabant*, Philosophes Médiévaux, III (Louvain: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1954), 459, in his claim that Siger was a Christian philosopher arrived at a conclusion which even Van Steenberghen calls too optimistic: Van Steenberghen, "Nouvelles recherches sur Siger de Brabant et son école," *Rev. Philos. de Louvain*, 3^m série, 54 (1956), 135; cf. Lea Perugini, "Il tomismo di

is the analysis of the arguments offered by the commentator, cited in St. Bonaventure's *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, who successfully defended exemplarism against Aristotle's attack. It is of course, quite obvious, that the commentator in question is *not* Averroes. The cogency as a whole of Van Steenberghen's argument that to affix the label, "Averroist," on Siger of Brabant is to mislabel him, does not depend upon the commentator in St. Bonaventure's text being the Cordovan. But as a retort to Gilson in his contestation that St. Bonaventure directed his criticism against an Averroistic Aristotle, Van Steenberghen's claim that not only the Seraphic Father "n'en fait pas grief à Averroès mais il oppose, sur ce point capital [on the reality i. e., of Ideas as divine exemplars], Averroès à Aristote," is worthless. The context in which the sentence: *et nihil valent rationes suae, et commentator solvit eas*, occurs,¹⁶

Sigieri di Brabante et l'elogio dantesco," *Giornale dantesco*, 36 (1935), 107—168 and L. Perugini and C. Ottaviano, "La nuova questione di Sigieri di Brabante," *Sophia* 5 (1937), 159—166. Among those accepting the proposition that the term "Latin Averroism" is misleading because it suggests "attachment to Averroes as Averroes" is Copleston, Review of *The Philosophical Movement in The Thirteenth Century*, by Van Steenberghen, *Mind*, 66 (1957), New Series, 420—422. We have already observed (above, note 5) that B. Nardi and E. Gilson refused to follow Van Steenberghen in his contestation that the term Latin Averroism cannot be applied to the philosophical position represented by Siger and his school; F. Pelster, Review of *Les Oeuvres et la doctrine de Siger de Brabant*, by Van Steenberghen, *Scholastik*, 15 (1940), 108—111, follows suit. See also *idem*, Review of *The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century*, by Van Steenberghen, *Schol.* 31 (1956), 153; cf., P. Robert, *loc. cit.* 6 (1950), 150 m. l.

¹⁶ "Unde illas ideas praecipuus impugnat Aristotelis et in *Ethicis*, ubi dicit, quod summum bonum non potest esse idea. Et nihil valent rationes suae et commentator solvit eas." *In Hex Coll VI*, no. 2, *ed. cit.* V, 360—61; cf. corresponding passage in the more primitive and faithful account preserved in the text edited by R. P. Ferdinandus Delorme, *S. Bonaventurae Collationes in Hexaemeron et Bonaventuriana quaedam selecta*, Bibliotheca franciscana scholastica medii aevi, 8, (Ad Claras Aquas, Florentiae, 1934), 91: Horum primus Aristoteles impugnat rationes aeternas et ideas contra Platonem, qui defendit eas; et Commentator, *Super [I] Ethicorum*, ubi probat Aristoteles quod summe bonum non est idea, ibi respondet Commentator ad rationes Aristotelis." Van Steenberghen, *The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century*, 90, also asserts: "On one point only Bonaventura saw Aristotle through Averroes: it is on the question of the singleness of the human intellect. But it is all the more remarkable that he did not even name Averroes on this subject: which proves that he saw in the Arts Faculty a menace from heterodox Aristotelianism and not an Averroistic menace . . ." If, however, we consult St. Bonaventura, *op. cit.*, ed. Quaracchi V, 361, we find that the Seraphic Doctor does indeed make this association, expressly naming Averroes in connection with monopsychism: "Ex isto sequitur alia caecitas de unitate intellectus, quia, si ponitur mundus aeternus, necessario aliquod istorum sequitur: vel quod animae sunt infinitae, cum homines fuerunt infiniti; vel quod anima est corruptibilis; vel quod est transitio de corpore in corpus; vel quod intellectus sit unus in omnibus, *qui error attribuitur Aristoteli secundum Commentatorem.*" (Italics mine.) Here there can be no question as to the identity of the "Commentator:" it is Averroes on the *De anima*.

makes it sufficiently clear that the commentator to whom St. Bonaventure is referring is indeed a commentator on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Now it may be true that Averroes adhered to divine exemplarism in one of its forms, yet it is also true that he never took it upon himself to refute, in a commentary on the moral philosophy of Aristotle, the arguments which the Stagirite had advanced against the Platonic Ideas in general and the Platonic Idea of the Good in particular, in the first book of his *Nicomachean Ethics*.¹⁷ Moreover, it has been known now for some time, that for the contemporaries of St. Bonaventure, the authority of Averroes ended at the frontiers of the *Ethics*, and that in connection with the moral philosophy of the Stagirite, the scholiast who was honored by them by being identified simply as "the Commentator" was Eustratius of Nicaea.¹⁸ Van Steenberghen himself had once borne witness to this fact.¹⁹ It is also to be noted that both in the Quaracchi and the Delorme editions of the *Collationes in Hexaemeron*, the reader is expressly warned not to make the assumption that by "Commentator" St. Bonaventure, in this instance, is referring to Averroes. The Quaracchi edition suggests and the Delorme edition states, that the Seraphic Father at this point is referring to the learned bishop of Nicaea.²⁰

Eustratius' attempt in his commentary on the moral philosophy of the Stagirite²¹ to uphold Platonism against the attack upon the doctrine of

¹⁷ In his exposition of *Nic. Eth.* i. 6, Averroes rallies to the position of Aristotle. See *Aristotelis Stagiritae libri Moralem . . . cum Averrois Cordubensis in Moralia Nicomachia Expositione*, Vol. III: *Opera latine cum Averrois . . . commentariis* (Venetiis apud Iuntas, 1562), 6rC—7vG.

¹⁸ Gauthier, *op. cit.*, 329, n. 2; cf. *idem*, Review of *The Philosophical Movement of the Thirteenth Century*, by Van Steenberghen, *Bulletin Thomiste* 10 (1957—1959), 148—149.

¹⁹ Van Steenberghen, Review of *Le Quodlibet XV et trois Questions ordinaires* de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. O. Lottin, *Revue Néoscholastique de Philosophie*, 41 (1938), 477: on this occasion the reviewer reported Lottin's verdict that the "Commentator" cited some 20 times by Godefroid in the questions concerning problems of moral philosophy is not Averroes but Eustratius of Nicaea.

²⁰ ed. Quaracchi, V, 361, n. 1 and ed. Delorme, 91, n. 4.

²¹ ed. G. Heylbut, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, XX (Berlin, 1892), 31—58. Eustratius has not received his due share of attention from scholars. The most useful introduction to his life and work is still J. Dräseke, "Zu Eustratios von Nicäa," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 5 (1896), 319—336; cf. "Eustratius von Nikaia," *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, Pauly-Wissowa, 11 (1907), 1490—1491, and B. Tatakis, *La Philosophie Byzantine* (E. Bréhier, *Histoire de la philosophie*, Fascicule Suppl. No. 2, Paris, 1949), 217 ff. Anna Comnena, *Alexiad* XIV. 8 describes Eustratius as a possessing a wide knowledge of religious and secular literature and a master of dialectics. See also the following monographs by P. Joannou bearing on Eustratius: "Die Definition des Seins bei Eustratios von Nikaia. Die Universalienlehre in der Byzantinischen Theologie im XI Jh.," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 47 (1954) 358—368; "Der Nominalismus und die Menschliche

Ideas in general and the Idea of good in particular, launched by Aristotle in his *Nicomachean Ethics*,²² is one of the more sturdy, and as Bonaventure's text shows, one of the more influential argumentative defenses of Plato. It was composed by a man who, not unlike St. Bonaventure himself,²³ combined his study of Aristotle with a bias for Platonism. In this respect Eustratius shows himself to be in the true Neoplatonic tradition. It must not be forgotten that men representing this current of thought utilized Aristotle freely and attached great importance to the study of his works.²⁴ As far as the Neoplatonists are concerned, the

Psychologie Christi. Das Semeioma gegen Eustratius von Nikaia (1117)," *ibid.*, 369—378; "Eustrate de Nicée. Trois pièces inédites de son procès," *Revue des Études Byzantines*, 10 (1953), 24—34; "Le Sort des évêques hérétiques reconciliés. Un discours inédit de Nicétas de Serres contre Eustrate de Nicée." *Byzantion*, 28 (1958), 1—30.

²² *Nic. Eth.* I. 6.

²³ I follow Gibson, Copleston, and Robert in refusing to accept that St. Bonaventure was a Neoplatonizing *Aristotelian*. See n. 10 above.

²⁴ Porphyry's statement, *Vita Plot.* 14, that in the *Enneads*, Plotinus all but condensed Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is revealing in this connection. T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, 1928), 157—158, notes that "by Plutarch first, and then by Syrianus," the reading of Aristotle as a necessary preliminary (a *προτέλεια*, as Syrianus calls it), to the study of Plato, was carried out as a regular practice, and that a man like Proclus learned in Aristotle, was a beneficiary of the system. F. Picavet, "Péripatétisme," *Grande Encyclopédie*, XXVI, 389—390, does well to draw attention to the fact that Plotinus borrowed from Aristotle, that Porphyry wrote commentaries on Aristotle, that Themistius commented on the Stagirite more than he did on Plato, that the Athenian school down to the closing of the Academy in 529 continued to produce commentaries and paraphrases of Aristotle. All these writers from Porphyry to Simplicius and Boethius, in their undertaking to compose commentaries on Aristotle are witnesses to the importance accorded to Aristotle in Neoplatonism. "Et tous ceux qui, par la suite, étudieront . . . les néo-platoniciens," continues Picavet, "relèveront d'Aristote, comme tous ceux qui liront Aristotle l'expliqueront en suivant ses commentateurs néo-platoniciens." *Ibid.* 390. For Picavet it is "a manifest exaggeration" to speak of Aristotle as the master of the Middle Ages. In fact many of the Aristotelian doctrines current in the Middle Ages were part and parcel of Neoplatonism and were encountered in the first instance in Neoplatonic sources, while Aristotle himself when he is studied, is almost always interpreted with the aid of Neoplatonist commentators. *Ibid.* The same tendencies can be observed in the attitude of an eleventh century Platonist like Psellus. This "restorer of the Academy" declared himself to be an admirer of Plato and affirmed that there is a special affinity between Platonism and Christianity, but he also protested that he did not neglect the philosophy of Aristotle ("οὔτε τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους παρεῖδον φιλοσοφίαν." *Μεσαιωνική Βιβλιοθήκη*, ed. Sathas, V, 444) and in the program of studies he organized at the University of Constantinople, he proceeded to accord to Aristotle as important a place as the Stagirite had been assigned in the curriculum of the Athenian school. See C. Zervos, *Un Philosophe neoplatonicien du XI siècle, Michel Psellus* (Paris, 1919), 89, 142—146, 189—193, 217 ff.; cf. Tatakis, *La philosophie Byzantine*, 162, 164, 167, 186—188. In John Italos the preoccupation with Aristotle is more intense than in the man who had preceded him to the title of "ὑπατος τῶν φιλοσόφων." Engrossment with the philosophy of Aristotle

Stagirite had not spoken in vain. Aristotelian doctrine was incorporated in teaching which remained Platonic in its fundamental inspiration. No scholar attempting to classify philosophers who were active after the closing of the Academy as Platonist or Aristotelian in tendency, can ignore this fact without running the risk of mistakenly identifying a writer as an Aristotelian for holding to doctrines which he accepts essentially as a Neoplatonist.

II

Eustratius launches his exposition and criticism of the arguments which Aristotle offered in his *Ethics* against the Platonic theory of the Good, by undertaking to explain at some length what is at issue. The question under dispute, he makes clear, is the legitimacy of assuming that, besides the many goods, there is another self-existent good which is to the numerous goods the cause of their being good; and in general whether it is legitimate to assume that there are archetypal forms, immutable, and absolutely existent which are the causes of everything which is what it is to be so.

is one of the most striking features of his *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* ('Απορίαι καὶ λύσεις), ed. P. Joannou, *Studia Patristica et Byzantina*, Heft 4 (Ettal, 1956); it is also noticeable in his *De arte dialectica, De syllogismis*, and *De arte rhetorica*, edited by G. Cereteli (Tyflis 1924—1926). Anna Comnena *Alexiad* V. 8—9, emphasized Italo's interest in Peripateticism and P. Joannou, *Christliche Metaphysik in Byzanz, I, Die Illuminationslehre des Michael Psellos und Joannes Italos*, *Studia Patristica et Byzantina*, Heft 3 (Ettal, 1956), 7, has gone as far as to question the fitness of classifying Psellus and Italos as Neoplatonists. But Psellus, *Ep.* 175, ed. Sathas, *Μεσ. Βιβλ.*, V, 444, 450, cries: "ἐμὸς ὁ Πλάτων," and as E. Stephanou, "Jean Italos. L'imortalité de l'âme et la résurrection," *Échos d'Orient*, 36 (1933), 425, stresses, Italos' conclusion remains that only to the more simple minded does Aristotle have a greater appeal than Plato: "τοῖς ἀπλουστέροις Πλάτωνος ἔδοξεν Ἀριστοτέλης σοφώτερος," a conclusion not unlike that of Psellus: "Οὗτος [Aristotle] ἀνθρωπικώτερον τὰ πολλὰ τῶν θεολογικῶν δογμάτων ἤπτετο," Sathas, *op. cit.* IV, Prologue, p. LI, no. 3. See also Stephanou, *Review of Christliche Metaphysik in Byzanz*, by P. Joannou, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 23 (1957), 431—436 and *idem*, *Jean Italos Philosophe et Humaniste*, *Orientalia Christiana Analecta*, 134 (Rome, 1949), 91—117; cf. Tatakis, *Phil. Byz.*, 210—212. Whether one will describe philosophers like Psellus, Italos, or Eustratius, as "Neoplatonists," depends in part upon one's conception of what constitutes the body of doctrines acceptance of which amounts to a commitment to Neoplatonism. An interesting attempt to settle this question was made by Endre v. Ivánka, "Zum Problem des christlichen Neuplatonismus," *Scholastik*, 30 (1955), 31—40 and 31 (1956), 384—403. With men like Psellus and Italos it is also extremely difficult to determine whether they are merely giving an account of a philosophical position and defending it in terms of its own inner logic or whether they are asserting what they consider to be a philosophical truth. See W. Wolska, *Review of Christliche Metaphysik in Byzanz* by P. Joannou, *Rev. des Études Byz.* 15 (1957), 281—285; cf. E. v. Ivánka reviewing the same work in *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 51 (1958), Heft 2, 381—382.

As might be expected, the interpretation of Plato's conception of the self-existent good which Eustratius offers, is that which is associated with Neoplatonism. The good which is good of itself and absolutely, is the transcendent source and principle of all things, the One and Ineffable.²⁵

²⁵ Ὁ γὰρ Πλάτων περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ζητήσας, τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῃ καὶ ἄρρητον εἶναι καὶ τάχαθὸν ἀπεφάνητο. in *Eth. Nic.* I. 4, ed. G. Heylbut, *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, XX (Berlin, 1892), 382 and nn. 300 & 301; It has been claimed that in *Metaph.* 988a 7—17, 1075a 38—b 1 and 1091b 13—15, Plato is held to have identified the One (conceived as the cause of the essence of the Forms) and the Good by Aristotle himself. See H. F. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (New York, 1962), 382 and nn. 300 & 301; L. Robin, *La Théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d'après Aristote* (Paris, 1908), 504—505, 571—573; and E. R. Dodds (ed.) *Proclus. The Elements of Theology* (Oxford, 1933), 199—200. For "orthodox" Middle Platonists like Albinus and Atticus, however, the supreme God is Nous rather than the supra-essential and supra-intellectual principle represented by the One and the Good. Even Numenius who identifies the primal God with the Good (αὐτοαγαθὸν) persists in describing him as Being and Intelligence — not a principle beyond these. See R. E. Witt *Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism* (Cambridge, 1937), 123—136 and T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, 34—35. Pseudo-Plutarch *De placitis* I. 3, ed. H. Diels, 287—288, presents Plato as having identified the supreme God with Intelligence (νοῦς τοῦ κόσμου) and the ideas with the thoughts of God; cf. *Ibid.* 304: Πλάτων τὸ ἐν τὸ μονοφυές, τὸ μοναδικὸν τὸ ὄντως ὄν, τάχαθον: πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων εἰς τὸ νοῦν σπεύδει νοῦς οὖν ὁ Θεός, χωριστὸν εἶδος. See also Numenius *apud* Eusebius *Praep. Evang.* XI. 22, 543—544 d, ed. E. N. Gifford, II (Oxford, 1903), 110—112. It was Plotinus who, in a bold and perhaps hazardous *tours de force* of exegesis, wrung from Plato and launched as Platonic the doctrine which identified the Good that is "above being" of the *Republic* (509B) with the One that is one of the *Parmenides* (137C) and the king who reigns over all (ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς) of the *Second Epistle* (312E) and introduced the ἐν-ἀγαθὸν as the absolutely transcendent, ineffable, form-less principle of all things beyond Being, Essence, Thought, Intelligence and Knowledge. Psellus, *Εἰς ῥητὸν ἀποστολικόν*, Appendix III: *De omniſaria doctrina*, ed. L. G. Westerink, 105, contrasts the pedestrian Aristotle who was unable to rise above the notion of the Intellectual Principle to Plato who, ranging beyond the limited vision of the Stagiritic, saw as the source of all things, the One, perfectly simple, indeterminable, unsearchable, incomprehensible, defying all classification, and transcending all the predicaments. As for Psellus, so for Italos, *Quaest. Quodl.* 2 and 68, ed. Joannou, 2—3, 109—114, Plato's theology is one in which the One identified with the Good is made into the root and source, end and goal, of all things and in which the life of the cosmos is conceived as consisting of two parallel, continuous, and everlasting movements: a downward movement, consisting of the procession (πρόσδεξις) of the effects from their cause, and the opposite tension consisting of the upward movement of reversion (ἐπιστροφή) by which the effects return to their cause. The point of distinction between this theology and the speculations of Aristotle is that the Stagiritic after arriving at the equation of Being and Intelligence ends his search for the first cause at this point, acknowledging Being and Intelligence as the highest principles. As a consequence of its elevation above and beyond the sphere of being and intelligibility, the One and the Good is frequently identified in Neoplatonic texts as "ἄρρητον" or "τὸ ἄρρητον." See e. g. Plot. *Enn.* V. 3. 13, V. 5. 6, I. 7. 1 V. 6. 6, VI. 9. 3 and Proclus, *El. Th.*, Props. 162, 123, ed. E. R. Dodds, 140, 142, 108. The term "ἄρρητος" as a description of God (ὁ πρῶτος νοῦς) appears also in Albinus. Witt, *Albinus*, 129.

It excels and surpasses all things to an infinite degree. It holds within itself all things in a supra-intellectual and supra-substantial mode of possession.²⁶ It flows out to all things without proceeding or issuing out

²⁶ Πάντα δὲ περιεχούσης ἐν αὐτῇ ἀνενοήτως καὶ ὑπερουσίως. Eus. in *Eth.* 40. 6—7. The proposition that all things are contained in the One in a supra-intellectual and supra-substantial mode is perhaps the key concept of Neoplatonism. In Plotinus the One is conceived as containing within itself all the intellectual causes (νοεράς αἰτίας) which are to be unfolded from it. It is within the One that we must seek what follows upon it. The One is the encompassment of all things (περίληψις πάντων). What is present in Intelligence, i. e., the intelligible universe, is also present in the One although in a far more transcendent mode (Οἷον γὰρ τὸ ἐν ᾧ πολλὰ καὶ μείζον ἢ τοιοῦτον τὸ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκείνῳ). The One stands to Intelligence as the exemplar stands to its image. See Enn. VI. 8. 18; cf. V. 3. 15—16, 4. 2, 5. 9, VI. 8. 21, III. 8. 9—10, and 3. 7. The One is “δύναμις τῶν πάντων” Enn. III. 8. 10, V. 3. 15. It possesses all things of which it is the principle (ἔχει δὲ τὰ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἅπαντα) and is the Source and type of all non-contingent things, VI. 8. 14. It is not Intelligence only in the sense that he is supra-intellectual (ἐπέκεινα νοῦ), its act is not intellection, only in the sense that it is an eternal supra-intellection (ὑπερνήσις αἰεὶ οὐσα), *ibid.* 16; see *praet. Enn.* VI. 7. 16, 36—37 and 40. If the act of the Soul is a contemplation which corresponds to the unity of One-and-Many, and that of Intelligence is a higher type of contemplation corresponding to the unity of One-in-Many, the act of the Supreme can only be conceived as a type of contemplation corresponding to pure Unity — a supra-intellection in which the absolute identity of the knower and Known excludes all duality. See also E. Bréhier (ed.), *Ennéades* (Paris, 1924—1938), III, 153, R. Arnou, *Πρᾶξις et Θεωρία* (Paris, 1921), 65—80, and *Le Désir de Dieu dans la philosophie de Plotin* (Paris, 1921), 136, 151—155, 162—187; W. R. Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus*, II (London, 1918) 114—115; Dodds (ed.), *Procl. El. Th.*, 264, 266; A. H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in The Philosophy of Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1940), 31, 39, 43 ff., 61 ff. J. Katz, *Plotinus' Search for the Good* (N. Y., 1950), 6. Intelligence in a mode inferior to that of the One, and Soul in a mode inferior to that of Intelligence can also be described as the whole of things, the cause, archetype and paradigm of the universe. Enn. V. 1. 4, 9. 6, VI. 7. 17, III. 6. 18, IV. 3. 10, 6. 3, V. 8. 9, VI. 4. 5, 6. 12—15. Porphyry, *Sententiae* XII, XXV, ed. B. Mommert (Leipzig, 1907), 3, 11, assigned to the Transcendent both a mode of life (ζῆ γὰρ κάκεινο, εἰ καὶ μηδὲν τῶν μετ' αὐτὸ παραπλήσιον αὐτῷ ζῶν κέκτηται) and a mode of knowledge superior to Intellection (περὶ τοῦ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ κατὰ μὲν νόησιν πολλὰ λέγεται, θεωρεῖται δὲ ἀνοησίᾳ κρείττονι νοήσεως). He also adopted and unequivocally asserted the broader generalization, implicit in Plotinus, that all things are in all other things but in each in a manner consonant with its proper character, in Intelligence νοερώς, in the Soul λογικῶς, in plants σπερματικῶς in bodies εἰδωλικῶς and in the transcendent, supra-intellectually and supra-essentially (ἀνενοήτως καὶ ὑπερουσίως), *ibid.* X, 2—3. Dodds, *Procl. El. Th.*, 254 reports that the general principle that all things are in all other things but in each after a fashion consonant with its own nature was ascribed by Syrianus to the Pythagoreans. Stobaeus *Eclogae* I. 49, 31 ed. Heeren, 866 (fragment 48 in K. S. Guthrie, *Numenius of Apamea* [London, 1917], 50) cites Iamblichus to the effect that the generalization: “ἐν πᾶσιν . . . πάντα . . . οἰκείως μέντοι κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἐν ἑκάστοις,” made part of the teaching of Numenius. Proclus, *El. Th.* 18, Dodds, 20, asserts it as a principle that “Everything which by its existence bestows a character on others itself primitively possesses that character which it communicates to the recipients.” Thus knowledge, for example, pre-subsists in the henads in a transcendent manner, *El. Th.* 121, 124, Dodds, 106, 110; see also Dodds' comments, *ibid.* 264, 266. For Proclus' formulation of the generalization that

of itself, and without loss or diremption.²⁷ It causes all things to be solely by reason of its goodness and not as a result of an act of deliberation, desire, or will, in a manner not unlike that of the sun which, being essentially luminous, emits light by its sheer presence, and not deliberately, or wilfully.²⁸ Finally it is the goal and end of all desiderative

all is in all but in each in a manner suitable to its nature, see *El. Th.* 103, Dodds, 92: "πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν, οἰκείως δὲ ἐν ἑκάστῳ, ἀλλ' ὅπου μὲν νοερώς, ὅπου δὲ ζωπικῶς, ὅπου δὲ ὄντως . . ." See *praet. ibid.* 118, 173, 195, 197, Dodds, 104, 150, 170, 172. In Proclus these principles are supplemented by the notion expressed in *El. Th.* 65, Dodds, 62, that all that subsists has its being either in its cause, as an origivative potency or as a substantial predicate or by participation, after the manner of an image. This in turn entails the affirmations on the three modes of wholeness made by Proclus *ibid.* 67—69, Dodds, 63—66. Thus in Plotinus as well as in Porphyry and Iamblichus the denial that the One is Thought, Knowledge, Form, Power, Life, Act, Will, Substance and Being is always significative, as Proclus in *Parm.*, ed. Stallbaum, 862 ff. asserts, not of privation, but of excess (ὑπεροχῆς σημαντικόν). Pseudo-Dionysius, *De div. nom.* IV. 7, ed. Migne, *P. G.*, III, 701, 704 writes that all things commune with all other things by virtue of the One, but each does so according to its proper nature. Whether this as Dodds (ed.), *Procl. El. Th.*, 254 assumes, represents an acceptance on the part of this famous pseudonymous of the Neoplatonic concept that all things are in all other things, is questionable. There is no doubt, however, that for Pseudo-Dionysius, *De div. nom.* IV. 10, *P. G.*, III, 705, all things pre-exist in the One supra-essentially and in a manner beyond all definition; see *praet.* I. 7, 597, IV. 10, 705; V. 5, 820; V. 6, 820—821; V. 7, 821; V. 8, 824; V. 9, 825; VII. 4, 872; IX. 4, 912; IX. 10, 917; XIII. 1, 977; XIII. 3, 980. Because He contains in Himself in advance and totally the plenitude of being, He is not being according to such and such mode (οὐ πῶς ἔστιν ὢν), but in a fashion absolute and illimitable. *Ibid.* V. 4, 817. See also Maximus, in *Lib. Div. Nom.* IV. 7 and V. 6, ed. Migne, *P. G.*, IV, 253, 254, 320—321. With reference to the opinion which Maximus attributes to Plato that it is improper to conceive of the ideas or exemplars as contained in the Supreme (the adage: τὸ ἐν ἐπέκεινα τοῦ παραδείγματος), he explains, *ibid.* V. 8, 329, 332, that St. Dionysius conceives of the archetypal forms as existing in God in a manner consistent with His nature, i. e., according to the mode of union, unique, absolute, and transcendent; cf. *ibid.* II. 3, 217 and V. 6, 320, 321, 324. God is, of course, according to Pseudo-Dionysius, *De div. nom.* IV. 3, *P. G.*, III, 697, "ἀνούσιος," "ἄζως," "ἄνους," but these privations in the supra-essential are superlatives (ὑπεροπικῶς νοοῦνται); cf. *praet.* Max., *loc. cit.* III. 3, 244 and IV. 7, 253, 256. Thus the Supreme is all things and none of them, He is everywhere and nowhere, and everything and at the same time nothing can be asserted of Him. Ps. Dion., *loc. cit.* I. 6, 596, V. 8, 824. cf. Plot. *Enn.* III. 9. 3, IV. 2, V. 2, 1—2, VI. 8. 16, Porph. *Sent.* XXXI, XXXVIII 16—17, 34, and Procl. *El. Th.* 98, Dodds, 86, 88. The principle *quævis in quibuslibet* is also accepted by Psellus who, in his *De omnifaria doctrina* 64, ed. L. G. Westerink, 43, offers the following paraphrase of Porphyry: "καὶ πάντα μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν νοῦς νοερώς ἔχει πάντα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ λογικῶς, τὸ δὲ φυτὸν σπερματικῶς, τὸ δὲ σῶμα τὰ εἰδῶλα ἔχει τῶν ὄντων, ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ἀνενοήτως καὶ ὑπερουσίως."

²⁷ Τὰς προόδους δὲ ποιούμενης πρὸς ἅπαντα ἀνεμφοιτήτως ἐαυτῆς καὶ τὰ πάντα παραγωγῆς . . . διὰ τὴν αὐτῆς ἀγαθότητα. Eus. in *Eth.* 40. 7—8. cf. Ps-Dion. *De div. nom.* XIII. 3. *P. G.*, III, 980: "πάντων ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνεμφοιτήτως αἰτίον." Cf. *praet.* Procl. in *Tim.*, III, 106. 2. Dodds, *Procl. El. Th.*, Introduction, xxviii n. 1, lists "ἀνεμφοιτήτως" as a Proclian term borrowed by Pseudo-Dionysius.

²⁸ Οὐ τῷ προαιρεῖσθαι καὶ βούλεσθαι ἐπὶ τῆς ποιήσεως ἀλλὰ αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι.

motion, the conferrer of all perfection, the source of all goodness, and the cause of all fulfilment and completion.²⁹

Having offered what he considers to be Plato's conception of the Idea of good, Eustratius considers the nature of the Platonic Ideas in

ὡς καὶ ὁ ἥλιος φωτίζει τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτῇ, οὐ προαιρούμενος οὐδὲ βουλόμενος. Eus. in *Eth. Nic.* 40. 8—13. In both Plotinus and Proclus "emanative creation" is conceived as contemplation and ποιήσις is identified with νόσις or θεωρία. Plot. *Enn.* III. 8. 3, Procl. *El. Th.* 174, Dodds, 152 and in *Parm.*, Stallbaum, 614—617, 655, 791. See also Arnou, *Πρᾶξις et Θεωρία* (Paris, 1921) and Dodds, *Procl. El. Th.* 220, 290—291. The identification of ποιήσις and θεωρία is also made by Christian writers. In St. John of Damascus, for example, the *ratio creationis* is conceived as *Dei bonitas* and the creatio itself as *Dei cogitatio*: "κτίζει δὲ ἐνοῶν καὶ τὸ ἐνόημα ἔργον ὑφίσταται." *De Fide Orthodoxa* II. 2, P. G., XCIV, 865; cf. Maximus in *Lib. Div. Nom.* V, 6, P. G., IV, 320—321: "αὐτὴ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἡ νόσις, γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς οὖσι." For Plotinus the Good is generative of other beings because it is the Good. *Enn.* V. 4. 1. The conception of providence founded upon the idea of deliberate creation is rejected. The cosmos came to be of necessity (ἀνάγκη) and not as a result of a deliberate decision that it ought to be (οὐ λογισμῷ τοῦ δεῖν γενέσθαι). *Ibid.* III. 2. 1—3. cf. *praet.* II. 9. 4 and 12, V. 4. 2, V. 16, 2. 1, V. 8. 7. and VI. 7. 1. For Proclus generative activity at its highest is αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι. God and the paternal causes create or produce merely by virtue of existing. Causation αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι involves no act of will and no movement or change in the cause. *El. Th.* 18, 151—157, 174, Dodds, 20, 133—139, 152, and editor's notes *ibid.*, 204—205, 290, 394—396. See also Procl. in *Parm.*, Stallbaum, 611—612 (Cousin, V, 6 f.). The notion of bestowal or causation αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι is also found in Pseudo-Dionysius, *De div. nom.* I. 5, P. G., III 593: "ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὡς ἀγαθότης ὑπάρχει, αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι ἐστὶ αἰτία," and *ibid.* IV. 1—2: "Καὶ ὅτι τῷ εἶναι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς οὐσιῶδες ἀγαθόν, εἰς πάντα τὰ ὄντα διατείνει τὴν ἀγαθότητα· καὶ γὰρ ὥσπερ ὁ καθ' ἑμᾶς ἥλιος οὐ λογιζόμενος ἡ προαιρούμενος, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τῷ εἶναι φωτίζει πάντα τὰ μετέχουν τοῦ φωτὸς αὐτοῦ κατὰ τὸν οἰκτεῖον δυνάμενα λόγον." (Italics mine.) Maximus, however, in his commentary on this passage hastens to explain that in comparing the operation of the *bonum essentiale* to the action of the sun, St. Dionysius' sole intention was to emphasize the fact that just as the sun is nothing but light, and does not possess luminosity as an accident (οὐ συμβατόν ἔχει τὸ φῶς) so God does not possess goodness as an adventitious property or quality, but exists as the Good in its very essence (ἀλλ' οὐσία τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς ὑπάρχων). Max. in *Lib. De div. nom.*, P. G., IV, 248. Pachmeres, following suit, takes care to point out that the Master was conscious of the limitations of the analogy between the mode by which the sun radiates light (as a mere consequence of the fact that its very essence is luminosity) and that by which God bestows being (as a consequence of the fact that He is the Good.) He did not wish to imply that God like the sun, is "ἄλογος," and "ἀπροαίρετος." *Paraphr. Lib. Div. Nom.* IV. 1 P. G., III, 748—749. According to Italos, *Quaest. Quodl.* 68, ed. Joannou, 109, "οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων θεολογικώτατοι" taught that the good bestows being by nature and not by choice (τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων φύσει καὶ οὐ προαιρέσει). Psellus, too, uses the figures of the overflowing vessel and the radiant sun to describe Plato's conception of the spontaneity of the creative act of God. Joannou, *Christliche Metaphysik in Byzanz*, 45—46.

²⁹ Ἀρχὴν μὲν ὡς πάντων ἐξ αὐτῆς τὸ εἶναι ἐχόντων, τέλος δὲ ὡς δι' αὐτὴν καὶ πάντων ἀναπλουμένων πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ ἐπιεμένων αὐτῆς ὡς πέφυκεν ἕκαστον ὡς πάντα τελειούσης καὶ ἀγαθυνούσης καὶ αὐτὴν εἶναι τοῦ πρώτου ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς οὐσιῶδες ἀγαθὸν οὐ πάντα ἐφίεται. Eus. in *Eth.* 40. 14—17. Proclus, in *Parm.*, Stallbaum, 717—720, argues against those who refuse to equate the object of all desire with the generative cause of all: "Πῶς γὰρ ὁ οὐρανὸς ὀρέγεται τοῦ θείου

general. The arguments which Aristotle advances in the sixth book of the *Ethics* embroil not only Plato's doctrine of the Good, but also his theory of Ideas as a whole. It is clear, he explains, that what is in question is not the logical universal existing as a mere sequent and in dependence upon the many, but the universal as an intelligible form, an eternal reality conceived as existing prior to its particular exemplifications; what is under dispute is the reality of those intellectual principles or intelligential laws (λόγους νοερούς) which the followers of Plato conceived as subsisting in the divine intellect (ἐν τῇ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ θεοῦ διανοίᾳ ὄντας)³⁰

μὴ γενόμενος ἐκείθεν;" cf. *idem*, *El. Th.* 31, Dodds, 35: Through that which gets it being does each of the beings attain well-being.

³⁰ Eus. in *Eth.* 40. 22—23. The reduction of the three principles of the Timaeus, God, Ideas, Matter, into two by the elimination of the Ideas as a principle distinct from Intelligence antedates Plotinus' verdict that the intellectual substances or intelligibles are not to be found outside Intelligence (οὐκ ἔξω τοῦ νοῦ τὰ νοητά). *Enn.* V. 5; Porphyry, *Vit. Plot.* 18. Seneca, *Epistulae* 65. 7, and Eusebius, *Praeparationis Evangelicae* XV. 13. 5, ed. Dindorf, 368, trace the notion that the Ideas are the thoughts of the deity to Plato himself. Cf. W. Lutoslawski, *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* (London, 1905), 470, 477. R. E. Witt, *Albinus*, 71—76, suggests that it is not unreasonable to assume that the conception of the Ideas as thoughts of God was current among members of the Old Academy; see, however, H. F. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, 498—499. R. M. Jones, *Classical Philology* 21 (1926) 317—326, has argued that the concept of the Ideas as the thoughts of God was suggested to the Platonists by Aristotle's theology. The view that the Ideas are intellection (νόησις) in relation to God, was entertained by Albinus. Witt, *Albinus*, 70—75, Atticus, described the Ideas as God's thoughts (τοῦ θεοῦ νοήματα), anterior and archetypal to all created things, purely intelligible, immutable and possessing true being. See F. Ueberweg, 12th ed. by K. Praechter, *Grundriß der Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie des Altertums* (Berlin, 1926), 548—9. Philo located the Ideas in the Logos and distinguished between the divine Mind and the supreme God. *Opificio Mundi* III. 17 ff., *De Cherubim* 35, 124 ff. See also Ueberweg-Praechter, *Die Philosophie des Altertums*, 519, 530, 542, 576, and Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, 35 f. Eustratius fails to make clear the identity of the Demiurge — God in whose mind the intelligential laws, ideas or exemplars have their subsistence. Is it his understanding that "οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα" as he vaguely calls them, identified the Demiurge — God with Intelligence or with τὸ ἐν-ἀγαθόν? For Plotinus, *Enn.* V. 9. 3, the title "demiurge" belongs in the first instance to Intelligence (νοῦν ποιητὴν ὄντως καὶ δημιουργόν). See the doxology on the question "τις ὁ δημιουργός οὗτος καὶ ἐν ποῖᾳ τάξει τέτακται τῶν ὄντων" given by Proclus in *II Tim.* ed. Diehl, I, 303. 24—310. 2. According to Proclus, *loc. cit.*, Porphyry conceived the demiurge as a transcendent soul, while Iamblichus the intelligible world as a whole. Proclus' own conclusion is that the term "demiurge" best applies to Intelligence. *Ibid.* 310. 5—312. 15 and 321. 10 f. cf. *idem*, *El. Th.* 34 and 174 Dodds, 36, 38, 152. See also editor's notes, *ibid.* 220, 285—287, and 290. Proclus also distinguishes between paternal and demiurgic causes. *El. Th.* 151—157, Dodds, 132—138 and editor's notes *ibid.* 278—280. See also, Proclus in *II Tim.*, Diehl, I 303. 24—330. 6. The same writer, in *Parm.* ed. Stallbaum, 839, 856, asserts that the One can be considered neither as paternal nor as demiurgic: it transcends all specificity and represents divinity without qualifications. Nevertheless the One remains for Proclus, *ibid.* 822—823, the principle of all generation and knowledge. Cf. Plot. *Enn.* V. 4. 2: "ἐπέκεινα

and as enjoying authentic being.³¹ Referring to them indifferently as forms, ideas, universals, and wholes, they held them to be transcendent (ἐξηρημένους) and distinguishable, not only from the logical universals but also from the forms indwelling in bodies which were deemed to be

νοῦ τὸ γενῶν." Psellus accepts the identification of the demiurge with Intelligence. In *psychogoniam Platonis*, ed. Migne, P. G., 1081 ff. Italos opines that the title demiurge applies to both the One and Intelligence: to the One supra-essentially and supra-intellectually and to Intelligence proximately and in a less exalted sense (χειρόνων). *Quaest. Quodl.* 68, Joan-nou, 111.

³¹ It is well known for Plotinus an idea is an intelligence or intellectual substance (νοῦς καὶ νοερά οὐσία) not different from Intelligence while the Intellect entire is the total of the Ideas. Plotinus also taught that the Ideas are authentic beings or substances and that Intelligence and Being are one nature (μία μὲν οὖν φύσις τὸ τε ὄν ὃ τε νοῦς). *Enn.* V. 9. 8; cf. V. 9. 5 and V. 1. 8. The Ideas are, of course, also the thoughts or intellections (νοήσεις) of Intelligence. They are not intellections, however, in the sense that Intelligence engenders them by the act of knowing them. Intelligence does not precede Being and the Ideas or intelligible substances exist as the content, and not the creation, of the knowing principle. *Enn.* 5. 9. 8. On the question of what is the nature of the exemplars and in what order of being they abide (τί τὸ παράδειγμα τοῦτο καὶ ποίας τάξεως τῶν ὄντων) see the doxology given by Proclus in *II Tim.*, Diehl, I, 321. 24—324. 10. According to Proclus, Iamblichus considered the Ideas as belonging to the order of Being while Porphyry who conceived the demiurgic principle as the imparticipable Soul, equated the exemplars with Intelligence. According to the same authority, Plotinus conceived the Demiurge (νοῦς) as containing the exemplars in himself, for Porphyry on the other hand, τὸ παράδειγμα is outside and above the Demiurge, while for Longinus it is outside and below. See also Dodds, *Procl. El. Th.*, 285—287. Proclus, however, who conceived Being as prior to Intelligence *El. Th.* 101, Dodds, 91, in *I. Tim.*, Diehl, I, 17—24 ff., and in *III Tim.*, Diehl, II, 222. 30 f., sees the Exemplar as being both prior to and immanent in the Demiurge (Intelligence): prior in so far as it is intelligible (νοητῶς) and immanent in so far as it is intelligible (νοερώς). In *II Tim.*, Diehl, I, 323, 20 ff. Proclus also points out, *ibid.*, 323. 22—324. 14 that Plato sometimes speaks as if the Demiurge were himself the model on which the sensible world is fashioned and sometimes as if the model is extraneous to him; cf. Plato, *Tim.* 39E, 30C, 29E. For Pseudo-Dionysius the Ideas exist in God in a supra-essential mode of union and they are the exemplary causes of things (παράδειγματα δὲ φαμεν εἶναι τοὺς ἐν θεῷ τῶν ὄντων οὐσιοποιούς λόγους). *De div. nom.* v. 8, P. G., 824. They are equated by him, *ibid.*, to what is known in theology as divine "προορισμοί" and "θελήματα" (predefinitiones, voluntates). The question how God who is above Being, Intelligence, and Knowledge can be celebrated as Intelligence or said to contain the exemplars, Dionysius answers with the assertion that negatory statements about God imply transcendence, not privation or defect. *Ibid.* 7. 2, 868. In knowing Himself God knows all things, material things immaterially, divisible things indivisibly, things that are many he knows as one. *Ibid.*, 869. For Maximus, in *Lib. Div. Nom.* V. 8, P. G., IV. 329, the Ideas or exemplars as conceived by St. Dionysius are best defined as the intellections of the Godhead (ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα κυρίως ιδέας φησὶν ὁ μέγας Διονύσιος, ἀλλὰ τὰς νοήσεις τοῦ Θεοῦ). Maximus elaborates that God (ἡ αὐτοῦτε-ραγαθότης) is pure Mind and Act utterly self-directed (εἰς ἑαυτὴν ἐστραμμένη) and that His essence is not distinguishable from His intellection. He explains that God knows the exemplary causes by the same act by which He knows Himself and that in possessing Himself, He possesses the Ideas. Finally he

only likenesses of the original types impressed upon matter by the Demiurge.³² They were described as "universals" and "wholes," because though each of the primals was conceived to be unique and numerically one, it was also conceived as standing over and encompassing a plurality

asserts that the Ideas subsist in God and are known by Him, indivisibly, yet fully articulated, and that none of them exists prior to the act by which God knows it. *Ibid.*, 6, 320—321. If the Ideas subsisted in themselves and were not the transcendent thoughts of the transcendentially unitary God, God would be a composite of Himself and the exemplars. *Ibid.*, 8, 332. Psellus interprets Plato as having equated the Ideas with the creative thought of God.: "Ἰδέαν δὲ λέγει Πλάτων τὴν πρώτην ἔννοιαν τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὴν ἄρρητον ἐκείνην φαντασίαν καὶ ἀνατύπωσιν καθ' ἣν τὸν κόσμον ἐδημιούργησεν." *De omn. doctv.* 83, ed. Westerink, 50; cf. *ibid.*, 84, 50—51. He adds, however, that Plato used the term "Idea" in other senses as well, so that "Idea" in Plato may also signify the intelligible order of the universe (τὸν νοητὸν διάκοσμον), and a universal as it exists in nature, in a rational soul, or in Intelligence. See also *idem*, *Περὶ τῶν ἰδεῶν ἃς ὁ Πλάτων λέγει*, ed. G. Linder, in *Philologus* 16 (1860), 523—526, and *Ἐπιτάφιος εἰς τὸν πατριάρχην κῦρ Ἰωάννην τὸν Ξιφιλῖνον* ed. Sathas, *Bibliotheca Graeca*, IV, 456. Italos follows Psellus in attributing to Plato the doctrine according which the Ideas are the content of the Divine Mind: "Πλάτων πρῶτος τῶν ἐν Ἑλλήσι σοφῶν ἰδέας τῶν ὄντων παρὰ τῷ θεῷ ἔφασκεν εἶναι ... ἐξ αἰδίου ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι ἔλεγεν ... ἀσωμάτως τε καὶ ὅλως." *Quaest. Quodl.* 5, ed. Joannou, 7.

³² The forms which exist in bodies and which bear an obvious similarity to Aristotle's "ἐνυλοὶ λόγοι," are to be distinguished from the First Intelligibles which as intellections of God are in themselves transcendent and therefore impartible. The distinction between universals immanent in matter and the archetypal ideas was probably elaborated by the Platonists of the middle period. Witt, *Albinus*, 58, notes that an analogous distinction is made by Seneca *Epist.* 58: "Alterum exemplar est ... alterum forma ab exemplari sumpta et operi imposita." The distinction between transcendent and immanent universals was adopted by the Neoplatonists. For this distinction in Plotinus see *Enn.* IV. 2. 1, V. 5. 1, VI. 4—5 IV. 8. 2—4, and VI. 2. 20. In Proclus it achieved a crucial importance. This philosopher recognizes that a principle which was in all would be divided amongst all. A form can remain one only at the cost of abiding in isolation and sterility and it can become the principle of many only through the diremption of its unity. He resolves the difficulty by arguing that while the archetypal Ideas remain in themselves unparticipated and transcendent, they generate terms capable of being participated. Proclus, *El. Th.* 23, 63—64, Dodds, 26—29, 61; see also editor's notes *ibid.*, 210—212, 233—235, E. Bréhier, *Hist. de la Philosophie* I (2), 477—478, and E. Vacherot, *Histoire Critique de l'École d'Alexandrie*, II (Paris, 1846), 272—273. In Pseudo-Dionysius the problem of reconciling transcendence and immanence is solved by the distinction between the principles and archetypal ideas as they exist in God and the same as the proceed from Him. Being-itself, Life-itself, Wisdom-itself considered as principles divine and creative, are one with the Superessential and therefore transcendent and unparticipated. What is susceptible of participation is αὐτο-εἶναι αὐτο-ζωή etc. as they come forth from Him. These Pseudo-Dionysius describes as providential powers (προνοητικαὶ δυνάμεις), generous gifts, and effusions issuing from the imparticipable God, by means of which the Universal Cause, *sine egressu* and while remaining absolutely and totally transcendent, achieves immanence in His creation. God imparticipable in Himself becomes participable in His gifts. Pseudo-Dionysius, however, insists that the Being-itself in which beings participate is not an essence capable of passing as the cause of existence for all beings. The only such cause is the unparticipated Being, i. e., God in his supra-essentiality. Similarly

of discreet things, and as the unity from which a coordinate manifold proceeds.³³

Eustratius dwells with insistence upon the difference between logical universals or concepts drawn off from objects and contemplated separately, and the archetypal forms immutable, eternal, and authentically existent. The primals exist as intellectual substances (νοερῶς), and not incidentally and as the product of abstraction or a generalizing mental operation (οὐκ ἐννοηματικῶς).³⁴ In so far as an Ideal existent possesses a universal nature and is a universal, it exists separately from, in transcendence of, the plurality which takes its rise from it; and in so far as it is a whole, it surpasses and is neither constituted by, nor conceived in terms of, the things of which it is the transcendent totality and unity.

Eustratius explains that the term, "whole", can mean one of three things: a whole-before-parts, a whole-of-parts and a whole-in-the-parts.³⁵ It was with the whole-before-parts, an entity utterly simple and immaterial, an intelligible substance preceding in existence the plurality of particulars whose indivisible unity and wholeness it is, that the Platonists identified the Ideal forms which they also described as divine Ideas.³⁶ A whole-of-parts on the other hand, is a composite or complex unity subject to division, and may indeed consist of like parts each of which is capable of bearing the name and definition of the whole, or of heterogeneous parts, none of which are like each other or like the whole of which they are parts.³⁷ Finally, wholes-in-the-parts, Eustratius describes, as abstract notions or bare concepts, resulting from generalizing mental operations, mental constructs (ἐννοηματικά) existing in dependence upon the many and possessing the nature of sequents (ὕστερογενῆ). They

he does not posit a participated life which can be described as the cause of all life, nor in one word does he contend that things have as their generating principles separate essences or substances: As principles and causes Being-itself, Life-itself etc. are identical with God: as participated potencies they are only gifts of God and neither gods nor substances enjoining hypostatic being. *De div. nom.* XI. 6, *P. G.* III, 953—956. The most primitive of the participations, the first gift of the Supreme is the Good-itself (ἡ αὐτοῦπεραγαθότης) *ibid.* v. 6, 820. For the conception of participable irradiations (ἐλλάμψεις) of the impartible riches remaining for ever locked within the One, see also Maximus, *in Lib. Div. Nom.* XI 6, *P. G.*, IV, 400—401, 404 and Pachymeres, *Paraphr. Liber Div. Nom.* XI 6, *P. G.*, III 965, 968. Pachymeres dwells on the fact that the point of difference between St. Dionysius and pagan philosophers is that the former recognizes only one demiurgic power. Cf. R. Roques, *L'Univers Dionysien. Structure hiérarchique du monde selon le Pseudo-Denys* (Aubier: Éditions Montaigne, 1954), 73—81.

³³ καθόλου δὲ καὶ ὅλα ταῦτα ἐλέγετο, ὅτι ἕκαστον ἐκείνων ἐν ᾧ ἔχει πολλὰ ἐξ ἐκείνου καὶ κατ' ἐκεῖνο γινόμενα ἐν σώματι καὶ ἔνυλα. *Eus. in Eth.* 40. 27—29.

³⁴ *Ibid.* 29—30.

³⁵ *Ibid.* 34 ff.

³⁶ *Ibid.* 35—37.

³⁷ *Ibid.* 37—41. 2.

partake of the nature of later products, because they are the resultants of abstraction (κατὰ ἀφαίρεσιν), the process by which the common element inherent in individuals of like form is discriminated; they are dependent upon the many, because their presence in the soul is contingent upon the experiential knowledge of individuals; they are conceptual, because they subsist only in an act of thought in the sense that apart from the particulars from which they were abstracted, they have no actual foundation in being; they are in-the-parts, because they exist only in attachment to and dependence upon those individual things of like form in relation to which they are said to be a wholeness.³⁸ Thus Aristotle, for whom universals do not exist independently as Ideal forms and are conceived by him as "wholes-in-the-parts," can claim that the universals, "animal," (and so too every other common predicate) is nothing at all, if it is not a later product, expressing thereby his conviction that a universal does not in itself enjoy substantial existence and that its subsistence or dissolution follows the subsistence or dissolution of the particulars from which it is derived.³⁹ In the sense, however, that

³⁸ *Ibid.* 41. 2—12.

³⁹ *De anima* I. 1. 402b7; *Eus. in Eth. Nic.* 41. 13—15; cf. *Eus. in Analytica Post.* ed. M. Hayduck, *Com. in Arist. Graeca*, XXI—1 (Berlin, 1907), 197. For the concept of unparticipated monads originative of a coordinate manifold (which Eustratius equates with the whole-before-parts) see Proclus, *El. Th.* 21, 63—65; Dodds, 24, 60, 62 and editor's notes, *ibid.*, 233—236. See also Eustratius' treatment of the same subject in his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, *loc. cit.*, 195: Wholes-before-the-parts he interprets to be the original monads (ἀρχαὶ μονάδες) in themselves impartible, but each the transcendent principle of an order of substances showing a common characteristic. Species and genera are wholes-of-parts not, to be sure, as sums obtained by simple addition, but as notions in which a plurality of entities possessing a common characteristic are condensed. Individual entities by virtue of being adequate representation of a class, bearing intact the definition of a whole, are wholes-in-the-part. In as much, however, as wholes-of-parts have their being not in themselves but in their parts, wholes-of-parts are also wholes-in-the-part. For modes of wholeness as understood by Proclus, see *El. Th.* 66—69, and 100, Dodds, 63, 65—66, 90; see also editor's notes *ibid.*, 236—238, and L. J. Rosán, *The Philosophy of Proclus* (N. Y., 1949), 81—94. To exist as an originative principle (κατ' αἰτίαν) is to exist as a transcendent term, incapable of being shared (ἀμέθεκτον) and as a whole-before-parts. To exist as an actualized potency (καθ' ὑπαρξιν) is to exist as a form capable of being participated (μεθεκτόν, μετεχόμενον) and, it would seem, as a whole-of-parts. To exist as a concrete substance is to do so as a participant (κατὰ μέθεξιν, μετέχον) and as a whole-in-the-part. The terms "κατ' αἰτίαν," "καθ' ὑπαρξιν," and "κατὰ μέθεξιν" as terms signifying three different modes of existence, are also utilized by Pseudo-Dionysius and his school. See, e. g., *Ps. Dion. Epist.* IX. 2, *P. G.*, III, 1108: things exist κατ' αἰτίαν as they exist in God, they exist καθ' ὑπαρξιν as His participable gifts (κατὰ τῶν νοητῶν αὐτοῦ προνοιῶν ἢ λόγων) and κατὰ μέθεξιν as the concrete works of this creation. Maximus, *in Epp. S. Dion.* IX, *P. G.*, IV, 564 comments that to exist as a participant is to exist as a substance other than and distinct from God and to possess a divine character adscititiously (ἐπιείσακτον

the Platonists used the terms, form, universal or whole, namely as terms signifying the exemplars or patterns with reference to which the Demiurge produced the sensible substances, they must be taken to be the inward creative thought of God (νοήματα τοῦ ποιοῦντος) existing not as elements of a knowledge acquired from without, but as substances, authentic beings, at once active and intellective (δραστικά τε καὶ νοερά); they are active in the sense that none of them is blind, inconsequential, and without issue; there are none whose energy is not manifested by beings which take their rise from them and in accordance with them. It is the Ideal forms, the conception of the universal as a whole-before-the-parts that Aristotle attempts to discredit.⁴⁰

III

Having thus stated the matter at issue and set the stage for his appraisal of Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic conception of the Good and of Ideas in general, Eustratius considers the first objection offered by Aristotle in his *Ethics* against the proposition, that there is an Idea of good over and above the many goods.

ἔχουσα τὸ θεοειδές); to subsist κατ' ὑπαρξιν on the other hand, is to be a procession from God and to possess divinity essentially (πρᾶγμα ἢ λόγιον θεῖον . . . ἐκ θεοῦ προαχθὲν); cf. Pachymeres, *Paraphr. in Ep̄p. S. Dion.* IX, P. G., III, 496, 497, 500: to be an essence κατ' αἰτίαν is to exist in a state of identity with God; to be καθ' ὑπαρξιν is to subsist as an emanation from Him, neither in a state of identity with God in His super-essentiality, nor as something other than God and divine by participation, nor yet as an entity which has its substantiality in itself. It is to possess the character of a divine word or providence and to subsist not as a hypostasis but as the potency for something or as a decree to be executed (οὐχ ὅτι ἐνυπόστατοι εἰσιν αἱ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόνοιαι, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἀπὸ θεοῦ εἰσι καὶ ὑπάρχουσι, οὐχ ὥς ὑφ' ἐστῶσαι ἀλλ' ὥς ἐνεργεῖν). Finally for an essence to exist "κατὰ μέθεξιν" is to exist as a hypostasis and to possess divinity adventitiously. The dissertation which Italos includes in his *Quaest. Quodl.* 90, ed. Joannou, 135—136 on modes of wholeness and their nature is founded on the relevant passages in the *El. Th.* and is even more ambiguous than that of Proclus. Italos seems to identify the whole-before-parts with the κατ' αἰτίαν ὅλον and to consider it as the exemplary originative cause of a coordinate manifold existing without division or extension (ἀδιάστατον καὶ ἀμερές). The whole-of-parts, on the other hand, he identifies with the whole καθ' ὑπαρξιν, asserting that it is an image of the whole-before-parts and that it is in a secondary sense what the whole-before-parts is in the primary sense. It is the sum total of the parts which exist in indivisible unity in the whole-before-parts and of which the latter is the potency or ground. Following Proclus, *El. Th.* 65 and 103 Dodds, 62, 92, Italos also goes on to assert that every existent is what it is said to be either as cause (κατ' αἰτίαν) or *secundum existentiam* (καθ' ὑπαρξιν) or still by participation (κατὰ μέθεξιν): Body is animal as cause, Animal is body by participation and Animal is existentially what it is asserted to be in its definition. The use of the term "καθ' ὑπαρξιν" to signify the mode that animality is contained in Animal is not readily reconcilable with the use of the same term to signify a wholeness-of-parts; cf. Joannou, *Christliche Metaphysik in Byzanz*, 52—54, 114—115.

⁴⁰ Eus. in *Eth.* 41. 16—31.

His critical examination of the Platonic doctrine of the Good which Aristotle offers in his *Nicomachean Ethics* he launches, it will be remembered, by urging against it what Eustratius calls the lemma: "ἐν οἷς τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὕστερον, ἐν τούτοις ἰδέα οὐκ ἔστιν." There are no Ideas of groups among the members of which there exists a relation of priority and posteriority. Honoring the principle that no Ideas are to be constructed for classes whose members form a serial order of prior and posterior terms, the Platonists themselves refrained from positing an Idea for number as such, an Idea that is, standing for the number series itself.⁴¹ This law, implies Eustratius, is analogous to the one which asserts

⁴¹ *Ibid.* 42. 21—25. *Nic. Eth.* I. 6. 1096a 17—19 should be read in conjunction with *Eud. Eth.* I. 8. 1218a 1—18: terms forming a serial order like the series of natural numbers can have no class-form, for if such a common and separable element existed, it would have had to be as the ground for the existence of the series as a whole prior to the first number of the series. Assuming, for example that the multiplicity predicated of multiples exists as a class-form it would have to be prior to the double which by definition is the first of the multiples. The conclusion, however, that there is something prior to the first, or that there are two grounds or prerequisites for the series, the one dependent upon the other, but both primal, is absurd. cf. Simplicius in *Cat.* 6, *Comm. in Arist. Graeca*, VIII, 126 and Aspasius in *Eth. Nic.*, *ibid.* XIX. 1. 11. For Aristotle's analysis of the concept of anteriority and posteriority see *Metaph.* V. 11. 1018b —1019a 14 and *Cat.* 12. 14a 26—14b 24; cf. *De. an.* I. 414b. See also *Metaph.* I. 9. 990b 20 and III. 3. 999a 6—10: if "number" conceived as the common predicate of all numbers, were a separable entity in the manner of an Idea, it would have to be prior to all numbers and therefore prior to the "first number", prior, i. e., to number "two" which starts off the series of natural numbers. On the problem which arises in the context of the Platonic theory of Ideas in connection with things among which the distinction of prior and posterior is present, see also S. Robin, *La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres d'après Aristote* (Paris, 1908), 154—170, 191—198, 612—626; J. Cook Wilson "On the Platonist Doctrine of the ἀσυμβλητοὶ ἀριθμοί," *Classical Review*, 18 (1904), 247—260; H. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Baltimore, 1944), 300—305, 513—524; H. H. Joachim, *Aristotle. The Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford, 1951) 34—41; Gauthier and Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, II. 1, 37—39. Robin, 197—198, points out that there is no Idea of terms constituting a series in which the distinction of priority and posteriority is present because no Idea can embrace such terms "dans ce qu'ils ont de différent et en tant qu'il forment une hiérarchie des termes subordonnés constituant une échelle de perfections." Wilson 255—256, opines that the "inseparableness" of the generic predicate from species which fall in an order of prior and posterior terms, is an instance of a more general principle which states that "If a generic notion is such as to include within itself the differentiae of certain given species, then none of the species contain anything outside and distinguishable from what is contained in the given notion." As an example of such a generic notion, Wilson cites "goodness." The nature of this notion is such that the many different goods are both like and unlike each other in goodness and goodness alone. Thus, in order to differentiate one good from another it is necessary to give different definitions of the goodness of each of the goods, a fact which makes it impossible to identify a single universal notion of goodness. The case of terms manifesting an order of prior and posterior terms "falls under this general principle, because the differentiae in respect of order are comprised in the generic notion itself as is obviously the

that it is necessary to conceive individuals belonging to a species as participating in the form constituting their specific nature in a strictly co-ordinate way ($\delta\mu\sigma\tau\alpha\gamma\omega\varsigma$) and not according to different degrees and priorities. What is true of the logical categories of species and genera is also true of Ideas. And just as it is impossible to see how individuals forming a hierarchy of prior and posterior terms and ranked in orders or classes, one above another, could constitute a single species of individuals, so it is impossible to see how things unequal in rank and related to one another disparately could be brought under the same Idea.⁴²

case with the generic notion of number." Cherniss, 301—305, 513—524, on the other hand, argued that the Platonists did not posit an idea of number in general because they conceived the essence of each idea of number to be "its *unique* position as a term in the ordered series of numbers," and the essence of number in general, as nothing but "the whole series of these unique positions." This being the case an idea of number apart from the order of ideal numbers, would be an unnecessary duplication. It is also his contention, *loc. cit.* 522—523, that for Aristotle all priority is ultimately capable of being reduced to a priority of the ontological kind. The Stagirite assumes that the term "prior" is essentially univocal and it is precisely this assumption that makes it possible for him to discover discrepancies in the Platonic teaching. Plato and the Platonists, however, did not grant that the relationship of priority and posteriority necessarily implies the ontological dependence of the posterior term upon the prior; nor did they show a disposition to include the principle of a serial order in the series itself by considering the first of the multiples as the principle of multiplicity, or the Idea of multiplicity as the first of the multiples. They indeed refused to posit Number-itself but not for the reasons attributed to them by Aristotle.

⁴² Eus. *in Eth.* 42. 25—30. The condition of coordination is in this connection identical for all practical purposes with the condition of simultaneity in nature exhibited by the species of the same genus. Species, though posterior to the genus to which they belong, are simultaneous in nature in relation to each other, and none is prior or posterior to the others. Arist. *Cat.* 12. Plotinus, *Enn.* vi. 1. 25, makes vigorous use of the principle that entities related to each other in terms of priority and posteriority cannot be brought under the same genus in connection with his appraisal of the fourfold division of being espoused by the Stoics. On the one hand, the Stoics assign to the category of Substrates priority over those of Qualities, States, and Relative States, assuming Substrates (including Matter) to be the source of all the rest of things, and on the other, they bring all four divisions under a single, overarching genus. This, however, is indefensible for in this relation the subsequent owes its existence to the prior, where as among things belonging to the same genus each must have essentially the equality implied by the genus. On the same ground Plotinus, *Enn.* VI. 1. 1., objects to an extension of the Aristotelian tenfold division of being, to cover all existence, intelligible as well as sensible. Either the term existence is equivocal as applied to both realms, or if there is no equivocation, it is strange to find the one same "Existence" applying to the primary and the derivative Existents, when there is no common genus embracing both primal & secondary; cf. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, 298, n. 197. A whole and its parts, a substance and its modifications, a principle and its derivatives, a cause and its effect, the original or authentic and its copies or imitations cannot be reduced to a unity, brought under the same head, and find representation in the same genus. See also, *Enn.* VI. 2. 3 and VI. 2. 1. Note, however, Cherniss' opinion that Plato did not conceive the relationship

The assertion that there is no common Idea embracing things related to each other in terms of priority and posteriority is true on the Platonists' own showing.⁴³ The minor premise of the syllogism, consisting of the proposition that the many goods in point of fact do constitute such a series of terms, the Stagirite establishes as follows: the term "good" is one that can be applied in at least three categories, that of substance, that of quality, and that of relatedness. Substance, however, stands for essential being, and nothing, unless it is a substance, has the property of existing of itself (τὸ ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ καὶ καθ' αὐτό). Quality too, though lacking the property of self-subsistence, is none the less capable of being known out of relation and without reference to or connection with anything else. But that which has the property of existing of itself or is knowable out of relation and *qua* itself, is naturally prior to that which has being or is meaningful only with reference to something else. Thus the "good" predicable in the category of quality must be conceived as being prior to mere relational good, and the "good" predicable in the category of substance as prior to both relational and qualitative goods. There are, therefore, relations of priority and posteriority among the many, partial goods, and given the law which disallows the representation by the same archetypal form of things which are not coordinate, the conclusion is unavoidable that the many goods cannot be represented by a single Idea.⁴⁴

obtaining between generic and specific ideas to be similar to that which obtains between principles and derivatives, wholes and parts. An Idea common to both animal and man is not for Plato absurd as a proposition. The Platonists may have refused to construct Ideas for entities having τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, but "they could not have included in this term the relationship of genus to species." Plato's notion of ontological priority and posteriority applies, to be sure, to the relation of Ideas to particulars, but not to that of generic to specific Ideas. Cherniss, *op. cit.*, 43—48, 264—265, 516, 524.

⁴³ See above n. 41. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, 519—520, also insists that the Platonists could not have objected to the mere separation of a common predicate of things having τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον: they did in fact posit the Idea of unity as the common predicate of the ideal: numbers. Plotinus, *Enn.* VI. 2. 13, seems to grant that the number series constitute a sequence in which the posteriors are latent in the priors and do not appear simultaneously. He also grants, *Enn.* VI. 3. 13, that it is a rule that numbers, thus grouped as prior & posterior, cannot be brought into a common genus. None the less, for Plotinus, *ibid.*, this does not mean that there is no wholeness or unity in which numbers are represented. Numbers are reducible to a single type by the mere fact of their being numbers. Moreover, numbers, besides having a common property, may also have a common origin, for the truth "may well be, not that one creates two, and two creates three but that all have a common source." Finally, Plotinus, *Enn.* vi. 6. 10, speaks of Absolute Number as he does of Absolute Justice, Beauty, Man etc., and considers it as the pre-existent cause by which produced things participate in quantity.

⁴⁴ Eus. in *Eth.* 43. 1—21; *Nic. Eth.* 1096a 17—22.

Enlarging upon the notion that there can be no common Idea of Good corresponding to the many partial goods, because the many goods, like the natural numbers, are things among which the relationship of priority and posteriority prevails or intrudes, Eustratius now makes a series of inferences which in effect constitute a fresh argument against the Platonic conception of a universal Good, distinguishable from the ones urged by Aristotle in this connection.

Priority and posteriority among participants in the same Idea, lack of equality in rank or order among them, he asserts, is indicative of an unequal participation of each individual in the archetypal Idea and can be attributed to a disparity in intensity or amount of participation: differing measures of distance and remoteness from the exemplar, unequal degrees of approximation.⁴⁵ Variability, however, in respect to amount or degree of participation occurs only in connection with the participation of accidents. It never arises in connection with the participation of substances (ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν συμβεβηκότων εὐρίσκεται μετοχής).⁴⁶ Thus, an Idea participated by things admitting increase or diminution in respect of degree would have to be treated as an accident. An accident, however, exists only in something else and through something else; and to attribute to an Idea the character of an accident, is to make that which is archetypal and is possessed of being in a pre-eminent sense, accessory to that which is secondary, derivative, and stands to the Idea as a copy does to a pattern; it is to make the imitation prior to the paradigm and the Idea of the Good, a simple accident in which substances participate. But this is inadmissible.⁴⁷ The unity which informs a plurality cannot be

⁴⁵ Εἰ γὰρ τῶν μετεχόντων ιδέας ἡστιν οὖν τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δ' ὕστερον, ἔσται καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐγγύτερον τοῦ ἀρχετύπου, τὸ δὲ πορρώτερον, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἔχειν μᾶλλον τὴν μετοχὴν τὸ δ' ἥττον. Καὶ ἡ ἑτερότης τῆς τάξεως ἐν τῇ μετοχῇ, <τὸ μὲν οἰκειότερον ποιήσει πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τὸ δ' ἀνοικειότερον, καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἔσται ἡ μετοχή>. Eus. in *Eth.* 43. 27—44. 1. Aristotle mentions the connection between priority and posteriority, on the one hand, and relative measure, degree, or amount of quality (attribute), on the other, in *Cat.* xii. 14b 3. See also Simplicius, in *Cat.* 6, *Comm. in Arist. Graeca*, VII, 126.

⁴⁶ Eus. in *Eth.* 44. 2—3. One of the most important characteristics of substance, according to Aristotle is that it does not admit of the variation of degree. The same substance "man" cannot be more or less man as compared with himself or another. With the exception of quantities, however, non-substantial being, relatives such as "like" and "equal," most qualities, and in general contingent, non-essential properties attached to substance, are capable of admitting degrees. *Cat.* V. 3b 33, VI. 6a 19, VII. 6b 20 viii, 10b 25. For a discussion of the approach of certain of the Schoolmen to the problem of forms admitting variations of degree see H. Shapiro, "Walter Burley and the Intention and Remission of Forms," *Speculum* 34 (1959), 413—427.

⁴⁷ Συμβεβηκότα δὲ λέγειν τὰ ἀρχέτυπα καὶ κυριώτερα ὄντα πρὸς τὰ δευτέρως ὄντα καὶ εἰκόνων λόγον ἐπέχοντα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς τινὶ συμβέ-

an accident of that plurality. It can only be conceived as its cause and principle. Unless one is ready to accept the conclusion that a cause can be subsequent to its effects and a plurality prior to the unity which it illustrates, one must grant that there is no single Idea corresponding to things which, like the many goods, constitute a series of prior and posterior terms.⁴⁸

In the first argument that Aristotle directed against the Platonic notion of a universal good, the Stagirite contented himself with showing that there was a substantial as well as a qualitative and relational good, because his aim had been to prove that the many goods constitute a class of things in which priority and posteriority can be predicated. In the second objection he urges against Plato's theory, his approach consists in establishing that the good is predicated in as many ways as being, that is, in all ten of the categories, no longer in order to show that the many goods constitute a class of things in which relations of anteriority and posteriority can be recognized, but in order to secure the admission that the term "good" is thoroughly equivocal. "Good" as applied to Intelligence enters the category of substance; as applied to the virtues enters the category of quality; as applied to the mean between excess and defect, that of quantity; as applied to occasion, that of time, etc. The term "good", then, has not one but ten generically distinct meanings. But an equivocal term whose meaning depends upon the category in which the predication is made cannot be said to derive from a single generic reality. There is, therefore, no Idea of good in the sense of one, ideal, archetypal

βηκεν ὃ δὲ συμβέβηκε τὸ συμβεβηκὸς πρότερον φύσει τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἐστίν. ἔσται ἄρα πρότερον φύσει τοῦ ἀρχετύπου τὸ μίμημα, ὅπερ ἀδύνατον. Eus. in *Eth.* 44. 3—7; cf. Arist. *Metaph.* VII. 6. 1031b 15 ff.: "At the same time it is clear that if there are Ideas such as some people say there are, it will not be substratum that is substance; for these must be substances, but not predicable of a substratum; for if they were, they would exist only by being participated in." In developing Aristotle's argument that entities in which the distinction of priority and posteriority is present cannot find representation in the same Idea, Eustratius pointed out that entities admitting τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον also admit τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. Only attributes or accidents of substance, however, can be participated in varying degrees, and to exist as entity admitting variability in quantity or quality is to exist as a non-substance. Such an Idea would lack self-subsistence and would be dependent for its being on something other than itself. Eustratius is working in this connection with ideas of the order of the ones utilized by Aristotle to support his claim that according to the Platonist's own principles only Ideas of substances are admissible. *Metaph.* I. 9. 990b—991 & 2 = 1079 & 26—33, and III. 6. 1002b 12—32. See also Robin, *La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres*, 171 ff., 191 ff., 499, 572, 627 ff., Cherniss *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, 239—240, 266, 279—283, 285 n. 192, 300—306, 314—316, 356—357.

⁴⁸ Eus. in *Eth.* 44. 7—12.

reality from which all particular goods arise and to which they trace their pedigree.⁴⁹

Eustratius offers a general answer to Aristotle's arguments against the Platonic Good founded on the fact that the many goods constitute a hierarchy in which the distinction of anteriority and posteriority is present, and that "good" is an ambiguous term which has as many senses as "being" and is predicable in all the categories, by referring once more the reader to what he is assured is the true teaching of Plato on the Good. Aristotle's objections to it are based upon a misinterpretation or even a falsification of the Master's doctrine. The crux of Eustratius' position is that Plato did not conceive of the Good as an ordinary Idea, one among many, and his contention is that Aristotle's objections are not pertinent to the case.⁵⁰ Plato conceived the Good as identical with the One and the Ineffable, the Idea which encloses within itself all other Ideas, introducing it as the transcendent, common cause of all beings. As the principle of all that is, it is identifiable with no being, part of being, or yet the whole system of things. Indeed, it can be said to be not-being: not to be sure as lacking in being, but as transcending all categories of being.⁵¹ It is the common good to which all secondary goods are referable and in which they participate. Each of these goods necessarily existing as something other than the Good-itself, is good by virtue of a participation in it, while its goodness is proportional to its capacity to receive the affluence of the Good. In contrast to all other goods, the Good-itself transcends all other determination and is uniquely and solely the Good. Its absolute unity is primarily a function of its utter simplicity. It is associated in thought with nothing else.⁵² This being the case, what fault did Plato commit when he affirmed the Good to be common to all as cause, on the ground

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 44. 14—45. 5. Arist. *Nic. Eth.* I. 6. 1097b 24—29; cf. *Topics* 107a 3—12. See also Robin, *La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres*, 153 n. 171 and Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, 322 n. 226; 360—362; 361 n. 270.

⁵⁰ Eus. *in Eth.* 45. 8—11.

⁵¹ Οὐδὲν τῶν πάντων διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὑπὲρ ὃν καὶ μὴ ὄν, οὐχ ὡς τοῦ ὄντος λειπόμενον, ἀλλ' ὡς ὄντος παντὸς ὑπερκείμενον. *Ibid.* 13—15 cf. Plato *Rep.* vi. 509b. See also note 26 below and Plot. *Enn.* V. 5. 6, III. 8. 9, VI. 9. 3, VI. 8. 11: The One is not Being, but beyond Being; it is no thing among things but prior to them all, and transcends even existence. In texts issuing from the school of Pseudo-Dionysius, God is frequently described as "μὴ ὄν" or "μὴ ὄν." See e. g. Max. *in Lib. Div. Nom.* IV. 7. P. G., IV, 253, 256, 260, 261. Italos writes with reference to Plato: "τὸν . . . θεὸν καθ' ὑπέρθεσιν τοῦτο [μὴ ὄν] ἐκάλει . . . εἰ τὸ αἰτιατὸν ὄν, μὴ ὄν ἢ τοῦτο παραγοῦσα ἀρχή." *Quaest. Quodl.* 5, Joannou, 7; cf. *ibid.* 21.

⁵² Ἐκεῖνο δὲ ὑπερῆπλωται καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τάχαθόν ἐστι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν κυρίως καὶ πρώτως, ὡς μὴ μετ' ἄλλου . . . θεωρούμενον. Eus. *in Eth.* 45. 18—20; cf. Plot. *Enn.* II. 9. 1.

that it is the universal cause, providing all things of which there is question in the ten categories with their very existence? And if he further described it as the universal good, on the ground that it antecedes the many goods and is the cause not only of their existence, but also of their existence *qua* goods, what absurdity did he state? Aristotle himself in the opening passage of his *Ethics*, points out Eustratius, undertook to praise those who identify the Good with the universal object of desire.⁵³ Such good, however, in order to be the ultimate object of all desiderative motion must be of necessity above all things, absolutely First and possessed of causality and univocity in the most ultimate degree. But a good defined in these terms is precisely the Good as conceived by Plato. Aristotle now undertakes to refute a thesis which he has already accepted. His opposition is purely sophistical.⁵⁴

R. A. Gauthier has recently declared that what is rejected by the Stagirite in his *Nicomachean Ethics* is not the reality of a transcendent good, but the Good-itself of Plato, the Idea of good, "an imaginary univocal concept of the good arbitrarily hypostasized." Aristotle willingly accepts the proposition of a self-subsistent universal good — what he refuses to entertain is the conception of the good as a self-subsistent universal.⁵⁵ The question, however, is precisely whether Plato did in point of fact conceive the Good as just a universal. Eustratius thinks that Plato did not, and he attacks Aristotle not for thinking that Plato did, but for *pretending* to think that he did. The whole weight of Eustratius' argument is that for Plato the Idea of the Good is the One, and the One is not a universal but the universal cause. What he understands Aristotle to be objecting to in the Platonic theory is the proposition itself that there is a primary good that is one and common to all goods (ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι καὶ ἓν). What he wants to know is how the originative cause of all things could fail to be one and common to all things, and how Aristotle

⁵³ The good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim. *Nic. Eth.* I. i. 1094a 2.

⁵⁴ Ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁμολογήσας αὐτό, νῦν δὲ σοφιστικώτερον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο μαχόμενος. *Eus. in Eth.* 45. 32—38; cf. *Metaph.* xii. 10. 1075a 11—25 where Aristotle grants that the highest good is conceivable as something separate and by itself (κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό), and *De Motu Animal.* 700b 32—35 where the prime mover, described in *Metaph.* xii. 7. 1073a 4 as a substance, eternal and separate from sensible things, is identified as the primary good. On the question of the correlation of the One and the Good in Plato and Aristotle see Robin, *La Théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres*, 504—505, 510, n. 455 II, 558 and n. 514, 571—583, and Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, 360—364, 381—383, and 382 n. 301. The retort in kind which Cherniss, *ibid.* 362—364, delivers to Aristotle is similar to the protest of Eustratius.

⁵⁵ Gauthier and Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, II, 48.

who acknowledges the Good to be that to which everything aspires, could also argue against the proposition that there is a good which is prior to all goods, one, and universal.

Eustratius does not undertake to explain precisely why he considers the cogency of Plato's true teaching on the Good impervious to the objections which Aristotle develops against it from the fact that the many goods form a serial order and that the term good is predicable in all of the ten categories. His reasons, however, are not difficult to ascertain. They are implicit in what he plainly states.

Eustratius admits that individuals must be conceived as participating in their species, and species in their genus, in a strictly co-ordinate manner and that for this reason entities which form a serial order of prior and posterior terms cannot be gathered into one class. If in spite of this admission he persists in asserting that this argument is inapplicable to Plato's conception of the Good, it can only be because it is his understanding that Plato did not put forth the Good as a genus and the secondary goods as so many equivalent manifestations of the same generic reality: though one and universal, the Good is not a genus predicable *in quid et essentialiter* of entities standing to it in the relationship of species. The argument of Aristotle disestablishes the Good as a genus. But then Plato, according to the Bishop of Nicaea, never said that the Good *was* a genus.⁵⁶

Eustratius dismissal as irrelevant of the first two of the arguments which Aristotle offers against the Platonic theory of the Good, on the ground that Plato did not conceive of the good as a genus, must be viewed against the background of Plotinus' dissertation on the kinds of Being in *Enneads* vi. 1—2. After examining the Aristotelian and Stoic views on the subject and opting for conclusions which he considers to be in agreement with those of Plato,⁵⁷ Plotinus raises the question whether unity or goodness may not have to be added to the five primary genera of Being, Motion, Stability, Identity, and Difference.⁵⁸ This question he answers negatively and the reasons why he does so are of the utmost interest to us in this connection. The plurality of existents is not fortuitous. It is a

⁵⁶ Aristotle, *Metaph.* X. 2. 1053b 9—1054a 19, who considers Being, Unity, and Good to be correlative terms predicable in all of the categories argues that they cannot be substances separable from other things and implies that Plato separated them as genera; cf. Robin, *La théorie platonicienne des idées et des nombres*, 133—134, 137, 192, 501—502, 504—505, 517, 527—528, 555, 557, and Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, 322, n. 226 (322—323) 358—362, n. 268 (359).

⁵⁷ *Enn.* vi. 2. 1.

⁵⁸ *Enn.* vi. 2. 9 and 17.

diversified unity or a plurality in unity.⁵⁹ Unity absolute as the cause of the incomplete and diversified unity of Being, cannot be placed side by side with the genera of Being. It is a rule that causes cannot be counted with effects.⁶⁰ Further, unity though it appears in connection with all things, it is not identical in all things. It is different in the cases of chorus, camp, ship, and house. Moreover, unity has a radically different significance according to whether it is applied to the intelligible or the sensible realms. The unity of a body which is a composite formed of diverse elements, is unlike the unity of Soul, which is that of a single nature.⁶¹ What is true of unity is also true of goodness. Goodness too is observed in all beings, but like unity it is not found identical in all of them. It appears in degrees and in so far as things good, they display relations of priority and posteriority: different beings as parts of Being participating in the Good in diverse measures, corresponding to their individual and characteristic natures.⁶² Indeed, the one and the Good being identical, the degree of the unity of one thing tallies with that of its goodness. Unity is proportional to Goodness: a greater degree of unity commands a greater degree of goodness and to the extent that something is one to the same extent it is also good.⁶³ Again, since the Good, identical with the One that is One, transcends all plurality and is simply and solely itself (οὐδὲν ἄλλον ἢ ἀγαθόν), a unity, that is, in which nothing else is present and to which nothing else attaches,⁶⁴ it contains no *differentiae*. But having no *differentiae* it can produce no species and a genus without species is not a genus.⁶⁵ Finally a genus is predicated of its species in respect of their essence. Thus when a genus is affirmed of a subject, its opposites cannot also be affirmed of the same subject. Nothing, however, is a unity to the exclusion of all plurality save the Absolute One. Consequently, if unity were a generic predicate attaching to the very essence of

⁵⁹ *Enn.* vi. 2—3.

⁶⁰ *Enn.* VI. I. I., I. 25, 2. 3, 2. 13.

⁶¹ *Enn.* VI. 2. 9—11.

⁶² *Enn.* VI. 2. 17 cf. *ibid.* 7. 18.

⁶³ *Enn.* VI. 2. 11. Degrees of unity do not correspond necessarily to degrees of being. Since unity is identical to goodness, degrees of unity correspond to degrees of goodness — the unity of a particular is related to a standard of perfection rather than to mere Being and aspiration is never merely for Being but for Being-in-perfection. *Ibid.*

⁶⁴ See n. 52 below. The “πάντως ἓν” is a unity in which nothing else is present (μηδὲν ἄλλο πρόσεστι). *Enn.* VI. 2. 9.

⁶⁵ Even the unity implicit in Being, the One that Is (τὸ ἓν ὄν) is as much a unity as it is a plurality. No particular manifestation of Being is a true unity ([τὸ] τὶ ἓν οὐχ ἓν· πολλά γὰρ ἦδη τὸ τὶ ἓν) and no genus or species can be a unity to the exclusion of plurality (ὁμωνύμως ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν). *Enn.* VI. 2. 10, cf. *ibid.* 11. It is a Plotinian dictum that unit to become a genus must forfeit its unity. *Enn.* VI. 2. 9 and 10.

those things which manifest it, one and the same thing would have to be both itself and its opposite.⁶⁶

Goodness and unity, accordingly, are observed in all beings and their manifestations are as many as those of substance.⁶⁷ The Good identical with the One, on the other hand, is not a genus of which substances in so far as they exhibit goodness and unity are species. The mere fact that an entity inheres in many things is not enough to make it a genus of those things or of anything else: "a common property need not be a genus," the point inherent in the complex is not the genus of the complex, and even Being implicit in Motion, Stability, Identity and Difference is not their genus.⁶⁸

It is not difficult to understand Eustratius' impatience with Aristotle when he sees him use in refutation of the Platonic notion of the Good arguments deriving from the fact that goodness comports degrees of priority and that "good" is a term capable of entering in all of the ten categories. For Eustratius knows that such arguments can only serve to establish the Good in the paramount position in which Plato had in fact placed it, not as one of the primary genera of things, but as the transcendent origin and goal of all things.

Soon after this, Eustratius, with reason, undertakes to re-examine the proposition that substantial being cannot be held to admit to *μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον* (variations of degree), that increase or decrease in pitch or intensity (*ἐπίτασις καὶ ἄνεσις*) occurs only in connection with the participation of accidents of substance and, consequently, that a form participated according to a greater or lesser degree cannot be said to enjoy substantial being.⁶⁹ He now points out that if, indeed, there can be no question of substances admitting variations of degree, it would be impossible to say that among beings there are some which participate in Being more and others which do so less. But rejecting the proposition that participation in Being can be according to varying degrees, makes it necessary for one to conceive the everlasting as having the same share in Being as that which is engendered, and that which is corruptible as that which is incorruptible. One would not be free to say that some beings are closer to that which *is* in the true and primary sense of the word, and others further removed from it, but that all beings participate in Being in a like manner.⁷⁰ Indeed, one would not be justified even in asserting

⁶⁶ *Enn.* VI. 2. 3 and 10.

⁶⁷ *Enn.* VI. 2. 10 and 17.

⁶⁸ *Enn.* VI. 2. 2, 8, 10—11.

⁶⁹ *Eus. in Eth.* 47. 27—33.

⁷⁰ *Εἰ δὲ μὴ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ἢ μέθεξις εἴη ἂν ἐπίσης ὄντα τοῖς αἰδιότοις τὰ γεννητὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀφθάρτοις τὰ φθαρτά. Ibid.* 35—38.

that the source of being excels in being and enjoys a natural priority over the things proceeding from it, except perhaps only in order of sequence, in the sense that is, that as cause it can be said to be prior to the things it causes.⁷¹ Finally, one would not be at liberty to say that the upward movement of reversion of things to their common cause differs from being to being. On the contrary one would have to take the position that it is the same in the case of the intelligible and the intelligent, the rational and the merely sensitive, the living and the non-living.⁷²

The fact is that the proposition that substances do not admit variations of degree is not true absolutely. From one point of view substances are principally and primarily the ones which the senses lay down. Substances, on the other hand, which are obtained by abstraction from sense perception and stand as mere concepts without hypostatical being are substantial in a secondary sense, their degree of substantiality depending upon their relative distance from sensible or primary substance with species being more truly substantial than genera.⁷³ From another point of view, however, substance in the primary sense is what Intelligence intellects, Being as the inner content or object of Intelligence. In this context all entities which subsist through participation in Being and Intelligibility are substances in a secondary sense only, their degree of substantiality depending upon the measure of their distance from the true standard in a scale of perfection whose grades range from intelligible to sensible existence and from being to becoming.

To speak in this sense of variation of degree in connection with substance, is by no means absurd. To be sure, a substance considered in itself or in comparison to other substances belonging to the same order of being, cannot be held to admit τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον. One particular substance "man" cannot be more or less man either than himself at different times or than some other man. Nor is the substance "man" more truly man, than the substance "horse" is horse. When one considers, however, substance in its vertical manifestation on diverse levels of

⁷¹ Οὐδ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ μεταδιδὸν τῆς ὀντότητος πλεῖον ἔξει τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τῇ φύσει πρῶτον ἔσται. *Ibid.* 47. 38—48. 1.

⁷² Οὐδ' ἡ ἔφεσις αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπιστροφή ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως. *Ibid.* 48. 1—5.

⁷³ Aristotle acknowledges that though substance cannot be said to be more or less what it is, one substance can be more or less truly substantial than another: genera are less truly substantial than species, and species less truly substantial than individuals. *Cat.* V. 2a 11—19, 3b 32—4a 9; cf. *Metaph.* VIII. 3. 1044a 10. Simplicius comments that variations of degree are predicable to substance accidentally. Species are more truly substantial than genera by virtue of their closer proximity to primary, sensible substance.

Being, variations of degree become predicable, and this admission does not have the effect of obliterating the distinction between substance and accident of substance: an accident remains capable of admitting τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον within itself and of manifesting itself in varying degrees among things possessed of the same rank and belonging to the same class.⁷⁴

The third argument against the Platonic conception of a universal Good that Eustratius considers is the one founded on the contention that things represented by one Idea must also constitute the object of a single science. Proceeding from the premise: ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν, μία ἐπιστήμη, Aristotle draws the conclusion that no common Idea is separable from the many goods, for not only is there no single science of all goods, but there are many sciences even of goods which fall under the same category (in the category of time, e.g., right occasion in war falls in the province of military strategy, in disease, it falls in that of medicine).⁷⁵

Even those who find the arguments which Aristotle offered in his *Nicomachean Ethics* against the Platonic notion of a universal good cogent, relevant, and compelling are apt to make an exception of the objection to the Platonic Good which Aristotle directs from the premise, "one science — one Idea." One of them readily admits that this argument is one of those criticisms "of Platonic doctrine in Aristotle which looks superficial and pedantic."⁷⁶ Eustratius on his part finds it positively

⁷⁴ Ammonius, in *Porph. Isag., Comm. in Arist. Graeca*, IV. 3, 94, distinguishes between variations of degree obtained from comparisons in depth (κατὰ βάθος) from such variations obtained from comparisons in breadth (κατὰ πλάτος). Substances do not yield τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον when compared in breadth: one man compared to another is not more "ἄνθρωπος" or more "λογικός," nor is a man or a horse more "animal" than an ox. When it is question, however, of comparisons in depth distinctions of degree among substances become operative. Rationality (τὸ λογικόν) exists in a greater degree in Intelligence than in Soul and in a greater degree in Intelligence and Soul than in us. Philoponus, in *Cat., Comm. in Arist. Graeca*, xiii. 1, 75—77, like Ammonius points out that when Aristotle denied that substances admit variations of degree he was considering substances in themselves and in their horizontal relationships. In vertical comparisons, however, variation of degree can be predicated. Thus it is not true that τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον is encountered only in connection with accidents and the participation of accidents. Both Intelligence and Soul are Life. But Intelligence is more truly Life than Soul; cf. also Plotinus *Enn.* VI. 1, 3: substance in the first degree is that which pure Intelligence grasps as the first intelligible, i. e., being *qua* being (τὸ ὄν ἢ ὄν); all other substances are substances by derivation and in a lower degree.

⁷⁵ Eus. in *Eth.* 46. 1—17. *Nic. Eth.* I. 6. 1096 29—34, and *Eud. Eth.* 1217b 34—1218 1. For Plato the Idea of Good is the highest knowledge (μέγιστον μάθημα) and the cause of science and truth (αἰτία ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἀληθείας). *Rep.* 505A, 508E.

⁷⁶ Joachim, Aristotle. *The Nicomachean Ethics*, 43.

sophistical.⁷⁷ The fact that the goods existing in the various categories and even the various goods in the same category are the objects of different sciences, can never amount to an argument against the reality of the Good as conceived by Plato.⁷⁸ That all these goods are good only in so far as they participate, and to the extent that they participate, in the source of all goodness no sensible person will doubt.⁷⁹ What if goodness *does* admit variation of degree, and one good approximates the standard more and another less, while one good is substantial and absolute and another relative and good only in so far as it contributes to an end that is good in itself?⁸⁰ One will admit that in respect of value the many goods do, indeed, exhibit degrees of perfection and constitute an ordered sequence of prior and posterior terms. Order which prevails everywhere, may also be expected to prevail in the sphere of the goods. The many goods form a hierarchical order of successive differentiations. Their participation in the Good itself is not random, but neither is it uniform. The extent to which each reflects the source from which it proceeds depends upon its place and grade in this order.⁸¹ Their unity is founded on the fact that they are all representation of the same exemplar and participants in the same reality, but both as representations and participants some are quite remote while others are more effective. If an orderly disposition of things is a good and disorder an evil, how can one reasonably dispute the proposition that the transmission of goodness must needs observe order and degree?⁸² Either one is willing to entertain the notion of a universe in which all things are of the same rank and grade, uniform throughout in nature and value, and from which all diversity and differentiation is absent, or one will have to accept a conception of the cosmos which admits the ideas of harmony, diversification, and variation in degree of importance and perfection — a universe whose parts though deriving from a single source, are not for this reason specifically or generically identical, but exhibit great variation in rank, nature, value, degree of approximation and extent of participation in the Supreme.⁸³

⁷⁷ Εἰ καὶ σοφιστικῶς ἐπιχειρεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τὸ καθόλου καὶ ἐν ἀγαθὸν παρεισάγοντας, ἀλλ' οὖν οὐ παραιτητέον οὔτε τὰ αὐτοῦ διασαφεῖν οὔτε μὴν τάληθες κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν παριστᾶν. Eus. in *Eth.* 46. 1—4; cf. Paul Natorp, *Platons Ideenlehre*, 2nd. ed. (1921), 431.

⁷⁹ Οὐδεὶς νοῦν ἔχων ἀμφισβητήσει. *Ibid.* 20—22.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 18—20.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.* 22—26.

⁸¹ τάξεις γὰρ πᾶσιν . . . καὶ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μέθεξιν ὑπάρχειν ἐκάστῳ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ τάξιν. *Ibid.* 26—29. Each principle or thing participates its superior in the measure of its natural capacity; cf. Proclus, *El. Th.* 173, Dodds, 150.

⁸² Eus. in *Eth.* 46. 29—31.

⁸³ Ἢ ἀπαιτεῖται τις ὁμοταγὴ πάντα εἶναι, ὁμοειδῆ τε καὶ ὁμοφυῆ καὶ τὸ διάφορον ἀφαιρεῖται τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ὑπάρξεως τε καὶ τάξεως μηδὲ κόσμου εἶναι μηδ' ἁρμονίαν τινὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλ' εἰκῇ συγκεχύσθαι πάντα ἢ εἰ κόσμος καὶ τάξις καὶ πάντα μὲν ἐξ ἑνός, πλὴν οὐ τὰ αὐτὰ κατ' εἶδος οὐδὲ κατὰ γένος. *Ibid.* 31—38.

If the objects of knowledge, however, differ in nature, order, and nobility, how could the soul's mode of knowing them be the same? It is a characteristic of the soul that it knows things in their diversity, diverse things in diverse ways, and each thing in a mode appropriate to its place in the hierarchy of being.⁸⁴ Intelligence, to be sure, existing in a state of complete separation from body and matter apprehends the totality of the real in a single act and is possessed of an undivided knowledge of things divided and a unitary knowledge of things manifold.⁸⁵ The soul, however, is incapable of realizing the ideal of a perpetuity of intuitive thought encompassing eternally, steadfastly, simultaneously and in an unvarying measure of completeness all knowledge. Its operation is not like that of Intelligence, a single, simple timeless act of intellection embracing all intelligibles. It is an activity which involves change and transition. Soul knows things in division, severally, parcelwise, in a transitive mode, and each in a way appropriate to its nature. Unable to grasp Being in its unity, the soul apprehends it as numerous and varied so that universality of knowledge the soul attains by knowing Being in the fulness of its diversity, one thing after another, and each in a mode appropriate to its nature.⁸⁶ But if beings *qua* beings are not knowable in the same way,

⁸⁴ Πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναγκαῖον θεωροῦσαν ἕκαστα οἰκείως ἐπιβάλλειν ἑκάστῳ καὶ οἰκείως θεωρεῖν καὶ τέχνας συνιστᾶν καὶ ἐπιστήμας κατὰ τε γένη τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ εἶδη καὶ θεωρεῖν τὰς φύσεις κατὰ τὸ ἑκάστη ἀνάλογον; *Ibid.* 46. 38—47. 4.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* 47. 4—7; cf. Procl. *El. Th.* 20, 52, 63, 169, 175, Dodds, 22, 50, 60, 146, 152. See also *ibid.* 124, Dodds, 110, and Plotinus, *Enn.* II. 9. 1, V. 3. 1—11 and 5. 1—3.

⁸⁶ In true Neoplatonic fashion Eustratius, *ibid.* 7—13, presents the Soul as circling around Intelligence and gaining Knowledge in its movement. This passage in Eustratius is all but a literal transcription of Proclus, in *Parm.* Stallbaum, 627—628 (Cousin, V, 32 f.). I am offering both passages. Eustratius: Νοῦς μὲν γὰρ ὕλης ἀπλύτως ὢν... ἀθρόως πάντα θεωρήσει καὶ ἡνωμένως τὰ πεπληθυσμένα καὶ ἀμερίστως τὰ εἰδητικῶς ἀριθμούμενα καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως τὰ διηρημένα περιέχων, ψυχὴ δὲ ἐφίεται μὲν τὴν ἀθρόαν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ νοῦ περιλαβεῖν, ὀρεγομένη τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τελειότητος, καὶ τὸν ἐκείνου καὶ ἀπλοῦ τῆς νοήσεως εἶδους. Μὴ δυναμένη δὲ τῆς ἀθρόας ἐκείνου ἐφικέσθαι νοήσεως, περιθεῖ τε τὸν νοῦν καὶ περιχορεύει κύκλῳ καὶ ταῖς μεταβάσεσι τῶν ἐπιβολῶν διαιρεῖ τὸ μεριστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ διάφορον. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τρόπους γνώσεως ἄλλους καὶ ἄλλους ἐπινόει, ἵν' οἰκείως ἑκάστῳ τοῖς γνωστοῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα τῆς τῶν πάντων ἐφικηται γνώσεως. Proclus: Ο μὲν θεῖος καὶ δημιουργικὸς νοῦς ἡνωμένως τὰ πεπληθυσμένα καὶ ἀμερίστως τὰ μεριστὰ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτως περιέχει τὰ διηρημένα· τὸ δὲ πρῶτον διαιροῦν τὰ ἐν ἐκείνῳ προϋπάρχοντα κατ' ἄκρην ἔνωσιν ψυχὴ ἐστίν, οὐχὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ θεία. Διότι γὰρ ἐν αἰῶνι μόνον τὰς νόησεις ἰδρυμένας οὐκ ἔλαχεν, ἐφίεται δὲ τὴν ἀθρόαν ἐνέργειαν τοῦ νοῦ περιλαβεῖν, ὀρεγομένη τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τελειότητος καὶ τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου καὶ ἀπλοῦ τῆς νοήσεως εἶδους, περιθεῖ τε αὐτὸν καὶ περιχορεύει κύκλῳ καὶ ταῖς μεταβάσεσι τῶν ἐπιβολῶν διαιρεῖ τὸ μεριστὸν τῶν εἰδῶν, καθορῶσα μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ καλὸν χωρὶς καθορῶσα δὲ τὸ αὐτοδίκαιον, καθορῶσα δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἄλλων· καὶ καθ' ἓν πάντα καὶ οὐχ ὁμοῦ πάντα νοοῦσα... Οὐ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἔστιν οὐκ ἔτι, τῶν θείων εἰδῶν ὁμοῦ καὶ ἡνωμένως ἐν τῷ δημιουργικῷ νῷ προϋφεισθηκότων, τὴν ἡμετέραν ψυχὴν διηρημένως αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλειν καὶ νῦν μὲν τὰ πρῶτιστα καὶ κοινότατα θεωρεῖν

neither can goods as goods (favorable opportunity *qua* favorable opportunity, the moderate *qua* the moderate) be embraced in a single science.⁸⁷ Being in its determinacy is various, being of this or that kind, physical, mathematical, celestial, terrestrial. For this reason not all beings are the objects of the same science. But the same diversity obtains in the case of the "opportune," the "moderate" etc. And if the fact that different kinds of beings are objects of different sciences causes no wonder, there is no reason why the fact that opportunity in war is the subject of strategy, while opportunity in disease is that of medicine should do so. All goods, then, in virtue of the fact that they are participants in the same reality, have one and the same referent. They do not, however, for this reason constitute a single class of things. They exist as goods of this or that kind and in their variety they are the subject matter of diverse arts and sciences each of which is specially adapted to contend with the good falling in its province.⁸⁸

Eustratius now comes to the argument which Aristotle develops against the Platonic postulate of a separate Good conceived as the Good itself from the fact that in as much as that which is good and the Good

εἶδη νῦν δὲ τὰ μέσσην ἔχοντα τάξι, αὖθις δὲ τὰ μερικώτατα καὶ ὅλον ἀτομώτατα τῶν εἰδῶν. Cf. *praet. Procl. in II Tim.*, Diehl, I, 248; *El. Th.* 20, 170, 190—193, 199 Dodds, 22, 148, 166, 168, 174 and Dodds' comments, *ibid.* 301—303. See also Plato *Sophist* 249 B—C; Arist. *Nic. Eth.* 1154b 24—28; Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, 441 n. 378; Ps. Dion. *De div. nom.* IV. 9, P. G., III, 769.

⁸⁷ "Ὡς περ οὖν ὡς ὅντα οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔσχε τῆς γνώσεως πάντα τὰ ὄντα, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἀγαθῶν ἀπάντων μία γνώσις ἢ ἀγαθὰ οὐδὲ τῶν καιρῶν ἢ καιροὶ οὐδὲ τῶν μετρίων ἢ μέτρια. Eus. in *Eth.* 47. 15—18. Eustratius is by no means disputing Aristotle's claim that there is a single science of being as being. *Metaph.* IV. 1. 1003a 21—32, VI. 1. 1026a 23—36, XI. 3. 1060b 31—1061b 17, XI. 7. 1064b 6—14. There is no question in this connection of being simply, i. e., being *qua* being, but rather of beings which in so far as they are, are determinate, fall under different classes, and in accordance with the principle: one class — one perception — one science, are objects of diverse sciences.

⁸⁸ It will be noted that in form Eustratius' argument resembles that which Aristotle offers in support of his contention that there is a single science of being *qua* being. Not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature. Since the term "being" has one referent (primary being or substance not identical with physical substance) and is said πρὸς ἓν not by mere ambiguity, beings do in fact fall under the category of things which are related to one common nature. Seeing, however, that the terms "being," "unity," and "goodness" are correlative, an argument which establishes a single referent for beings establishes also a single referent for entities that are one and good. It also establishes a science of the good distinct from the sciences and arts which are concerned not with good *qua* good but with the good *qua* right opportunity, *qua* the mean between excess and defect etc. cf. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato & the Academy*, 235—240, 237—239 n. 143, 357—364, 361—362 n. 362.

itself are both good, they are indistinguishable with respect to nature and consequently indistinguishable with respect to being.⁸⁹

This argument, Eustratius remarks, is an embarrassment not only to Plato's doctrine of the Good but to the whole theory of Ideas, for it renders destitute of sense the adoption of any entity with the characteristics of the Platonic Idea. If both "man himself" (ὁ αὐτοάνθρωπος, the Idea of man), and man in his essential nature (ὁ ἄνθρωπος, man simply) are "man" and answer to the same definition, then *qua* men, "man himself" and each man in that in which his being consists, cannot be differentiated. What is true of what the Platonists call "ὁ αὐτοάνθρωπος" and "τὸ αὐτοαγαθόν" is also true of all entities which they separate as wholes prior to parts; neither in definition nor in being are they distinguishable from individuals in their essential natures. The hypothesis of ideas is superfluous and extravagant.⁹⁰

By way of retort Eustratius invites Aristotle to explain how goodness can be the same and subsist in the same mode in that which is material and in that which is not, in that which exists as a copy and in that which has its being as an exemplar, in the simple and in the composite, in that which owes its existence to participation and in that which transcends the fact of partaking as well as that of being partaken.⁹¹ He also demands to know how, indeed, the account of the essential nature of entities differing from each other as an archetype differs from its image can be the same, when even *qua* substances archetype and image will not admit the same definition,⁹² and finally, how the definition of an immaterial substance which must needs be a formula of form only can be the same as that of a physical substance which is incomplete unless it figures matter as one of its parts.⁹³

⁸⁹ Eus. in *Eth.* 49. 13—24; *Nic. Eth.* I. 6. 1096a—b5.

⁹⁰ Eus. in *Eth.* 49. 22—24; cf. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* 202—203. The difficulties arising from the distinction between the Good-itself, a particular good, and "being good," i. e., the essence of good, Aristotle also examines in *Metaph.* vii. 6.

⁹¹ Ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὃ Ἀριστοτέλες, τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται καὶ ὡσαύτως ἐν τῷ ἀλόῳ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐνύλῳ καὶ ἐν τῇ εἰκόνι καὶ τῷ παραδείγματι καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀπλῷ καὶ τῷ συνθέτῳ καὶ τῷ κατὰ μέγεθος καὶ τῷ ἀμεθέκτῳ; Eus. in *Eth.* 49. 24—27.

⁹² Ἡ καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι πῶς ἔσται ὁ αὐτὸς τοῖς οὕτως . . . διεστῶσι πρὸς ἄλληλα, εἰ μὴ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν καὶ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ὡσαύτως τὸν τῆς οὐσίας [λόγον] ἐπιδέχεται; *Ibid.* 27—30. The difference between the exemplar and its copy is the difference between Socrates and his portrait.

⁹³ Ἐπεὶ καὶ κατὰ σέ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνύλων καὶ φυσικῶν τότε ἔξει ὁ ὅρος τὸ τέλειον ἔπαν ἢ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἀλλήλοις συνέρχονται. *Ibid.* 30—34. If the definition of a form were identical with that of its material representation, the formula of the essence of a form would include matter as one of its parts; cf. Arist. *Metaph.* VII. 10—11. A definition of an entity is for Aristotle the formula of its essence. In the case of material substances matter is necessarily an ele-

For Aristotle, then, the words which the Platonists form by the addition of the term αὐτό to the names of particular things, "the good itself", "man himself" etc., cannot be held to refer to entities different in nature or being from particular things. Moreover, according to him, the assertion of the Platonists that Ideas are eternal, the particulars perishable, is irrelevant, for this distinction, too, fails to introduce a difference in nature. Just as the white which endures for a year is no whiter than that which last for a day only, so the Good itself will not be more good than the many goods by reason of its being eternal: *qua* good the universal good and the particular goods will continue to abide in the condition of identity which the sharing of a common formula of essence implies.⁹⁴ Things do not share the formula descriptive of their essence in degrees proportionate to the length of their continuance in time, any more than a substance in its quiddity admits variations of degree.⁹⁵ A man whose life span is long is not more "man" than a man whose life span is short. The definition of man remains the same in both cases. Time is not a form which can function as a complement to an essence.⁹⁶

Nonetheless, it is a simple and inescapable truth that the eternal is a good of a superior rank to the ephemeral. If being can be graded higher than non-being, then that which remains for ever rooted in being, the timeless and eternal, is superior to that which is susceptible of lapsing into non-being.⁹⁷ In developing his argument that the distinction between the timeless and the perishable does not indicate a difference in nature, Aristotle proceeds on the assumption that the eternal and self-dependently real is related to the ephemeral as that which has a long life span is related to that which has a shorter one.⁹⁸ This, however, is unwarranted. Among things which are liable to change and decay relative differences in length of life span do not indicate differences in type of being.⁹⁹ The difference, however, which sets off the timeless and eternal from the

ment of the definition. The brazen circle, e. g., has its matter in the formula of its essence. Where the formula, however, does not refer to the concrete object, as for example the definition of the circle considered as a figure, matter will not be present in the definition.

⁹⁴ Eus. *in Eth.* 49. 35—50. 8. *Nic. Eth.* I. 6. 1096b 3.

⁹⁵ Eus. *in Eth.* 50. 8—12. See also notes 73 and 74 above.

⁹⁶ Οὐδὲν γὰρ ὁ χρόνος εἶδει τινί, ἢ εἶδος ἐστὶ, προστιθήσιν. Eus. *in Eth.* 50. 13—14.

⁹⁷ Εἰ γὰρ τὸ εἶναι ἐκάστῳ κρείττον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ αἰεὶ εἶναι κρείττον τοῦ ποτέ. Τῷ γὰρ ποτέ ὄντι, ὅταν τὸ εἶναι διακόπτεται, τότε οὐκ ἔστιν ὄν, ἀλλὰ δὴ μὴ ὄν. "Ὅν δὲ τότε τὸ αἰδίδιον κρείττον τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἐστὶ. *Ibid.* 16—18.

⁹⁸ Witness his appeal for illustration to the case of the white which lasts for a year and to that of the white which lasts for a day.

⁹⁹ Βραχυχρόνιον γάρ τι καὶ μακροχρόνιον ἕτερον τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι ἐνδέχεται φύσεως. Eus. *in Eth.* 50. 22—23.

contingent and temporary *is*, indeed, a difference in kind of being. The temporal represents material substance subject to flux and always in a state of becoming, never in one of being. The eternal, on the other hand, represents immaterial substance excluding all fluidity, true being transcending all becoming.¹⁰⁰

All in all, in comparing the good which is in and by itself the reality it is said to be, and the good which is good only by participation, it is impossible to see how one cannot but admit that the former is principally, primarily, and most truly the reality which the latter is derivatively and secondarily.¹⁰¹

It may be objected, continues Aristotle, that the Platonists predicated under one species and referred to a single Idea only the so-called intrinsic goods and not all goods indiscriminately. But if there are many goods which are good *per se*, then the Idea of good is not unique in being good in itself and if the Idea of good is unique in being good in itself, then the Idea of Good would be a genus devoid of species in which case the theory of a universal good would be inane and superfluous, for it is void of meaning or sense to postulate a universal when there are no particulars to represent it.¹⁰²

In his response to this argument, Eustratius' exasperation with the Stagirite is once more palpable. Addressing him in the second person he asks how can anyone fail to see that even if intellectuality, wisdom, and the contemplative life are declared to be intrinsically good in the sense of being good in themselves and being sought after for themselves, without accessory advantage, their intrinsicality as goods is not identical with that of the Idea of good. The Idea of good is the Good itself in the sense that it is the self-subsistent, self-existent, exemplary cause of all goods. Goods such as prudence, on the other hand, though good in themselves and not mere means or contributory to good, are not archetypal to, or productive of, other things, do not exist in themselves, and are said to be καθ' αὐτά not as substances, but merely as goods pursued for their own sakes.¹⁰³ Eustratius dismisses Aristotle's argument as a spurious

¹⁰⁰ Ἄλδιον δὲ καὶ ἐφήμερον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται [τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι φύσεως]. *Ibid.* 23—26. cf. Arist. *Metaph.* I. 10. 1058b 36—1059a 9: the essential nature in virtue of which things are perishable and imperishable are opposed and therefore are other in kind.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.* 26—30. Eustratius adds ironically that Aristotle, it would seem, is bent upon offering nothing but sophistical objections to the doctrine of Ideas in order not to detract from his Master's reputation. *Ibid.* 30—33.

¹⁰² Eus. in *Eth.* 51. 20—53. 25; *Nic. Eth.* 109668—20.

¹⁰³ Eus. in *Eth.* 53. 25—32.

objection founded upon equivocation: the ambiguity of the term καθ' αὐτό.¹⁰⁴

Neither can one concede to Aristotle's next argument. If, on the contrary, argues Aristotle, the idea of good is not empty and there are in fact many things which are good *per se* besides the idea, all these goods ought to be conceived as manifesting the same notion or account of goodness. Such intrinsic goods as intellectuality and certain pleasures, and honors, however, have diverse accounts. Therefore, they cannot be held to be good by reference to one idea.¹⁰⁵

The first thing to note points out Eustratius, is that Aristotle himself furnishes us here with the means to solve the sophism which he sets up.¹⁰⁶ If by his own admission certain goods can be specifically defined as "good in themselves" on the ground that they are pursued and desired of their own sakes, this can only be because such goods do in fact in respect of their very goodness come under one and the same notion of good.¹⁰⁷ In spite of his protestations, Aristotle seems strangely to forget that the question is not whether prudence *qua* prudence or pleasure *qua* pleasure can be given the same account, but whether prudence and pleasure *qua* goods can be held to manifest the same notion of goodness.¹⁰⁸ The fact that not all intrinsic goods can be declared to be good to an equal degree or measure is no reason why one should abstain from positing a good in itself as the idea under which those of the goods which manifest the notion of intrinsic goodness are capable of being subsumed. Just as all white objects are white by participation in a form the account of which is one even though participation in it is not always according to one rule, so too the ideal good is one even though the various intrinsic goods in their capacity as so many different approximations of that good do not attain identity. In their nature as goods which are desirable in themselves and not as accessories, they share the same account, but in their nature as so many different likenesses of the Good, they are distinct.¹⁰⁹ It must be further noted that what the many intrinsic goods directly participate, is not the Good as the undivided principle of all goodness, the Good as

¹⁰⁴ "Ὡστε περιττόν σοι καὶ τοῦτο τὸ σόφισμα ἐξ ὁμωνύμου τάχα παρεισαγόμενον διὰ τὸ πλεοναχῶς τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι. *Ibid.* 32—34.

¹⁰⁵ Eus. *in Eth.* 54. 1—13. *Nic. Eth.* 1096b 21—26.

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.* 54. 14—15.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.* 15—18.

¹⁰⁸ Οὐ γὰρ ἡ τιμὴ καὶ φρόνησις καὶ ἡδονή, ζητεῖται, εἰ εἰς ὁ λόγος αὐτῶν, ἀλλ' ἡ ἀγαθὰ ἐστίν· οὗτος δὲ εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀποδέδοται. *Ibid.* 18—20.

¹⁰⁹ Οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ἐντεῦθεν κωλύεται ἰδέα τις εἶναι τοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθοῦ, ὅφ' ἦν ἀναφέρεται τὰ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀγαθὰ, ἔπειτα εἰ ἕκαστον τούτων οὐκ ἰσωμέτρως λέγεται ἀγαθὸν ὥς οὐδὲ λευκὰ τὰ λευκά. *Ibid.* 20—27.

the-whole-before-the-parts in its transcendent plenitude and universality, prior to all distinction and differentiation and as it preexists in simple, impartible, absolute unity. Participated goodness consists of the types of goodness into which the transcendent universal is analyzable, while participation in goodness is always participation in patterns of goodness actualized in their individuality.¹¹⁰ Thus, the fact that the several intrinsic goods fail to display a complete equivalence as goods is an indication that they are goods by participation, not a sign that they are not good by reference to a single Idea.¹¹¹ It is necessary to posit a transcendent Good conceived as the good as a whole and the potency of all specific goods, in order to account for the-unity-in-variety displayed by the many immanent forms of goodness. The diversity observed in the participants in goodness, springs from the fact that the Good, *proprie* impartible (ἀμέθεκτον), is susceptible to participation indirectly in its various manifestations: the many immanent forms of goodness it generates.¹¹²

Eustratius now comes to Aristotle's admission that whereas the many intrinsic goods cannot be predicated under a single Idea, neither can they be held to be homonymous accidentally. It is not by chance or caprice of language that certain things though differing as to nature and statement of essence, should nevertheless carry the common name of "good." The community of appellation (κοινωνία τῆς κλήσεως) obtaining among the different goods must be conceived as resting upon some sort of real unity, upon a genuine affinity of some kind.¹¹³ The act of applying the term good to two distinct things, elaborates Eustratius, is not in fact

¹¹⁰ Εἶναι δ' ἄλλο τὸ μετεχόμενον καὶ ἄλλο τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ θεωρούμενον καὶ ἐν ἀμεθέκτῳ ὑπάρξει ὀφειστικῆς καὶ νοοῦμενον, πρὸς δὲ τὸ πολλὰ καὶ ἀλλήλων διάφορα ὡς ὁμοιάματα ἀναφέρεται. *Ibid.* 27—30.

¹¹¹ "Ὅτι γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν κατὰ μετοχὴν ἀγαθὸν ἐστὶ . . . δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὡσαύτως εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἕκαστον. *Ibid.* 54. 30—32.

¹¹² The Good itself as a transcendent universal and the principle of a series of things possessing a common character is distinct from participated goodness and "does not become a chattel." Participation in the same universal is no bar to variety. An act of participation gives rise to a number of particular things related to each other as so many distinct likenesses of the same archetypal form. No particular exhausts the essence of the universal whose light it reflects. Present in all the recipients of its power, the informing principle is not present in all of them identically. This elaboration in Eustratius reflects the Neoplatonic solution of the problem of participation, that is, the problem of how the higher is present in the lower. This solution consists in part in declaring the universal to be in itself transcendent and impartible, and immanent and partible only in its emanant powers: sketched out by Plotinus, *Enn.* IV. 2. I, VI. 4—5, VI. 2. 20, it was given dogmatic formulation by Proclus, *El. Th.* 23, Dodds, 26—29, in a proposition which E. Bréhier, *Hist. de la Philosophie*, I (2), 477 calls the fundamental theorem of the *Elements of Theology*. Cf. Dodds, *Proclus. El. Th.* 210—212.

¹¹³ Eus. in *Eth.* 55. 1—56. 19; *Nic. Eth.* I. 6. 1096b 26—30.

like the act by which two men, one living in Egypt, the other in Rome, and complete strangers to each other, happen to name their sons "Alexander."¹¹⁴ The homonymy of the many goods cannot be founded on mere chance. Aristotle concludes that the correspondence which the many goods exhibit must be founded on one of two reasons: goods are denoted by the same name either because they derive from a single type of thing or principle and contribute to a single purpose or end (ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἓν) or their homonymy is based upon analogy, a similarity or correspondence in some respect between things essentially dissimilar.¹¹⁵

Since according to Eustratius, Aristotle's arguments do not destroy the notion that the unity or affinity of the many goods results from the fact that they all answer to one idea, he contents himself, at this point, with a restatement of the Platonic position. Whenever there is a real affinity such as that which exists between the many goods, the community of denotation is founded upon a participation in a single idea and not upon analogy or upon any other circumstance. The only thing to observe is that whereas the Platonists described the participant as bearing a likeness to the Idea in which it participates and the participants in the same Idea as bearing a likeness to each other by virtue of the community of their participation, they did not further conceive the likeness which binds the image to the exemplar capable of being turned the contrary way. The copy always resembles the pattern, for it is after the pattern or paradigm that it is formed. On the other hand, there is nothing that makes it also necessary to say that the exemplar bears a likeness to its semblance. It is sufficient if it is conceived as the archetype of the copy.¹¹⁶

¹¹⁴ Eus. in *Eth.* 55. 14—19.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* 55. 22—56. 1.

¹¹⁶ Ἄλλ' οὐχ αἱ ἰδέαι οὕτωςί, Ἀριστοτέλες, ἀλλ' ὡς αὐταὶ καὶ ἑαυτῶν καὶ ὡς ὅλα καὶ παραδείγματα καὶ ἐν ἑκάστη πρὸς πολλὰ κατὰ μετοχὴν τὴν αὐτῆς καὶ ἀναφορὰν τὴν πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν παρὰ τῶν ταύτας εἰσαγόντων ἐτίθεντο οὐκ ἀντιστροφούσης ἐνταῦθα τῆς ὁμοιώσεως. "Ενθα μὲν γάρ πλείοσιν ἑνός ἐστι μετοχὴ, ἐκεῖ τὰ μετέχοντα ὅμοια πρὸς ἄλληλα τῷ ταυτῷ τῆς μεθέξεως, ἐνθα δὲ εἰκῶν καὶ παράδειγμα, ἡ μὲν εἰκῶν ἐκεῖ τῷ παραδείγματι ὅμοιον ὅτι πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἀπεικασται. Τὸ δὲ παράδειγμα ὅμοιον οὐ χρὴ τῇ εἰκόνι λέγειν ἀλλ' εἰκόνος ἀρχέτυπον. *Ibid.* 2—9. A copy is a copy of its original but the original is not and cannot be a copy of the copy. On the example of Proclus, in *Parm.*, Stallbaum, 682—689, 715—717 (Cousin, V, 122—132, 173—176), Eustratius denies that the relation between an idea (archetype) and its particular representations (copies) is merely one of resemblance and therefore symmetrical. The admission that the relation between the universal and the particular is symmetrical makes the theory of Ideas vulnerable to the argument from regress advanced in *Parmenides* 132 A—B. Archetypes and copies do not belong in the same class, or as A. E. Taylor, *Plato* (N. Y., 1936), 358, puts it, the relationship of copy to original is one of resemblance *plus* derivation and therefore strictly asymmetrical.

Abandoning at this point the attempt to determine more accurately the kind of homonymy which obtains between the many goods, on the ground that it does not belong to the province of a practical science like ethics to investigate such questions, Aristotle now argues that whether the Good is an abstraction disengaged by the mind from particulars (ἐννοηματικόν) and capable of being predicated of all partial goods, or whether it exists as a transcendent entity and Idea (ἐξηρημένον λόγου καὶ ἰδέας ὑπάρχοντος) separate from the many, and in and by itself (καθ' ἑαυτό), in neither case would it be something that man could attain, acquire, and possess by means of virtuous action. Ethics, however, is concerned with a good which can find realization in a state of character and a mode of life. Thus neither the good of the logician nor that of the theologian can be identified with the good of the moral philosopher. One might, of course, inquire whether the knowledge of the Good conceived either as a transcendent universal or as the form representing the common character of all goods, may not be useful with respect to the attainment of goods which *are* capable of being carried into effect through action. Still, if that were true none of the arts or sciences would fail to pursue the knowledge of the universal good. In fact, however, though all arts and sciences pursue a good, none of them pursues the Ideal Good.¹¹⁷

The substance and thrust of Eustratius' reply is that desire and activity which directs itself toward the realization of a specific and relative good, a native perfection of some kind, takes place under, and is an instance of, the universal aspiration for the good and for perfection without qualification. For each entity, to be sure, the good consists in the activity which is expressive of its own nature and being. But the principle and source of all such activity, of all acts conformable to nature, is the Good. No entity would strive to realize its own native perfection if it did not previously aspire towards the Good. With regard to the sciences in particular, it is neither a case of each of them aiming at supplying a particular deficiency or need and aspiring therefore at *some* good and not at *the* good, nor one of the sciences aiming at the universal good and neglecting their particular ends. For if it is true that there is no pursuit of a particular good except in so far as there is an aspiration for the good as such, it is also true that there is no aspiration for the good as such, except in so far as there is a pursuit of particular goods.¹¹⁸ Finally, it is obvious

¹¹⁷ Eus. in *Eth.* 56. 10—57. 15, 57. 31—58. 7; *Nic. Eth.* I. 6. 1096b 32—1097a 11.

¹¹⁸ Εἴτε γὰρ οὐκ ἐφίεντο τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, οὐδὲν ἦν καινὸν ἢ ἄτοπον, εἰ κατελείπανον τὴν γνώσιν τοῦ κοινού ἀγαθοῦ συμβαλλομένην αὐταῖς εἰς κατάληψιν τῶν οἰκείων τελῶν, καὶ ἐζήτουν τὸ αὐταῖς ἐνδεές, εἴτε ἐφίεμεναι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μὴ ἐζήτουν τὸ

that it is neither a case of the arts and sciences aiming at the particular and neglecting the universal nor one of the arts and sciences aiming at the universal and neglecting the particular. For whereas the object of an action and its effect is always particular, the knowledge which constitutes the ground and spring of action is that of a universal.¹¹⁹

IV

So ends Eustratius' attempt to defend the Platonic conception of the Good and the theory of ideal-forms against the attack which Aristotle mounts in the *Nicomachian Ethics*. It is by all accounts a brave, and on the whole, successful attempt. Before we take leave of him, however, we must again emphasize that it is the archetypal Ideas as the thoughts of the deity that Eustratius defends. It is the first intelligibles of Ideal forms as the content and possession of the divine mind that he is interested in preserving. The possibility that the Ideas may be self-standing entities outside the divine intellect which God contemplates but which are not identical with the content of the divine mind, he never considers. The intelligible cosmos is identical with the divine mind and the divine mind is the universe of the authentic existents: the Truth. Thus for Eustratius the Ideas are independent of and separate from things but they are not independent of and separate from the divine mind. Thus too, for Eustratius, the Ideas are the exemplars of created things but they are not for this reason participated by the things which immitate them. Being one with the Demiurge, they remain exalted above the things

αὐταῖς ἐνδεές, εἰκὸς ἦν μὴδ' ἔχειν ζῆτεῖν. Νῦν δ' ἄμφω ταῦτα ἐν πάσαις αὐταῖς θεωρεῖται, ἥ τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔφεσις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς ζήτησις. Eus. *in Eth.* 57. 15—20. Eustratius' comments must be understood against the background of Neoplatonic discussions of the Primary Good and the secondary forms of goodness, discussions which as in Plotinus, *Enn.* I. 7 are refutations of Aristotle in his attempt to rob the Platonic Idea of the good of moral significance. Aristotle himself admits, *Metaph.* XII. 10. 1075a 11—25, 7. 1073a 3—5 that the Prime Mover is the ground of all desiderative motion and that the good of man is good in reference to the absolute good which the Prime Mover represents. See also Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, 361—364.

¹¹⁹ Ἀμφω γὰρ σκοπεῖ ὁ τεχνίτης τὸ τε [δὲ] καθόλου καὶ τὰ καθέκαστα, τὸ μὲν κατὰ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τοὺς κανόνας τοὺς τεχνικούς, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ προχειρίσεις, ὡς περὶ ταῦτα ἐνεργοῦντες καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπαγγελλόμενοι κατορθοῦν. Τὰ γὰρ καθόλου ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὐ μὴν καὶ ἐν ταῖς προχειρίσεσιν, ἐννοηματικά ὄντα καὶ ὑπὲρ αἰσθῆσιν. Eus. *in Eth.* 58. 9—13. As it is true with his denial that knowledge of the ultimate ground of all value is ethically unnecessary, so in connection with his denial that the practical way of science stands in need of a knowledge of universals, Aristotle badly overstates his case. It is difficult, indeed, to reconcile *Nic. Eth.* 1097a 3—14 with the Aristotelian formula "τοῦ κοινοῦ αἰ ἐπιστῆμαι," *ibid.* 1180b 13—23. Cf. Gauthier and Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, II (1), 48.

whose exemplary causes they are. What is asserted by Eustratius on the matter of universals in his commentary on the *Ethics* is complemented by his statements elsewhere.

That which exists as the attribute of many cannot be conceived as an actuality in extra-mental reality. It does not possess the property of self-subsistence. In so far as it exists apart from particulars, such universal exists solely *in intellectu* as a concept. If by universality we mean the property of being common to, shared by, and divided among many, and by singularity its opposite, then it is only the "singular" that enjoys actual existence and hypostatic being. The essential logos of man, shared by all men, in so far as it exists in separation from individual men, exists only as a bare concept or notion, not as a thing. "Man-ness" conceived as the common and specific nature of all men is encountered in a fully realized and accomplished state only in men.¹²⁰ To exist as a substance, and to do so as a predicate of substance or as something whose property it is to be affirmed or denied of others, are two mutually exclusive modes of being. Self-subsistence excludes the property of being partible and capable of being shared by many. Forms as substances are in themselves imparticipable. It is only in their "projected potencies" that they are participable. Universality in the sense of being common to many, on the other hand, signifies lack of substantiality.¹²¹ Eustratius claims that indefinite regress in connection with the theory of forms can be avoided only on the condition that the *participated* form is not itself conceived as an individual substance outside the particulars.¹²²

¹²⁰ Ἐπεὶ καὶ ὁ θεὸς Λόγος οὕτω διὰ τοῦ προσλήμματος τὴν φύσιν ἐθέωσεν, ὡς τῆς φύσεως τελείας ἐν τῷ ἐνὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑπαρχούσης. Ἐπειτα ὁ λόγος ὁ οὐσιώδης ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνύλων καὶ φυσικῶν ἐπινοεῖται μὲν καθ' ἑαυτόν, οὐχ ὑφίσταται δὲ χωρὶς τῶν καθ' ἑκάστα, ἐν τούτοις ἔχων τὴν ὑπαρξίν ὡς ὅλον οὐκ ἐκ μερῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν μέρεσιν, ὡς ἐν ἐκάστῳ ὑπάρχων ὅλον αὐτῶν· καὶ ὁ τῷ λόγῳ λατρεύων γυμνῷ ἐπινοήματι μᾶλλον λατρεῦει ἢ πράγματι. (*Italics mine.*) Eus Περὶ τοῦ τρόπου, τιμῆς τε καὶ προσκυνήσεως τῶν σεβασμίων εἰκόνων συλλογιστικῇ ἀποδείξει. Demetracopoulos, *Eccl. Bibl.*, 157.

¹²¹ Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ κοινὸν ἐννοηματικῶς καὶ κατὰ θεωρίαν μόνην λαμβάνεται, οὐ κατὰ ἐνεργείας πρᾶξιν ἀναφαίνεται, τὸ δὲ καθέκαστά ἐστι τὸ ἐνεργεῖα ὃν καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοῦ ὑφιστάμενον, τούτου ἕνεκεν καὶ ὑπόστασιν τοῦτο κεκρίκασιν ὀνομάζεσθαι, ὡς τῷ καθόλου τούτου μὴ ἐφαρμόσοντος διὰ τὸ ἐννοεῖσθαι μόνον οὐ, μέντοι γε καὶ ὑφίστασθαι, εἰ μὴ τι ἐν τοῖς καθέκασται ὡς τούτων ἐχόντων τὸ κύρος τῆς ὑποστάσεως ταυτὸν δ' εἰπεῖν τῆς ὑπάρξεως. Eus. Ἐλεγχος καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῶν λεγόντων μίαν φύσιν ἐπὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ. *Ibid.* 164—165. See also Eus., in *Analyt. Post.*, ed. Hayduck, *Comm. in Aristot. Graeca*, cxi (1), 194—196.

¹²² Εἰ γὰρ ἔσται κάκεινα καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφιστάμενα καὶ μὴ καθ' ἑτέρων λεγόμενα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐ κοινὰ πολλοῖς ἀλλὰ ἴδια, καὶ ἑτέρα τε ζητήσομεν τὰ κοινὰ ἐφ' ὧν καὶ αὐτῶν ἐροῦμεν ταυτό, καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ἄπειρον. *Ibid.*, 164. On the matter of the argument from regress as this was developed in connection with the critique of the theory of Ideas see W. D. Ross, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* I (Oxford, 1924), 195—196; Taylor, "Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates," *Proc.*

Eustratius is, however, consistent. He recognizes universals *ante res* as well as universals *in rebus* and *in intellectu*. He is, indeed, forever careful to distinguish between universals existing as bare concepts in the human mind and subsequent to particulars,¹²³ and universals as the intellections of the deity and the exemplary causes of things. The former are not substances but mere denotations, generic or specific, predicable of a certain class of things. Things are not subsumed under them as effects under their cause. They remain dependent upon particulars and represent mere notions derived by abstraction from them. They overarch particulars only as general concepts inclusive of what is common to a class of individuals. A universal in this sense is a secondary substance and possesses only potential or nominal existence.¹²⁴ Universals conceived as the intellections of the deity enjoy, on the other hand, authentic existence. They are productive and creative powers, essences which in themselves remain transcendent and imparticipable, and which communicate themselves to other things without loss or diremption, without emptying themselves into them and passing into their effects. An Idea in this sense is a universal because it presides, extends over, and comprehends the totality of the things which proceed from it as from their proximate cause.¹²⁵ It shares with the universal in the sense of a class concept predicable of individuals only the name. The term "universal" is therefore, thoroughly ambiguous, standing as it does for the whole-in-the-parts and the whole-of-parts as well as for the whole-before-the-parts.¹²⁶

It is clear then, that for Eustratius universals conceived as predicates of substance and affirmed of individuals of a species or genus, are not self-subsistent entities. The universal we predicate of individuals is a whole-in-the-part and in separation from particulars it exists only as a con-

Aristot. Soc., N. S., XVI (1915—16), 249—271; Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy*, 226, 233—234, 287—300, 500—505.

¹²³ It must not be supposed, however, that for Eustratius the Ideas came to the human mind as generalizations from perception. Following Plotinus, *Enn.* III. 4. 3, VI. 5. 7, and Proclus, *El. Th.* 194—195, Dodds, 168, 170 *Parm.*, Stallbaum 604—695, 892—893, 894, Eus., in *Eth.* 320, he acknowledges that the soul possesses the rational notions or forms of things before the act by which it re-constitutes them by generalization from experience. The world of extension pre-exists in the soul in a more perfect mode than it exists in itself. Notions actualized as generalizations from perception, possessed of the nature of subsequents are to be distinguished from the rational notions of things which are the property of the soul by virtue of its derivation from Intelligence. See Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*, 257; cf. Dodds, *Procl. El. Th.*, 299.

¹²⁴ Eus., "Ελεγχος, 166—167; in *Analyt. Post.*, 194.

¹²⁵ Eus., "Ελεγχος, 165; in *Analyt. Post.*, 195.

¹²⁶ Eus., "Ελεγχος, 166.

cept. Does this, however, detract from Eustratius' essential Platonism? Do we have the right upon the example of P. Joannou, to use the term "nominalism" to describe Eustratius' position?¹²⁷ Obviously not. The refusal to identify the Ideas in the sense of the eternal and immutable exemplars of things with the common predicates is, indeed, a commonplace of late Platonism. Plotinus taught not only that the forms residing in bodies are mere images of the authentic existents,¹²⁸ but also that predicates have no real existence and that they are mere affirmations linking separate entities.¹²⁹ Proclus, for his part, clearly distinguishes between immanent and transcendent universals.¹³⁰ The philosophical realism of the Platonic tradition as this is represented by Eustratius, and as it is enshrined in the works of Plotinus and Proclus, recognizes the necessity of positing exemplars of things. These exemplars it conceives as the thoughts of Intelligence, while the world of souls and that of extension it interprets as the product of the creative activity of intellect. The passage in St. Bonaventure in which the Seraphic Doctor traces Aristotle's rejection of creationism to his previous rejection of exemplarism remains a remarkable piece of acute philosophical analysis.

On the other hand, the doctrinal tradition to which Eustratius belongs rebuffs the propositions that intelligible being exists outside the Knowing Hypostasis,¹³¹ and that Ideas as they exist in separation from things are capable of being participated or shared. Nor does it attempt to deny the affirmation that τὰ κοινά in the sense of the predicates of logic are anything but abstract, general notions or concepts having a mental existence only.¹³² Even if our choice lay only between associating Eustratius either with a Plato interpreted as having conceived the intel-

¹²⁷ "Die Definition des Seins bei Eustratios von Nikaia," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*, 1954 (47), 358. For the idea of a "nominalisme idéaliste" fathered by the Neoplatonists and destined to prove very attractive to Christian theologians see also Tatakis, *La Philosophie Byzantine*, 219—222. For E. Bréhier, *Histoire de la Philosophie*, I (3), 586, it is possible that nominalism should co-exist with a species of Platonism which conceives the Ideas or the thoughts of God. Cf., however, P. Vignaux, "Nominalisme," *Dictionnaire de Théol. Cath.*, II (1), 731—732, 761.

¹²⁸ *Enn.* v. 9. 5.

¹²⁹ *Enn.* v. v. 1.

¹³⁰ See n. 32 below and Rosán, *The Philosophy of Proclus*, 87, 158—163.

¹³¹ The Ideas are also conceived as existing in a supra-intellectual mode in the One. It is in the One that the chain of causality comes to rest. See n. 26 above.

¹³² The question of the status of characters existing neither κατ' αἰτίαν nor κατὰ μέθεξιν but καθ' ὑπαρξιν in the ontology of a system like that of Proclus is a very obscure one and we propose to undertake its investigation in a subsequent study.

ligibles as existing "outside" Intelligence, or with Aristotle who summarily rejects Ideas even as exemplary causes of things,¹³³ we would not hesitate to classify Eustratius with Plato. It may be that to assert an identity between intelligibles and Intelligence is to transcend authentic Platonism. But the infringement on authentic Aristotelianism by any attempt to graft upon it some form of exemplarism is bound to be much greater.

KIMON GIOCARINIS

Hiram College
Hiram, Ohio

¹³³ *Metaph.* XIII. 5. 1079b 24—26; I. 9. 991a 20—22.

A SERMON OF THOMAS OF YORK ON THE PASSION

INTRODUCTION

Author

Thomas of York is mainly remembered as the author of the *Sapientiale*. Very little else is known about him. The first mention of his name occurs in a letter of his friend and confrere, Adam Marsh. At that time, 1245, Thomas was already a member of the English province of the Franciscan Order. In another letter, dated 1251, Adam Marsh recommended to the English provincial that Thomas of York continue his studies at Oxford. This advice was heeded, for on March 14, 1253, Thomas incepted in theology at Oxford. He at once entered upon his period of necessary regency, which probably lasted till 1256. He then became the sixth master of the Franciscan *Studium* at Cambridge, succeeding William de Melitona. There is no further record of Thomas of York. The probable date of his death is about 1260.¹

Thomas of York's only major work is the *Sapientiale*, a comprehensive and distinctive philosophical treatise divided into seven books. There are only three extant manuscripts.² In two of the manuscripts, however, the

¹ Cf. A. G. Little, "The Franciscan School at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XIX (1926), pp. 839—841; cf. also E. Longpré, "Fr. Thomas d'York, O. F. M., La Première Somme Métaphysique du XIII^e Siècle," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XIX (1926), pp. 803—874; M. Grabmann, "Die Metaphysik des Thomas von York," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Supplement Band (Münster, 1913), pp. 181—193; F. Tressera, "De Doctrinis Metaphysicis Fratris Thomae de Eboraco O. F. M.," *Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia*, V (1929), pp. 33—102; and "Entorn del Sapientiale de Tomas de York," *Críterion Revista Trimestral de Filosofía* V (1929), pp. 1—180; D. E. Sharp, *Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century*, (Oxford, 1930); J. P. Reilly, Jr., "Thomas of York on the Efficacy of Secondary Causes," *Mediaeval Studies* XV (1953), pp. 225—233; E. Scully, "Thomas of York and his use of Aristotle: an early moment in the history of British Philosophy," *Culture* XX (1959), pp. 420—436; and "The Power of Physical Bodies according to Thomas of York," *Sciences Ecclésiastiques*, XIV (1962), pp. 109—134.

² Books I—VII have been edited as dissertations in the University of Toronto. The critical edition of the *Sapientiale* will soon appear under the general editorship of J. R. O'Donnell, C. S. B. of the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto.

Sapientiale is accompanied by a shorter work entitled, *Comparatio Sensibilium*.³ Its exact relationship to the *Sapientiale* is not yet known. Another work usually attributed to Thomas is: *Manus quae contra Omnipotentem*.⁴ This is a defense of the mendicants in their controversy with the seculars during the mid-thirteenth century. Finally, there is the sermon on the Passion, which is edited here. This sermon is clearly ascribed to Thomas of York.

Edition

The present edition has been made from the only manuscript of the sermon known to exist. The sermon is preserved in a manuscript of *Miscellanea*, Trinity College, Cambridge, B. 15, 38 (no. 373 in James' catalogue). The manuscript itself is vellum, 211/155 mm. There are 239 folios, wrongly numbered. This appears to be a 13th century manuscript written in four different hands, the first of which is very beautiful. Among the varied items contained in this manuscript of *Miscellanea*, there are short works and sermons attributed to Robert Grosseteste, Robert Fishacre, John Gallensis and Robert Kilwardby, among others. The sermon of Thomas of York on the Passion begins on f. 201r and ends at f. 204v.⁵

In editing this sermon on the Passion, we have tried to achieve a critical text within the limits imposed by a single extant manuscript. With the exception of several obvious misspellings, we have indicated in the *apparatus criticus* every significant divergence from the text as it appears in the manuscript. And lastly, in order to simplify the appearance of the edition, we have given the correct verse number of the texts of Sacred Scriptures cited by Thomas of York without any identifiable *sigila*, even though, as is well known, such verse numbers for the entire text of Sacred Scripture were not introduced until the sixteenth century.⁶

³ A critical edition is now in preparation by the author in collaboration with C. A. Grassi.

⁴ Cf. M. Bierbaum, *Bettelorden und Weltgeistlichkeit an der Universität Paris, Franzisk. Studien*, Beiheft 2, Münster 1920, pp. 37—168; cf. also Pelster, "Thomas von York, O. F. M., als Verfasser des Traktats *Manus quae contra Omnipotentem tenditur*," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, XV (1922), pp. 3—22.

⁵ M. R. James, *Catalogue of Manuscripts, Trinity College Library*.

⁶ Cf. *Dictionnaire de la Bible*, V—2, Paris, 1938, 2403—2404. On three occasions, there appears in the manuscript a subdivision of the chapters of Sacred Scriptures designated by letters, after the manner introduced by Hugh of St. Cher. These are: *Prov.* 12 g (cf. *infra* p. 212), *Matth.* 17 c (cf. *infra* p. 221), and *Rom.* 8 c (cf. *infra* p. 222).

Sermon

1. *Content* — Thomas of York's sermon on the Passion is basically a development of two successive and related texts of St. Paul, *Heb.* 12, 2—3. The sermon naturally divides into two parts, each introduced by its respective text.

In the first part, announced by the text: *Aspicientes in auctorem fidei* (*Heb.* 12, 2), Thomas reminds his hearers that St. Paul's appeal to Christians, namely, to gaze upon the author of their faith suspended on the cross, was already prefigured in the Old Testament. Moses, at the command of God, raised a serpent on a stake which the people of Israel were to look upon that they might be cured of the sting of the fiery serpents. In commanding this, God chose to use the serpent, the cause of man's fall from grace, as the symbol of man's restoration — but a bronze serpent, impervious to change, a fitting symbol of the unchanging holiness of Christ. The original serpent, the devil, had indeed been the source of the poison which is human damnation, but from the second serpent, Christ, comes the antidote for this poison, human redemption. Thus in Christ will men find the medicine for their spiritual ills.⁷

Thomas concludes the first part of his sermon saying, that by His Passion Christ washed us in His blood from our sins. Indeed in pouring forth His life's-blood, Christ gave to us the life of grace. Without the blood of Christ shed for us, we could not lead the life of grace, nor look forward to the life of glory.⁸

The second part of the sermon, announced by the text: *Recogitate eum qui talem sustinuit a peccatoribus adversus semetipsum contradictionem: ut non fatigemini, animis vestris deficientes* (*Heb.* 12, 3), begins with an examination of the meaning of two key terms of the text, namely, *recogitate* and *contradictionem*. Clearly Thomas wishes to emphasize the Christian's need to keep the thought of the suffering Christ in the forefront of his mind. But even more, the Christian must keep Christ and the memory of His Passion in his heart, and must show forth the suffering Christ in his very actions. Yet surely it is a contradiction that the spotless Christ should suffer for the sins of man; and so He remains to all who disbelieve in Him. But to those who believe in Him, Christ is indeed the way of salvation.⁹

Because He is the way of salvation, the suffering Christ must be the wellspring of the Christian's life. To make Christ such, the Christian must constantly dwell upon the Passion of Christ, and this for many reasons.¹⁰

⁷ *Infra* p. 210. ⁸ *Infra* pp. 210-211. ⁹ *Infra* pp. 211-212. ¹⁰ *Infra* p. 212.

Thomas begins by invoking the Passion of Christ as the means by which hope is induced and despair excluded. Only then can we keep our souls in peace. But if our souls are at peace, we can more easily endure hardships and sufferings. Yet because we are weak, we need the Passion of Christ to heal the wounds made by our sins, as well as to strengthen us in our resolve to mourn for our past failures. Further, if we are to pursue the Christian life, we need the aid of Christ's Passion to fortify us in the battle of temptation. Nor must we ever forget Christ's generosity, but instead it should remind us constantly of the heinousness of sin. Mindful then of Christ's Passion, we will unceasingly strive to grow in His love, because He Himself has called us to that love. Strengthened by this knowledge, we will ever value the price paid for our salvation, and thus will never cease to seek in the Passion the shield and sword of faith against the assaults of our enemy, the devil, nor will we fail to find there the sure remedy for our weakness. Persevering then in the Passion of Christ, we will be worthy children of the Father, and will, on the last day, deserve to be numbered among the children of God. For if indeed we wish to see Christ in His glory, we must now, in this life, see Him in His Passion. And if we wish to share in His glory, we must now become companions of His Passion.¹¹

2. *Technique* — This sermon of Thomas of York on the Passion is in most respects a typical mediaeval sermon. Though it does not employ the customary *thema* but substitutes instead an *antethema*, a not unusual occurrence in mediaeval sermons,¹² there is nonetheless sufficient evidence to indicate that Thomas' sermon is structurally consonant with the requirements of the sermons of his time.¹³ Certainly Thomas follows the usual recommendations. He bases his sermon on the texts of Sacred Scriptures and on the established Fathers and Doctors of the Church, and he employs the usual methods of exposing the texts of Sacred Scriptures.

Finally, this sermon may have been delivered to clerics or as a University sermon, although there is no indication in the manuscript of either the date, place, or occasion of this sermon. The style of the sermon, however, suggests a relatively educated audience. But whoever the

¹¹ *Infra* pp. 212-222.

¹² Cf. Robert de Basevorn, *Forma Praedicandi*, 23, ed. Th.-M. Charland, O. P. in *Artes Praedicandi*, (Ottawa, 1936), p. 259; cf. also Charland's introductory study pp. 125-135.

¹³ Cf. M. M. Davy, *Les Sermons Universitaires Parisiens*, (Paris, 1931), pp. 23-76; cf. also G. R. Owst, *Preaching in Medieval England*, (Cambridge, 1926), pp. 309-354, and *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England*, (Cambridge, 1933), *passim*.

audience, the present manuscript version of the sermon seems to be a *reportatio*, that is a version made while the sermon was delivered, or else a dictated copy, rather than a copy of a text prepared and edited by the author himself¹⁴.

3. *Importance* — There is little, if any, direct relationship between this sermon and the other known works of Thomas of York. It is purely theological and devotional without any trace of philosophical learning. Yet this is not surprising since a different purpose directed this work. But it does give another side of the author of the *Sapientiale*, and provides us with a fuller picture of a man known only by random correspondence.

¹⁴ To support this conjecture we can note the following: on at least three occasions the scribe seems to have misunderstood what he heard. Thus he writes *ceti* for *siti* (*infra* n. 2), *immutatio* for *imitatio* (*infra* n. 34), and *gaudia* for *cauda* (*infra* n. 40).

SERMO FRATRIS THOMAE EBORACENSIS: DE PASSIONE DOMINI NOSTRI IESU CHRISTI

ANTETHEMA: *Aspicientes in auctorem fidei* <Heb. 12, 2>. — In signum huius, *Num.* 21, 9: *fecit Moyses serpentem aeneum, et posuit pro signo, quem cum percussi aspicerent, sanabantur*. Serpens in palo, Christus in cruce, *Ioan.* 3, 14: *sicut Moyses exaltavit serpentem in deserto, ita etc.* De serpente fit venenum, et fit¹ tyriaca. A primo serpente, diabolo, fuit venenum humanae damnationis; a secundo serpente, Christo, fuit tyriaca humanae redemptionis. Et dicitur, *aeneum*, non consumptum ab igne passionis nec rubigine peccati.

In Christo enim est medicina: Contra superbiam, mortis vilitas. Contra acediam, hoc: eis obviam processit eum quaerentibus, *Ioan.* 18, 4. Contra gulam, aceti potatio, in *Ps.* <68, 22>: *et in siti² mea potaverunt <me> aceto*. Contra iram, eius inaestimabilis mansuetudo, *Isa.* 53, 7: *sicut ovis ad occisionem ducetur etc.* Contra invidiam, dolor de perditione inimicorum; unde pro eis oravit, *Luc.* 23, 34. Contra tristitiam, quia in cruce psallebat psalmodia: *Deus Deus meus respice in me* <*Ps.* 21, 2>,³ usque ad illum locum: *in manus tuas commendo spiritum* <*Ps.* 30, 6>.⁴ Contra inanem gloriam, taciturnitas, *Matth.* 27, 12: *cum accusaretur a principibus sacerdotum et senioribus populi, nihil respondit*. Contra opprobria, benigna patientia. Contra carnis concupiscentiam, corporis extensio in cruce, *Ps.* <118, 120>: *confige timore tuo carnes meas*. Contra avaritiam, patrimonii sui supereffusa largitio, cum latroni pendenti dixit: *hodie mecum eris in paradiso* <*Luc.* 23, 43>. Haec omnia debemus attendere, *Thren.* 1, 12: *O vos omnes, qui transitis per viam, attendite, et videte etc.* Ecce ergo quod bene debemus pro eo pati; hic tibi totus Crucifixus sit in corde, qui pro te totus est fixus in cruce.

Passio Christi comparatur sanguini quia humidus; liquor enim humidus fluens est; ita Christus in passione, suo sanguine | f 201 v | fluens, scelera nostra lavit, *Apoc.* 1, 5: *qui dilexit nos, et lavit nos a peccatis nostris in sanguine suo*. Quia sicut sanguis rubeus sive purpureus est,

¹ sit *ms.*

³ Cf. *Marc.* 15, 34.

² ceti *ms.*

⁴ Cf. *Luc.* 23, 46.

ita passio totum corpus eius tinxit. Credibile est enim spinas cruorem de capite eius extraxisse, et constat quod flagellis cruor dorsi extractus est, et sanguineus sudor reliquas partes corporis tinxit, et ita non tantum manus et pedes aspersi sunt sanguine, sed totum corpus Iesu Christi. Unde *Isa.* 63,⁵ 2, (dicunt ei angeli ascendenti):⁶ *quare rubeum est vestimentum tuum, et tua vestimenta quasi calcantium in torculari?* Quia sanguis calidus est, ita Christi passio per caritatem, *Ioan.* 15, 13: *maiolem caritatem nemo habet* etc.; ideo dicit *Luc.* 12, 49: *ignem veni mittere in terram.*

Quia sicut sine sanguine non est vita, ita sine Christi passione non est vita gratiae quantum ad omnem effectum; nec vita gloriae, quia ante Christi passionem omnes antiqui patres straverunt lectulum suum in tenebris inferni, *Iob* 17, 13: *in tenebris stravi lectulum meum.* Quia sicut sanguis diffunditur in omnibus membris, ita Christus passus est in omnibus et singulis membris; unde in *Ps.* <21, 17—18>: *foderunt manus meas et pedes meos, et dinumeraverunt omnia,* et Versus: *respice . . .*⁷

ANTETHEMA: *Recogitate* <*Heb.* 12, 3>. — *Respice eum qui talem sustinuit a peccatoribus adversus semetipsum contradictionem: ut non fatigemini, animis vestris* etc., *Heb.* 12, 3. Primo videndum est quid sit cogitare, ut sic melius pateat quid sit recogitare. Dicit autem Isidorus, libro I, de summo bono, quod cogendo animum reminisci quod memoriae commendatum est, dicitur cogitatio.⁸ Quia igitur mundi vanitas et voluptas inducunt oblivionem Crucifixi, ideo necesse est cogere animum ut eius reminiscatur, quia, ut dicit Gregorius, oportet saepe reminisci quod mundus cogit oblivisci.⁹ Recogitare est ergo iterum et iterum cogitare, hoc est frequenter. Sed pro dolor! contingit modo illud *Isa.* 57, 1: *iustus perit*, hoc est, iustus iustorum, Christus, patitur; *et nemo est qui recogitat in corde suo.* Et bene dicit: *in corde suo*; multi enim sunt qui revolvunt Christum in ore suo et scriptura, sed non in corde nec opere, de quibus dicitur in *Ps.* <77, 36>: *dilexerunt eum in ore suo,* et <non> in corde suo etc. *Cor autem eorum non erat rectum cum <eo>: nec fideles habiti sunt* etc. <*Ps.* 77, 37>. *Cor non erat rectum*: ecce defectus recogitationis Christi in corde. *Nec fideles habiti sunt* etc.: ecce defectus recogitationis Christi in opere.

Contradictionem, Haymo: omnia adversa quae Christus sustinuit, plagas scilicet, irrisiones, sputa, colaphos, blasphemias, ipsamque mortem,

⁵ 58 ms.

⁶ Glossa Ordinaria, PL 113, 1306.

⁷ Cf. *Ps.* 21, 2; also *Ps.* 83, 10; also Bernard, *Vitis Mystica*, 7, PL 184, 655 A.

⁸ *Sententiarum*, I, 13, PL 83, 564 C.

⁹ Cf. *Dialogorum*, V, 38, PL 77, 316C—317A.

nomine contradictionis ostendere voluit Apostolus.¹⁰ Et notandum quod sicut contradictio est oppositio cuius non est medium, ita quantum ad Iudaeos et crucifigentes pertinebat, non fuit medium, id est modus sive mensura. In signum huius dicunt impii, *Prov. 1, 12: deglutiamus eum*, scilicet insontem Christum, *qui peccatum non fecit, nec inventus est* etc. <*Pet. 2, 22*>, *sicut infernus viventem, et integrum quasi descendentem in lacum* <*Prov. 1, 12*>.

Passio Iesu Christi est cogitanda multis rationibus. Prima ratio huius cogitationis est, ut in nobis timor inducatur et praesumptio excludatur.

De primo, *Iob 23, 15: ego a facie eius turbatus sum, et considerans eum*, scilicet passum Christum, *terrore sollicitor*. Nec mirum; quia si iustus in terra opprobria et persecutiones recipit, quanto magis impius et peccator, *Prov. 12, 21*; et *Luc. 23, 31: si in viridi ligno haec faciunt, in arido quid fiet?* Huius autem timoris fiunt rationes tres. Prima est, quia eius passio fuit, quantum ad se pertinebat, iniusta et iniuriosa; unde *Iob, 16, 18: haec passus sum absque iniquitate manus meae* etc. Nostra autem iusta; *nos enim* pro peccatis nostris *patimur*, ut *II Mach. 7, 18*, argumentum. Secunda, quia eius passio tam acerba, tam pauperrima, tam vilis, immo turpissima, et tamen voluntaria fuit, *Thren. 1, 12: O vos omnes, qui transitis per viam, attendite, et videte* etc. Nostra autem tam modica est, vel nulla, et tamen invite patimur. Rarus enim est qui velit pati magnam paupertatem; rarior qui acerbitem et asperitatem; rarissimus qui vilitatem. Quis est | f 202r | enim qui paupertatem non declinet? Quis est qui asperitatem et acerbitem non timeat? Quis qui vilitatem non exhorreat? Tertia ratio est, quia ipse pro nobis passus est. Nos autem nec, ad exemplum summi Dei pro nobis humilitati, pro nobis ipsis pati volumus, cum tamen secundum Apostolum, *Act. 14, 21: per multas tribulationes oportet nos intrare in regnum caelorum*.

De secundo, ut praesumptio tollatur, *Iob <42, 5>. oculus meus videt te*, scilicet pendentem in cruce, quia in *Deut. 28, 66. erit vita tua <quasi> pendens ante te; idcirco me reprehendo*, *Iob. 42,¹¹ 6*, ante te et sacerdotem confitendo, *et ago poenitentiam* etc., quasi respectu tui nihil sum. Et signanter post inductionem timoris sequitur exclusio praesumptionis, quia ut *Sap. 17, 11: nihil est enim timor nisi praesumptionis adiutorium*, id est contra praesumptionem.

Secunda ratio principalis quare passio Iesu Christi est cogitanda est, ut excludatur desperatio periculosa quae solet accidere de criminis magnitudine, ut *Gen. 4, 13: maior est iniquitas* etc., et introducatur spes firma.

¹⁰ In *Epistolam ad Hebraeos*, 12, PL 117, 919 B.

¹¹ 14 ms.

De primo, super *Cant.* 2, 13—14: *veni: columba mea in foraminibus petrae, <in caverna maceriae>*. Peccavi peccatum grande; turbabitur conscientia, sed non perturbabitur, quia vulnerum Domini recordabor.¹² Unde dicit alibi beatus Bernardus: nihil enim tam ad mortem quod non morte Christi deleatur. Si ergo in mentem¹³ venerit tam potens, tam efficax medicamentum, miseriam morbi possum malignitate terreri. Sed audacter quod ex me deest usurpo mihi ex visceribus Domini, quoniam ex misericordia affluunt; nec desunt foramina per quae effluunt.¹⁴ Patet arcanum cordis per foramina corporis; patet illud magnum pietatis sacramentum; patent viscera misericordiae Dei nostri, in quibus visitavit nos oriens ex alto.¹⁵

De secundo dicit beatus Augustinus: quomodo non dabit nobis bona sua, qui passus est mala nostra?¹⁶ Et beatus Bernardus: quis non rapietur ad spem impetrandi fiducialiter cum videat fide, scilicet caput inclinatum ad osculum, brachia extensa ad amplexum, manus perforatas¹⁷ ad largiendum, lateris apertionem ad diligendum, pedum confixionem ad nobiscum commorandum, totius denique corporis extensionem ad se totum impendendum?¹⁸ Ideo *Thren.* 3, 19, 21: *recordare passionis meae absinthium; haec recolens in corde meo, in Deo meo sperabo*.

Tertia ratio quare passio Christi est cogitanda, ut tuta et firma requies detur animae. Unde beatus Bernardus ibi, *veni: columba mea* etc. <*Cant.* 2, 13—14>: revera ubi tuta et firma infirmis requies, nisi in vulneribus Salvatoris? Tanto illuc securior habito, quanto ille potentior est ad salvandum.¹⁹ Ideo *Ier.* 48, 28, dicitur: *relinquite civitates, et habitate in petra, habitatores Moab; et estote quasi columba nidificans in summo ore foraminis*. Per Moab, mundani; per civitates, mundana conversatio quae reliquenda est, quia omnis qui voluerit esse amicus huius saeculi, inimicus Dei constituitur <*Iac.* 4, 4>; talem enim civitatem Dominus non ingreditur, ut *Os.* 11, 9; ideo *Ps.* <54, 8>: *elongavi fugiens* etc. *Petra*, Christus, in quo habitare debemus per sedulam meditationem vulnerum et passionis²⁰ Christi; unde *Isa.* 2, 10: *ingredere in petram* etc.; et *Cant.* 2, 13—14: *veni . . . in foraminibus petrae, scilicet vulneribus pedum*

¹² Bernard, *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, 61, PL 183, 1072 B.

¹³ mente *ms.*

¹⁴ affluunt *ms.*

¹⁵ *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, 61, PL 183, 1072 B.

¹⁶ Cf. *Enarratio in Psalmum*, 56, PL 36, 665.

¹⁷ perforatos *ms.*

¹⁸ Cf. *Vitis Mystica*, 44, PL 184, 725 B—C.

¹⁹ *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, 61, PL 183, 1072 A.

²⁰ passiones *ms.*

et manuum, et *in caverna maceriae*, id est vulnere lateris. Sicut enim maceria est²¹ coniunctio lapidum sine cemento,²² ita corpus Christi lanceatum in latere exanime, id est mortuum, tunc fuit. Ideo sequitur in *Ier.* <48, 28>: *estote quasi columba nidificans in summo ore foraminis*; quasi dicens, non ad parvum tempus, sed mansionaliter ibi habitare per meditationem, scilicet secundum illud *Iob* 29, 18: *in nidulo meo moriar* etc.

Quarta ratio quare passio Christi est cogitanda est, ut poena inflict a facilius toleretur. Unde Apostolus ad *Hebraeos*, 12, 3, postquam dixit: *recogitate* etc., finem subiunxit dicens: *ut non fatigemini animis vestris deficientes*. Et dicit beatus Ioannes Chrysostomus in sermone de duobus filiis Zebedei, quod mater eorum, sexu fragilis, aetate etiam defecta, Christi vestigia sequebatur, quia fides numquam senescit, et religio fatigationem non sentit.²³ Ideo dicit Bernardus super *Cant.*: vult benignus dux devoti militis vultum et oculos in sua sustolli vulnera, ut exemplo sui | f 202 v | reddat ad tolerandum fortiorem. Enimvero non sentiet sua, dum illius vulnera intuebitur.²⁴

Quinta ratio quare passio est cogitanda, ut vulnus animae efficacius curetur. Unde Bernardus super *Cant.* ibidem: nihil tam efficax ad curandum conscientiae vulnera, quam vulnere Christi sedula meditatio.²⁵ Unde ut Dominus curaret vulnera infidelitatis et duritiae in animabus discipulorum, et fide resurrectionis eos instrueret, et sic curaret, dixit, *Luc.* 24, 39: *videte manus meas et pedes meos*; et *Ioan.* 20, 20, dicitur quod *ostendit eis manus et latus*; et sequitur ibidem: *gavisi sunt ergo discipuli, viso domino*; quasi dicens, visis cicatricibus vulnerum Christi, maxime per fidem et tristitia infidelitatis abscessit. Hoc etiam in beato Thoma evidentissime apparuit; unde fide curatus, dixit: *Dominus meus et Deus meus* <*Ioan.* 20, 28>. Ideo dicit Gregorius in homilia, *De ascensione*, de beato Thoma sic curato, quem effectum in nobis habuit. Sic enim ille Thomas, dubitando, vulnere cicatrices tetigit, et de nostro pectore dubietatis vulnus amputavit.²⁶

Sexta ratio, ut validius peccator compungatur de vita mala praeterita, et ut bona vita deinceps arripiatur.

De primo, Bernardus in sermone, *De coena Domini*, ut validius compungamur: occurat et ingerat se spiritualiter cordibus nostris Christus Iesus, proditus et vendictus a discipulo, a Iudaeis tamquam vile

²¹ et ms.

²² *Glossa Ordinaria*, PL 113, 1141 B.

²³ *Opus Imperfectum*, In *Mattheum*, 35, PG 56, 826.

²⁴ *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, 51, PL 183, 1074 B.

²⁵ *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, 62, PL 183, 1079 B.

²⁶ *XL Homiliarum in Evangelia*, II, 29, PL 76, 1213 C.

mancipium, pretio sacer exiguo comparatus, captus, tractus, ligatus; scisso verberibus dorso, vellificatis genis, facie sputi illita, puncto vepribus capite, latere saucio,²⁷ terebratis palmis, pedibusque confossis; qui tamquam agnus iugulatori suo, scilicet inde alludens, se ipsum non reluctans exposuit, et nudum²⁸ corpus quasi incudem malleatorum ictibus patienter explicuit; dum pro nobis per huius vitae pelagus ad patriam de exilio transfretandis, piratis rapacibus naulum suae mortis exsolvit.²⁹ An non de peccato est conterendum et compungendum pro quo delendo necesse erat Unigenitum Filium Dei mori et crucifigi? ut dicit Bernardus in meditationibus suis.³⁰ Ideo *Ps.* <21, 28> dicit: *reminiscentur* etc. Ecce recogitatio passionis Christi, quia de hac superius in *Ps.* <21, 28> laetatus est: *et sic convertentur ad Dominum*. Ecce contritio sive compungatio, principium enim conversionis ad Dominum est cordis contritio; hoc est etiam quod nos admonet vel potius praestatur per *Isa.* prophetam, 44,³¹ 22, dicens: *revertere ad me* per contritionem, *quia redemi te* per passionem. Et Bernardus: visa Christi passione, quis tam delicatus qui non absterneat? Quis tam iracundus qui non condonet? Quis tam malitiosus qui non condoleat?³²

De secundo, scilicet vita bona arripienda, visa Christi passione, dicit Petrus, *I Pet.* 4, 1: *Christo passo in carne, et vos eadem cogitatione*, scilicet Christi passi, *armamini*, bonis operibus scilicet, tamquam armis lucis, secundum quod dicit Apostolus, *Rom.* 13, 12: *abiciamus*³³ *opera tenebrarum, et induamur arma lucis*. Quod autem Dominus noster Iesus tam pro peccato tollendo, quam pro iustitia amplectenda sit passus, dicit Petrus, *I Pet.* 2, 24: *peccata nostra*, scilicet poenam pro peccatis, *ipse tulit in corpore suo posito super lignum crucis*; et quare *ut peccatis mortui*, ecce primum! *iustitiae vivamus*, ecce secundum!

Septima ratio quare passio Christi est cogitanda est, ut bona vita incepta magis acuamur, quasi in praelio et fortes fiamus. Unde Bernardus in sermone, *De passione*: memor ero, quamdiu fuero, laborum illorum quos pertulit in praedicando, lacrimarum in compatiendo, temptationum in <ieiunando>, fatigationum in discurrendo, vigiliarum in orando, insidiarum in colloquendo; postremo, periculorum in falsis fratribus. Fiet igitur mihi fortitudo, sed si accesserit, imitatio³⁴ ut sequar³⁵ vestigia eius. Alioquin exquireretur a me sanguis iustus, qui

²⁷ sanctio ms.

²⁹ *Sermo in Coena Domini*, PL 184, 952 D—953 A.

³⁰ Cf. *Meditationes Piissimae*, 3, PL 184, 490 D.

³¹ 43 ms.

³² *Sermo de Passione Domini*, PL 183, 263 A.

³³ abiciamur ms.

³⁴ immutatio ms.

²⁸ mundum ms.

³⁵ sequamur ms.

effusus est super terram, nec immunis ero ab illo tam singulari scelere³⁶ Iudaeorum; quod videlicet tantae³⁷ caritati ingratus fuerim, quod spiritui gratiae contumeliam fecerim, quod sanguinem pollutum duxerim, quod calcaverim Filium Dei, *Heb.* 10,³⁸ 29.³⁹

In signum huius acutionis habetur I *Mach.* 6, 34: *ostenderunt elephantis sanguinem uvae et mori ad acuendos eos in praelio*. Per *elephantes*: poenitentes ad modum elephantorum sunt casti et fortes, et arbori, scilicet crucis, se inclinantes ut requiescant. Sicut elephans dormit incumbens arbori, sed homines eo absente fere per medium secant arborem, [f. 203r] et tunc elephantem ibi incumbentem et ruentem comprehendunt et interficiunt, ita hostis poenitentiae, diabolus, homine torpente et quasi dormiente, secat lignum crucis poenitentialis, ut homo torpens et improvidus a gratia deficiat, secundum quod dicitur *Os.* 7, 9: *comederunt alieni*, scilicet demones, *robur eius*, et *nescivit*. Draco enim stringit elephantem in pedibus cauda sua ut ruat, sic serpens antiquus poenitentem per caudam stringit. Unde *Iob* 40, 12 dicitur de behemoth: *stringet caudam suam quasi cedrum*. Gregorius: cauda⁴⁰ eius stringitur, cum fini hominis insidiatur.⁴¹ Ideo poenitenti sanguis uvae et mori proponitur, id est Christi passio, ad acuendum eum in poenitentia suscepta.

Christus enim fuit quasi uva, quando pressus fuit in torculari crucis sicut uva; unde et *Ps.* intitulantur: *in finem pro torcularibus*;⁴² a qua quidem uva vinum⁴³ in calicem ecclesiae expressum est; unde significatur per botrum uvae quem filii Israel tulerunt in vertice, scilicet crucis, ut dicitur *Num.* 21, 9.⁴⁴ Quasi morus fuit, cum pro inimicis mori voluit, cuius sanguis induratus ad similitudinem liquoris mori, niger factus est. Morum autem dicitur fructus arboris mori et pertinet ad calorem et humiditatem cum est maturum et dulce; ita Christus, cum ad maturitatem temporis a se dispositi quo conversaretur inter homines pervenit, falsae(!) passionis successus(!)⁴⁵ calore caritatis de quo: *nec est qui se abscondat a calore eius* <*Ps.* 18, 7>, et humiditate gratiae de qua: *pluviam voluntariam segregabis, Deus, haereditati tuae* <*Ps.* 67, 10>, et dulcedine verbi Dei de qua⁴⁶ *Ps.* <118, 103>: *quam dulcia faucibus meis eloquia tua*, et *Eccli.* 23, 37: *nihil dulcius, quam respicere in mandatis Domini*. His, inquam, omnibus mundum implevit; unde et in modo mori fructus ventrem

³⁶ ecclesiae ms.

³⁷ tanti ms.

³⁸ II ms.

³⁹ *Sermo de Passione Domini*, PL 183, 269 A; also *Sermones de Diversis*, 22, PL 183, 597 C, and *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, 43, PL 183, 994 C.

⁴⁰ gaudia ms.

⁴¹ Cf. *Moralium*, XXXII, PL 76, 655 D—656 B; also 649 A.

⁴² Cf. *Ps.* 8, *Ps.* 80, *Ps.* 83.

⁴³ unum ms.

⁴⁴ Cf. Isidore, *In Numeros*, 15, PL 83, 347 V.

⁴⁵ falsae passionis successus *sic*

⁴⁶ quo ms.

humectavit, id est memoriam nostram humore gratiae et compassionis pro ipso madefecit, immo et inebriavit tamquam vinum; unde illud *Os.* <14, 8> vult: *memoriale eius sicut vinum Libani*; quasi dicens, sicut vinum illud laetificat, sic memoria Domini nos^{tri} Iesu Christi; unde *Eccli.* 49, 1: *memoria Iosiae*, id est Christi etc.

Octava ratio est quare Christi passio est cogitanda, ne tanto beneficio ingrati simus; unde *Eccli.* 29, 22: *ingratus servus dereliquit liberantem se. Gratiam fideiussoris tui*, scilicet Christi, *ne obliviscaris: dedit enim pro te animam suam* <*Eccli.* 29, 20>; alioquin non solum inobedientiae, sed etiam impietatis arguemur. Unde Bernardus ad fratres in sermone, *Domini de monte*: praeter peccatum inobedientiae, quam impium sit hominem tantae pietatis Dei esse immemorem, palam omnibus est; cum amici hominis abeuntis sub quolibet signo commendatam memoriam nefas sit oblivisci. Siquidem sanctae huius ac reverendae commemorationis mysterium, suo modo, suo loco et tempore celebrare licet paucis hominibus, quibus <hoc> creditum est mysterium; rem vero mysterii in omni tempore, et in omni loco dominationis Dei, modo quo creditum est, hoc est debitae pietatis affectu, agere, et tractare, et sumere sibi in salutem omnibus in promptu est, quibus dicitur: *vos estis genus electum, regale sacerdotium* etc. <*I Pet.* 2, 9>. Nam et sacramentum, sicut accipit ad vitam dignus, sic ad mortem suam et damnationem temerarie potest accipere indignus. Rem vero sacramenti nemo percipit nisi dignus et idoneus; sacramentum enim sine re sacramenti sumentis mors est; res vero sacramenti et praeter sacramentum sumentis vita aeterna est.⁴⁷

Sed sicut puero deflenti mortem patris datur quandoque pomum vel aliquod huiusmodi, ut huiusmodi obliviscatur, similiter collatis temporalibus beneficiis aliquis statim obliviscitur Christi, Redemptoris sui; unde *Gen.* 40, 23, in fine: *succedentibus prosperis, princeps pincernarum oblitus est interpretis sui*, scilicet Ioseph, per quem Christus intelligitur. Ideo dicit Bernardus: potuit aliter redimere, sed noluit, quoniam maluit cum iniuria sui quam ingratitude tui.⁴⁸

Nona ratio est, ut peccata pro quibus Christus delendis mortuus est, magis horreantur et caveantur, quia, ut dicit Augustinus in libro, *De spiritu et littera*: quanto laudibus maioribus medicina praedicatur, tanta magis vulnera vituperantur et horrentur morbi a quibus liberat.⁴⁹ Si ergo a vulneribus et morbis peccatorum liberavit nos passio Christi, horrere et cavere deinceps omnino peccata debemus; alioquin, ut dicit

⁴⁷ *Epistola ad Fratres de Monte Dei*, 10, PL 184, 327 A—B.

⁴⁸ *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, 11, PL 183, 827 B.

⁴⁹ *De Spiritu et Littera*, 6, PL 44, 205.

Augustinus: gravi damnatione iterantur peccata postquam sanguine Christi sunt redempta.⁵⁰

Decima ratio, ut dilectio nostra in | f. 203 v | ipsum magis ac magis extendatur et alliciatur. Unde Bernardus: hoc est quod nos vehementius allicuit, et artius nos astringit calix quem bibisti, o bone Iesu.⁵¹ Et Bernardus, *De amore Dei*, capitulo 5: loquens ad patrem dixit: verbum tuum, *omnipotens sermo tuus . . . durus* <errorum> *debellator* <Sap. 18, 15>, dulcis amoris commendator. Quicquid fecit et dixit in terris usque ad opprobria; sputa, alapas, crucem et sepulchrum, non fuit nisi loqui tuum nobis in filio, amore tuo provocans et suscitans ad te amorem nostrum. Sciebat enim Creator animarum, Deus, in animabus filiorum hominum cogi non posse, sed provocari oportere affectum etc.⁵²

Undecima ratio quare passio Christi est cogitanda est, ut dilectio ipsius et misericordia erga nos facilius agnoscat, qui non solum sua, sed et se ipsum pro nobis dedit, secundum quod dicit Apostolus, *Gal. 2, 20*: *qui dilexit me, et tradidit semetipsum pro me*; et Hugo, *De arrha animae*: ut ostenderet quantum te dilexit, non nisi moriendo a morte te liberare voluit.⁵³

Duodecima ratio quare passio Christi est cogitanda est, ut pretium nostrum attendatur. Augustinus: appende te ex pretio ne tibi vilesceas⁵⁴ Hugo, *De arrha animae*: amplius mihi vilis esse non debeo, quia tantum Deo placui, ut et mori pro me eligeret, ne me perderet.⁵⁵ Leo papa: pretium tuum est sanguis Christi.⁵⁶ Et Bernardus, *De diligendo Deo*: si totum me debeo pro me facto, quid addam iam pro perfecto et refecto hoc modo? Nec enim tam facile refectus, quam factus; siquidem non solum de me, sed⁵⁷ de omni quoque quod factum est: *dixit, et facta sunt* <Ps. 148, 5>. At vero qui me tantum et semel dicendo fecit, in reficiendo profecto et dixit multa, et gessit mira, et pertulit dura; et non tantum dura, sed etiam indigna. *Quid ergo retribuam Domino, pro omnibus quae retribuit mihi* <Ps. 115, 12>? In primo opere me mihi dedit; in secundo opere se mihi dedit; et ubi se dedit, me mihi reddidit. Datus ergo, et redditus, me pro me debeo, et bis debeo. Quid retribuam pro se? Nam et si millesies me rependere vel impendere possem, quid sum ego ad Deum?⁵⁸

⁵⁰ Cf. *De Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione*, I, 12, PL 44, 117; also cf. *De Spiritu et Littera*, I, 28, PL 44, 230-231.

⁵¹ Cf. *Sermones in Cantica Canticorum*, 20, PL. 183, 867 C-D.

⁵² *De Contemplando Deo*, 6, PL 184, 374 A—B.

⁵³ *De Arrha Animae*, PL 176, 963 A.

⁵⁴ Cf. *Sermo CLIV*, PL 39, 2045.

⁵⁵ *De Arrha Animae*, PL 176, 963 B.

⁵⁶ Cf. *Sermones Inediti*, 2, PL 56, 1133 B.

⁵⁷ scilicet *ms.*

⁵⁸ *De Diligendo Deo*, 5, PL 182, 983 C.

Sed vae tantum pretium repellentibus, de quibus dicit *Ps.* <61, 5>, loquens contra eos in persona Christi: *verumtamen pretium meum cogitaverunt repellere*, quasi dicens, quamvis pro eis tanta fecerim, tam indigna pro eis pertulerim, tamen *pretium meum cogitaverunt repellere*. Quod quidem totiens repellimus, quotiens animas pretiosas, pretio sanguinis redemptas, peccato mortali violamus. Hoc autem praecipue accidit in peccato carnis; unde *Prov.* 6, 26: *pretium scorti vix est unius panis: mulier autem pretiosam viri animam capit*, vel rapit, id est, animam ad imaginem Dei creatam et Christi sanguine redemptam. Heu! quam iniusta statera est et falsa, ubi plus ponderat amor meretricis quam Christi sanguis; haec est statera de qua *Prov.* 11, 1: *statera dolosa, abominatio est apud Deum*.

Tredecima⁵⁹ ratio quare passio Christi est cogitanda est, ut in campo huius saeculi pugnaturi scutum defensionis et gladium impugnationis contra spirituales inimicos Christi passionem habeamus. Unde quod passio Christi nobis sit scutum defensionis, habetur *Thren.* 3, 65: *dabis eis*, scilicet bonis, *scutum cordis*, id est, defensionem contra hostes, *laborem tuum*, id est, passionem tuam. De hoc labore *Isa.* 43, 24, in fine: *prae buisti mihi laborem iniquitatibus tuis*. Passio enim protegit nos cum per eius fidem tum per eius signaculum. Et bene dicitur, *scutum cordis*, quia in parte sinistra portatur ubi et cor situm est. Hinc posset sumi quarta ratio quare passio Christi dicitur scutum, et nos debemus fidem crucis Christi per meditationem in corde portare, et sic nos ab hoste maligno defendere et munire, ut *omni custodia custodiatur cor* <*Prov.* 4, 23>.⁶⁰

Et bene Christi passio scuto comparatur tum propter officium scuti, quod est defendere vel protegere, sic et passionis, ut dictum est, tum propter figuram triangularem quae est in scuto. Triangulus autem habet tres angulos; omnis autem angulus in arcto et acuto terminatur. In passione autem fuerunt tria principaliter arctantia atque acutissima; unde Versus: in cruce poena, pudor, paupertas, perdita reddunt.⁶¹ Paupertas fuit arcta, quia non habuit Filius ubi caput suum inclinaretur, [f. 204r] <*Matth.* 8, 20; *Luc.* 9, 58> et omnino nudus suspensus fuit. Pudor arctus, quia derisioni omnibus fuit, *Ps.* <21, 8>: *omnes videntes me deriserunt me* etc. Poena arcta fuit, quia post multipliciter flagellatus est, colaphizatus, alapis cesus, tandem cruci clavis affixus.

Tum propter picturam a qua denominatur scutum; qualis enim color est in pede scuti, tale denominatur et scutum. Cum enim color in huius-

⁵⁹ tricesima ms.

⁶¹ non inveni.

⁶⁰ Citation in ms. illegible.

modi pede fuerit rubeus, rubeum dicitur et scutum. Iuxta quod dicitur *Can. 5, 10: dilectus meus candidus et rubicundus* etc. Et Augustinus: candet nudatum pectus, rubet cruentum latus, tensa arent viscera, decora languent lumina, ora pallent regia, procera rigent⁶² brachia, crura pendent marmorea, rigat terebratos pedes, beati sanguinis unda etc.⁶³

Insuper passio Christi fit gladius impugnationis contra diabolum; patet in figura, I *Reg. 17, 50—51*, ubi dicitur: *cumque gladium non haberet in manu David, cucurrit, et stetit super Philisthaeum, et tulit gladium eius, et eduxit de vagina sua; et interfecit eum, praeciditque caput eius*.⁶⁴

David, Christus; *Philisthaeus*, diabolus; *gladius*, crux sive passio Christi. David igitur non habuit in manu sua gladium, quia ipse non meruit aliquo suo opere crucis passionem, sed Philisthaeo tulit hunc gladium, quia diabolus instigatione sua procuravit passionem; gladio igitur Goliae, id est, passione a diabolo procurata, a Christo, vero David, voluntarie perpressa⁶⁵ — et hoc est, *tulit gladium eius* — et a Deo patre praedestinata — et hoc est, *eduxit eum de vagina sua* — interfecit Goliam. *Interfecit Goliam*, manum eius attrahentem adnihilando, et manum flagellando, debilitando, *praeciditque caput eius*, id est, intentionem eius frustravit tam in semetipso quam in membris. Utrorumque enim intentio erat ipsum de terra eradere, et nomen eius omnino auferre. Unde dicit *Ier. <11, 19>* in persona eorum: *venite . . . mittamus lignum in panem eius*; id est, *panem eius*, Christum, qui est panis vivus qui de caelo descendit, in ligno crucis suspendamus. Et sequitur causa quare hoc fecerant, scilicet, ut *eraderent eum de terra viventium, et nomen eius amplius non memoraretur*. Sed caput eorum amputatum est, quia intentio omnino frustra per hoc quod eum crucifixerunt, magis ac magis dilataverunt tam in caelo quam in terra; unde *Phil. 2, 8—9: factus est obediens usque ad mortem, mortem autem crucis. Propter quod et Deus exaltavit illum, et donavit illi nomen* etc. Et certe si hoc cognovissent, numquam Deum gloriae crucifixissent <I *Cor. 2, 8*>; id est, non suggessissent crucifigi, quia non suggereret eum diabolus crucifigi per quem ius suum perdere sciret. Similiter si Iudaei credidissent per suam passionem locum et gentem se amissuros, numquam Deum gloriae crucifixissent.

De utroque istorum tangitur *Deut. 33, 29: beatus es tu Israel: quis similis tui, popule, qui salvaris in Domino? Scutum auxilii tui, per pas-*

⁶² vigent ms.

⁶³ non inveni; cf., however, Bernard, *Lamentatio in Passionem Christi*, PL 184, 770 A.

⁶⁴ Cf. *Glossa Ordinaria*, PL 113, 556 C.

⁶⁵ perpensa ms.

sionis defensionem, *et gladius gloriae tuae*, per eiusdem passionis impugnationem contra spirituales inimicos.

Quattuordecima ratio quare passio Christi est cogitanda est, ut hac habita in memoria, excludamus omnia vitia et flagitia; ideo super *Ezechielem* 22, 12, ibi: *mei oblita es* etc., Glossa: memoria Dei excludit omnia vitia <et> omnia flagitia;⁶⁶ unde per oppositum dicit *Ps.* <H. 10, 5>: *non est in conspectu eius; ideo inquinatae sunt viae eius* etc. Quanto magis memoria Dei redimentis et patientis excludet omnia vitia et flagitia; ideo respicite Iesum Christum, et contra omnes languores invenies medicinam.

Quintadecima ratio quare passio Christi est cogitanda est, ut illius pullos spiritualiter nos esse comprobemus, de quo dicitur *Iob*, 39,⁶⁷ 30: *pulli eius*, scilicet aquilae, Christi videlicet, *lambunt sanguinem*. Gregorius: sanguinem lambere est passionis dominicae recordari.⁶⁸ Talis pullus fuit qui dicebat, <I> *Cor.* 2, 2: *non enim iudicavi me scire aliquid inter vos, nisi Iesum Christum, et hunc crucifixum*. Non sic illi de quibus dicitur: spectat in obliquum strabo, sed limus in altum, et specus huc illuc, luscus prope, [f. 204v] lippus aquessit.⁶⁹ Qui enim neglecta memoria passionis Christi transitoria obliquantia ambit, strabo est; et qui eadem contempta, sublimia caelorum perscrutatur, limus est; immo revera uterque eorum caecus est spiritualiter. E contrario autem dicitur de apostolis, *Matth.* 17, 8: *levantes autem oculos neminem viderunt, nisi solum Iesum*. Item quandoque dicitur de aliquo: "iste non videt nisi castella," talis est superbus cuius oculi sunt excelsi etc., *Prov.* 30, 13: *generatio cuius excelsi sunt oculi*; e contra, *Prov.* 23, 5: *ne erigas oculos ad opes* etc. De alio dicitur: "iste non videt nisi terram," talis est avarus et carnalis, *Ps.* <16, 11>: *oculos suos statuerunt declinare in terram*; e contra, *Eccl.* 2, 14: *oculi sapientis in capite eius*.

Sextadecima ratio quare passio Christi est cogitanda est, ut in die iudicii filii Dei grati vocari mereamur, quia dicit Bernardus, *De diligendo Deo*: quem suavem in memoriam non sentitis, asperum procul dubio in futuro sentietis.⁷⁰ Quid enim faciet tunc ingratus homo, Christo passo pro ipso, cum crux Christi perorabit et Christus per vulnera allegabit, cicatrices loquentur et clavi conquerentur?

⁶⁶ *Comm. in Ezechielem*, VII, 22, PL 25, 210.

⁶⁷ 38 ms.

⁶⁸ *Moralium*, XXXI, 52, PL 76, 630 C.

⁶⁹ sic ms.

⁷⁰ *De Diligendo Deo*, 4, PL 182, 981 B.

Septemdecima ratio est, ut quandoque sicuti est in gloria sua videatur, secundum quod dicit *Isa.* 33, 17: *regem*, Christum scilicet, *in decore suo videbunt*. Unde Bernardus: si vis videre Christum sicut est, vide eum sicut pro te factus est. Numquam enim te, socium passionis, patietur a cognitione gloriae coerceri, quoniam *sicut socii estis passionis, sic eritis et consolationis*, II *Cor.* 1, 7; et II *Tim.* 2, 11—12: *si commortui sumus, et convivemus; si sustinemus, et conregnabimus*; et *Rom.* 8, 17: *si compatimur, et glorificemur*; quod nobis praestare dignetur etc.⁷¹

J. P. REILLY, JR.

Franciscan Institute

⁷¹ Cf. *Sermo in Die Sancto Paschae*, PL 183, 282 C; also cf. *Meditatio in Passionem et Resurrectionem Domini* PL 184, 750 A.

THE REDEEMPTIVE ROLE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF NATURE¹

Modern society is marked by an increasing passion for study and research. The purpose of this essay is to clarify and deepen the significance of such a passion by exploring the meaning of a life of learning within the universe that Christianity has revealed to us. The Christian meaning of studies such as theology and philosophy and even the social sciences may seem more obvious than the pursuit of the natural or physical sciences; yet it is more properly with these that the essay deals. With appropriate nuances it may throw light upon the entire range of studies, but it directly faces the question: What is the properly Christian significance of the attempt to understand the non-human world? The attempt to understand nature includes that of the natural scientist and the technologist who, with experiments and constructs, attempt to understand and control natural forces; but it also includes that of poets who in symbols seek to understand and celebrate the natural things with which we live. Moreover, it is not the incidental inspirational ideas that may come to an individual while attempting to understand nature but the very structure of the attempt itself that is under inquiry. What is under discussion, then, is the *import of the human search for an understanding of nature considered in the light of what Christ has revealed* both nature and that human search to be. The reflections which follow suggest the meaning that the author thinks is to be found in the metaphysical-theological tradition of Christian thought.

I. A statement of the question: the apparent privacy of knowing

Sometimes Christians and non-Christians seek to "justify" their intellectual pursuits by appealing to individual self-perfection or social utility. Or the Christian himself may appeal to their religious equivalents:

¹ These reflections were first presented to students at Loyola University of Los Angeles and Marquette University, and appeared in a different form in *Center* (Summer, 1961, pp. 5—13), published by the Sisters of the Divine Saviour of Milwaukee. They were brought to final form during a fellowship received from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung. I wish to express my thanks to all for their interest and help.

the salvation of his own soul or the furtherance of apostolic programs. If a fledgling Christian is asked, What is the meaning of life? he may thumb through the first pages of his catechism to read, "the purpose of life is to know, love and serve God." Now as a Christian he knows that there are cups of water to be delivered and sick to be visited, heads to be held and hearts to be calmed in the love and service of God. What, however, is his mandate precisely as a student or a researcher? It is to know,² and even, through knowing, to know God; but what, then, is this knowing? In what sense is *it* a service, and in what sense a loving? To love and serve God is a thoroughly public affair, whereby the Christian becomes his brothers' keeper. In sharp contrast, knowing seems such a private affair. It occurs somehow *within* the interior of his life. It is not difficult to see how even private prayer is important to others. The hermit indeed is an intercessor, even for men unknown to him. His act of praying catches him up into the communion of saints and calls upon the immense power of the invisible church. His personal prayer, uttered in solitude, is an important social event. Even the non-Christian, while he may deny the reality of that event, sees that the argument follows from the premises of the Christian faith. Knowing, on the other hand, seems such a private affair. Your knowledge is yours and mine is mine. The act of understanding in which you grasp a difficult geometrical demonstration does not enlighten me. My ignorance may be removed only when a bridge is built between your understanding and mine. Every teacher and student knows with what cooperative care that bridge must be built in order that the privacy of the teacher's insight may be opened and the knowledge shared with the student. That is why teaching is difficult work. The problem then becomes this: if the life of study and research is a life of knowing, and if knowing is such a private affair, how can *it* have meaning for others? How can it have public significance? What is the role of knowing in the life of society?

To this question, Christians and non-Christians sometimes propose these answers. First, the intellectual can by vocation or avocation become a teacher, and in this way communicate his knowledge to others. What is unsatisfactory about this answer, however, is that teaching cannot be the ultimate reason for a life of study, for it is knowledge that teaching hopes to bring about. Teaching is a secondary, derivative, genetic

² The mandate is universal but with especial import for those who devote their lives to learning. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologicae* I, 54, 2, obj. 1 and reply. See also James Robb, "Intellegere Intelligentibus est Esse", in *A Gilson Tribute*, ed. Chas. O'Neil, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, 1959, pp. 209—227.

activity which is practised for the sake of the primary activity of knowing. An individual may study simply in order to teach others, but the structure of study does not have that as its principal aim. Teaching is a preparation for knowing and to give it primary place would be like holding banquets in order to set tables. Such an answer looks upon teaching as a public act but regards knowing as private. If knowledge has only private significance, however, the public character of teaching is engulfed in the private character of its result, like public waters poured down private wells. The public act of teaching will remain ordered to privacy.

Second, it is sometimes proposed that through knowledge a moral reformation of personal character or a technical modification of our situation may be induced. Like teaching, this too may be a good reason for taking up a life of study and research, but it is not a reason which corresponds most closely to the structure of study and research. This second answer looks upon right action, both moral and technical, as public and practical, but implies that knowing is not, for it justifies knowing in terms of its practical fruits. It rests in a conception of the intellectual life according to which the public world is given over to action but knowing has not as such entered that world. It admits that knowing may *result* in something of public importance but does not consider that the very act of knowing is *itself* directly meaningful to others.

I think that we can surpass these views and maintain against them the thesis that *the intimate and personal activity of knowing is a public occasion*, even without publication or teaching, and even without considering reformation and modification, although the fullest sense of knowing (of which we here speak) encourages these consequences, and is even inseparable from them. Drawing from the metaphysical-theological Christian tradition, it seems possible and even necessary to say, that the fullest activity of human understanding can be an event of cosmic importance which "penetrates" even into the interior life of the Trinity. Knowing is an act which shakes the ancient foundations of being. Even a creature's act of knowing does that. The created universe has never been the same since a creaturely intelligence has sought and in some measure begun to know it. And perhaps those death-like planets do but sleep . . . and wait . . .

We should speak perhaps of the activity of understanding rather than of the act of understanding, for the latter word today may suggest isolated and momentary insights. We have in mind, rather, a prolonged and sustained endeavor. Moreover, in a sense to be clarified later, we are speaking here of knowledge in its fullest sense, that is, considered as

opened to its fullest meaning, and demanding even certain dispositions of an affective nature. The question, then, becomes more preposterous as it becomes more precise: How can the life of study and research, as a prolonged activity of understanding in its fullest sense, be of deep, lasting and even universal importance for all creation? The basis of our answer is the meaning of knowledge within the Christian universe.

II. Intelligence in history

Our consideration of the activity of understanding in its fullest sense is inseparable from a consideration of history, for the activity of human understanding is an historical event. Its immediate object is an historical situation, whether it be a laboratory experiment, a controlled interview, an intellectual analysis or a poetic symbolism. The being which man immediately knows and to which he is led through his knowledge is a being which is involved in historical movement. Moreover he himself as a knower is historically involved. We are not here asking: What must a proposition or event possess if it is to lay claim to inclusion within the study which we call history? That question demands an examination of the distinctive subject-matter and methodologies proper to the discipline of history. We are asking, rather, about the existential and ontological character of that reality which is historical. What is the character, value and ontological status of that uncompleted and sketchily recorded *totality* of events whose immediate agents are human persons? What is the being of this evanescent, unfinished whole? What is its meaning? Because man's being is fraught with and even constituted by the being of history, our question asks about the very meaning of human life itself. Man is an historico-metaphysical animal and has perennially sought an answer to this question.

Within so called historical times several non-Christian accounts have been given. We are familiar with an a-Christian answer which sweeps away the question itself. History, it says, is illusion, a vast shifting realm of *maya*; it has no being. We are familiar too with the pre-Christian account of our antiquity. History, it said, is not illusory, it has being; but its movement is cyclical and has no terminal. This gives history a minimal meaning, for it allows one to place himself or an event within a determinate stage of the cycle and to derive its meaning in that way. Nevertheless, a cyclical history, tied to the subhuman rhythms of nature, does not lead anywhere, and an eternal recurrence robs each event of its unique importance. To most of us today such a history may claim to be real, but does not seem to be worthwhile. We are familiar too with a

post-Christian account of history, originating in the Enlightenment but still influential today. According to it, historical process is real and going somewhere; it is a linear, not a cyclical, movement. Moreover, it is irreversible and moving toward an indwelling terminal. This account arose out of a society long familiar with the Christian insistence that history is a movement towards a goal; but it rejects the transcendent and yet immanent Christian goal in favor of a goal exclusively within this world. Its proponents are eighteenth century rationalists, Marxian and non-Marxian socialists and twentieth century democratic and totalitarian secularists. To them history is a real and meaningful movement whose goal is immanent. There is also, of course, the contemporary analysis of *historicity* which one hears from existentialists but especially from the Dasein-analysis of Heidegger. The latter proposes an a-teleological conception of history, for it sees the teleological conception irretrievably bound up with a metaphysical understanding of being which must be overcome. There is undoubtedly much that is fruitful in such an analysis. It demands of us a new appreciation of the existential and ontological character of time; its very criticisms allow us to look with new understanding at the metaphysical tradition; and it reminds us to distinguish carefully between revelation and the metaphysical-theological tradition which has interpreted it. Our present consideration draws from insights within that tradition, however, and a careful analysis would be required to show the differences and affinities of the Heideggerian conception with the metaphysical-theological tradition which has dominated Christian thinking about history. In that Christian conception of history as both immanent and transcendent, unlike even the latest views of Heidegger, man is open to the infinite and eternal.

Christ gave a new and ultimate perspective to history, at once revealing and embodying its unique and universal value. The metaphysical-theological tradition has sought to understand that perspective by placing two questions concerning the meaning of history. The first asks about the modality of history, the second about its direction.

The modality of history: intelligent motion. To ask about the modality of history is to ask about its being. The basal or minimal being of history is time, and time has two aspects, sequence and simultaneity. The ontological equivalent of sequence is movement; and of simultaneity presence. The famous Aristotelian definition of time determines it to be the measure of a motion whose roots are physical and even material. From this it follows that history, too, in its roots supposes incarnation. History belongs to a mode of being which does not have all that it is or

may be, in contrast with eternity which is always what it is, can and will be. Nevertheless, although the basal being of history is a becoming, this becoming is a peculiar sort of movement which is found properly only in the ontological structure of man. History is the becoming of human intelligence:

It belongs to man to advance in the knowledge of truth little by little . . . (and so for him) time seems to be a sort of helpmate and beneficent co-worker.

History is the development of incarnate intelligence in time, a development which is not an insertion of spirit into matter but the subsumption of matter into spirit.³

To appreciate the aspect of simultaneous presence which also characterizes history we must look beyond its basal being. There can be no history without intelligence. We speak of the *natural history* of plants and animals, but only because *we* comprehend the totality of their successive movements. For *them* there is no history, only movement. The very conception of history demands totality, for even if history is thought to be without beginning or end, *it* is comprehended after the manner of a whole. History demands comprehension, and this requires a power which can in some sense transcend the moving parts and embrace the movement as such and in its entirety. With such an activity of intelligence the mere presence of time is transformed into the presence of history. In the growth of present trees the past is operative, but there is no history unless the past is understood as operating in the present. In contrast, present rapid technological advances are departures from a once stable way of life, and they are seen as improvements or degradations of the immediate past. The basal being of history is a becoming but its eminent being is intelligence.

That intelligence is not the isolated Cartesian ego, nor is it the anti-historical Reason of rationalism indifferent to tradition with its affectivity, fidelity and love. The intelligence which is a proper, intrinsic principle constituting the being of history is a rational and fully human intelligence. It intuits step by step and according to a kind of time. It is a finite, discursive, spiritual openness. As theoretical intelligence it is discursive and intuitive. As practical it is ordered to affectivity, to inclination, decision and execution, for in intelligent motion there is the

³ Hegel saw this perhaps too clearly (see, for example, his lectures on *The Philosophy of History*, Introduction); what is questionable in his undertaking is his conception of spirit. The quotation is from St. Thomas, *Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nichomachum Expositio*, Marietti, 1934, lib. I, lect. xi, nn. 132—134; it is based upon Aristotle, *Ethica Nichomachea*, I, 7, 1098a 20—25.

decisive will to move. History, then, in its modality is the temporal movement of human, that is, incarnate intelligence.

The terminal of history: Eternal Being. Inscribed in any movement is a reference to its end and goal. Suppose that some migrating birds fly over. Are they flying to or from the nesting grounds? You cannot discern the meaning of their movement until you know its terminus. Or suppose that a blurr flashes across the movie screen. You do not know the meaning of that movement until you determine whether there are smiling faces to left and right, or, on the contrary, a scowling face and a terrified victim. The meaning of a movement derives not simply from its motion but principally from its term. The question about the modality of history, then, leads us to the question of its direction. What is the terminal of history?

Josef Pieper underlines how restricted a contribution the philosopher can make to the understanding of history. From his study of the being of God, the philosopher can assure us that God is not likely to permit the historical process to end in nothing. Nihilism is not the truth about history. The philosopher cannot, however, provide us with the experience, the datum or the subject-matter of the meaning of history. Jacques Maritain proposes certain functional and typological laws of history which, though they do not give us a knowledge of the last days of history, provide us with indications of certain tendencies projecting into the future and calling for our action. These laws are based on historical inductions, situated within the philosophical analysis of human nature and reality, and not unaffected by theological data "which are particularly illuminating and suggestive for the philosopher of history, because they provide him with a basic framework and basic indications about the direction of human history."⁴

Nevertheless, history has a depth which exceeds the grasp of philosophical intelligence. In the life of an individual intelligence history is experience and its goal is happiness; in the life of nations it is tradition and their destinies; and in the life of civilizations it is culture and their

⁴ Josef Pieper, *The End of Time*, c. 2, sec. 2, trans. M. Bullock, New York, Pantheon, 1954. The kind of experience required, c. 1, sec. 11; the subject matter of the philosophy of history, c. 1, sec. 5. Jacques Maritain, *On the Philosophy of History*, New York, Scribner's 1957, ed. J. W. Evans, cc. 2 and 3. For M. the philosophy of history is an extension of practical wisdom; for its subject matter, pp. 4—5. P. Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man*, trans. B. Wall, New York, Harper's 1959, offers a quasi phenomenological application of orthogenesis to cosmic movement, resting principally upon biology and paleontology. His work suggests that many disciplines can make positive contributions towards the understanding of the direction of history. The light of theology which guards the transcendent freedom of God and the exalted freedom of man is a privileged, but not thereby the only light in this quest.

ideals. What is it in the life of the world? The human intelligence, immersed in history and even constitutive of it, can grasp history only as an indeterminate whole, and so, if we are to understand history more adequately we must turn to the knowledge received from an intelligence which stands beyond history as its primal cause. We must turn to trans-historical revelation.⁵

To early pagan peoples the word of God was a pronouncement about the meaning of history. The Venerable Bede has described a great council of 627 which King Edward of Northumbria had called in order to determine whether his people should accept the faith of Christ. After debate an elder spoke as follows:

The present life of man upon earth, O king, seems to me, in comparison to that time which is unknown to us, like to the swift flight of a sparrow through the house wherein you sit at supper in winter, with your ealdormen and thegns, while the fire blazes in the midst, and the hall is warmed but the wintry storms of rain or snow are still raging abroad. The sparrow, flying in at one door and immediately out the other, whilst he is within, is safe from the wintry tempest; but after a short space of fair weather, he immediately vanishes out of your sight, passing from winter into winter again. So this life of man appears for a little while, but of what is to follow or what went before we know nothing at all. If therefore, this new doctrine tells us something it seems justly to deserve to be followed.⁶

What does the new doctrine tell of this goal? It proclaims that history is the journey of the people of God with God and to God, — that God of Whom it is said by St. Anselm in the eleventh century that He is eternal joy, and by Lacordaire in the nineteenth that He is eternal youth. History culminates, then, in an everlasting and joyful presence. It is in this sense, too, that Christian theologians have understood the formula (first uttered by Plato in a radically different sense): History is the moving image of eternity.

History is the way towards the living God.⁷ Its agents are human wayfarers who are incarnate intelligences; the Divine Intelligence and eternal Being is the creative source, the providential guide and the final goal of the way.

⁵ It is not a present purpose to elaborate the profound difference between subhistorical myths and trans-historical revelation. For a discussion see Jean Daniélou, *The Lord Of History*, trans. N. Abercrombie, Chicago, Regnery 1958, pt. I, c. 8, esp. p. 111.

⁶ *Bede's Ecclesiastical History of England*, II, xiii, a revised translation (of Giles and of Stevens) by A. M. Sellar, London, Bell and Sons, 1912, pp. 116—7.

⁷ We do not mean to deny or ignore evil in history; history in its sacral being and meaning is the overcoming of evil on the way to God. See the concluding remarks, below, VI.

III. The Divine Intelligence in history

We began by asking about the meaning of the attempt to understand nature. Since the activity of the understanding is historical, we asked about the meaning of history. We have drawn from the metaphysical-theological tradition of Christianity the reply that it is the movement of incarnate intelligence towards the eternal being of God. We are here, however, at the most dangerous possibility of misunderstanding, a possibility which Christians have not always avoided. It would be false to imagine history as a linear movement unrolling in the direction of a distant God. That would have reduced time itself to a mere sequence, and have forgotten that time is also presence and that history is co-presence.

We can, perhaps, best avoid this misunderstanding by placing the question: How can history move *towards* God? The final cause of any movement is the first of all the causes, and so there can be movement only if the final cause is somehow possessed, — in the passive potency of that which is moved, and in the active potency of that which moves itself towards its end. Pascal says that we could not move towards God unless we first possessed Him; and St. Thomas recognizes that no one would set out to prove the existence of God unless he first somehow knew Him to be.⁸ Following an ancient teaching, St. Bonaventure tells us that, to a mind illumined by faith and purified by prayer, the Blessed Trinity shines everywhere in the created universe. There is a trace or vestige of the Trinity in all created things, and rational creatures bear an even clearer reflection of the Trinity. Indeed, they are formed in the image of the Trinitarian God. This God is a moving force (*objectum motivum*) in the conscious life of men, that is, He is an objective Who solicits their understanding and love. It is well known that, for St. Bonaventure, God is an eternal presence Who is somehow present in our knowledge as a confirming and stabilizing light. His teaching has been criticized as irrelevant to a philosophical explanation of natural human knowledge; and it has been said that, in proclaiming the natural incapacity of creaturely knowledge to attain certitude, the doctrine of Divine Illumination does not honor the Creator. Nevertheless, among Christians, it gives witness to a presence of God in the conscious life of men. What is, at any rate, most essential here is the insistence that the Trinitarian

⁸ On the inchoative knowledge of God, *Contra Gentiles*, III, 38; also *In Joannem Ev. Expositio*, ed. Vivès, XIX, 669–671, and *Exp. Super Symbolos*, ed. Mandonnet, *Opuscula*, IV, 351–3. On final causality, *S. T. I—II*, I, 2c; *CG III*, 17–21, 24–5. St. Paul remarks, *Romans II*: 36: “How deep is the mine of God’s wisdom . . . All things find in Him their origin, their impulse, the center of their being, their goal.” (Knox Translation).

God is possessed by the human intelligence in the manner in which a dynamic image possesses its authentic original.⁹ The individual human intelligence in history possesses God as *objectum motivum*; and more, — history itself is possessed by that Appeal for human understanding and love. History is movement towards God, a movement which would not be intelligent and which would not move at all unless God were present in it. God, indeed, has a home in history. History, which is the movement of incarnate human intelligence, is the moving image of *His* eternity.

History, then, possesses God as an eternal creative presence. The great moments of sacred history, however, also teach us that He intervenes in the course of events. The pristine moment was that of the creation of man. God looked at His handiwork and judged it good. It was a fresh moment of innocent joy, and indeed was not so much a moment of history as it was its prelude. For our history is a movement of return to God, and it is difficult to conceive it in the absence of that original sin which was a calamitous yet divinely forgiven turning from God.¹⁰ In that age of innocence man sealed his God-given mastery of the subhuman world. The second and most dismal moment of history was that of the fall of man. We must not forget that with the master the world of subhuman things fell too. This was the moment of evil, sorrow and rejection of God by man. God, however, did not totally reject him, and so the third moment dawned, that of the covenant. God freely bound His hands with those of Abraham, and then of Isaac, Jacob and Moses. It was a somber moment of promise and hope. The fourth moment is that of the incarnation and redemptive suffering of Christ, wherein God became an infant and entered history in a most intimate way, even to death on a cross. It is our moment of faith, of deliverance from slavery, of freedom and decision, for in Christ God revealed to men that they might become His sons. It is seen that the "world-historical individual" is not the exalted pagan hero, nor the post-Christian revolutionary, but anyone who receives the adopted sonship of God. The final moment of history will be that of resurrection, judgment and communion, when all things are returned to the Father through Christ in union with the Holy Ghost. It will be the moment of consummation when history shall have been fulfilled.

Reflecting upon this course of history, we may ask again: How does

⁹ *Breviloquium*, II, xii, 1—3, in *Tria Opuscula*, Ad Claras Aquas, 1925, pp. 93—4: "Omnis intellectus, quantumcumque parum habens de lumine, notus est per cognitionem et amorem capere Deum." See also *Itinerarium*, *passim*, ed. cit.; trans. G. Boas, *The Mind's Road To God*, New York, Liberal Arts Press, 1953.

¹⁰ In the Easter Liturgy the Roman Church itself exults: "O certe necessarium Adae Peccatum . . . O felix culpa!" (Exsultet).

the providential God dwell within His moving image? How does He work in history? God committed Himself to history by choosing the Jewish people, establishing them as a people and intervening for them. Christians have understood the divine covenant as having been taken up for the sake of Christ's redemptive mission.¹¹ God works in history, then, through Christ its principal figure. St. Bonaventure tells us that we must return all things to the Father through Christ, because He Who is the creative principle is also the recreative principle. Christ is deeply, freely and generously involved in the return which is history. Through Him the Trinity works in history; through Him the Eternal One enters fully into history. For it is not until Christ's incarnation that God Himself becomes historical in His being. Of such a God strange things may be expected. In other religions men may go to God, but in Christianity God comes to man, even in time, even in matter. In and through Christ the eternal becomes historical.

There is the ground in Christ for the co-existence of past and present in a remarkable way. Ordinarily the past may exist in the present in two ways. First, it may be present in the results which it presently produces, as the cause is present in its effects; this is the generative past. Second, it may be present in consciousness, in memory, experience and affectivity: this is the historical past. In this way the past is recollected and enters as a determinant of the present. In Christ's saving act, however, there is more. He has not only worked salvation through intermediary times and generations: the generative past. His very act is present and active here and now. Moreover, it is not merely present in commemoration: the historical past. To be sure, Christ is not a mythical culture-hero whose acts can be repeated in a "time outside of time."¹² Christ died on a rise of ground in a city which today makes our headlines from time to time. His death was a thoroughly historical moment, and yet His act, and indeed all those acts which are done by or in Him, is here-and-now-in the-present. Christ's act is truly historical, but it is more: it is an eternal act. His act is eternal in its value and being because it flows from His own

¹¹ St. Paul, *Hebrews*, 8, 9, and 11; Moses esteemed "the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of the Egyptians, for he was looking to the reward" (11: 26). See also Justin Martyr, *Dialogue with a Jew*. For a comprehensive account of this practice in an early father, see Jean Daniélou, *Origen*, trans. W. Mitchell, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1955, pt. II, c. ii: "The Typological Interpretation of the Bible," especially p. 148. For the following reference to St. Bonaventure see below n. 25.

¹² Such mythical escape from history is sought through imitation of a hero or god and by reenactment of an original archetypal event. See Mercea Eliade, *Cosmos and History, The Myth of the Eternal Return*, Harpers, New York, 1959, pp. 34-7.

Eternal Being. The ontological value of Christ's redeeming act is both historical and eternal because His being is both historical and eternal. The eternal of which we here write is, of course, not mere timelessness. It is the mode of being which is the creative source of time and into which time can be taken up. In the personal being of Christ it is taken up into His eternal life. Christ is the Son of Man, The Saviour who is immersed in history, through His own life, in His Eucharistic Presence in the Church and by incorporation with the members of His Mystical Body. He is also the Son of God, the Saviour of the totality of events, things, persons and deeds which comprises history. Christ is the Saviour in and of history: *Christus viator et comprehensor simul*.¹³ Every act associated with His life can be and is both historical and eternal. Such an association is the very opposite of a fusion of the historical and eternal, and instead it clarifies their distinct modalities while uniting them hypostatically in the personal life of Christ.

Christ the historical-eternal person came to enlist men in their return to God. With Him God works in history through His creatures, — through physical things, human persons and their communities. In the Old Testament the first fruits and the first-born became sacrificial offerings which acknowledged God's dominion and His people's devotion. Fire, cloud, stick and lions played their role. In the New Testament, the water of baptism, the bread, wine and oils stand forth for man and for all creation. In the Old Testament we learned how God worked through patriarchs, judges, priests, prophets and kings, and through His people and through their enemies; in the New Testament through apostles and disciples; and in the Church through saints and even through sinners. In the Old Covenant we learn how God works through the Jewish nation; and in the New Dispensation through His Church. In truth, God works through *all* His creatures. In sharp contrast, if we humans were at the throttle of history, — surely sometimes we think it! — we should run things differently. There would not be so much "waste" motion, so much "meaningless" passion. In fact, however, no man, not even Big Brother, runs history; God runs it. He is known by many names, but that which best suits Him as the providential guide of history is Patience. For He works through His creatures and seldom (if ever) does what the creatures can do. He could have saved all in any way He wished, but instead He began by choosing a people. It would be absurd to pretend to understand why He chose *that* particular people, but we can guess at why he chose

¹³ St. Bonaventure, *Brev.* IV, ix, 5, *ed. cit.*, p. 156. On the being of eternity, see St. Thomas, *S. T.* I, 10, 4c and ad 3m.

some particular people. He wished to enlist men and their communities and things in the task of their own salvation. This is the basic principle that gives meaning to the drama of the history of the world.

We began by asking about the meaning of the attempt to understand nature. The question led us into a discussion of the meaning of history in which the attempt takes place. From the metaphysical-theological tradition in Christianity we have determined history to be the movement of incarnate intelligence in the presence of the eternal being of God, yet moving towards His fuller presence. Although we may in some context wish to distinguish the creative Intelligence of the way from the creative Intelligence of the term, we must remember that it is the one and same divine Intelligence, that Eternal Being Who in creating the way which is history is precisely its term. It would be a crass misunderstanding, too, to suppose that God as present mover is immanent and as distant term is transcendent. It is the same Eternal Being Who as the term of history is at once immanently present *and* transcendentally present. It is a fatal error to identify immanence with presence and transcendence with a kind of absence. Just such an error lay at the base of nineteenth century criticisms of Christianity, such as Nietzsche's, who charged that Christianity urged denial of this life for the sake of life beyond the grave. To him that was the highest nihilism: to give up an uncertain something for a certain Nothing.¹⁴ A Christendom which had forgotten that the new life with God begins here and now in this life would deserve to be parodied as "Platonism for the people." But the metaphysical-theological tradition, on the contrary, manifests the living God as an Eternal Presence, Who by His indivisible presence is both immanent and transcendent. His way of being manifests His creative transcendence as the source of His intimate immanence and His creative immanence as the mark of His absolute transcendence.

We have said, too, that time manifests itself as sequence and simultaneity, and that history is revealed as culminating in eternity. Christ in His person and church unites sequence and simultaneity, that is, past and present with His eternity. Thereby He enlists the beings of history in His redemptive work.

IV. The human intelligence in history

Our original question about the attempt to understand nature is now ready to undergo yet another transformation. In a universe in which

¹⁴ In *Beyond Good and Evil*, I, 10, said of the metaphysicians (*Werke in drei Bänden*, ed. K. Schlechta, Hanser, Muenchen, II, 574).

all creatures are called upon to share in the task of their common salvation, what is the meaning of this activity of understanding? In such a universe what does it mean to study or research or symbolise? What does it mean above all to seek an understanding of nature? The first step in answering the question calls for a reflection on the ontological structure and tendency of the human intelligence. In the metaphysical-theological tradition it is manifested as (1) trans-subjective, (2) trans-temporal and (3), in the visible creation, the unique creaturely access to the spiritual world of Eternal Being.

The human understanding is trans-subjective in its awareness. The activity of understanding manifests itself as an ontological openness. It "carries" a man beyond his own circumference to the being of others, for knowing is always a knowing-of . . . something. A knowing without a reference to something would refer to nothing. A knowing which did not signify something other than its knowing would be without significance. In technical terms, knowing is described as intentional, referential, even as "objective"; the knower is said to be the other *as other*.¹⁵ Its referential character anticipates the public nature of knowing. It does not put the world in a man's head, but rather places him before the world, or rather in the world. Knowing is representation because it makes a man present in the world and to things in the world. If some physical thing were, by fanciful supposition, suddenly given the gift of knowing, that gift would not place the world within it, but would rather make it present in the world in a new and strange manner. It would retain all its former relationships with the world and the things in the world; it would continue to be related spatially, chemically and physically; but now it would relate itself in a new and distinct way, for it would confront the things in the world. Knowing is confronting. To know is to place oneself before something and within a world. And so getting to know is radically different from getting fat, for fat qualifies its subject and resides within the increasing circumference of its being, whereas knowing "carries" a man beyond

¹⁵ See J. Maritain, *Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. from fourth French edition, supervised by G. B. Phelan, Scribner's, New York, 1959, pp. 128—132. The term "objective" may be misleading. The existentialists are correct in criticizing any attempt to rest the ultimate ontological character of human knowledge on objectivity, since the word strictly taken either excludes the subjectivity of knowing or reduces knowing to a question of validity. The term is here used with quotation marks to distinguish it from its use as a criterion of validity or certitude (as on p. 28 below). Here it is a synonym for the descriptive attitude of the human intelligence. The ability to "objectify", that is, to describe, is rooted in an ontological openness which is trans-subjective and trans-objective.

his circumference so that he might be present to and with the being of others. Knowing is being trans-subjective.

The study of so called animal languages shows that, excepting man, no animal gives evidence of a capacity for trans-subjective representation. The often subtle and complex communications between animals reflect the immersion of the subjects in the here-and-now situation as it affects them.¹⁶ Even so-called instinctual behaviour, whose ends are often remote, is triggered by considerations acting upon the subject here-and-now. Of course, much human language and behaviour reflects the involvement of the human subject. Sentences beginning with phrases as, "I hope that . . .," "I like . . .," and so on, may be determined by the relationship of the subject to the situation here-and-now, but what is decisive is the *manner* in which the human subject relates itself to that relationship. What is present over and above the relationship of the subject to the here-and-now situation, and what is present in human language and apparently wholly absent in so-called animal languages is the descriptive attitude which expresses itself in declarative sentences, such as, "This paper is white." Such an expression reveals an attitude which intends to be trans-subjective; its speaker is other-centered in interest and not merely subject-centered. Such human knowledge is, by intention at least, trans-subjective, and even subjective wish-demand expressions are shot through with trans-subjective meaning-elements. Thus, in the sentence, "I like ice cream," or even, "I would like some ice cream," the meaning of "ice cream" may be "that which pleases me here-and-now," but *that which* is an *object* and is so understood. Ask the speaker what ice cream is, and he will launch into a description of it as something-in-the-world.

The human understanding is trans-temporal in its being. To fail to see knowing as radically different from other acquisitions which determine the condition of the subject is to fail to see the peculiar ontological character of knowledge and the unique way it can fulfill the open being of the human person. The trans-subjective direction of knowing is rooted in its supra-temporal character, a supremacy which does not indicate a flight from time but, on the contrary, a taking up of time into a more-than-temporal mode of being. "Beasts live in the present, they know only the here and the now, but Man — and that constitutes his peculiar

¹⁶ Cf. G. Révész, *The Origins and Prehistory of Language*, trans. J. Butler, New York, Longman's Green and Co., 1956, pp. 30—37. Also W. Kohler, *The Mentality of Apes*, trans. 2d. ed., Ella Winter, New York, Vintage, 1959, app. II, p. 272; and E. Cassirer, *An Essay on Man*, New York, Doubleday Anchor, 1953, c. 8, 1, esp. pp. 152—3.

quality — thinks of the future, thinks also of the past. And not only of days, weeks and years, but of the ever recurring, of the ever present, problem of birth and death.”¹⁷ To have seized upon the beginning and end of one’s own being is, at the least, to have sensed the possibility of the beginning and the end of all being that comes to be. It is because the animal does not seem able to perceive anything except as bound with him in the spatio-temporal confines of the present situation that he is not able to disengage himself sufficiently in order to respond to and attempt to describe the situation *as it is* and not merely as it envelopes his organism. Even animal memory manifests itself as intra-temporal. On the contrary, human language can express even the subjective organic affections of the speaker in a descriptive manner. We ought, however, to avoid reducing that descriptive response to an automatic reaction. The trans-subjective achievement of human understanding is a possibility and as such, a task to be undertaken again and again. It is the effort to open oneself in order to be with the other as he is in his being.

If the animal cannot describe things as they are, it would seem to have no means or needs for modes of awareness which are trans-historical. Human language, on the other hand, is filled with terms which designate things and activities, but without immediate reference to this or that thing or activity. Thus for example, *beauty*, *humanity*, *animal*, refer to things which exist in time and place, but the mode of representation and reference is free from engagement in any particular temporal-spatial situation. The terms are universal. Paradoxically they manifest an abstract poverty, but also declare that man in his intelligence is existentially free of physical determinations and faces the physical world from a transcendent trans-temporal and trans-spatial niveau.

For their being there is no need to appeal to Platonic common essences, but simply to recognize certain similarities of function which the understanding observes in existentially diverse individuals. Anne writes poetry, Geoff writes mathematics, Donald types, Jonathan writes with ink. Each of these activities is diverse and different. Nevertheless the intelligence can see a similarity of function in each: each is the use of shapes to convey meaning, and we call this function, *writing*. The universal mode of knowing “carries” a man beyond the circumference of his own being and refers him to others by disengaging aspects of their nature and circumstances and representing them as meanings which transcend the spatio-temporal restrictions and pressures of the immediate situation.

¹⁷ Herbert Kuhn, *On the Track of Prehistoric Man*, trans. A. H. Brodrick, New York, Random House, 1955, p. ix.

To be sure, human knowing is the activity of an incarnate spirit, and so its fulfillment demands reference to things as they are in place and time. What is needed, however, before there can be any reference to *things* in time and place is to recognise the elements which are conditionally necessary throughout the duration of the things' existence in time and place. Thus, for example, *book* is a complex notion whose meaning-structure is without immediate reference to this or that book and demands a posture of the human intelligence which transcends all actual or possible individual books. That meaning-structure includes such similarities as "man-made," "for reading," "physical depository of intelligible signs," and so on. The human intelligence is perfected, to use this example, only by associating with books, these here, those over there; but it cannot associate with *books* at all unless it reads in these diverse individuals an intelligibility which transcends the mere temporal-spatial limitations of this or any other actual or possible situation.

More must, however, be said. Remarkable as is the human ability to represent meaning-elements in a universal fashion, it is an error to conclude that this ability is identical with the even more remarkable so-called "objectivity" of human knowledge, namely, the ability to recognise a situation or thing as it is and not merely as it affects the knower. The so-called "objectivity" is the peculiarly human achievement of being present to the other precisely or at least in some degree as he or it is, that is, as *other*. The ability to disengage universal meaning-elements from the other is the necessary prelude and condition to such a recognition, but does not constitute it. Recognition of the other as other arises through the judgment that this is so and so. In this sense the termination of knowledge in a judgment of the other is not a mere *return* to the senses but a *completion* of a free and spiritual activity of the understanding, whereby it frees itself from enclosure in its own being. At this niveau of "objectivity" the sensible and the intellectual conditions of knowing are taken up into a trans-subjective, trans-temporal and trans-spatial openness.

The human understanding gives access to the world of Eternal Being. The trans-subjective intentionality of human understanding demands the trans-historical character of knowing which in turn demands the spiritual being of such a knower. Because in his intelligence man exists as an openness beyond time and process, he can be given the grace to perceive the trans-subjective and trans-historical truth of religious revelation. Without this, religion would remain, if at all, at the level of subjective conviction and changing feelings. To be sure, it is necessary that conviction fortify true dogma and that emotion strengthen true

judgments, but conviction without truth and emotion without reality are a shifting and uncertain morass. Experience teaches us the central role of trans-subjective truth in our lives. Without it we remain closed in on ourselves, and the reality of other persons and things is obscured. Writing of the belief in the brotherhood of man Chesterton remarks:

I have therefore found in my middle age this curious fact about the lesson of my life, and that of all my generation. We all grew up with a common conviction, lit by the flames of the literary genius of Rousseau, of Shelley, of Victor Hugo, finding its final flareup and conflagration in the universalism of Walt Whitman. And we all took it for granted that all our descendants would take it for granted. I said the discovery of brotherhood seemed like the discovery of broad daylight; of something that man could never grow tired of. Yet even in my own short lifetime, men have already grown tired of it. We cannot now appeal to the love of equality as an *emotion*. We cannot now open a new book of poems, and expect it to be about the life-long love of comrades, or "Love, the beloved Republic, that feeds upon freedom and lives." We realize that in most men it has died, because it was a mood and not a doctrine. And we begin to wonder too late, in the wise fashion of the aged, how we could ever have expected it to last as a mood, if it was not strong enough to last as a doctrine. And we also begin to realise that all the real strength that remains in it, was the original strength of the doctrine.¹⁸

It is the natural spiritual openness of the human intelligence to which the revealing God appeals as to the sesame through which His healing truth may penetrate the human being and open his life out to the world of Eternal Being. This is the meaning of religious dogma which is so often parodied as blind stubbornness. It is difficult today to retrieve the trans-subjective openness of religious dogma, and it is no accident that the same cultural revolution of the seventeenth century (under whose influence we still live) saw both the rise of non-dogmatic religions of affective piety and inspiration and also the rise of subjective philosophical theories of knowledge.

The relation between the trans-subjective openness of knowing and the ontological order of religious truth and good should dispel the attempt to found religion upon subjective feeling. All attempts, for example, to place the efficacy of the sacrament upon the good or evil character of the minister ministering it have failed to grasp the trans-human status of religious truth and good. Eleventh century proponents of the Gregorian reform saw this when they reaffirmed the validity of function even in an evil priest. There is an efficacious religious order and through knowledge man may be given access to it.

¹⁸ *The Thing, Why I am A Catholic*, New York, Dodd Mead and Co., 1930, p. 19.

The trans-subjective openness of human knowing is the human basis for the ontological order of graces which are present in and through the sacraments. The latter are understood as visible physical presences and signs of the invisible presence of spiritual graces. They mirror man's twofold nature, for they are unions of two realms of being, of body and spirit. They are apt remedies for beings who are both temporal and trans-temporal, physical and trans-physical, and they are rooted in the spiritual reality of God's living care for His creation. The ontological order of graces teems with the living presence of the divine Persons and wholly originates from Them. The trans-subjective and trans-temporal character of the sacraments, however, finds its natural complement in the trans-subjective capacity of human knowing. The spiritual character of the human knower is the needle's eye through which eternal light-borne religious goods enter the human and subhuman world. For this reason the intellectual act is a most worthy activity, an exceptionally powerful and promising favor given to creation. It is within this *favor* that we find the meaning of the activity of understanding in its fullest sense, and within that we find the meaning of the attempt to understand nature.

V. The fourfold dignity of the activity of human understanding

The activity of human understanding considered in its fullest sense is the activity of an intelligent being whose openness of knowledge presupposes an openness of love. For that reason it is an activity which can be exercised by all men. Our question, however, asked about the meaning of an intense and enduring intellectual attempt to study, research or symbolize nature. We are, perhaps, better prepared after our discursus through the character of history and knowing to answer the question with more depth. For the light of the metaphysical-theological tradition in Christianity manifests to us a universe in which the intellectual act has a privileged role. The activity of understanding is an intellectual act which is (1) primary, even primordial and original, (2) most appropriate, (3) which enhances the things that it knows, and (4) which, in the Christian economy, can even redeem them.

The activity of understanding is primary, primordial, original. The human act of understanding is an inner mental word made manifest in the spoken and written word. The inner word bears a likeness to the divine Word, which is the originating principle through Whom all things are made, and so the human understanding in its activity resembles the creative act. In that resemblance it finds its own power as the most primary and original act in the order of creaturely acts.

(a) What does it mean to say that the human understanding bears a likeness to the divine Word? Following a tradition which is elaborated in even greater fullness by St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas describes the image relationship as a causal relation in which the image comes from, resembles and participates in its original. In the following text he distinguishes the way in which the resemblance of the rational creature differs from that of the sub-rational.

Every effect in some degree represents its cause, but diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the cause, but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a representation is called a trace (*vestigium*); for a trace shows that someone has passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause in terms of a likeness to its form, as fire generated represents fire generating, and as a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is called the representation of image. Now the processions of the divine Persons are referred to the acts of the intellect and will, as was said above. For the Son proceeds as the Word of the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as the love of the will. Therefore, in rational creatures which possess intellect and will, there is found the representation of the Trinity by intellect and the love proceeding in the will.¹⁹

The essential attributes by which men come to be in the image of God, then, lie in their capacity for knowledge and love. In another passage St. Thomas cites St. John Damascene and remarks that man is made to the image of God because he is intellectual and free and has dominion over his own acts. Man has an absolute dependence on God in and for his very being, yet the marks of that resemblance and dependence anticipate his own human work: the effort to understand, the marshalling of his own freedom, and responsible dominion over his own acts and his relations with others. This is the dynamic and historical image which man both is and in a fuller sense can be.

Looking forward to the fulfillment of that opportunity, St. Thomas sets forth three ways in which man can be to the image of God: with the resemblance of nature, grace and glory.

The image of God can be considered in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Second, inasmuch as man actually or habitually knows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows God actually and loves Him perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Therefore, on the words, *The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us* (Ps. iv, 7) the Gloss distin-

¹⁹ S. T. I, 45, 7. The next citation is from S. T. I—II, prol.

guishes a threefold image, of creation, of re-creation and of likeness. The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed.²⁰

At the creaturely level, the image is the primordial creative gift which the rational creature receives in receiving his natural intellectual being. At the wayfaring level, that is, within history, the image as a journey, is a supernatural gift of God, though still an imperfect likeness of Him. And at the apex, the image as repatriation is a supernatural gift of God and a perfect likeness. Nevertheless, it is still a likeness, and so "our word is never to be equalled to the divine Word, not even when we shall be like God."²¹

For that reason we can never properly say of the human intelligence and its language that it is creative. Yet we may ask in what sense human thought and language resemble the creative power of the divine Word. The prevailing conceptions of language do not make it easy to answer the question. Much importance is attached today to reaching the linguistic ideal of precision and clarity. This is a necessary corrective to lazy and irrational abuses of language. The descriptive formulas of modern, and especially of the natural, sciences seem to all but reach perfection in this endeavor. Such an ideal when taken as absolute, however, leads to an inadequate conception of the full power of language, in which language is understood simply as a function and limited to the narrow role of merely restating data. It is a commonplace that we have lost much of man's previous reverence for the spoken and written word. It is too easy to accept uncritically the Comtean-like view that the sacral, theological and ontological conception of language has been outmoded by a newer secular and scientific conception which is primarily psychological and epistemological.²² The reverence for the word is to be found in the metaphysical-theological tradition in the form of a certain sapiential conception of language, though since the seventeenth century it has been increasingly deemphasized. An appreciation of language deeply rooted in wisdom remembers the transforming power of even the human word. The wise man is the man of exceptional understanding and effective counsel. He brings to birth true thought, right sentiment and efficacious

²⁰ S. T. I, 93, 4c.

²¹ St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, XV, xvi, trans. W. J. Oates in *Basic Writings of St. Augustine*, New York, Random House, 1948; vol. II, p. 855.

²² Or to explain it away as entirely conditioned by the authoritarian nature of ancient political society in which the king called and men were known and acts done and things made. For the portrait of the wise man touched upon below, see St. Thomas, *CG I*, 1—2.

action. He brings harmony into human affairs; and feeling and deed come to be transformed through the power of his word. Language in the service of the ideal of wisdom demands appropriate precision and clarity but also reveals even the descriptive formulas of modern science as a new birth in being. It knows, too, that human discourse shapes a new world of intercourse between men and things. Such a language resembles and participates in the truly creative power of the divine Word.

That divine Word has a privileged role in the formation of things. "In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God; and the Word was God, He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through Him and without Him was made nothing that was made."²³ The origin of created things lies in the continuing utterance of the Word, and the Fathers therefore liken the created universe to a book. The Psalmist, prefiguring the revelation of the divine Word, proclaims:

Praise ye the Lord . . . Praise ye Him, O sun and moon: praise him, all ye stars and light. Praise Him, ye heavens of heavens, and let all the waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord. For He spoke, and they were made: he commanded, and they were created . . . Fire, hail, snow, ice, stormy winds, which fulfill His word: mountains and all hills, fruitful trees and all cedars: beasts and all cattle: serpents and feathered fowls: kings of the earth and all people: princes and all judges of the earth.

Christians have understood this as applicable to the relation of things to Christ, and in the minor elevation during mass have offered all things to the Father through Christ in union with the Holy Ghost.²⁴ St. Bonaventure writes that it is most fitting that man return to the Father through the God-man Christ, but also because the Word is that through Whom all things first come to be.²⁵ St. Paul remarks:

²³ John I, 1—5. The next quotation is from *Psalm* 148, Cf. *Apoc.* 5: 13.

²⁴ Christ Himself says: "I am the way and the truth and the life; no one comes to the Father but through Me." (*John* 14: 5—6.) See also *John* 6: 48—59; 10: 1—18; Cf. *Apoc* 22: 13—17.

²⁵ See the following texts from St. Bonaventure: *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*, 12, ed. cit., p. 376—7: "Per hunc intellige, quod a summo Opifice nulla creatura processit nisi per Verbum aeternum, in quo omnia disposuit, et per quod perduxit non solum creaturas habentes rationem vestigii, sed etiam imaginis, ut eidem assimilari possint per cognitionem et amorem. Et quoniam per peccatum rationalis creatura oculum contemplationis obnubilatum habuit; decentissimum fuit, ut aeternas et invisibile fieret visibile et assumeret carnem, ut nos ad Patrem reduceret. Et hoc est quod dicitur Ioannis decimo quarto: *Nemo venit ad Patrem nisi per me*; et Matthaei undecimo: *Patrem nemo novit nisi Filius, et cui voluerit Filius revelare*. Et ideo dicitur *Verbum caro factum*. Considerantes igitur illimitationem artis mechanicae quantum ad operis aggressus, intuebimur ibi Verbum generatum et incarnatum, id est Divinitatem et humanitatem et totius fidei integritatem." Also *idem*, 23, ed. cit. p. 383: "Necesse est etiam ponere medium

In the Son of God, in his blood, we find the redemption that sets us free from our sins. He is the true likeness of the God we cannot see; His is that first birth which precedes every act of creation. Yes, in him all created things took their being, heavenly and earthly . . . They were all created through Him and in Him; He takes precedency of all, and in Him all subsist . . . It was God's good pleasure to let all completeness dwell in Him, and through Him to win back all things, whether on earth or in heaven, into union with Himself, making peace with them through His blood, shed on the cross.

St. Augustine asks:

How, O God, didst Thou make heaven and earth? . . . Thou speakest, and they were made, and in Thy Word Thou makest them . . . and whatever Thou sayest shall be made is made . . . In this Beginning, O God, hast Thou made heaven and earth, in Thy Word, in Thy Son, in Thy power, in Thy Wisdom, in Thy Truth; wonderously speaking, and wonderously making.²⁶

The dignity of the human understanding consists in its imaging the divine Word which is both the creative and recreative principle of the world. In the imaging of this two-fold role of the divine Word, *creator et redemptor*, the human understanding has an opportunity to play a major role in the recreative redemption of the world.

The beginning of that work and its fulfillment lie in the intimate openness of the human intelligence and its word. It is, says St. Augustine, a dual word, for when we understand we express an interior silent word, and when we speak we utter an exterior audible word. He remarks that "the word that sounds outwardly is the sign of the word that gives light inwardly; which latter has the greater claim to be called a word," for it is the work of a word to give light. So too the inner word expresses itself in the bodily sound, just as the divine Word assumed bodily flesh; and so too, just as all things are made through the divine Word, so all human acts proceed through the inner human word. The language of inner and outer, of sign and meaning may appear to us to be too dualistic, may

in egressu et regressu rerum; sed medium in egressu necesse est, quod plus teneat se a parte producentis, medium vero in regressu, plus a parte redeuntis; sicut Mediatorem Dei et hominum non tantum Deum esse, sed etiam hominem, ut homines reducat ad Deum." And finally *Brev. IV, i, 2, ed. cit., p. 128*: "Quid sapientius et congruentius, quam quod ad perfectionem totius universi fieret coniunctio primi ultimi, Verbi scilicet Dei, Quod est omnium principium, et humanae naturae, quae fuit ultima omnium creaturarum?" and *id. IV, ii, 6, ed. cit., p. 132—3*. The quotation of St. Paul is from *Colossians 1: 14—20*. See also Hans Urs Balthasar, "Scripture as the Word of God," in *Selection I*, ed. C. Hastings and D. Nicholl, New York, Sheed and Ward, 1953, esp. pp. 122—3.

²⁶ *Confessions XI. Cf. De Trin. VI, 10*. The basic text is *Genesis 1: 3*. The next quotation of St. Augustine is from *De Trin. XV, xi*; see also xii, xiv and xvi.

suggest a too external relation between thought and expression, between meaning and speech. It may indeed be true that today we understand more deeply the incarnate and historical character of human speech and that the human word is ontologically one. On the other hand, at least part of our dissatisfaction with St. Augustine's account may lie with ourselves who, having undergone the historical experience of Cartesian dualism, may have lost the immediate sense in which the outer dynamically signifies the inner by partaking of its light and life and thereby forming with it one complex word. That human word is the analogue of the creative Word. The intellectual act which bears as its fruit the interior word of understanding, and with it the entire complex human word, is privileged because it is the powerful likeness of that primary, primordial and original act through which all is made.

(b) The realization of that likeness is not static, but rather a gift to be received and a task to be undertaken. The gift is a growing likeness of one's understanding and being to the divine; the task is one of participating in the formation of one's being and understanding, the task of self-formation. An image relationship can, of course, be understood in a variety of ways. One of the crudest relations is that of the wax plate to the seal or the printed paper to the press. Much more mysterious is the relation of an artistic work to its artist who is inspired and guided by his artistic objective. An even more profound and mysterious embodiment of the image relation is the kinship of father and son. Most men hope that their sons come to be, at least in some ways, in their image and likeness. In procreation certain biological affinities are brought about; but true fathers hope for more, and in their families they work consciously towards an enculturation of ideals, attitudes and skills. A father and mother generate a child in their biological image, and if they are truly parents, go on to give him example, to train and teach him, and to offer him an inheritance and a heritage. In this activity father and mother should be principal causes who cooperate within the family and with the community through friends and teachers. The child thereby comes to participate in a complex exemplar: he is in the image of his father and mother, of his family and community and of individuals and societies which transcend his community. It is the task of parenthood to lead him into this complex ideal. To be a fully human parent to one's child is a conscious and deliberate work. Such fully human deeds require a loving understanding, that is to say, an openness to the child in *his* being. It is a difficult ideal, perhaps, to set before a parent, but it should be taken up by the understanding, in uncertainty and hope, with its anguish but also its satis-

factions. St. Augustine remarks that "there are no works of man that are not first spoken in his *heart*: whence it is written, *A word is the beginning of every work.* (*Ecclus.* xxxvii, 20)." ²⁷ Gabriel Marcel reminds us that each fatherly act is the incarnation of a father's love and understanding, and a proclamation to "behold my son!" In the begetting and rearing of his son a true father is an effective cause who offers to his son an opportunity, that is, an exemplar which can be a formal and final cause, and which is offered in a spirit that respects the intelligence, freedom and autonomy of his son.

On the side of the son, over and above the hereditary affinities such as psychological dispositions, the exemplar can be assimilated as formative of his very being. For he can become like his father in modes of action, such as zeal or placidity, gusto or deliberation, and in qualities, such as generousness, courage, honesty and openness. As a final cause the exemplar offers itself as that in which the son participates as in a goal to be achieved, such as to seek excellence in what is worthy and to further what is best in himself within the ideals of family, community and humanity. We are here far from the mechanical relation of seal to wax, and can see that the image relation of son to father is a rich texture of human associations and ideals. It not only respects the unique freedom of the son but manifests that becoming a true son demands a work which is most intimate, personal and non-repetible, and which calls for all the resources of a truly human freedom. The son is not the image of the father as wax is the repetitive and inert image of the seal, and the father or son who attempts to bring about such an imitation will surely fail. Rather the son is the image of the father as the incarnation of everything that is best and highest in him. The image relationship, so understood, does not demand slavish imitation; nor does it include the mimicry of vices but only their overcoming.

The image relationship reaches its peak in the resemblance man bears to God. Marcel writes that human fatherhood is only partly organic and finds its highest exemplar in the fatherhood of God. We are often told that a child takes his early conception of God from his relation to his own human father. It remains to add that the chief work of maturity and the sign of the authenticity of a religious experience can be manifest

²⁷ *De Trin.* XV, xi; *ed. cit.* II, 847—8. The following two references to Gabriel Marcel are from "Creative Vow as Essence of Fatherhood," in *Homo Viator*, trans. E. Craufurd, Chicago, Regnery, 1951. This essay along with "The Mystery of the Family" is prime reading. The reference to Descartes is from *Discours de la methode*, pt. 2.

when a son begins to understand his father as the image of the divine Father. In that moment he also sees himself as an image of the divine Son. The realities of fatherhood and sonship, divine and human, are especially difficult for us to grasp today. We have undergone the cultural experience of an anti-historical rationalism and individualism which also denied and thereby degraded the meaning of childhood. Decartes, for example, all but complains that it would have been better to have been born a fully mature adult. That, of course, would have been to bypass the first efforts of coming-to-be in the likeness of one's father. In this lies at least a great part of the meaning of that immature dependence which is one's childhood. Nevertheless, important as childhood is, we should not, under the influence of a prevalent ideal of independence in which a "mature individual" feels that in the deepest sense he owes nothing to anyone, not even to his father, — under that influence we should not reduce the meaning of sonship to the passing status of childhood. It would be an error, of course, to deny that such a dependence is included in the very meaning of sonship: as the child is dependent on his father, so much the more are we as children of the heavenly Father dependent upon Him. Nevertheless the full meaning of sonship must be disengaged from an equation with the immaturity of childhood. For sonship means coming-to-be-like-and-with-the-father. For this work of maturation the son must receive from his father as from an efficient, final, formal and exemplary cause; but that reception calls for the highest human effort and upon his full autonomy. The effort, enspirited by grace, begins and is achieved in the open and loving awareness of the human understanding. In its responsive and creative role the human understanding in father and son bears a likeness to the divine creative Word through Whom all things are made in the likeness of the Father.

In opening ourselves out to what is best in family and community we form our being and with the help of grace become more like the divine Word and the divine Father. In this same growth we open ourselves out to the world of things and are enabled to play there a role in their redemption. To see how this is possible we now turn to the other marks of the dignity of human understanding considered in its fullest sense.

The activity of understanding is the most appropriate act. In the creaturely order only the spiritual openness of intelligence can assimilate all being to itself. Thus Aristotle declares that the soul is in a manner all things, both "by virtue of becoming all things " and "by virtue of making all things." The human intelligence is an openness ordered to being, for that which it knows is always being in one of its modes, and

through these modes it is open to being without qualification.²⁸ Since it can assimilate or appropriate all being to itself, the intellectual act is the most appropriate of all acts.

Such an assimilation or appropriation, however, is easily misunderstood and even thwarted or perverted. To assimilate is to become like. There is that assimilation which is accomplished through the dissolution of one being by and in another, as when a wolf assimilates sheep. Thereby one term of the relation increases itself in its own flesh. We have seen, however, that assimilation in knowing means that the knower is "carried outward" and terminates in conforming, that is, in "being made over in the likeness of," or more truly, in being present to the thing known as *it* is in *its* being. So too when we think of appropriation within the category of power we think of a being bringing more being into or under itself, as when a government appropriates land or a slave owner binds to himself slaves. Thereby one term of the relation increases itself in property and power. It is possible and even frequent for a person to misuse his understanding in order to bind all things known by it to himself, as a tyrant encloses subjects within his own self-interest. Such a misappropriation is bound to fail, however, and violates the ontological structure of the understanding. The relation of the intelligence to the thing known is originated and sustained by the intelligence itself and it makes the thing to be in some sense appropriated by that intelligence. Nevertheless it is a trans-subjective appropriation and leaves the proper being of the known untouched. By such a trans-subjective appropriation the intelligence makes the being of the known to be its (that is, the intelligence's) being, but that appropriation is constituted by the intelligence opening itself to the thing known and making the being of the known a matter of interest and concern to the being of the knower. Making the being of the known a matter of concern (understanding in its fullest sense) means standing open to the being of the known and respecting it in its being. Only in this way is the truth of the thing revealed.

This should not condemn the human intelligence to a passive and inert resignation in the face of things. Study, research and the poetic expression of nature require experience and this comes through intercourse between man and the world of things. In that intercourse man must often be active, even aggressive. In research, above all, he must

²⁸ On the soul, Aristotle, *De Anima*, III, 8, 431b 20—28; 5; 430a 14—17. On being, St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, I, i. Cf. J. Maritain, *Degrees*, ed. cit., pp. 210—218; B. Lonergan, *Insight*, New York, Philosophical Library, 1957, pp. 348—64, 644—57.

control the conditions of observation and actively embark upon theoretical as well as practical constuctions. Moreover, modern science and technology are becoming more and more intimately interdependent, so that one can scarcely speak of technology as the mere application of theoretical knowledge already gained. Even philosophical contemplation demands intercourse between men and things. It is only that this intercourse and the human power to transform things ought to be placed within a basic respect for the integrity of things. The particular form of that respect will vary from situation to situation and no over-all formula can be laid down in advance. The difficulty is especially acute in our world of rapid technological change because, while the respect should derive from an intellectual insight into the ontological structure of things, it is precisely such an understanding which is difficult to achieve in a world that is being transformed more and more through human power. Nevertheless the need to respect things is neither a medieval hang-over from a supposedly static world of substances nor a merely sentimental feeling. It is demanded as much by human knowledge as it is by things themselves. It is the basic condition for trans-subjective truth, and within that, for scientific objectivity. Considered in its fullest ontological sense the human understanding is an open concern for the being of things and for its own being, for it is the awareness that man and things share a mutual destiny.

Because of the nature of this trans-subjective appropriation, man is ordained to be master of subhuman creation. Revelation teaches us that, in the original order of things, Adam was their master. For God said:

Let us make man to our image and likeness: and let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the fowls of the air, and the beasts, and the whole earth, and every creeping creature that moveth upon the earth.

In the garden of paradise he walked and saw the creation with which the Lord had endowed him. The Lord brought each animal before him, and as Adam saw it he named it. The first man thereby sealed his mastery over the animals by calling them by name.²⁹ They were not only known

²⁹ *Genesis* I: 26; cf. St. Thomas, *S. T. I*, 96, 1 and 2. An old tradition holds that Adam gave each animal the proper name which revealed its true and essential character and that we have lost this knowledge through the sin. Moses seems to be speaking of the Hebraic names in use in his day: "And the Lord God having formed out of the ground all the beasts of the earth, and all the fowls of the air, brought them to Adam to see what he would call them; for whatsoever Adam called any living creature the same is his name. And Adam called all the beasts by their names, and all the fowls of the air, and all the cattle of the fields." (*Genesis* 2: 19—20; 1: 27—9.) The chief point is clear: Adam's naming fixed the order between himself as master and his creation as subject. Cf. St. Thomas, *S. T. I*, 94, 3 *sed contra*.

to him but came to be known by him. There was great power in Adam's exterior word because it was the sign of his interior word; and that first naming under God was sufficient to fix man's mastery under God. The tradition attaches great import to the act of naming. So too, Christians have always known that the greatest misfortune that can befall a man is that the Lord not recognize him, that he be not called and that his name be blotted from the Book of Life.³⁰ The power of naming reflects the power of knowing, and this knowing penetrates into the very being of another. The language of common law preserves an ancient testimony to the penetrating power of knowing, for it describes the most intimate physical union as a carnal knowing; and carnal knowledge is that union which classical authors describe as transforming a youth into a man and a maid into a woman.

Man lost his original masterful knowledge, and yet there are pale reflections of it. The persistent primitive belief in magic is, in part, an inefficacious and amoral conviction of the transforming power of the word. A more forceful example is modern technology, whereby man masters things by his intelligence, unifies vast data by compact symbols and thereby transforms the physical world.³¹ Too often today, perhaps, man in his fallen state corrupts his mastery over the subhuman world until it becomes an unintelligent domination. Too often he forgets that man and things have a mutual destiny and that their common destiny is sealed in and by his knowing them. Knowledge with its attendant culture is a remedy for man's indigence and also for a certain indigence in things. That mutual indigence, however, can be remedied only in an activity of appropriation whereby man becomes the master of things by mutually respecting himself and things, their natures and laws. As the father respects the son in his being, so too this appropriation respects the dignity of natural things and is farthest removed from appropriation as a sheer

³⁰ *Exodus* 32: 32—3: "He that hath sinned against me, him will I strike out of my book." *Psalms* 68: 29: "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living; and with the just let them not be written." St. Paul, *Philippians* 4: 3: "They have toiled with me in the gospel, as have Clement and the rest of my fellow workers whose names are in the book of life." *Luke* 10: 20: "Rejoice rather in this, that your names are written in heaven." *Apoc.* 3: 5: "I will not blot his name out of the book of life, but I will confess his name before my Father." *Apoc.* 20: 15 "And if anyone was not found written in the book of life, he was cast into the pool of fire." Cf. *Psalms* 146: 4—5; *Apoc.* 20: 12.

³¹ Cf. Sir Basil Willey, *The Seventeenth Century Background*, New York, Doubleday Anchor, first published 1934, c. II: "Bacon and the Rehabilitation of Nature". Also F. Bacon, *The Great Instauration*, Preface; in *English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill*, ed. E. A. Burt, New York, Random House, Modern Library, 1939, p. 12—13.

display of power and lust of conquest. When he undertakes the free work of an intelligent appropriation of things, a man is on the way to meeting their Creator; and the closer he gets to God, the more he and they come to be in His image.

The activity of understanding is an act which by its nature enhances things. This too may be easily misunderstood. If we ask, What happens to a thing when it is simply known? we must, of course, answer: Nothing happens to it at all. If a sheep is only perceived by a wolf, it is all the same to the sheep. On the other hand, if afterwards the sheep is eaten by the wolf that does make a difference. This latter union is one in which the being of one of the subjects is dissolved and that of the other fattened; one circumference collapses, the other increases. Physical union is a necessary condition for sensory perception and is especially intimate in sensations of touch, taste and smell. Yet it is because sight is least immediately dependent upon physical contact that its awareness is least restricted and that it is the most open and discriminating mode of sensory perception.³² For all that, it would be an error to model a theory of understanding exclusively upon the perceptive powers of sight, and to represent the knower as a spectator spying out things from afar. For if sight anticipates the free openness of the activity of understanding, touch more deeply prefigures the intimate union which that activity achieves. Intimacy and openness, while they manifest a certain irreconcilability at the level of sensory perception, together constitute the singular, spiritual nature of understanding. The spiritual openness of the human understanding in its fullest activity is achieved in the intimate co-presence of the being of the knower with the being of the known. In that spiritual community of knower and known the physical being of neither is altered. To be sure, although physical conditions are present in human knowing, they are not intrinsic to the intellectual co-presence of knower and known. It does not alter the book lying on the desk if it is known. The physical being of the book is in a certain sense indifferent to being known or unknown. The sense is this: The physical being of the book is not thereby engulfed within the circumference of the knower, nor does the knower increase the circumference of his own being through knowing. The union of knower and known has traditionally been called

³² St. Thomas, *S. T. I.*, 78, 3c; 84, 2c. One can abandon St. Thomas' erroneous notion that the power of sight was enacted by a wholly "spiritual" immutation without abandoning the essential differences between seeing, hearing, touching, etc., as perceiving powers. Cf. G. Klubertanz, *The Philosophy Of Human Nature*, Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1953, pp. 103—111.

intentional by philosophers to designate its non-physical character, and *intellectual* to designate its spiritual nature.³³

Although we must insist that the co-presence of knower and known leaves the thing known unaltered, we must also insist that it is not an indifferent affair to things, whether they be known or not. Gray's desert flower does not bloom to remain unseen and unknown. To be sure, it is known to God, but can we perhaps say that it is not born to be *unknown* by its human master? To those who fear such poetic sentiment, it may be put as a question of the relation of things to man. In modern times it has been a philosophical fashion to ask whether the world is as man understands it to be. Such an epistemology is heavily weighed with the egocentric individualism of the classical seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophies. Concretely it asks, for example, whether the tree "in itself" is green. The question presupposes that the tree is something which can be and can be considered in isolation from its world, from its relations with other physical beings, and from its relations with sentient and intelligent beings. This "tree in itself" suggests a kind of impenetrable unit which stands alone, indifferent to the world of things, and in principle beyond the realm of meaning. To seek the sensible qualities of the thing "in itself" is to suppose that physical beings do or can exist "in themselves" and to suggest that their being is indifferent to a meaningful relation with the human understanding. In truth, physical beings and human beings are citizens of the same world, and are subjects of being mutually involved with one another. That involvement reaches its peak in the open spiritual community of knower and known in the activity of human understanding. The ontological structure of a thing is an invitation for understanding. A being calls to be known, and a knowing power is an answer to that call. And when a created intelligence answers that call that thing is in some sense fulfilled.

In what sense we must now try to understand. What is it to be known? In what sense is a thing fulfilled by being known? We may begin by saying, somewhat clumsily, that the thing which is known is elevated or sublimated. When the incarnate intelligence knows a thing, it establishes a relation of its own, a relation of reason or spirit, a relation of meaning with the thing which is known. We might say that it takes the thing

³³ St. Thomas, *S. T. I*, 14, 1c., on the equivalence of immateriality and knowledge. For a fuller explanation of the knowledge union, see E. Gilson, *Elements of Christian Philosophy*, New York, Doubleday, 1960. pp. 226 ff.: G. Smith, *Natural Theology*, New York, Macmillan, 1951, pp. 193—7, and by the same author, *Philosophy of Being*, section on our knowledge of being. Also F. Wilhelmsen, *Man's Knowledge of Reality*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1956, c. 8.

into its household, that it lends it its light, or even that it gives the thing citizenship in the community of spirit. These, of course, are metaphors, and they are heavy with the taking and giving of physical alteration. We appeal to a better example. Let us imagine that we are gathered together in a room to honor a splendid man. Suppose again that a group of people enter. The honored guest asks who they are, and upon being told that they are John's friends he walks over and stands by John waiting to talk with him in friendship. Suppose further that John is unaware of his approach. John is not changed. Nevertheless he is enhanced by association with the distinguished guest. It is as though he were taken into alliance, even into partnership, with the guest. In the eyes of his friends, and indeed in truth, John is taken up into the life of this revered person. And so too, when a human intelligence knows another person or physical being, that person or thing is taken up into the life of a spirit. The person or thing is ennobled by its invitation to a presence-in-spirit. Certain tributes paid to the dead manifest the truth of what has been said. After a man of great spirit has died we instinctively honor his remains, for they have been involved in the great adventure which is his life. So too we are drawn by the same insight to look upon objects associated with him as enhanced by that association. Even the property of a powerful though depraved spirit can awaken a kind of morbid fascination in us. Moreover the reverence of relics is in its essential meaning neither morbid piety, nor superstitious belief in magic, nor a concession to popular religion. It is moved by the genuine realization that a great spirit enhances those things with which it is identified.

The significance of this insight for the study, research and symbolic expression of nature is profound. When a chemist knows the strength of a chemical bond, or a physicist traces a sub-sensory particle, when a mathematician manipulates a set of numbers, or a psychologist observes animal behavior, when a biologist studies the structure of an organism or a poet sees new meaning and harmony in words: — whenever the intelligence of man is at work — it is as though the newly wrought Adam were walking once again in the primeval garden and ennobling all its beings by his conscious presence. And indeed every knower is the fallen Adam who like Milton's Lucifer still bears the dignity of his nature. The Greek poet wrote: Many are the wonders of the world, but none so wondrous as man. And in the mass the Church proclaims: O God Who has established the nature of man in wondrous dignity. Knowing, then, is an act proper to the nature of an incarnate spirit whereby, without in any way altering the physical being of the knower or known, it neverthe-

less enhances the being which things have within the total order of creation. Knowing *does* nothing for a thing, but it is *better* for the thing to be known. Knowing *does* nothing because it is not a *doing*. To be known is to be better because it is to be taken up into presence with a living spirit.

What is this *better*? Just as the radical being of a thing is not to be misconstrued as a unit in isolation, so too the radical good of a thing is not to be misjudged in isolation from the universal order. Aristotle remarks that "all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike — both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected. For all are ordered together to one end . . . All share for the good of the whole."³⁴ St. Thomas says that "that which is best in things is the good of the order of the universe." The full goodness of things is the radiance which shines in them when they exist in due order. This order is neither one of static substances nor of absolute process; it is ontological, an order of beings. It is through the life of the divine Being that things have their ordered natural goodness, for that ordered goodness of nature is possessed within the all-embracing creative omnipresence of the divine Intelligence. Within this living omnipresence the human understanding plays its natural role. When it knowingly stands open to things it lends them its own presence and fulfills its own nature by allowing things to participate in the life of spirit and in the spiritual order.

The bewildering power of human evil brings its confusion deep into the heart of things, for it forces upon the things with which it associates an evil presence that can corrupt or at the least leave unrealized the natural intentionality of things towards a full ontological goodness. We are not here committing the anthropomorphic fallacy of attributing properly conscious, even spiritual, aspirations to things which do not have them. We are rather stretching human language in order to express the very real tendency of things towards inclusion in a spiritual order. Unless one is almost completely despiritualized, he views with horror the weapon in a particularly heinous murder, even though he knows that the weapon in itself is incapable of bearing guilt. This deep feeling is too easily explained away with talk of psychological association, vicarious experience and the like. That is certainly constitutive of the experience, but the horror is inseparable from the presence of the weapon itself. The

³⁴ *Metaphysics* XII, 10, 1075a 12--24. The quotation from St. Thomas is from *S. T. I*, 15, 2.

ritual of religious purification is more to the point, and is no mere bygone superstition belonging to the supposedly overly fearful man of the past. It is rather a deep insight into the truth that things are not mere instruments which remain indifferent to the spiritual struggle of good and evil. It is their own full destiny that is at stake. That destiny can be realized by man's masterful knowledge which can appropriate and enhance the things it knows.

The activity of understanding is an act which, in union with Christ, can redeem things. We have insisted that the intellectual act is a privileged activity in this Christian universe because every intelligence by its nature can enhance things through knowing them. But when the human intelligence which enhances things is, through the grace of God, a holy intelligence, a sacred temple of the Holy Ghost, then that intelligence can redeem the things it knows. For a holy intelligence, sanctified by God, the effort to understand nature is not only an effort to spiritualize and thereby make it anew; it is also and above all an endeavor with Christ to liberate things from their fallen state, that is, to redeem them.

We must speak as precisely as possible here. It should be clear that *persons* cannot be redeemed simply by being known by other persons, although their being known may awaken in them a response of understanding and love. Indeed, are not the saints on earth vessels of grace and spiritual opportunity for other persons? And, if we desire their company with a worthy desire, is this not an earnest of salvation? But it is different with things. When their master fell from grace the universe of subhuman things fell with him. St. Paul tells us that the universe groans under the weight of sin:

If creation is full of expectancy, that is because it is waiting for the sons of God to be made known. Created nature has been condemned to frustration; not for some deliberate fault of its own, but for the sake of him who so condemned it, with a hope to look forward to; namely, that nature in its turn will be set free from the tyranny of corruption, to share in the glorious freedom of God's sons. The whole of nature, as we know, groans in a common travail all the while.³⁵

Recognizing the partnership of man and things the Psalmist calls upon subhuman things to proclaim the praises of God. Christ consecrates bread, wine and human sounds to the mutual redemption of all creatures. Both man and things need redemption and can receive it through Christ. Things, however, receive it properly through man who is their ordained

³⁵ *Romans* 8: 19—21 (Knox Trans.).

master in cooperation with Christ. Human persons can respond to Christ and other persons through intelligence, and things cannot. Nevertheless, things respond to intelligence. In the divine power of Christ, waters are stilled or transformed into wine, sensory organs are opened, physical organisms are brought back to life. The early Christians represented Christ as bringing the peace of a new order to the world of natural things, for their redemption had also begun.

That redemption is an historical undertaking in which men and things are involved. The Christian intelligence is not the divine Intelligence, but it is Its image and can play its humble and yet exalted part in the redemption of things. Each sanctified intelligence can help redeem the things with which it associates during its life by taking those things up into an appreciative intercourse with itself. Here too, surely, lies a deep significance for the Christian artist, who can take up into hands sanctified by Christ the things of the natural world so that they can play a role in the spiritual world of art. Christian art is much more than merely a psychological or apologetic instrument, of course; it is first of all art. But it is also an ontological transformation of the natural in the service of the mutual redemption of man and things. In a very special sense, however, and because of a long and intense association with nature, a sanctified intelligence, whether chemist's, physicist's, biologist's, psychologist's or poet's, can participate in redeeming the things it knows. For redemption seen from the side of the redeemed is one term of a relation which is established by the redeeming intelligence and through the grace-filled power of his sanctity. When a holy intelligence, sanctified by God, enters the world of things in answer to their call, things are enhanced by the nature of intelligence and are brought towards their redemption by the power of this intelligence-in-grace.

It is easy, of course, to parody what has just been said, and to misrepresent the redemptive act as a magical, isolated act of knowing, as though the knower were a kind of spiritual camera who intermittently takes shots of things. Rather, the knower is a life, and the incarnate knower undertakes an historical life of knowing. The mysterious redemption of the world will not be accomplished until the end of history, yet even now the student of nature plays his role in bringing nature towards its redemption. This is the meaning of an intellectual life devoted to the understanding of nature. The redemption of things through knowing is the full and proper and splendid association of their being with the life of incarnate spirit-in-grace.

VI. What has not been said

The explanation which has been given of the life of study is not a reason which will solve any problems in chemistry or biology; but it does give a profound meaning to a life dedicated to solving such problems. An antagonist might declare, however, that the best reason for solving such problems is simply that they are there to be solved. That, however, is just what we meant when we said that things ask to be known. We may put the objection in another way: to give any other reason for knowing than knowing itself is to betray the life of study; to say that one knows in order to redeem the things known displays an anti-intellectual depreciation of the value of knowing itself, and that is an error which the first pages of this essay professed to put aside. It must be said in reply: Anti-intellectualism depreciates the worth of knowledge by seeking outside of it a reason for a life of understanding. Quite the contrary, in saying that redemption is the reason for knowing, we have grounded the life of knowing within knowing itself, for the gratuitous term of redemption is a *vision* which is the very life of man and creatures within a new order of happiness. The Beatific Vision is knowing at its peak; it is face to face conscious presence to, with and in Him Who is the Truth in Whom we have our being and our final good.³⁶

There is another possible misunderstanding. It may seem that we are putting forth a psychological and conscious motivation for one's every act of knowing, a kind of religious technique or pious gimmick. Not at all! We are far from suggesting that, while he is studying nature, every Christian intellectual ought to constantly remind himself that he may be engaged in redemptive activity. Such a consideration would almost certainly distract him and thereby defeat his purpose; for if he redeems, it is to the extent that he knows. At any rate, he may know his chemistry or physics ever so surely, but he never knows his condition in grace. For the Christian intellectual, it is sufficient to seek knowledge, and to ask for grace. Moreover these reflections intend to respect the mysterious and highly personal devotion between a deeply committed inquirer and the kind of understanding which he pursues. Nor do they forget that man is finite and that, although all forms of knowledge are valuable, for a man to seek all of them with equal ardor is but to scatter his genius. The study of nature at its best is a kind of love affair. One man pursues nature in chemistry, another in poetry, and it is sufficient to them that it yield itself to chemistry and to poetry. This essay is not presented as an

³⁶ St. Thomas, *CG* III, 18, 25, 37, 51, 53, 61, 63, Cf. *S. T. I*, 12, 2.

attempt to explain why one man finds satisfaction in one form of knowledge and another in another. And above all it is not an attempt to present a psychological motivation which ought to, as it were, replace with a "higher" motive the "mere" interest in this or that form of inquiry. Such a false kind of piety has hindered the development of art and science among many Christian communities. On the contrary, these reflections are meant to free the already noble pursuit of natural truth in all its forms for its own tasks and satisfactions within a Christian world of grace. There is no attempt at all here to supply a non-scientific psychological justification for the study of nature, because none is needed. We have simply tried to give an account of what, it seems to us, happens whenever an intelligence in grace takes up that pursuit.

The most serious misunderstanding, however, would be to suppose that these reflections advance a kind of Christian rationalism according to which men would have an unconditioned claim to knowledge. Like all human activities, on the contrary, the pursuit of knowledge is conditioned, for it is from beginning to end, the understanding of a finite and incarnate spirit which is seeking that knowledge. That historical pursuit is conditioned by ignorance, error and evil; and a further, and perhaps, deeper reflection is required to come to grips more meaningfully with these forms of darkness. The metaphysical-theological tradition is aware of them as privations, but it refuses to consider evil as native to being or error essential to truth. In addition to the mysterious threat of evil it traces our unknowing to two sources which are not privations but which are rather rooted in the ontological structure of our present relation to God. The first lies in our finitude. Hans Urs von Balthasar writes that in our concourse with other persons we are sometimes asked by love to leave unknown to us what should be known only to God and his creature, and what it would be a violation of the other person to uncover.³⁷ Things, of course, are not persons, and yet it is also true that in our finitude we should approach them as though they too are worthy of a certain respect. It is only absolute rationalism and the most unthinking optimism that maintains that all knowledge of all things in all respects and at all times is an unconditional mandate for the sake of "progress." This does not mean that we should be fearful or even hesitant in advancing the frontiers of knowledge, but only that that advance like all human undertakings does not absolve us from judgment, and combines the risk of a false step with the promise of truth.

³⁷ Hans Urs von Balthasar, "The Freedom of the Subject," in *Cross Currents*, vol. XII, Winter, 1962, pp. 13—30.

The second source of our unknowing lies in the excess of light which is revealed to us. The Christian revelation is able to be understood by us just to the extent that we can recognize that there is a common redemption of men and things; how that redemption is every day realized about us is beyond our ken. It is sufficient that we strive to know in grace, and that we take up our task of knowing within the light of that mystery. It is knowledge enough to inspire the Christian intellectual, student, researcher, poet, to pursue the truth reverently and fearlessly, reverently for its sake and fearless of his own. Such a person will want to become more and more learned and capable in his own discipline. He will want to reform himself more and more, and to bring his knowledge to the healing of man and nature. He will want to go out into the highways and byways to proclaim the redemptive truth. But the first creaturely act of redemption is to be found in the silent interior of that holy intelligence. To know is to enhance by nature, to know-in-grace is to redeem. The sanctified intelligence is the shepherd of being. The intelligences of men can be the shelters of beings who are returning home.

KENNETH L. SCHMITZ

Freiburg im Breisgau

HUSSERL'S INTERPRETATION OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

In examining Husserl's judgment of the history of philosophy, we are not interested in whether Husserl approved of or condemned individual thinkers. We wish to find how he conceived of the totality of philosophy's history, what he thought was the key to explaining the multitude of men and ideas that comprise our philosophical heritage. Is there some intelligible pattern, some *telos* or immanent rule that guides the rise and fall of philosophical systems, or is the story of philosophy merely the narrative of haphazard events? Does the history of philosophy, taken as a whole, reveal some intelligible criterion against which this same history can be judged? We wish to see in what way Husserl raised this question and how he answered it.

Husserl was thoroughly persuaded of his own originality as a philosopher. But the claim of originality can be made only against the background of that whence the new arises; what Husserl proposes as a new beginning for philosophy becomes itself a judgment on this philosophical tradition, because it reveals what the tradition has been striving for but has never, in his opinion, attained. Thus his "speculative" thought becomes a factor in his "historical" interpretation and hermeneutics, and phenomenology as a system is supposed to shed light on philosophy as a developing series of events. But the reverse is also true. The philosophical history that finds its renewal and climax (in Husserl's mind) in phenomenology, has actually served as a propaedeutic to this end, and if we can sympathize with the striving of this tradition, we will be all the better prepared to understand what satisfies it. Husserl's "historical" interpretations shed light on the nature of his "speculative" thought. His exegesis of philosophy's history helps us to understand what he felt philosophy should be.

The problem of locating his own philosophy within the stream of philosophical history does not appear in Husserl's early works. In his *Logical Investigations*, he does make reference to many other philosophers, both classical and contemporary, but this is always done in connection

with certain specific, limited questions. Thus the entire volume of *Prolegomena* is written to contrast Husserl's new way of explaining logic with the psychological methods of explanation used by many philosophers and logicians. In the body of the *Investigations*, Husserl spends much time contrasting his concept of abstract species or meanings with that of the British empiricists, and he later claims that his idea of categorical constitution provides the correct solution to Kant's problem of sensibility and understanding. He compares his own idea of intentionality favorably with that of the medieval scholastics, and he frequently compares or contrasts his doctrine with that of such contemporaries as Natorp, von Brentano, Lipps, etc. But all these remarks are simply elucidations of single points, and the references are more for the purpose of clarification than to show that phenomenology has a special place in some sort of overall development of philosophical thought.

In his lectures of 1905, published under the title of *The Idea of Phenomenology*, the same is still true. Here, about the only significant historical reference is that made to Descartes. Husserl formulates his own concept of the phenomenological reduction fairly clearly in these lectures, and he cites Descartes as the philosopher who came closest to carrying out a similar project.¹ He does not claim, however, that either he or Descartes revolutionized the evolution of philosophy with this discovery of the ego.

To this point, therefore, Husserl's view upon the history of philosophy is modest, and the understanding he has of this history is quite prosaic. He does not find in history any special unity, whether of structure or of purpose. He does not claim that the multitude of philosophers have developed their theories because of some immanent law of development, nor does he say that the varied philosophies are all looking for one thing, and would all be satisfied by one *telos*, even though they differ totally from one another in structure. The history of philosophy is for him simply an arsenal of problems, comparisons, hints and solutions, which are helpful in the treatment of given subjects.

Why this lack of a unified conception and judgment of history? The answer is that Husserl has not yet thought through his own philosophy as a coherent, unified system, and therefore still does not have a framework against which to see a pattern in history. Although the subjects he has treated are indeed important and fundamental, such as the nature of logic, Husserl does not yet grasp all his problems and solutions thoroughly

¹ *Die Idee der Phänomenologie* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958), pp. 30—33, 49—50.

and radically enough, so as to be able to find anticipations of his philosophy in earlier thinkers. As he will say in the *Crisis of European Sciences*, when he discusses the problem of the meaning in philosophy's history, "Only when the conclusion is established does this become revealed; only from the conclusion can the unified directedness of all philosophies and of all philosophers be disclosed, and from it we can gain a light in which we can understand past thinkers as they could never have understood their own selves."²

The picture changes drastically in Husserl's *Logos* article of 1910—11, "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science." The very first words bring a historical perspective that was completely absent in his earlier works: "Since its very beginnings, philosophy has claimed to be a rigorous science . . . This claim has been maintained sometimes with greater, sometimes with less energy, but it has never been completely abandoned."³ In the next paragraph, Husserl continues with a dim view of how philosophy has fulfilled its pretension: "At no age in its development has philosophy been capable of satisfying this claim to be a rigorous science."

Statements like these are new in Husserl. Here we have him discussing the "pretensions" of the whole history of philosophy and, furthermore, passing judgment on this history. Such a sweeping, ambitious view cannot be found in what he had written earlier. He claims to have discovered the impulse, the *Denkenergie* that has motivated the twists and turns of philosophical thought, that inspired the ancient upheaval (*Umwendung*) wrought by Socrates and Plato, that has again been the source of Descartes' renewal of philosophy. He finds it at the root of Kant and Fichte, and judges that this true motivation of philosophical thought has been betrayed by Hegel and the romantic thought of the nineteenth century.⁴ This motivation, which has worked implicitly and anonymously in the great philosophers of the past, has finally been grasped consciously and critically, he claims, in his own thought: it is the drive to science, the *Wissenschaftstriebe*.⁵ It is the profound desire of humanity to possess radical clarity, the "inevitable claim of humanity to pure and absolute knowledge."⁶

² *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), p. 74.

³ „Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," *Logos*, I, 1910—11, p. 289.

⁴ *ibid.*, p. 292. Even Husserl's implicit references to Empedocles and Anaximander suggest that the insights they had receive their fulfillment and correct appraisal only in the new phenomenology.

⁵ *ibid.*, p. 293.

⁶ *ibid.*, p. 290.

The reason Husserl can take such an olympian view of history is that he feels that he has made a discovery. He has had a speculative insight into human nature and reality, and feels that this insight reveals the deepest element, the most profound "reality" that man is capable of experiencing. This speculative insight goes hand in hand with his historical critique, for it is the criterion by which he judges the history of thought: past philosophies are judged favorably in proportion to their success in approaching this ultimate reality. Thus Husserl can interpret the history of philosophy as a search for something only when he has himself discovered what the object of this search is. Until this discovery has been made, he could not have seen any sort of coherent pattern in the flux of philosophical opinion.

Husserl feels that he has stopped the flux of philosophical search, because he has found what it has been looking for. Now, he claims, philosophy can proceed safely and surely, in contrast to its hapless wandering in the past. Thanks to his new insight, philosophy can now be set on the right road, the correct method of science.⁷

The *Logos* article itself does not explain what it is in Husserl's discovery that makes his thought so revolutionary in the history of philosophy; the article simply states that philosophy has always sought to be a rigorous science, and that phenomenology is the first to fulfill this need. The precise way in which this is achieved is described in Husserl's major work, the first volume of *Ideas*, which was written to carry out the program described in his article.

The fulcrum of Husserl's thought in this work is the description of transcendental subjectivity, and the realization of philosophy as a rigorous science rests on the nature of subjectivity as it is expressed in the *Ideas*. Husserl feels that we have a special type of experience of our own consciousness, an experience that is radically different from the awareness we have of the world.⁸ This difference in our experience is grounded in the way subjectivity and the real world exist; they comprise two fundamentally different regions of being, each absolutely irreducible to the other. They each exist in different ways. The real world exists in space and in the change that is implied by spatial existence; consequently, the experience we have of the material world is also characterized by spatiality, and results in a permanent, inherent continuum of profiles (*Abschattungen*).

⁷ Cf. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), p. 8. The similarity to Kant's project for his critical philosophy is obvious.

⁸ This argument is developed in Section Two of *Ideen*, especially pp. 69—119.

Whenever we experience a material thing, it is never given to us in its totality. Only certain aspects, certain profiles can be given at one time, and if we wish to expand our perception of a given object, we explore the profile continuum further, but can never hope to exhaust it. No matter how complete our investigation is, there always remains a horizon of aspects that are not directly experienced. The evidence, the givenness of real things, is never exhaustive and absolute, but always allows room for further penetration, change, and revision. Our experience of the real world is essentially structured in this way. Furthermore, the reason it is so structured does not lie simply in the way our knowing faculties are made, but in the very nature of material reality. Material reality is such as to be able to furnish only incomplete, inadequate evidence, because of its spatiality.

It follows, claims Husserl, that any statements made about the real world are always subject to correction, revision, and even complete negation. Any pronouncements about what is the case in reality always retain the *possibility* of being revised or subsequently denied, because it can always happen that the profile continuum will not corroborate what we seemed justified in saying at an earlier time. The changeableness of material reality makes any statements about it inherently open to correction. The fact that no absolute, exhaustive evidence can be given in our experience of the real world implies that no apodictic statements can be made about this world and the things in it. Even statements simply asserting the existence of material things contain this built-in factor of corrigibility. "To be thus incomplete *ad infinitum*, belongs to the irremovable essence of the correlation 'thing' and thing-perception."⁹

Husserl's analysis of material reality and the experience we have of it is carried out in a constant contrast with the reality and experience of subjectivity. Subjectivity does not exist in space, and therefore it is capable of being given to consciousness in a nonspatial way. It can be given absolutely, adequately, and apodictically, because it does not contain the principle that was the cause of corrigibility in material things: the profile continuum. Husserl stresses the "absolute" way in which subjectivity is given to itself, and claims that this results in an absolute evidence, an absolute basis for apodictic statements about subjectivity. When we describe transcendental subjectivity, we need not fear that some subsequent turn in a profile continuum will upset what we have once said. This danger does not exist; in fact, it would be a contradiction to attribute it to our experience of subjectivity, because this would be

⁹ *ibid.*, p. 101.

equivalent to attributing the status of material reality to subjectivity. Even the possibility of such revision or change in reflective experience is excluded, both for the existence and for the nature of transcendental subjectivity and its intentional acts. "But my acts of empathy and my consciousness in general are originally and absolutely given, not only according to essence, but also according to existence."¹⁰ ". . . It would be a contradiction to hold it as possible that an experience, given in such a way, really does not exist."¹¹

Phenomenology studies this privileged sphere of being, transcendental subjectivity. It studies pure consciousness, after the phenomenological reduction has shown that such consciousness can be isolated and disengaged from any admixture of the "real" world, and considered in itself as an independent sphere of being. Phenomenology, as Husserl conceives it, analyzes the various acts of consciousness, the intentional structure such acts have, and the interconnections they can form with other acts. It describes the essential, eidetic structure of consciousness in this way. All these descriptions are carried out on pure consciousness, but since this consciousness is the "source" of the meanings of all things in the world, phenomenology also shows how such meanings are intentionally constituted. In this way, it lays bare the ultimate source of objective reality and the meanings in reality.

Thus phenomenology is a radically new type of science, according to Husserl, and differs from all other sciences in two ways. First, it is more fundamental than the others, because it inquires into the sources, the constitution of those basic meanings which all other sciences assume when they begin their investigations. Secondly, it alone is an absolute and final science, because it alone operates on a realm of being which exists and is experienced in an absolute, apodictic way. Of all human attempts at knowledge, only phenomenology, claims Husserl, enjoys this absoluteness and finality, this complete lack of presuppositions. Thus it alone can qualify as the ultimate human way of knowing, and as such it alone can satisfy that basic human quest that has been left unsatisfied by the entire history of philosophy. Husserl's ambitious claim for phenomenology as the end, the *telos* of philosophy's history, is thus based on his discovery of transcendental subjectivity and the way it exists and is experienced.

Husserl feels that all past philosophies have looked in the wrong place for the answer to the quest for absolute knowledge. They have all

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 107.

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 106.

attempted, in one way or another, to find it in the real world, but the real world cannot furnish definitive and absolute knowledge because of the element of corrigibility, of doubtfulness, of profile continua, that intrinsically limits both the existence of things in the world and our experience of such things. The real world is not the type of being that can support a final, apodictic science. Thus Husserl's speculative insight into the nature of subjectivity and, correlatively, the nature of the world, is the basis of his interpretation of past philosophy, and it also gives him a criterion by which he can judge the failure or the partial success of earlier philosophers. In the *Ideas*, after he has described what transcendental subjectivity is like, he says that this insight and the phenomenology built upon it answer the "secret yearning" of all modern philosophy.¹² He goes on to credit Descartes with stumbling upon this domain of subjectivity, but not disengaging it sufficiently from "real" existence. Hume, he says, almost entered it, but completely missed its significance because his eyes were blinded by a materialistic prejudice. Kant did see it correctly, but his partial insight can be fully appreciated only since what he hesitatingly grasped has been fully comprehended by the new phenomenology. Thus Husserl feels that his discovery is a turning point in the history of thought; and even more than a turning point, it is the final answer to what philosophy has always been looking for and never definitively found.

Husserl's phenomenology claims to do more than give philosophy a secure and absolute starting point; it also presents it with a project that has a definite, attainable goal. Philosophy as a rigorous science will comprise an achieved body of knowledge, and therefore the search that characterized past philosophy now comes to an end. Every intentional experience, claims Husserl, has its own essential structure.¹³ Phenomenology will investigate and describe such structures, and when it has done this for all the types of intentional experiences there are, it will have

¹² *ibid.*, p. 148.

¹³ *ibid.*, p. 75. In this connection, Husserl asks whether phenomenology is anything like geometry. He answers negatively: phenomenology is not a science of "ideal structures," but a *descriptive*, eidetic science. The only reason Husserl denies similarity between the two sciences is that geometry talks about ideal structures that are not given in intuition, whereas phenomenology describes the essences of intentional acts, essences which it directly experiences. (*Ideen*, pp. 168—74) Nevertheless, for our purposes, the comparison is illuminating: Husserl does not deny that phenomenology and geometry *are* the same in that both use fixed, pure essences. Both are equally independent of and abstracted from history. It would not be counter to Husserl's thought at this time to say phenomenology is a "descriptive geometry" of subjectivity.

succeeded in building up an apodictic, absolute science. Much like the "ideal language" of Russell or the *mathesis universalis* of Leibniz, phenomenology will furnish all the conditions of possibility for human knowledge. It will give all the essential structures and relationships found in the acts that constitute the real world, and in this way will give man an absolute, apodictic knowledge of the foundations that underlie all that he knows. Of course, all this is not achieved in the *Ideas*; as Husserl notes in his introduction, only a sample is given in this work.¹⁴ But the principle is established and the possibility is there, he claims, now that we have discovered transcendental subjectivity. It only remains for the phenomenologists, working together, to carry out the project outlined for them.

Thus at the time he wrote *Ideas I*, Husserl was optimistic about the ability of phenomenology to build up a definitive structure of absolute knowledge. If we turn now to a much later period in Husserl's life, to the time when he wrote the *Crisis of European Sciences*, we find a very different opinion. Husserl's concept of the history of philosophy has undergone some significant changes.

One element remains the same. Husserl still feels that his phenomenology uncovers a realm of being (subjectivity) which is *sui generis* and allows the possibility of an ultimate, final type of inquiry. There is no other type of investigation or science that would be more radical or more fundamental than the phenomenological description of subjectivity. "To lead back to intentional origins and to the units of the formation of sense — this results in an understanding which, once it is reached (this is, of course, an ideal case), leaves no meaningful question remaining."¹⁵ No other types of questions can be raised that would be more fundamental than those asked by phenomenology. "When the ego has been attained, one realizes that one stands in a sphere of such evidence, that to want to raise further questions beyond this is meaningless."¹⁶ Thus Husserl still feels that he has made a turning point in philosophy with his discovery of transcendental subjectivity, because he has shown where the ultimate types of questions can be directed.

However, although no further types of questions can be raised, the answers given to the questions in phenomenology are never definitive. This is implied even in the passage quoted in the last paragraph, where Husserl says that final, definitive phenomenological understanding is an "ideal." He uses the term "ideal" in the Kantian sense, as a guiding

¹⁴ *ibid.*, p. 7, n. 1.

¹⁵ *Krisis*, p. 171.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 192.

principle that is never actually realized. The final completion of phenomenology can never be attained, because there is always room for progress to infinity. Speaking of his phenomenology, he says, "Its fate (and of course this is afterwards understood to be essentially necessary) is an incessant, renewed falling back into paradoxes that stem from unquestioned, even unnoticed horizons . . ." ¹⁷ Husserl now feels that his region of subjectivity is not so absolute as he thought it was in the *Ideas*. It has horizons and profiles of its own; not spatial ones, it is true — and consequently the experience we have of subjectivity is different from and more certain than that of spatially extended material reality — but temporal profiles, which introduce an element of obscurity even in this privileged sphere of experience. Whatever statements can be made about subjectivity and its structure are themselves in principle subject to revision and change, because there always remain implied and unclarified aspects that must be clarified. The ego is not perfectly transparent to itself, and can never hope to possess itself completely, even through phenomenology. What he formerly considered only a temporary state of obscurity, which could be cleared up by a more refined use of words and more attentive reflection, is now seen to be a permanent horizon, a permanent state of unclarified confusion.

Is it significant that whereas Husserl had a low esteem of Hegel during the period in which he wrote the *Ideas*, his argument in *Crisis* has a definitely Hegelian flavor. The most impressive instance of this is found in the section included by Biemel as § 73 of *Crisis*. This chapter, which was not originally part of the manuscript for this book, dates from the same period as the *Crisis* and is an important testimony to how Husserl conceived of the history of philosophy at this time. When speaking of the philosophical life, he says, "This life, as a personal thing, is a constant becoming in a constant intentionality of development. That which becomes, in this life, is the person himself. His being is perpetual becoming . . ." ¹⁸ He describes philosophy as, "*ratio* in the constant movement of self-clarification." ¹⁹ And finally, in a phrase that could easily serve as a motto for Hegel's own philosophy, he says that humanity "is reasonable in willing to be reasonable." ²⁰ That is, mankind never actually possesses the ideal of pure, definitive knowledge, but fulfills itself in its obligation to live according to reason simply by *willing* to be reasonable, by having the will to continue in its unending clarification and purification of what it knows. This aim will never be attained; there will always

¹⁷ *ibid.*, p. 185.

¹⁹ *ibid.*, p. 273.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, p. 272.

²⁰ *ibid.*, p. 275.

remain regions of obscurity and confusion, but as long as man is willing to clarify the obscurity that is within his reach, he is faithful to his obligation of living according to reason.

Whereas Husserl, in the *Ideas* and in the *Logos* article, considered his phenomenology as the final possession of philosophical truth, and the historical tradition before him as only a striving or a willing to possess it, now he introduces the element of will and desire into the heart of his own phenomenology. This element of incompleteness is not accidental; it is essentially inherent in the nature of human knowing.

Husserl still thinks, however, that his phenomenology is a radical turning point in the history of philosophy. As we have seen, he claims that no one has ever asked questions systematically and thoroughly about transcendental subjectivity before him, and once these questions are discovered, no further, deeper *type* of question can be asked. His philosophy is the *telos* of earlier thought because it sets human thinking on the right road; thus it is an absolute in relation to what has gone before. But it is not an absolute in itself; the road it opens has no final resting place, but continues constantly in the development of reason's clarification of itself. His philosophy is an *Endgestalt*, a final form of thinking, and likewise an *Anfangsgestalt*, a beginning for "a new type of infinity and relativity."²¹

In keeping with this, Husserl now envisions the history of philosophy in the following way. There was first a period of blind groping, where the demands of reason were felt but no way of satisfying them was conceived. Insight into the nature of transcendental subjectivity provided the answer, and this insight took place in two stages. Husserl credits Descartes with being the first to recognize what reason's demand for apodicticity and radical clarity mean, and to realize that one must turn to subjectivity to find them. But this first breakthrough was not final; it was not fully appreciated by Descartes, and more or less misunderstood by those who followed him. A second epoch begins with Husserl's phenomenology, when the true motivation at the root of Descartes' discovery is fully understood, the nature of subjectivity is correctly evaluated, and the phenomenological method is developed. "And with this there begins a philosophy of the deepest and most universal self-comprehension of the philosophizing ego, as bearer of the absolute reason that now comes unto itself . . ." ²² But this final discovery is only the beginning of a new development; a development that is carried out in self-awareness, in a critical

²¹ *ibid.*, p. 274.

²² *ibid.*, p. 275.

understanding of what it is doing, realizing all the while that what it desires can never be fully achieved. Phenomenology still has a history. It is not the end of philosophical changes, but really only the beginning, since all that went before could not, in Husserl's opinion, be called truly philosophical.

Husserl's *Crisis* is basically an interpretation of history, although it contains many other interesting philosophical themes. His treatment of the problem of the history of philosophy is carried out in a comprehensive, thorough manner, much more consistently than it is handled in his earlier works. He considers the history of European thought as unique in the story of mankind; only here do we have, he claims, the revelation of reason to itself. European history is not simply a story of human events, an anthropological development, but the discovery and development of reason itself. "Philosophy, science, would thus be the historical movement of the revelation of universal reason, 'inborn' in mankind as such."²³ Phenomenology is, of course, the final step in this self-revelation, but it is such as to demand continual development, continual clarification. Change and mobility are now seen to be inscribed in the very nature of reason itself, even in the ultimate form it can attain.

This concept of philosophy is quite different from the one Husserl proposed in the *Ideas*, some twenty to twenty-five years earlier. Would it be possible to find when the change in his thinking occurred, and what prompted it? If we consider the documents that have been published, we find that even in 1923, concepts similar to those found in *Crisis* are present. In his course for the winter semester of 1923—24, published under the title, *First Philosophy*, Husserl gives an extensive description of the history of philosophy as a development preparing the way for his own phenomenology. At the beginning of this historical conspectus, he makes the following remark: "Only with a rigorous first philosophy can a rigorous philosophy in general, a *philosophia perennis*, appear — as one that is perpetually becoming, it is true, insofar as endlessness belongs to the essence of all science, but still in the essential form of completion."²⁴ Likewise, in the second volume, when he is about to describe his own philosophy, based on the special experience we have of our subjectivity, as a culmination of earlier thought, he makes the reservation: "Perhaps it might turn out that such self-givenness is simply an 'Idea' . . ."²⁵ And later this is precisely the conclusion he reaches. The inner life of subjecti-

²³ *ibid.*, pp. 13—14.

²⁴ *Erste Philosophie*, I (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), p. 6.

²⁵ *Erste Philosophie*, II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959), p. 33.

vity is immediately given to phenomenology, but it is "an eternally remote limit-idea, that contains in turn an infinity of limit-forms and infinite points lying in the distance."²⁶ Everything reached in phenomenology still essentially has horizons of relative obscurity which will never be totally dissipated. The state of pure, radical knowledge of self is only a limit concept. Husserl maintains, as he does in the *Crisis*, that phenomenology is different from naive experience and does not have the same obscurity that permeates such experience. It is on the right road to rigorous self-knowledge, but the road itself is interminable, and the goal set by phenomenology will never actually be reached. The history of philosophy is again distinguished into the two major stages of pre-phenomenological, naive groping, and the assured, apodictic, but nonetheless imperfect development and becoming that is proper to phenomenology itself. Thus ten years after the publication of *Ideas I*, Husserl has revised his concept of the history of philosophy.

Nothing we have said so far gives us any hint as to why Husserl changed his mind on this point. Why does he come to realize that phenomenology itself can never reach a definitive form, can never become a finished, self-contained "geometry" of consciousness? The way this problem is treated in the *Cartesian Meditations* gives us a clue to a solution, and also enables us to affirm with more precision when the change in Husserl's doctrine occurred. The *Meditations*, originally given as lectures in Paris in 1929, stand midway between the *First Philosophy* and *Crisis*.

The problem is to find something in our experience of subjectivity which will render this experience, and the science built upon it, inherently, essentially corrigible, and hence incomplete, fluid, and at least relatively obscure. At first, however, it seems as though Husserl reverts to his doctrine of *Ideas I*, for there are several statements in the *Meditations* that say subjectivity, and its acts, can be rigorously analyzed in such a way as to exclude correction. When he discusses the temporality of the ego, Husserl says, "In spite of that, however, the idea of an intentional analysis is legitimate, since, in the flux of intentional synthesis . . . an essentially necessary conformity to type prevails and can be apprehended in strict concepts."²⁷ It would seem that Husserl is laying the groundwork for a "geometry of the cogito," a science that would have clear cut, fixed concepts, with no obscurity left to be clarified by further inquiry. Both

²⁶ *ibid.*, p. 162.

²⁷ *Cartesian Meditations*, tr. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 49.

the noematic sense of things and the acts correlative to and constituting such sense have a "determinate structure."²⁸ Such structure will be described apodictically, claims Husserl, in the new science that was only anticipated by Descartes.

Hand in hand with such assertions, there are others that seem to imply an intrinsic indeterminacy not only in the concepts that phenomenology will elaborate, but also in the very structure of the ego described in phenomenology. Every act and every sense constituted by acts contain some potentialities that surround them with a circle of obscurity: "Every subjective process has a process 'horizon,' which changes with the alteration of the nexus of consciousness to which the process belongs and with the alteration of the process itself from phase to phase of its flow . . ."²⁹ In one passage, Husserl uses terms that remind us of *Crisis*: "But we speak more correctly if we say that here it is a matter of an infinite regulative idea, that the evidently presupposable system of possible objects of possible consciousness is itself an anticipative idea (not however an invention, an 'as if') . . ."³⁰ Such statements expressing both tendencies, that of *Ideas* I and that of *Crisis*, are found in the first three meditations, and their co-presence is a puzzling ambiguity, for Husserl does not explain how he can hold both to be true. In particular, he does not yet show what it is in subjectivity that causes the "permanent horizon" of obscurity to pervade even phenomenology.

Only in the fourth meditation does Husserl face the problem squarely, in connection with his treatment of genetic constitution. He is aware of the fact that he has left something in abeyance until now, a factor that is of fundamental importance to his phenomenology, for when he introduces genetic constitution in the fourth meditation, he says: "Before we clarify the more precise sense of genetic phenomenology, a renewed meditation concerning phenomenological method is needed."³¹ This "renewed meditation" will touch upon the point that was the source of ambiguity in the first three sections. Husserl says that this new aspect was left aside until now because it is difficult, and would confuse his introduction to phenomenology. Until this point, he has treated the ego and its acts in a purely eidetic way. He has limited himself to pure possibilities, abstracted entirely from any historical situation or temporal period. Until now, ". . . We confined our description to such universality that its results remain unaffected, regardless of what the situation may be with respect to the empirical factualness of the transcendental ego."³²

²⁸ *ibid.*, p. 45.

³¹ *ibid.*, p. 69.

²⁹ *ibid.*, p. 44.

³² *ibid.*, p. 70.

³⁰ *ibid.*, p. 54.

For this reason, it was possible to speak of "clearly delineated concepts" after the fashion of *Ideas I*, where such a universal point of view is maintained throughout. Now, however, this atemporal viewpoint has to be dropped, because both the acts and the constituted noemas of the ego can be realized only as the result of a certain genetic process, which is itself only a stage in a wider process of development or becoming. "It should now be added that the constitutive systems (systems actualizable by the ego), by virtue of which such and such objects and categories exist for him, are themselves possible only within the frame of a genesis in conformity with laws."³³ The eidetic structures are now set in motion, and are seen to be steps in a process. They are not immobile, fixed formations.

Husserl states this in another way when he says that not all eidetic structures, not all meanings or senses, are compossible in any factually existing ego.³⁴ Certain noemas must be constituted before certain others can appear, and the latter in turn are necessary for further constitutions. Husserl explains, "If I form some scientific theory or other, my complex rational activity, with its rationally constituted existent, belongs to an essential type that is possible, not in every possible ego, but only in one that is 'rational' in a particular sense . . ."³⁵ For instance, the constitutions that have been achieved at the stage called "childhood" could not immediately yield scientific theorizing. This temporal or situational limitation applies not only to the noemas that are constituted, but also to the acts that form them; certain intentional acts can be carried out only if certain other acts have preceded them. "The ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a 'history.'"³⁶

Once Husserl introduces this element of genetic constitution, the old ideal of a changeless "geometry" of subjectivity becomes unrealizable in principle, and with it falls the hope of a phenomenology totally composed of clearly marked, fixed concepts with no obscurity or vagueness. Phenomenology is now trying to conceptualize a process which inherently contains, at every stage of its becoming, potentialities that are not yet actual and hence are vague and indetermined. Furthermore, the subsequent actualization of these potentialities will reorganize the concepts and acts that went before them, so that no description of any stage of the ego's genesis is definitive and final. Subsequent analysis will not contradict what went before it; but it will and must clarify what precedes, and this process of self-clarification takes place within phenomenology

³³ *ibid.*, pp. 75—76.

³⁵ *ibid.*, p. 74.

³⁴ *ibid.*, p. 74.

³⁶ *ibid.*, p. 75.

itself.³⁷ Husserl's statements in *Crisis* on phenomenology as a constant process of reason clarifying itself are only an explication of what is taught in the *Cartesian Meditations*.

Husserl gives an indication concerning the time when the theme of genetic constitution entered his thinking. "Only in the last decade has this system begun to make itself clear, above all because we have gained new ways of access to the specifically universal problems of the transcendental ego's constitution."³⁸ Since the time of writing of this passage was about 1929, the "last decade" would put the beginning of these themes at about 1919. This confirms the conclusion reached by the fine historical analysis of Iso Kern, who dates Husserl's discovery of genetic phenomenology as occurring in August-September, 1918, under the influence of Paul Natorp's works.³⁹ This was the seed for the historical interpretation of philosophy that is found in *Crisis*, and introduces an element of becoming or relativity into the nature of phenomenology itself. Such a development is indeed a major change in the doctrine that was presented in *Ideas* I or in the *Logical Investigations*; if we were to give a historical analogy, it would be as though Kant began to teach that the categories are not fixed and determined, but can change in formulation and even in number.

The change in Husserl's thought has much in common with the two main stages in Wittgenstein's philosophy. Wittgenstein, in the *Tractatus*, maintains a fixed system of logical elements and structures, but in the *Investigations* he holds the more indeterminate, mobile theory of language games that denies sharp boundaries to word meanings and associates them with the processes of human activity. The analogy with Wittgenstein can be carried a step further; throughout these changes, Wittgenstein always thought that language questions are the most basic type of question that can be asked. To ask about language is to do philosophy. Husserl too maintains the same methodological posture through his development. Both in the *Ideas* and in *Crisis*, he asserts that phenomenological inquiry into subjectivity is the ultimate form of human explanation. Even though it will never reach definitive answers, Husserl is sure

³⁷ *ibid.*, p. 22. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl distinguishes between "absolute" and "apodictic" as characteristics of phenomenology. In his earlier works, and even in *Erste Philosophie*, he claimed phenomenology was both absolute and apodictic. In the *Meditations*, it is no longer claimed to be absolute (the factor of temporality and genetic constitution makes this impossible now), but apodicticity is still retained.

³⁸ *ibid.*, p. 74.

³⁹ Cf. Iso Kern, *Husserl und Kant* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 339—356.

that no *type* of inquiry will arise that will be more fundamental than phenomenology.

We have pointed out one motivation that led Husserl to change his mind in his interpretation of the history of philosophy: the introduction of genetic phenomenology or genetic constitution into his thought. Genetic phenomenology is indeed the crucial factor in this change, but it is in turn itself the product of other themes and developments in Husserl. Our subject could be investigated more profoundly, and other elements in Husserl's thought could be brought in, until Husserl's interpretation of the history of philosophy would be seen as the product of many currents. For instance, genetic phenomenology itself is an outgrowth of Husserl's earlier thought on temporality.⁴⁰ The factor of intersubjectivity is also important, especially since Husserl speaks so much, in the *Crisis*, of "humanity" and "mankind" in general as the carrier of phenomenological self-revelation.⁴¹ Furthermore, when Husserl says in the *Cartesian Meditations* that genetic constitution has become clear to him only in the last decade, the reason he gives for this is significant: it is "above all because we have gained new ways of access to the specifically universal problems of the transcendental ego's constitution."⁴² The "new ways of access" refer to new "ways to reduction," new ways of uncovering the nature and existence of subjectivity, and hence new ways of founding phenomenology as a philosophical science. Thus the problem of reduction is an important factor, albeit a deeply hidden one, in Husserl's new evaluation of philosophy's past and future. Finally, the problem of the self-constitution of the ego in time is the dominant concern of Husserl's fourth meditation, and should also be considered as a factor. All these points would require far too much development to be elaborated here, and the treatment we have given of genetic constitution is adequate for our immediate purposes, but they are phases of Husserl's thought that still stand in need of clarification.

Husserl's doctrine on the history of philosophy raises many problems that are relevant to the philosophy of the history of thought. One difficulty that arises immediately is the old Platonic objection: if change and becoming are introduced into the very nature of knowing, how is it possible for us ever to say what knowing is?⁴³ In the Husserlian perspective, how can we ever say anything about subjectivity and inten-

⁴⁰ We have traced this development in a study to appear soon from Nijhoff, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*.

⁴¹ Cf. *Krisis*, pp. 1—14.

⁴² *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 74.

⁴³ *Cratylus*, 440a—b.

tionality? Husserl does not fall prey to this objection, because he does not claim that subjectivity and the flow of consciousness are subject to chaotic, unregulated change. What phenomenology asserts at any stage of its development is apodictically certain, he claims. Perception, for instance, is never equivalent to imagination or memory. Phenomenology has blurred horizons, and thus allows for clarification because what it experiences is never absolute, but nothing that is acquired in phenomenology will be contradicted by what follows. It will constantly be seen in a new light. Phenomenology moves in rectilinear progression; it builds upon its past and does not annihilate it.

A more difficult problem concerns the terminal point of phenomenological progression. It is the problem of how an absolute can appear within the flow of phenomenology, even if this absolute is called a "limiting ideal." The flow of phenomenology is so described in the *Crisis* as to exclude the possibility of full self-possession in consciousness. This is equivalent to saying that there is no final philosophical truth, since phenomenology is, for Husserl, the locus of the most definite knowledge we can have. And yet, Husserl does speak of a final ideal towards which phenomenology strives. This limit itself must be an absolute, and even to talk about it, Husserl must know it and must possess it somehow. How can this occur?

The problem is especially acute in Husserl because he does not settle for the Kantian escape, which is to consider "regulative ideal limits" as necessary unifying functions in the mind. In the Kantian tradition, such ideals do not express reality itself, but are simply subjective factors that serve to gather together, under one global viewpoint, the elements of human experience. They allow experience to be made into a totality. Husserl refuses to follow Kant, and claims that the limit ideal is not simply regulative, but real. He says that the "infinite regulative idea," the "anticipative idea," is "not however an invention, an 'as if.'"⁴⁴ When we have insight into the final, ideal state of human knowledge, we possess something that is already reflected in present consciousness. We apprehend the absolute within the change and obscurity of subjectivity, and in Husserl's mind, this means that such an absolute already exists somehow within the becoming of consciousness. It must be there for us to see it. There are no evidences, according to Husserl, except of those things that are.⁴⁵ So the absolute must be present in the relative, and

⁴⁴ *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 54.

⁴⁵ This is the "principle of all principles" expressed in *Ideen* I, p. 52: we are warranted in asserting only what is given in direct evidence.

perceived there by us; but if this is so, how is it that we only grasp a limited, obscure glimpse of it? How can we only know a "piece" of this absolute? Is not even our insight into the absolute as a limiting ideal enough to put a stop to the flow of phenomenology, and to stop the historicity of thought? How can we, who live in history, grasp the totality of history?⁴⁶

The problem can be stated more sharply with a metaphor Husserl uses in one of the supplementary papers included in the *Crisis* volume. Man's historicity is like an organism.⁴⁷ This brings out well the developmental character of phenomenology, but what then is the place of Husserl's "limit ideals"? Are they simply the last stage of the organism's development? If this were so, then we could understand how we can now grasp anticipations of this final stage; we can see the seeds that lead to the terminal state. But the metaphor of organism breaks down at its most critical juncture, the final stage of development. We understand what it is for an organism to come to maturity, but what does it mean for knowledge to come to its end? Keeping to the metaphor, we would say that it means knowledge becomes perfectly what it is supposed to be; it means exhaustive, complete possession of truth. In Husserl's philosophy, it means the complete translucence of the ego to itself, with no more horizons of obscurity and change. But if this stage is reached, is it still part of the developmental organism that led to it? All through its history, change and vague horizons were intrinsic, necessary constituents in this philosophical organism; now that they are removed, are we dealing with the same thing? Similarly, all through its history we contemplated subjectivity by virtue of phenomenological methodology; now at this final stage, so different in its structure, do we still use the same method to know subjectivity?

The radically different nature of what is known in possession of this final phenomenological absolute would make us suspect that a new way of knowing should be ushered in at this point.⁴⁸ But Husserl has excluded this possibility; once phenomenological questions are asked, no deeper questions can be raised. No other meaningful type of inquiry can be initiated, claims Husserl, and he is left with the difficulty that the single method of phenomenology is supposed to do double service: it is supposed to be able to operate upon the relative and changing flow of historical

⁴⁶ Husserl is aware of this paradox; cf. *Krisis*, p. 501.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p. 502.

⁴⁸ It is in connection with this problem that medieval thinkers placed the ideal knowledge in the divine mind, and that St. Augustine made use of the theory of divine illumination to explain how we can possess eternal truths.

development, and also to handle the final, trans-historical knowledge of the absolute ideals.⁴⁹

It is true, Husserl does not claim to describe what this final stage of ideal knowledge is like; he would not claim that we will someday actually reach it. Still, if he goes so far as to talk about it as an ideal, problems such as those we have raised are bound to appear. We have concretized much that he would leave in the abstract, but in concretizing it, we have pointed out logical difficulties inherent in the concepts he uses. The very use of an "ideal" absolute, which Husserl does mention, has logical implications that lead to the difficulties we have raised. How can the language game of ideals be reconciled with the language game of developing, changing, relative, and obscure historical phenomenology?

Husserl's problem is not new in the history of philosophy. It is a reassumption of Hegel's fundamental difficulty, and can be found as far back as Parmenides, who gave a different solution to it. Parmenides also thought that he set philosophy on the right road to ultimate, definitive truth, and felt that his insight yielded the final possession of such truth. His solution was to remove history, to remove the relativity and change of human existence. Thus what he leads us to is not a road at all, but a starting point which is at the same time the end of the journey. In this, he resembles the thought Husserl expresses in the *Logos* article and in the *Ideas*, whereas the *Crisis* finds more in common with Hegel.

The problem that Husserl runs up against as the fundamental difficulty in his interpretation of philosophy's history can be summarized as follows. A philosophy that claims to reach the apex of thought can base its claim only on the supposed possession of an absolute starting point. Its claim is only as solid as the basis on which it is built. This starting point, which for Husserl is the experience we have of transcendental subjectivity, can be used as a criterion by which to judge philosophies that have preceded it. Once this starting point is reached, two possibilities remain open. First, the philosophy can deny any change or obscurity within itself, and thus deny its own historicity. The starting point is the terminal point as well; this is the choice made by Parmenides and the early Husserl. Second, the philosophy can admit its own historicity, relativity, and development; but it must at least claim to possess an

⁴⁹ Some elements towards a solution might be found in Husserl's inquiry into a "metaphenomenology," which he developed during the last fifteen years of his life. However, not enough study has been made on this subject to allow a decision at present. At any rate, metaphenomenology is still carried out within phenomenology itself, and to ask how this is possible is to pose the same problem in different terms.

anticipation of an absolute terminal point, correlative to its absolute starting point. The later Husserl turned to this alternative. But such a claim issues in all the difficulties we have outlined above: how is it possible for us only partially to know the absolute terminus of philosophy? Why does not this partial presence of the ideal totally swallow up the possibility of change and relativity in phenomenology?⁵⁰

ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI

Catholic University
Washington 17, D. C.

⁵⁰ It can be argued that the retention of this paradox, of the simultaneous presence of absolute and relative, is necessary for philosophy. Cf. Stanley Rosen, "Wisdom: The End of Philosophy," *Review of Metaphysics*, 16, 1962, pp. 181—211. Paul Ricoeur examines Husserl's conception of history in general in: "Husserl et le sens de l'histoire," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 54, 1949, pp. 280—316. Some remarks on the problem of the history of philosophy, and in particular the problem of absolute and relative in this history, can be found on pp. 310—312.

BOOKS RECEIVED

- Bougerol, J. Guy, O.F.M., *Introduction to The Works of Bonaventure*, xiv—240 pp.; Paterson, N.J.: St. Anthony Guild Press, 1964.
- Corvan, Thomas G., *The Best of Gracian*. A new translation, 84 pp.; New York, N. Y.: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1964.
- Cranny, Titus, S.A., *Father Paul and Christian Unity*, xv—334 pp.; Peekskill, N. Y.: Graymoor Friars Press, 1963.
- Gössmann, Elisabeth, *Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte*. Eine theologische Untersuchung der Summa Halensis (Alexander von Hales), 424 pp.; München, Germany: Max Hueber Verlag, München, 1964.
- Jarret, Bede, O.P., *No Abiding City*, 86 pp.; Springfield, Ill.: Templegate Publishers, 1964.
- Kempis, Thomas A., *The Imitation of Christ*, xii—283 pp.; Springfield, Ill.: Templegate Publishers, 1964.
- Knox, Ronald A., *Just For Today*. Selections from *St. Teresa of Lisieux* and *The Imitation of Christ*, viii—242 pp.; Springfield, Ill.: Templegate Publishers, 1963.
- The Logic of Science*, edited by Vincent E. Smith. St. John's University Studies, Philosophical Series, No. 4. Mortimer J. Adler, Roland Houde, Léon Lortie and James A. Weisheipl, O.P., New York, N. Y.: St. John's University Press, 1964.
- McCarthy, Thomas P., C.S.V., *Guide to the Catholic Sisterhoods in the United States*, xi—404 pp.; Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1964.
- Moran, Sabino Alonso, O.P., & Marcelino Cabrereros de Anta, C.M.F., *Commentatorios al Código de Derecho Canonico con el Texto Legal Latino y Castellano*, III, Cánones 1322—1998, xxxv—705 pp.; Madrid, Spain: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 1964.
- Patka, Frederick, *Value and Existence*. Studies in Philosophic Anthropology, vii—239 pp.; New York, N. Y.: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1964.
- Prezioso, Faustino Antonio, *L'Eternita, Aristotelica del Mondo in una "Quaestio" inedita di Guglielmo Alnwick* († 1333), Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto Universitario di Magistero di Catania, 75 pp.; Padova, Italy: CEDAM, Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, 1962.
-, *La "Species" Medievale e i Prodromi del Fenomenismo Moderno*, Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto Universitario di

- Magistero di Catania, 102 pp.; Padova, Italy: CEDAM, Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani, 1963.
- Principe, Walter Henry, *William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union*, 332 pp.; Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963.
- Przywara, Erich, S.J. & Introduction by Mgr. H. Francis Davis, *The Heart of Newman*, xx—361 pp.; Springfield, Ill.: Templegate Publishers, 1963.
- Reilly a Brooklyn, P. Gavino, O.F.M. Cap., *Ideals of Matrimony and Virginity in The Writings of St. Bonaventure*. Excerpta ex dissertatione ad Lauream in Facultate Theologica Pontificiae Universitatis Gregoriana, 61 pp.; Roma, Italy: Collegio San Lorenzo da Brindisi, 1964.
- Schmitz, Very Rev. Walter J., S.S., edited by Rev. Eugene J. Weitzel CSV, *Follow the Rubrics*, x—166 pp.; Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1964.
- Stroick, Clemens, O.M.I., *Unpublished Theological Writings of Johannes Castellensis*, ix—200 pp.; Ottawa, Canada: University of Ottawa Press, 1964.
- Van Dijk, Stephen J. P., O.F.M., *Sources of the Modern Roman Liturgy. The Ordinals by Haymo of Faversham and related documents (1243—1307)*, Volume One, Introduction description of Manuscripts, xvii—293 pp.; Leiden, Holland: E. J. Brill, 1963.
-, *Sources of the Modern Roman Liturgy. Volume Two, Texts*, x—552 pp.; Leiden Holland: E. J. Brill, 1963.
- Van Zeller, Dom Hubert, *Death in Other Words. A Presentation for Beginners*, 96 pp.; Springfield, Ill.: Templegate Publishers, 1963.
-, *Famine of The Spirit*, x—194 pp.; Springfield, Ill.: Templegate Publishers, 1964.
-, *Moments of Light*, xi—196 pp.; Springfield, Ill.: Templegate Publishers, 1963.
-, *The Psalms in Other Words*, 94 pp.; Springfield, Ill.: Templegate Publishers, 1964.
-, *Suffering in Other Words*, 96 pp.; Springfield, Ill.: Templegate Publishers, 1964.
- Wedek, Harry E., *Classics of Greek Literature*, viii—385 pp.; New York, N. Y.: Philosophical Library, 1963.
-, *Classics of Roman Literature*, x—556 pp.; New York, N. Y.: Philosophical Library, 1963.

FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE

St. Bonaventure University

St. Bonaventure, N.Y., U.S.A.

FRANCISCAN INSTITUTE PUBLICATIONS

Philosophy Series

1. *The Tractatus de Successivis Attributed to William Ockham*. Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., 1944. \$ 2.00.
2. *The Tractatus de Praedestinatione et de Praescientia Dei et de Futuris Contingentibus of William Ockham*. Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., 1945. \$ 2.00. Out of print.
3. *The Transcendentals and Their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus*. By Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M., 1960. \$ 2.00. Out of print.
4. *Intuitive Cognition. A Key to the Significance of the Later Scholastics*. By Sebastian Day, O.F.M., 1957. \$ 2.00. Out of print.
5. *The De Primo Principio of John Duns Scotus. A Revised Text and a Translation*. By Evan Roche, O.F.M., 1949. Out of print.
6. *Psychology of Love According to St. Bonaventure*. By Robert P. Prentice, O.F.M., 1951. New edition, 1957. \$ 4.00.
7. *Evidence and Its Function According to John Duns Scotus*. By Peter C. Vier, O.F.M., 1951. Out of print.
8. *The Psychology of Habit According to William Ockham*. By Oswald Fuchs, O.F.M., 1952. Out of print.
9. *The Concept of Univocity Regarding the Predication of God and Creature According to William Ockham*. By Matthew C. Menges, O.F.M. 1952. Out of print.
10. *Theory Demonstration According to William Ockham*. By Damascene Webering, O.F.M., 1953. \$ 2.50. Out of print.
11. *The Category of the Aesthetic in the Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure*, By Emma Jane Marie Spargo, 1953. \$ 2.50.
12. *Collected Articles on Ockham*. By Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., and Eligius M. Buytaert, O.F.M., 1958 \$ 12.00.
13. *Motion, Time and Place According to William Ockham*. By Herman Shapiro, 1959. \$ 3.85.
14. *Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae*. By Geoffrey G. Bridges, O.F.M., 1959. \$ 4.50.
15. *John Duns Scotus and The Principle "Omne Quod Movetur Ab Alio Movetur."* By Roy R. Effler, O.F.M., 1962. \$ 6.00.

History Series

1. *Three Saints' Lives* by Nicholas Bozon. Edited by M. Amelia Klenke O.P., 1947. \$ 2.00.
2. *Seven More Poems* by Nicholas Bozon. Edited by M. Amelia Klenke, O.P., 1951. \$ 2.00.
3. *History of Saint Bonaventure University*. By Mark V. Angelo, O.F.M., 1961. \$ 6.00.

Missiology Series

1. *Imperial Government and Catholic Missions in China During the Years 1784—1785*. By Bernward H. Willeke, O.F.M., 1948. \$ 2.00.
2. *The Negotiations Between Ch'i-Ying and Lagrène 1844—1846*. By Angelus Grosse-Aschoff, O.F.M., 1950. Out of print.

Theology Series

1. *The Eucharistic Teaching of William Ockham*. By Gabriel Buescher O.F.M., 1950. Out of print.
2. *De Corredemptione Beatae Virginis Mariae*. By Juniper Carol O.F.M., 1950. \$ 4.00.
3. *The First-Gospel. Genesis 3:15*. By Dominic J. Unger, O. F.M.Cap., 1954. \$ 4.50.
4. *Transiency and Permanence. The Nature of Theology According to Saint Bonaventure*. By G. H. Tavard, 1954. \$ 3.75.
5. *The Sacrament of Confirmation in the Early-Middle Scholastic Period*. By Kilian F. Lynch, O.F.M., 1957. Vol. I: Texts. \$ 9.00.

Text Series

1. *Walter Burleigh. De Puritate Artis Logicae*. Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., 1951. Exhausted. See below under No. 9.
2. *William Ockham. Summa Logicae (Pars Prima)*. Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., 1951. \$ 2.50. (Pars Secunda et Tertiae Prima). Edited by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., 1954. \$ 5.00.
3. *Peter Aureoli. Scriptum Super Primum Sententiarum*. Edited by Eligius M. Buytaert, O.F.M., 1953. Vol. I: Prologue-Dist. I. \$ 5.00. Vol. II: Dist. II-VII, 1956. \$ 8.50. Vol. III-VIII in preparation.
4. *Guidonis de Orchellis Tractatus de Sacramentis ex eius Summa de Sacramentis et Officiis Ecclesiae*. Edited by Damiani et Odulphi Van den Eynde, O.F.M., 1953. \$ 5.00.
5. *Henry of Ghent. Summa Quaestionum Ordinarum*. (Reprint of the 1520 edition). Vol. I, 1953. \$ 6.00. Vol. II, 1953. \$ 6.00.
6. *Saint John Damascene. Dialectica, Version of Robert Grosseteste*. Edited by Owen A. Colligan, O.F.M., 1953. \$ 1.00.

7. *Gregorii Ariminensis, O.E.S.A., Super Primum et Secundum Sententiarum*. (Reprint of the 1522 edition), 1955. \$ 7.50.
8. *Saint John Damascene. De Fide Orthodoxa, Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus*. Edited by Eligius M. Buytaert, O.F.M., 1955. \$ 9.00.
9. *Walter Burleigh. De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior*. With a revised edition of the *Tractatus Brevior*. Edition by Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., 1955. \$ 4.50.
10. *Henrici de Werla, O.F.M. Opera Omnia, Vol. I- Tractatus de Immaculata Conceptione Beatae Mariae Virginis*. Edited by Sophronius Clasen, O.F.M., 1955. \$ 2.25. Vol. II-IV in preparation.
11. *Petrus Thomae, O.F.M. Quodlibet*. Edited by Sister M. Rachel Hooper, O.S.F., and Eligius M. Buytaert, O.F.M., 1957. \$ 6.00.
12. *John de la Rochelle. Eleven Marian Sermons*. Edited by Kilian F. Lynch, O.F.M., 1961. \$ 3.75.
13. *Paul of Pergula. Logica and Tractatus de Sensu Composito et Diviso*. Edited by Sister Mary Anthony Brown, 1961. \$ 5.75.

Works of Saint Bonaventure

1. *De Reductione Artium ad Theologiam*. A Commentary with Introduction and Translation. By Sr. Emma Thérèse Healy, S.S.J., 1955. \$ 2.25.
2. *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum*. With an Introduction, Translation and Commentary. By Philotheus Boehner, 1956. \$ 2.00.

Spirit and Life Series

1. *From Sunday to Sunday*. By Thomas Plassmann, O.F.M. (Order from St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, N.J.).
2. *The Revelations of Margaret of Cortona*. By Bishop Ange-Marie Hiral, 1952. \$ 1.75.
3. *Examination of Conscience According to St. Bonaventure*. By Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., 1953. Second edition, hard-bound, 1959. \$ 2.00.
4. *In Journeyings Often. Franciscan Pioneers in the Orient*. By Marion A. Habig, O.F.M., 1953. \$ 3.75.
5. *The Legend and Writings of Saint Clare of Assisi*. 1953. \$ 2.75.
6. *The Upper Room. Retreat Readings for Priests*. By Thomas Plassmann. O.F.M., 1954. \$ 2.75.
7. *The Priest of the Gospel*. By Martin Wolter, O.F.M., 1954. \$ 1.50.

8. *The Book of Life. An Explanation of the Rule of the Third Order Regular of Saint Francis.* By Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M., 1954. Paper bound \$ 1.50.
9. *Spiritual Exercises According to Saint Bonaventure.* By Dominic Faccin. Translated by Owen A. Colligan, 1955. \$ 3.85.
10. *Where Caius Is and Other Poems.* By Sister Mary Francis, P.C., 1955. Out of print.

Other Books Available

- John Duns Scotus. A Teacher for Our Times.* By Béraud de Saint-Maurice. Translated by Columban Duffy, 1955. \$ 3.50.
- Mary in the Franciscan Order.* Proceedings of the Third National Meeting of Franciscan Teaching Sisterhoods, Vol. III, 1955. \$ 2.50.
- History of the Development of the Devotion to the Holy Name.* By Peter R. Biasiotto, 1943. \$ 2.00.
- De Paroecia Domui Religiosae Commissa.* By Francis I. Muller, 1956. \$ 2.00.
- I Know Christ.* The personality and spirituality of Saint Francis of Assisi. By Gratian of Paris, O.F.M.Cap., 1957. \$ 1.00.

3601
F7 Franciscan studies
ser.2
v.24
1964

BX
3601
F7
ser.2
v.24
1964

62441

GRADUATE THEOLOGICAL UNION LIBRARY
BERKELEY, CA 94709



